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ABSTRACT 
 
JACQUELINE E. WHITT:  Conflict and Compromise: American Military Chaplains and the 
Vietnam War  
(Under the direction of Richard H. Kohn) 
 
 Military chaplains, serving alongside American servicemen and women, have lived and 
worked at the cultural and institutional intersections of religion and war. Understanding how 
chaplains experienced the Vietnam War—as military officers and as clergy—illuminates both the 
sympathies and tensions between faith and war. This dissertation examines chaplains’ 
experiences and reflections of the Vietnam War in order to track that war’s effects on chaplains 
personally and on the institutional chaplaincy. Chaplains acted as “cultural mediators” or links 
between religious and military cultures in situations that demanded explanation and 
reconciliation. Chaplains’ experiences highlighted the stress fracturing the nation as “Vietnam” 
came to represent a failure of both American foreign policy and a certain vision of American 
identity. This dissertation examines the impact of the Vietnam War on chaplains as individuals 
and on the institutional chaplaincy. 
 The dissertation uses four types of primary sources: Chaplain Corps official records; first 
person accounts of Vietnam-era chaplains; oral interviews with chaplains; and publications of 
the mainstream media, the popular religious press, and denominational organizations. These 
materials uncover not only the structural and organizational workings of the chaplaincy, but also 
the cultural patterns and ideas that influenced chaplains and those around them. The dissertation 
is organized into three parts. The first part examines the religious, cultural, and international 
contexts of the early Cold War in order to contextualize the Vietnam War. The second part deals 
 iv 
 
 
with the combat period of the Vietnam War, roughly 1962-1973; its three chapters examine 
chaplains’ official functions, chaplains’ experiences, and chaplains’ relationship to homefront 
communities. The third part of the dissertation deals with post-Vietnam responses and changes 
among chaplains and within the institutional chaplaincy.  
Chaplains remain at the forefront of discussions about the relationship between religion 
and war, and the reverberations from Vietnam are intense. Several contemporary situations 
reveal uncertainty about the chaplain’s role in the modern United States military. Many of these 
questions are rooted in the tensions of chaplains’ experiences in the Vietnam War. 
Understanding the chaplaincy during this period provides important insights into the history of 
both religion and the military in late twentieth century America.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 1967, in Bien Hoa Province, Vietnam, Catholic chaplain Angelo J. Liteky 
was caught with Company A, 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry, 199th Light Infantry Brigade in an 
intense firefight. Over the course of the battle, Liteky, himself wounded, evacuated more than 
twenty wounded and dead soldiers to a landing zone and directed several medivac choppers in 
and out of the area. Liteky’s citation for the Congressional Medal of Honor told of heroic deeds 
in the face of danger—in addition to evacuating many men to safety, he prayed with men who 
were dying and observed last rites for the dead while bullets flew fewer than fifteen feet away. 
On the surface, Liteky displayed precisely the courage and self-sacrificial actions that popular 
images of heroic chaplains might suggest. He showed concern for his men but also was 
intimately involved in the military’s mission. In a 2000 interview, Liteky recalled “I was 100 
percent behind going over there and putting those Communists in their place . . . I had no 
problems with that. I thought I was going there doing God's work.”1 
Yet Liteky’s case was far more complicated than a simple story of unexpected battlefield 
heroism. He left the chaplaincy in 1971 and the priesthood in 1975, “mainly because of 
celibacy.” In subsequent years, Liteky took up the cause of human rights abuses in Central 
America, vociferously protesting American foreign policy there, especially the Reagan 
administration’s support for Nicaraguan Contra rebels. In July 1986, Liteky renounced his Medal 
of Honor and its attendant benefits; he placed the medal, along with a letter to Ronald Reagan, 
in a paper bag and left it at the Vietnam Veterans’ memorial wall in Washington, D.C. Liteky 
                                                 
1 (Charles) Angelo Liteky, quoted in Michael Taylor, “A Matter of Honor: He Gave Back His Medal of 
Honor to Risk His Freedom in Protesting His Country’s Policies,” San Francisco Chronicle, 13 March 2000. 
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continued to protest U.S. operation of the School of the Americas, and said in a 2001 interview, 
“The reason I do what I do now is basically the same” as the reason he cited for his actions in 
Vietnam: “to save lives.” He explained, “In the case of the School of the Americas, it’s to stop 
training the military from the Third World, who take the training back and employ it in the 
oppression of their people.”2 Liteky understood his role vis-à-vis the United States military as a 
life-saving one, regardless of whether that positioned him to act in concert with U.S. military 
goals or in opposition to them. In Vietnam, Liteky said, “the situation was more immediate. 
People were getting blown up, shot and killed all around me. I didn’t get hit, and there was 
nothing for me to do but help them. Some were dead. One young man died in my arms, 
breathing his last breath and just gasping for air. I held him for a bit, then I gave him last rites. 
Then I moved on because there were other people crying for help.” While Liteky’s protest did 
not emerge directly from his participation in the Vietnam War, the place he chose to return the 
medal demonstrated the significance of that experience—in order to honor his values and beliefs 
about American involvement in Central America, he returned to the site established to honor 
those who had died in Vietnam. 
For Liteky and other chaplains who served in the Vietnam War, experiences in Vietnam 
and subsequent reflection about those experiences revealed both deep-seated tensions and 
compatibilities between the realms of faith and war. Chaplains followed a religious calling to 
enter into vocational ministry, and most felt a special pull to ministry with military personnel. At 
the same time, this calling involved them in one of the most divisive wars in American history, 
during which mainline and liberal religious leaders led intense protests against American actions 
in Vietnam and conservative ones trumpeted the cause of the Christian United States against a 
godless Communist enemy. Chaplains, full members of two near-total institutions, the church 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
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and the military, lived and worked at the intersections of these two worlds. Vietnam and the 
memory of it became specific sites for working out the proper philosophical and institutional 
relationships of religion to the state as well as chaplains’ individual religious beliefs and the role 
of faithful people in a time of war.  
Scholarly analysis of chaplains and their role in war is limited, especially for the late 
twentieth century. Memoirs and polemics abound, but chaplains—individually and 
institutionally—have been neglected by historians of both the military and religion. Nevertheless, 
Doris Bergen, in the introduction to an essay collection about military chaplains, identified three 
major themes that appeared consistently within such scholarship: the relationship between 
chaplains and those they served; the relationship of chaplains to their military and religious 
superiors; and the moral and theological dilemmas of the chaplaincy.3 This dissertation seeks not 
only to engage those questions but also to place chaplains’ experiences and interpretations of 
war into a broader context. From accounts in Deuteronomy of Jewish priests inspiring and 
blessing soldiers before battle, to the more recent furor created over charges that a Muslim 
chaplain aided in espionage at the US military detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
chaplains have represented both sympathies and tensions between religious and military 
communities. Though the Latin word “capellanus” (from which the French “chapelain” and the 
English, “chaplain” are derived) did not appear until the ninth century, modern chaplains trace 
their historical antecedents back much farther: Canadian chaplains to the Assyrian army; British 
to the Roman army; and Americans to ancient Israel, Egypt, and Rome. In claiming such long 
historical roots, chaplains assert their significance to the military and religious life of their 
                                                 
3 Doris Bergen, “Introduction,” in Doris Bergen, ed. The Sword of the Lord: Military Chaplains from the First to 
the Twenty-First Century (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 1-28. 
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societies.4 Although it is unlikely that chaplains’ actions directly affect the outcomes of wars, 
their experiences and connections to broader military and religious institutions do reveal 
important aspects of the relationship between religion and warfare in a given society.  
 The literature about religion’s role in it the Vietnam War has centered almost entirely on 
religious dissent during the war. Scholars have privileged the religious motives of the antiwar 
movement without taking seriously the religious responses and motivations of either pro-war 
advocates or those who were ambivalent about the war. Andrew Preston’s historiographical 
essay about religion and foreign relations in Diplomatic History argued that scholars should look 
more closely at the links between the two and used the extensive scholarship on religious dissent 
for the Vietnam War as evidence to the possibilities. Preston even suggested that the most 
fruitful areas for research in this area lay outside of the “Truman, Eisenhower, and Vietnam War 
eras,” because the literature on such dissent is extensive and persuasive.5 For many scholars, to 
study religion and the Vietnam War was to study religious protest.6 Especially evocative were 
biographical profiles of nationally-prominent religious leaders or groups, such as the National 
Council of Churches; Yale University Chaplain William Sloane Coffin, or Daniel and Philip 
                                                 
4 See Bergen, Sword of the Lord, 4; and Albert Slomovitz, The Fighting Rabbis: Jewish Military Chaplains and 
American History (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 1-3. See especially Deuteronomy 20:2-4. In 2003, 
Muslim chaplain James Yee was arrested for sedition and charged with passing classified information to detainees at 
the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The charges were eventually dropped, but Yee resigned his 
commission. 
5 Andrew Preston, “Bridging the Gap between the Sacred and the Secular in the History of American 
Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 30 (November 2006): 783-812. 
6 Even during the Vietnam War, religious groups and presses published a significant amount of dissenting 
literature. See for example Michael P. Hamilton, ed. The Vietnam War: Christian Perspectives (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1967), which includes anti-war sermons and essays from a variety of Christian preachers and leaders. For 
scholarly analysis of the religious aspect to the antiwar movement see Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, 
An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990); 
Michael Brooks Friedland, Lift Up Your Voice Like a Trumpet: White Clergy and the Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements, 
1954-1973 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
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Berrigan, well-known anti-war Catholic priests.7 Taking chaplains to be fundamentally part of the 
story about the ways in which religion and the Vietnam War affected one another provides a 
broader view of the religious landscape. While chaplains’ responses to the war were far from 
uniform, many offered the perspective of a plausible middle ground in which religious 
Americans were deeply conflicted over the morality and conduct of the war, but for whom all 
out denunciation was never a comfortable possibility. It might be easiest if these views could be 
written off as only quasi-religious—mere examples of the military’s power to co-opt religious 
language and ideals—but this essentially leaves scholars in the position of judging the veracity 
and sincerity of other people’s faith, and it plainly ignores the long history of how religion and 
warfare have complemented and supported each other. 
Partly as a result of this historiography, most who have written about military chaplains 
have assumed that conceptually and practically, the American chaplaincy system was (and 
remains) rife with contradictions, ironies, and conflicts. The literature has assumed that the 
intersection of religion and the military in such a specific institution must necessarily involve 
some level of conflict between church and state, a Judeo-Christian tradition and war, and 
military and clerical professionalism. Much of the sociology scholarship has argued that 
chaplains experienced conflict because of their multiple roles as military officers, clergymen, and 
soldiers and were thus confronted by the “two masters” dilemma, or by the idea that religious 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Mitchell K. Hall, Because of their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam 
War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Jill K. Gill, “Peace is Not the Absence of War, but the Presence 
of Justice’: The National Council of Churches’ Reaction and Response to the Vietnam War, 1965-1972,” (PhD diss., 
University of Pennsylvania, 1996); Jill K. Gill, “The Political Price of Prophetic Leadership: The National Council of 
Churches and the Vietnam War,” Peace and Change 27, no. 2 (2000): 271-300; Murray Polner and Jim O’Grady, 
Disarmed and Dangerous: The Radical Lives and Times of Daniel and Philip Berrigan (New York: Basic Books, 1997); David 
J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1986); Warren Goldstein, William Sloane Coffin, Jr.: A Holy Impatience (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2004); and Mark Hulsether, Building a Protestant Left: Christianity and Crisis Magazine 1941-1993 (Knoxville: University 
of Tennessee Press, 1999). 
 6 
 
 
and military values and expectations were mutually incompatible.8 The results of these 
interpretations are three popular, though inaccurate, images of chaplains: the hero, the military 
mouthpiece, and the incompetent. Chaplains did not emerge from Vietnam as battlefield heroes 
or martyrs, constantly displaying the “best qualities” of soldiers and clergy as uncritical 
supporters of the chaplaincy have suggested; nor did they appear to be militant legitimizers of an 
unjust war who carried weapons and encouraged soldiers to “kill a Commie for Christ,” as those 
critical of the chaplaincy and of the war have implied. Neither were chaplains well-intentioned 
but bumbling and ineffective ministers caught between the demands of religious conviction and 
military necessity. Rather than cementing tensions between chaplains’ multiple roles, the 
Vietnam experience demanded chaplains work out solutions to problems that existed in the 
material as well as spiritual realms.  
 At every turn, chaplains witnessed and participated in the intersections of religion and 
war. This positionality afforded chaplains the opportunity to act as “cultural mediators” for 
various communities by bridging the divides that separated them. They served as mediators 
between religious and military cultures in situations that demanded explanation and 
reconciliation, though their resolutions of these tensions were neither consistent nor uniformly 
positive or negative. Those who served in Vietnam faced fierce moral and religious dilemmas 
during the war, and personal faith did not always provide satisfactory answers—nor did it 
alleviate the stress of combat. Yet most chaplains did not buckle under the pressure of their 
ambiguous positions, nor did they abandon their religious values and beliefs in favor of military 
ones. Instead, chaplains operated, even flourished, in liminal spaces between various 
                                                 
8 The specific case for “role conflict” as the primary paradigm for understanding chaplains’ experiences is 
discussed in Chapter Three. The “two masters” dilemma stems from the Christian scripture that warns, “No slave 
can serve two masters; for a slave will either hate the one and love the other, or be devoted to the one and despise 
the other. You cannot serve God and wealth.” Luke 16:13. While the scripture refers specifically to wealth and God, 
theologians have interpreted it more widely and understand it to mean that humans cannot be faithful to both God 
and a secular entity or object. 
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communities: civilian and military; religious and secular; officer and enlisted; and between a host 
of denominational and faith groups.  
 
Chaplains in the United States Military 
In the United States, ministers serving with troops have been part of every major conflict 
since the Pequot War in the 1630s.9 George Washington frequently asked the Continental 
Congress to make allowances for chaplains and repeatedly emphasized their importance for 
improving troop morale and securing God’s blessing on the army before battle.10 Chaplains 
continued to participate in American wars at various levels and in different ways through the 
Civil War and World War I.11 World War II introduced new sets of functions and expectations 
for the chaplaincy, and the early Cold War ushered in new connections between religion and 
war. 12 Throughout these conflicts, chaplains worked under various sets of assumptions about 
their place in the military and religious life of the United States, and they fulfilled different roles 
in each war.  
 Men who wished to serve as military chaplains in Vietnam had to meet two types of 
requirements, military and ecclesial, before they could be appointed. The military required that 
they meet the age and physical standards for military service, though at the height of the 
Vietnam War the military waived some of these limits, especially for Jewish and Catholic 
chaplains who were in chronically short supply. Furthermore, chaplains had to have completed 
                                                 
9 Bergen, Sword of the Lord, 8. 
10 Slomovitz, Fighting Rabbis, 4.  
11 On development of US military chaplaincy see Richard Budd, Serving Two Masters: The Development of 
American Military Chaplaincy, 1860-1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). See William Corby, C.S.C., 
Memoirs of Chaplain Life: Three Years with the Irish Brigade in the Army of the Potomac, ed. Lawrence Frederick Kohl (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1992) for the memoirs of an Army Chaplain in the Civil War.  
12 On the relationship between evangelicals and the American military see Anne C. Loveland, American 
Evangelicals and the U.S. Military, 1942-1993 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996). 
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three years of graduate study in theology or a related program and to have served at least two 
years in parish or congregational capacities. For chaplains from denominations without seminary 
training, equivalent education in another field sufficed. Seminarians who wished to enter the 
chaplaincy were generally commissioned as staff specialists as they completed their educational 
and pastoral requirements. Additionally, the military required endorsement by an ecclesiastical 
agency, which could set its own standards for appointment and endorsement. For most of the 
twentieth century the military chaplaincy operated on a loose quota system to ensure 
denominational diversity. The chaplaincy generally tried to maintain a balance of one-third 
Catholic; one-third Liturgical Protestant (Episcopal, Lutheran, Presbyterian, etc.); and one-third 
evangelical Protestant, “other” Protestant, and Jewish chaplains. The Armed Services 
occasionally relaxed these ratios as some denominations were unable to fill their assignments and 
others consistently offered more than their allotment.  
 Because of these strict requirements, chaplains were self-selecting. Any chaplain who 
wished to quit could ask his endorsing agency to lift his endorsement, thereby making him 
ineligible for continued service, and clergymen were exempt from the draft.13 When from 1968 
through 1970 chaplains were called up for second tours of duty in Vietnam, only a few chose 
this way of avoiding service; Army Chief of Chaplains Francis Sampson reported the total was 
fewer than twelve. Because service in the chaplain corps and in Vietnam remained essentially 
voluntary, chaplains who served there must have already resolved for themselves at least some of 
the common dilemmas about the morality of faithful people serving in war.  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Joseph Dulany, Once a Soldier, A Chaplain’s Story (np: np, 2002), 26. 
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Chaplains as Cultural Mediators 
 In the midst of heated discussion about the war in Vietnam, chaplains became “cultural 
mediators” for various communities, serving as vital links between diverse communities, 
sometimes working to reconcile—both personally and publicly—occasionally conflicting 
worldviews. As the military found itself embroiled in conflict in Southeast Asia and as religious 
communities responded to this intervention, chaplains were critical connectors in networks that 
involved individuals and organizations. They mediated power relationships and communicated 
cultural and social needs from one group to another. Chaplains occupied a liminal space in the 
intersections between military and religious cultures and appeared to stand astride two different, 
but intimately connected, worlds. They were challenged by the implications of their actions for 
each group, by their resistance to or participation in warfighting, and by the necessity to maintain 
their credibility among diverse groups of people.  
 “Liminality,” a concept borrowed from anthropology and religious studies, helps to 
define chaplains’ position within military and religious institutions. Arnold Van Gennep 
introduced the idea into the humanities from psychology in 1909, when he described “rites-of-
passage” as experiences that involved three stages: separation, transition (the liminal period), and 
reassimilation/ reincorporation.14 The idea gained traction, however, in the mid-twentieth 
century with the writings of Victor Turner.15 Though Van Gennep and Turner dealt specifically 
with ritual process, it is possible to imagine certain people, in certain roles, existing in a liminal 
                                                 
14 See Victor Turner, The Rites of Passage, trans. Monika B. Vizedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee (1909; repr. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). 
15 See especially, Victor Turner “Liminality and Communitas,” in The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-
Structure (1969; repr. New York: Walter de Gruyer, Inc., 1995), 94-130, and “Passages, Margins, and Poverty: 
Religious Symbols of Communitas,” in Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1974), 231-270. On the issue of the military as a ritual community and using Turner’s ideas 
of liminality and communitas, see Karen J. Diefendorf, “The Military as a Ritual Society,” The Army Chaplaincy 
(Summer-Fall 1997). 
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state for an extended period of time. Turner argued that liminal people’s status is structurally and 
socially ambiguous. The idea that chaplains were neither “here nor there,” that they could exist 
“betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and 
ceremony,” fairly well describes chaplains’ liminal positions.16 
 In 1974, Turner updated his categories of analysis and made a clearer distinction between 
“liminars,” who, in a transitory state, had the promise of final reincorporation into a distinct 
community, and “marginals,” who did not have the “cultural assurance of a final stable 
resolution of their ambiguity.”17 Chaplains may fall into either category: career chaplains may be 
in a perpetually marginal state, while for short-term or reserve chaplains, the idea of liminality as 
a temporary and transitory state makes more sense. In either case, chaplains operated in between 
and on the margins of well-defined social structures. 
 The term “cultural mediator” can encompass a good number of people in different 
circumstances, including military chaplains. Cultural mediators are people who, by virtue of their 
cultural skills such as language, cultural knowledge, or education, are firmly entrenched in two or 
more worlds and can move easily between these cultures and communities.18 While “mediation” 
is frequently understood in terms of direct arbitration and negotiation toward a definite goal, 
                                                 
16 Turner, “Liminality and Communitas,” 95. 
17 Turner, “Passages, Margins, and Poverty,” 233. 
18 The definition of “cultural mediator” used here is informed by a general reading of global history 
literature and American history literature—particularly in the areas of civil rights and religious movements—as well 
as a more specific sociological framework, rather than a linguistic framework, which proposes cultural mediation 
primarily as a factor of international cultural exchanges and language translation. Though they do not always use the 
term, some important works for my conceptualization of “cultural mediators” have been: Jill Lepore, “Dead Men 
Tell No Tales: John Sassamon and the Fatal Consequences of Literacy,” American Quarterly 46 (December 1994): 
479-512; Jill Lepore The Name of War King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1998); Richard White The Middle Ground Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991); Aldon Morris The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing 
for Change (New York: Free Press, 1984); Belinda Robnett, How Long? How Long? African-American Women in the 
Struggle for Civil Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and 
the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Sharon Erikson Nepstad, 
Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture, and Agency in the Central America Solidarity Movement (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 67. 
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that definition is too restrictive. Instead, an older usage of “mediate” is more accurate, where “to 
mediate” means “to lie or occupy the space between two things, times, etc.; to be transitional 
between.”19 
 Cultural mediators’ positions are defined both structurally and culturally. Given their 
structural positions and cultural knowledge, cultural mediators can speak to more than one 
community using language, cultural signs, rituals, or symbols that each community understands. 
In one form or another, cultural mediators exist nearly anywhere that two or more groups of 
people with radically different interests or world-views interact. Sociologist Sharon Nepstad has 
suggested that five variables contribute to one’s role as a cultural mediator: the social and 
cultural attributes of mediators; the structural position of the mediators in organizations and 
societies; the cultural knowledge of structures; the historical conditions that lead to their 
position; and the biographical experiences of cultural mediators.20 These five categories, she 
argued, would help scholars identify cultural mediators and recognize their influence on various 
communities. For chaplains, the first three variables were most important in determining and 
cementing their roles as cultural mediators. 
 As a group, chaplains would be expected to have some of the social and cultural 
attributes of both clergy and military officers. As clergy, they were likely to hold faith and 
religion in high regard, to display strong interpersonal communication skills, and to exhibit 
moral and spiritual leadership. As military men, chaplains would be expected to achieve certain 
physical and mental standards, to accept and function within an intensely hierarchical system, 
and to value discipline and mission. By their assent to the philosophical basis of the 
chaplaincy—cooperation without compromise—chaplains demonstrated their willingness to go 
                                                 
19 Oxford English Dictionary, “Mediate,” Online edition. 
20 Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul, 22. 
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between two cultures. These attributes would have made chaplains well-suited for an 
environment that required both spiritual and military bearing. 
 Second, chaplains possessed specialized cultural and social knowledge that allowed them 
to navigate military and religious worlds. Most significantly, chaplains who served in Vietnam all 
had graduate degrees in ministry, theology, or other fields. Their religious education provided 
chaplains with credibility in religious circles and within the military. For most, their graduate 
training included historical studies, theological studies, and ecumenical studies as well as training 
in counseling, religious education, and liturgical or worship leadership. These skills were useful in 
both military and religious contexts as chaplains ministered to and counseled a diverse 
population and participated in military duties. Many chaplains had also served in the military, 
active duty or reserve, before entering the chaplain corps, giving some a personal understanding 
of military culture and expectations. Military training and prior service initiated chaplains into the 
workings of the chain of command and basic battlefield maneuvers, while their religious training 
and connections allowed them to create programs and obtain supplies and services that would 
serve military personnel.  
 Structurally, chaplains occupied liminal spaces in both their religious and military 
communities. While chaplains serving with Reserve or National Guard units often served a 
parish or congregation in addition to their military constituency, those who served with regular 
units did so infrequently. When chaplains were activated and later deployed to Vietnam, they 
inevitably left their local ministries, which placed them outside the normal rhythms and 
expectations of organized religious bodies. In the Roman Catholic Church, for example, 
chaplains served under a special Archdiocese for military service—an organization 
fundamentally different from the episcopal and territorial organization of civilian Catholic 
parishes. Other churches, too, developed special organizations through which to organize and 
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supervise chaplains within ecclesiastical structures.21  
 In the military, chaplains enjoyed rank without command. Though they held rank and 
wore rank insignia on their uniforms, chaplains were addressed as “Chaplain” rather than by 
their rank and wore their religious insignia above symbols of rank. Sometimes, because of this 
positioning, chaplains served as intermediaries between officers and enlisted personnel. 
Furthermore, chaplains served as advisors to commanders on moral and religious matters, and 
chaplains retained the clerical privilege of confidential communications with servicemen and 
women that other officers did not have. In 1965, the Presbyterian Church released a statement 
on the issue of chaplains and rank that explained why they believed chaplains retaining military 
rank was necessary, an argument they based on their understanding of the historical 
development of the United States Army Chaplaincy. The church wrote “before and during 
World War I there were chaplains who had no rank, and they found, as did the Red Cross men, 
that they were often regarded by the military as accessories with no standing and of questionable 
value,” and they concluded that “when things needed to be done for the men, the chaplains had 
no power that would provide a basis for action.” They upheld the idea that rank legitimized the 
chaplains’ actions: “Rank was given to chaplains to introduce order into a confused situation and 
to give the chaplain a legitimate voice within the establishment.”22 Most military and some 
religious leaders agreed that chaplains’ carrying rank was critical to their military and religious 
effectiveness. 
                                                 
21 For example, the Episcopal Church of the United States of America organizes its chaplains under a 
Suffragan Bishop for Chaplaincies; in the Presbyterian Church (including the Presbyterian Church United States of 
America), chaplains could retain their affiliation with their “home” presbytery or transferring to a presbytery closer 
to their military assignment, and in 1973, four Presbyterian bodies created the Presbyterian Council for Chaplains 
and Military Personnel, which would provide an additional level of organizational and ecclesiastical oversight for 
chaplains. Church bodies with purely congregational structures created loose organizations to serve the specific 
needs of chaplains. 
22 The United Presbyterian Church, “Ministry to Persons in the Armed Forces: A Report to the 187th 
General Assembly,” 1975. 
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 Ultimately, chaplains occupied space in between and on the margins of several 
communities: sacred and secular, civilian and military, officer and enlisted, and between 
denominational and faith groups. They were positioned there for structural reasons and because 
of their specific cultural knowledge and skills, but this liminal position allowed them to interpret 
their experiences from both military and religious  perspectives. Having access to various 
religious, secular, civilian, and military communities afforded chaplains significant flexibility 
when they faced moral, theological, pastoral, or identity-related conflicts in the Vietnam War. 
Chaplains’ flexible responses helped find middle ground between divergent perspectives.  
 
Sources and Methodology 
 How to deal with cultural approaches to the study of war has been an ongoing question 
in the field of military history in recent years, as has the question of how to deal with the 
discourse created by, in, and about war. Though historians of the American military have come 
to accept, if not embrace, cultural history approaches and methodologies as important aspects of 
military history, they have struggled to articulate its significance to the field and to incorporate 
fully such approaches and methods into their work. In a 1993 article, John Shy suggested that 
historians were apt to use “cultural approaches” to the study of war only when historians’ 
explanations of events could not rely on rationality, citing the brutality of the Second World War 
and the “surprising ferocity of the Civil War” as prime examples of when such approaches might 
be useful.23 A decade later, John Lynn proposed a model by which historians could understand 
the relationship between the “discourse” of war and the “reality” of war, arguing that the two 
were closely and dialogically related to one another. Again, his work suggested that 
                                                 
23 John Shy, “The Cultural Approach to the History of War,” The Journal of Military History 57 (October 
1993): 13-26, 14. 
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understanding “discourse” or culture was most helpful for figuring out why and where things 
seemed to stray from the reality of war, neglecting to consider that the “reality of war” may itself 
be culturally determined.24 These two works represented a concerted effort to retain military 
history’s traditional focus on battle and the explanation of military outcomes while recognizing 
other historical perspectives and methodologies.  
 Frequently, the “homefront” emerged as an obvious place to understand the cultural 
dimension of warfare. The most robust discussions of the homefront have been in the realm of 
“war and society” studies, which Wayne Lee defined as “those that emphasize the connections 
between social organization, political institutions, and military activity.”25 Yet, as Jeremy Black 
noted, such studies almost always cleave “more to society than to war in both methodology and 
fundamental concerns.”26 Lee also suggested that historians may take into account “societal 
culture,” which “encompasses not only the silent assumptions that common soldiers bring with 
them from society into the military (for example, notions about courage or masculinity) but also 
the public’s expectations and values about war that form the environment in which decision 
makers operate and that they must take into account.”27 Combining these two categories of 
study may lead to fruitful discoveries about the relationship between homefront attitudes, 
cultures, and institutions and battlefield actions, attitudes, and realities. 
 This dissertation seeks to engage the growing base of cultural studies of the military by 
engaging in close analysis of the discourse and cultural expectations that surrounded chaplains 
and by examining a specific site in which civilian and military worlds came into sustained 
                                                 
24 John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, From Ancient Greece to Modern America (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2003). 
25 Wayne E. Lee, “Mind and Matter—Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State 
of the Field,” Journal of American History 93 (March 2007): 1116-1142. 
26 Jeremy Black, “Determinisms and Other Issues,” The Journal of Military History 68 (October 2004), 1218. 
27 Lee, “Mind and Matter,” 1118. 
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contact. At the same time, it is clear that such cultural analysis is less useful without a narrative 
context. Thus, archival records, including those from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 
provide facts and a basic chronology regarding the chaplaincy and chaplains. These sources 
provide a timeline for the dissertation and allow for analysis of bureaucratic and organizational 
issues. Additionally, cultural sources balance out the official and structural view of the archives. 
Cultural historians have argued that many kinds of sources can be read as texts and interpreted 
in multiple ways. Sources requiring a close cultural-historical reading include chaplains’ memoirs, 
diaries, and letters as well as various national and religious media sources. 
Following cues from the linguistic turn, chaplains’ own descriptions of and writing about 
their wartime experiences form an important evidentiary base for the project. Understanding and 
interpreting the language, context, intention, and reception of written sources is central to the 
analysis of chaplains’ beliefs and roles during and after the war.28 Chaplains wrote and published 
reflections on the war in specific historical contexts and for specific reasons—both stated 
explicitly and constructed implicitly. Ultimately, memoirs, diaries, and interviews provide 
compelling evidence of what chaplains believed and did and how they interpreted the war and 
their role in it. 
Such sources, however, present some challenges for the historian. Even though 
chaplains enjoyed significant credibility and authority, especially among religious audiences, their 
first-person accounts were certainly not immune to the persistent “problem of memory” so 
readily identified by cultural historians.29 To be sure, memory is fallible and published accounts, 
                                                 
28 The categories for analyzing written texts come, in part, from Dominick LaCapra’s work, “Rethinking 
Intellectual History and Reading Texts,” History and Theory 19 (October 1980): 245-276.  
29 See, for example, John E. Toews, “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of 
Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience,” American Historical Review 92 (October 1987): 879-907; Joan W. Scott, 
“The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry 17, no. 4 (Summer 1991), 773-797; Leonard V. Smith, “Paul Fussell's 
The Great War and Modern Memory: Twenty-Five Years Later,” History and Theory 40 (May 2001): 241-260; Louise 
White, “Telling More: Lies, Secrets, and History,” History and Theory 39 (December 2000): 11-22; Kerwin Lee Klein, 
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given the interplay of memory, selectivity, authorial intent, and editorial decisions, provide a 
relatively narrow view of a chaplain’s experience. These types of sources, do, however, represent 
a vital and vibrant discourse for understanding how people interpreted and made sense of their 
past. They require the historian to move beyond simple narrative and factual claims and enter 
into the mental world of others.30 What chaplains wrote and how they conceived of their 
experiences is critical to understanding the stories they chose to tell and why they told them in 
certain ways. 
 
Organization 
 The body of the dissertation is organized into three parts. The first part examines the 
broad religious, cultural, political, and international contexts of the early Cold War in order to 
contextualize chaplains’ experiences in the Vietnam War. Chapter One, “For God and Country: 
Civic and Religious Faiths in the Early Cold War,” examines larger cultural forces in the years 
preceding American intervention in Vietnam. It explores the relationship between the post 
World War II religious revival in the United States, public theology, and anti-communism in the 
early Cold War. The tropes of religious consensus and Civil Religion provided Americans a 
                                                                                                                                                       
“On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse,” Representations 69 (2000): 127-150; Susannah Radstone, 
“Working with Memory: An Introduction,” in Memory and Methodology, ed. Radstone (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 1-22; Jay 
Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, “Setting the Framework,” War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, ed. Winter and 
Sivan (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe, and Leo Spitzer, Acts of 
Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1999); Marita Struken, Tangled 
Memories: The Vietnam War, the Aids Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997); David Paul Nord, “The Uses of Memory: An Introduction,” Journal of American History 85 (September 1998): 
409-410. 
30 Louise White, writing about rumor, has argued that “historians could read in the inaccurate, the 
fantastic, and the constructed a world of . . . peoples we would not otherwise see.” Memoirs allow historians to see 
those worlds “glimpsed through the fantastic and constructed accounts,” and to come up with “a more specific 
version of events than we’d had before.” White demanded that historians move beyond the dichotomy of true and 
false, in which “false” accounts are simply discounted. “Fears and fantasies are situated in distinctive terrain,” she 
wrote “The power and importance of the made-up . . . are precisely that they are made up . . . they have to be 
constituted by what is credible. The imaginary and the fantastic must be constructed out of what is socially 
conceivable. . . . For historians, the invented account is at least as good as the accurate one.” Louise White, “Telling 
More,” 14. 
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common language through which to understand diverse religious and political ideas, but that 
these linguistic ties were insufficient to mask deep divisions that would fracture American 
communities during the Vietnam War. 
 The second part of the dissertation includes three chapters that deal with direct 
American engagement in Vietnam, roughly from 1962-1973, the years of heaviest American 
involvement in Vietnam. Each chapter focuses on a particular aspect of these years to examine 
the ways that chaplains acted as cultural mediators. Chapter Two, “Building a Network of 
Religious Support,” lays out a framework for understanding chaplains’ day-to-day activities and 
functions in the Vietnam War. It examines the organizational and bureaucratic nature of the 
chaplaincy in Vietnam from approximately 1962 to 1972—the decade when the most chaplains 
served in Vietnam—by focusing on chaplain coverage, denominational distribution, and official 
policies about issues like Civic Action Programs and drug use. The chapter also explores 
chaplains’ professional relationships with their commanders and supervisors and their pastoral 
relationships with officers and enlisted personnel. These analyses illuminate the ambiguous 
structural position of chaplains within the military community.  
 Chapter Three, “Contested Meaning and Identities: Chaplains Respond to Conflict in 
Combat Zones,” examines issues of morality and religious practice in wartime in order to 
understand the cultural and religious functions of chaplains in war. Chaplains faced intense 
conflict over moral and theological issues and responded creatively as they worked out practical 
solutions to wartime situations and created distinct and dynamic liturgies of war that involved 
reinterpreting traditional religious practices. In helping to create these liturgies of war, chaplains 
acted as inter-religious cultural mediators and mediators between martial and religious cultures. 
 Chapter Four, “Chaplains and Homefront Debate about Vietnam,” seeks to understand 
how chaplains related to the homefront, particularly to the sometimes-fierce debates over the 
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war within religious groups. Chaplains were both participants and symbols in debates about the 
Vietnam War in both religious and secular communities. Chaplains’ liminal positions allowed 
them to address a wide variety of audiences to offer experientially-grounded analysis of the 
Vietnam War, yet it also placed them in the middle of a long-standing philosophical debate 
about the proper role of chaplains in war and a policy-oriented discussion about civilianizing the 
military chaplaincy. While the debate over chaplains never dominated, or even became central to, 
mainstream debates about the Vietnam War, it was indicative of theological and doctrinal 
fissures within the American religious community. Examining chaplains’ position within these 
debates illuminates a wider range of “religious” responses to the Vietnam War than is often 
imagined. 
 The third part of the dissertation deals with post-Vietnam responses and changes among 
chaplains and within the institutional chaplaincy. Chapter Five, “Personal Reflection, 
Reconciliation, and Revelation after Vietnam,” deals with the ways in which chaplains worked to 
resolve ongoing moral, theological, and identity-related conflict after the war ended. It focuses 
specifically on chaplains’ post-war writing by situating chaplain narratives in the traditions of 
combat memoirs, spiritual autobiography, and trauma writing. Chaplains’ first-person accounts 
overwhelmingly offered a narrative of redemption as the primary marker of the Vietnam 
experience, counter to the more traditional Vietnam-era narrative of defeat. Chaplains’ writings 
about the Vietnam War combined religious and martial themes, which further evidenced their 
roles as cultural mediators, as they wrote for both personal and public reasons. Their 
autobiographical writing provided a counternarrative that reflected broad trends within wider 
American society, and they symbolized chaplains’ own reentry into the civilian religious 
community. 
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 Chapter Six, “Institutional Challenges and Reorganization after Vietnam,” uses three 
major currents in the post-Vietnam era to highlight changes within the chaplain corps: First, in 
the 1970s, the chaplaincy came under nearly continuous attack from liberal and mainline 
religious groups and from secular critics. Second, the chaplaincy undertook a major ecumenical 
project to produce an armed services worship book, and its inclusion of the song “It Was on a 
Friday Morning” created an uproar among conservative Christian groups and secular politicians 
who claimed it was blasphemous. This challenge exemplified the chaplaincy’s attempts to retain 
independence and its historical commitment to ecumenism as well as the religious right’s 
increasing political power. Finally, the chapter examines how these cultural crosscurrents—
declining liberal support for the chaplaincy and rising power of conservative religious groups—
affected the organizational culture of the chaplaincy. Major changes occurred between the 1970s 
and 2000s, and this chapter deals with the ways in which the Vietnam experience informed and 
influenced these discussions. Ultimately, these changes marked a conflation of military and 
religious values for military chaplains, which threatened the chaplain’s position as a cultural 
mediator. 
 
 As chaplains lived and worked at the intersections of religious and military cultures 
during the Vietnam War, they faced intense conflicts and questions about the viability of 
religious faith in war. As the nation waged literal war in Vietnam, it also came apart over a war of 
words and actions about the war in Vietnam. The battlefield could not be isolated from 
developments at home, nor could the home front be divorced from the violence in Vietnam. 
Additionally, changes in the demography of the chaplain corps, chaplains’ experiences, and their 
interpretations of the war reflected wider changes in the way religion and the military interacted. 
Because of their unique position between two near-total institutions and cultures, chaplains’ 
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experiences, though not typical, served as bellweathers for changes in both communities. 
Divisions over moral, political, and social issues affected religious communities and religious 
people, and for chaplains and soldiers, experience in Vietnam often compounded or complicated 
these divisions. Vietnam brought about a host of doubts and conflicts for individuals and 
religious communities, but also for the nation as a whole as “Vietnam” came to represent both a 
failure of American foreign policy and of a certain vision of American identity and destiny.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
FOR GOD AND COUNTRY: CIVIC AND RELIGIOUS FAITHS IN THE  
EARLY COLD WAR 
 
 By most measures, the decade following World War II was a period of renewed religious 
commitment. According to polls, church membership and attendance rose, as did financial 
support of religious institutions, and charismatic evangelical leaders began to leave their mark on 
a mass audience. The religious atmosphere that emerged was simultaneously theistic and civic. It 
owed much of its character to mainline Protestantism with a smattering of other beliefs mixed 
in.1 In the civic realm, it encouraged loyalty to the nation, in some cases substituting doctrines of 
patriotism and nationalism for common religious doctrines. Responding to both World War II 
and the Cold War, Americans redefined their religious heritage as “Judeo-Christian,” recognizing 
the contributions of at least one non-Christian minority to the development of the United States, 
while still clearly marginalizing Islam and non-Abrahamic religious traditions.2  
 It was a time when religion entered public discourse frequently and urgently, and 
theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr and religious leaders such as Billy Graham were truly 
                                                 
1 Though there is some debate, “mainline” generally refers to the Protestant Christian churches that 
William Hutchison identified in his work, Between the Times: The Travail of the Protestant Establishment in America (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). It should be taken to include Presbyterians, Methodists, 
Congregationalists (United Churches of Christ), Episcopalians, and occasionally Lutherans and the Church of the 
Brethren, though my usage excludes the more conservative branches of these churches (i.e. the Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod, Presbyterian Church in America, etc.). “Evangelical” will refer to churches and groups with a 
generally conservative outlook on theology, the Bible and social issues, and who claim evangelism as a main goal of 
their group. This category includes the conservative branches of mainline churches as well as denominations like the 
Southern Baptists, Assemblies of God, and other groups whose chaplains were endorsed by the National 
Association of Evangelicals or the Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches. Where further clarification is necessary, 
theological and political orientations are indicated in the text. 
2 Mark Silk, “Notes on the Judeo-Christian Tradition in America,” American Quarterly 36, no. 1 (1984): 65-
85; Eric Michael Mazur, The Americanization of Religious Minorities: Confronting the Constitutional Order (Baltimore, MD: 
John’s Hopkins University Press, 1999). 
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public men who exercised considerable influence on American politics. Politicians also entered 
the discourse by declaring the United States’ religious foundations and consistently invoking 
religious imagery in political contexts. As the Cold War came to dominate thinking about 
America's relationship to the world, America's religious culture assumed a martial character, 
planting itself firmly in the way of a godless Soviet empire. Civil religion employed both clergy 
and politicians as priests and prophets.  
 At the same time, as the state mobilized to confront the Soviet Union, the military 
leadership worked to integrate the dominant religious and political cultures of the day into 
policy. These efforts were most visible in the military chaplaincy and in various “character 
guidance” programs implemented during the Cold War. Designed to build up the character and 
fighting effectiveness of American troops, chaplains and character guidance programs identified 
religious beliefs as essential components of American identity while at the same time connecting 
civil society, military service, and religious faith. 
 Nevertheless, many religious groups, especially liberal ones, kept a distance, retaining a 
critical edge in their dealings with and commentary on the government. The “religious 
community” did not speak with a unified voice even in the 1950s, and religious dissent against 
government action did not begin only in the 1960s. In addition to the religious left’s 
participation in the Civil Rights Movement, religious responses to the use of the atomic bomb, 
proposals calling for Universal Military Training and peacetime conscription, and the UN action 
in Korea pervaded complex conversations that took place between military and religious 
interests during the 1950s, and were basic to the religious and military issues that emerged during 
the Vietnam War. 
 After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, American policy-makers started the 
country down the long road of intense involvement with Vietnam. Having marked South and 
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Southeast Asia as a critical pointed in the Containment line, government officials assumed some 
level of involvement in Vietnam almost a matter of course in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 
addition to religious overtones to policy rhetoric in the United States, the presence of a small but 
significant minority of Catholics in Vietnam and close ties between American and Vietnamese 
Catholics such as John F. Kennedy and Ngo Dinh Diem served only to enhance the significance 
of Vietnam for American political objectives. As a result, religious groups’ responses to early 
American forays into Vietnam were generally supportive, though not entirely uncritical, and 
American policy statements about Vietnam frequently had religious undertones. By the time the 
first chaplains arrived in Vietnam in 1962, the stage had been set for a decade-long struggle to 
define the proper role of religion in the American military, the religious nature of America’s 
Cold War mission, and the character of the American military chaplaincy. 
 Cold War civil religion, early debates over religious programs within the U.S. military, 
and initial American forays into Vietnam all point to the contested atmosphere in which 
chaplains in Vietnam eventually operated. The early Cold War and an American religious revival 
injected religious and civil religious language into public discourse and public space, suggesting a 
distinct “public theology” during the 1950s and early 1960s. As this theological language entered 
the public imagination, the military responded to and used the dominant religious culture of the 
day to shape policies, specifically those regarding the chaplaincy and character guidance 
programs. Eventually, early American involvement in Vietnam and long-standing ties to the 
Catholic community in Vietnam prompted responses from religious communities that were 
wrapped in the language of civil religion. 
 The convergences and divergences in American military and religious cultures during the 
early Cold War illuminated not only trends within each realm, but also highlighted the extent to 
which the two existed in a dialogic relationship with one another. Religious communities and 
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military ones borrowed freely and frequently from the lexicons and cultures of the other, 
producing in the early Cold War period a common language with which to express and 
understand religiosity and patriotism. Yet theological and doctrinal differences did not disappear 
with the construction of common tropes and rhetorical moves, even as the fear of confrontation 
with the Soviet Union demanded that religious communities and civic communities emphasize 
unity over difference for the collective good of the nation. These ideological and theological 
differences, buried beneath a common language, emerged in full force in the 1960s, especially as 
American involvement in Vietnam expanded; the foundations of civil religion that provided a 
patina of consensus in the early Cold War crumbled, setting American religious and political 
communities up for a left-right/liberal-conservative divide that would define the Vietnam and 
post-Vietnam eras.3 
 
An American Way of Life and Civil Religion 
 Since the 1967 publication of Robert Bellah’s essay “Civil Religion in America,” scholars, 
clergy, politicians, and other commentators have debated the substance and utility of such an 
idea, that suggested an intimate relationship between American religion and American civil 
society.4 The essay poses a special interpretive challenge for scholars of American religion during 
the Cold War, however. Because it appeared near the height of the war in Vietnam and was 
                                                 
3 Historians of the 1950s have recently called to our attention the multiple ways in which the older story of 
the so-called “liberal consensus” falls apart under scrutiny. For examples, see Larry May, The Big Tomorrow: Hollywood 
and the Politics of the American Way (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the 
Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.) On the issue of 
divergent civil religions, Robert Wuthnow has argued that a distinction emerged since the 1960s between 
conservative and liberal Protestants; see “Divided We Fall: America’s Two Civil Religions,” The Christian Century, 20 
April 1988, 395-399. 
4 Robert Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96 (Winter 1967):1-21; Russell E. Richey and 
Donald G. Jones, eds., Civil Religion in America, (New York: Harper & Row, 1974); Phillip Hammond, Amanda 
Porterfield, James G. Moseley, and Jonathan D. Sarna, “Forum: American Civil Religion Revisited,” Religion and 
American Culture 4, no. 1 (1994):1-23. 
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sharply critical of US involvement there, the essay itself, as well as much of the writing just 
before that historical moment are rightly considered primary sources for studies on the Cold 
War and religion; they help to establish the tenor and content of public religious and civil 
debates. Yet since the 1970s, “civil religion” has become a key analytical tool for understanding 
the nature of American religion, particularly in the public sphere. Defining civil religion as both 
an idea that emerged in a specific historical context and as an analytical category is necessary to 
understand the relationship between the military, politics, and religion during the Cold War. 
 In the years following World War II, civil, military, and religious themes appeared to be 
integrated or at least to exist alongside one another. How, for example, could one explain the 
poll in Ladies Home Journal, which suggested Americans believed they needed to follow the “law 
of love”—at least in theory—toward nearly everyone save the nation’s enemies and those of 
suspect political orientation.5 American behaviors and attitudes, in addition to presidential 
comments, sermons from religious leaders, and changes to the pledge of allegiance emphasized 
that the lines between church and state were blurry indeed. 
 To be sure, the lines had never been clear. Historians have been well attuned to the 
intricacies of the theocratic New England colonies, to the establishment of churches across the 
colonial and republican United States, to the relationship between ecclesiastical and political 
divisions in the Civil War, and to the religious bent of the southern Lost Cause.6 As the United 
States entered the twentieth century, instances such as these continued to suggest an intimate 
                                                 
5 Poll cited in Jackson W. Carroll, Douglas W. Johnson, and Martin E. Marty, Religion in America: 1950 to the 
Present (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979). 
6 See Perry Miller, Errand into the Wilderness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956); Jon Butler, 
Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Patricia 
Bonomi, Under the Cope of Heaven: Religion, Society, and Politics in Colonial America, updated ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003); Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout, Charles Reagan Wilson, eds., Religion and the American Civil 
War, new ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Mitchell Snay, The Gospel of Disunion: Religion and Separatism 
in the Antebellum South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); and Charles Reagan Wilson, Baptized 
in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause, 1865-1920 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1983). 
 27 
 
 
relationship between the American state, the American people, and God. But the nature of that 
relationship was always under discussion.7 
 Using language that could be traced to John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Bellah 
proposed that “civil religion” clarified the complicated relationship between religion and politics 
in the United States. In this essay, Bellah joined a long line of scholars interested in the “general” 
religion of the United States, naming more definitely what historian Sidney Mead called the 
“Religion of the Republic” and theologian and sociologist Will Herberg the “American Way of 
Life.”8 But it was Bellah’s term and conception that sparked the longest-lasting interest and 
debate, appearing as it did in the middle of the national crisis of Vietnam. Rather than 
understanding this pattern as evidence that civil society had co-opted religious beliefs, Bellah 
believed the resulting “civil religion” to be a kind of hybrid, related to but separate from either 
the church or the state. “There are . . . certain common elements of religious orientation that the 
great majority of Americans share. These have played a crucial role in the development of 
American institutions and still provide a religious dimension for the whole fabric of American 
life, including the political sphere. This public religious dimension is expressed in a set of beliefs, 
symbols, and rituals that I am calling the American civil religion.”9 
 Will Herberg’s earlier formulation of the “American Way of Life” served as an important 
foundation for Bellah’s concept. He argued that in the twentieth century, the United States had 
indeed been a “melting pot,” albeit more accurately three melting pots rather than one. He 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Sydney Ahlstrom A Religious History of the American People (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1972) and Catherine Albanese, Sons of the Fathers: The Civil Religion of the American Revolution 
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1976). 
8 Sidney Mead coined the phrase “Religion of the Republic” in his book, The Nation with the Soul of a Church 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 94; Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955). 
9 Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” 100. 
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believed that the broad categories of “Protestant,” “Catholic,” and “Jew” had created spaces in 
which ethnic and racial differences were subsumed by religious denomination—at least for white 
Americans.10 The results of this combination, Herberg argued, were significant: “With the 
religious community as the primary context of self-identification and social location, and with 
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism as three culturally diverse representations of the same 
‘spiritual values,’ it becomes virtually mandatory for the American to place himself in one or 
another of these groups . . . For being a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew is understood as the 
specific way, and increasingly perhaps the only way, of being an American and locating oneself 
in American society.”11 Herberg and others have since suggested that the significance attached to 
being “American” may have prompted people who did not identify with one of these traditions, 
or who in fact did not believe in God at all, to respond otherwise in polls and in public. 
 Herberg asserted that the “American Way of Life” constituted the general religion of 
American society, particularly for white Americans. He believed it supplied “American society 
with an ‘overarching sense of unity’ amid conflict.’”12 Herberg argued that Americans were 
tolerant of anything widely construed to be “American,” (namely white Protestants, Catholics, 
and Jews) and nothing was as un-American as intolerance. For Herberg, “The American Way of 
Life” was, at bottom, a spiritual structure of ideas and ideals, of aspirations and values, of beliefs 
and standards; it synthesized all that commends itself to the American as the right, the good, and 
the true in actual life. It embraced such seemingly incongruous elements as sanitary plumbing 
and freedom of opportunity, Coca-Cola and an intense faith in education.”13 Furthermore, the 
                                                 
10 Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew, 35. 
11 Ibid., 39. 
12 Ibid., 75. 
13 Ibid. 
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American Way of Life was peculiarly democratic, individualistic, dynamic, pragmatic, 
humanitarian, and idealistic. This “common denominator” religion allowed Americans with 
diverse political and theological views to coalesce against the Communist enemy around shared 
language and basic ideas without having to agree on the specifics of motive and policy.14 
 Yet this blending of popular culture, religion, and national identity was not, in Herberg’s 
mind, a positive development. He saw great danger in the perpetuation of this system, where 
religious terms and ideas had no religious meaning. If a watered-down version of mainline 
Protestantism was to stand in for what it meant to be American, then Herberg wanted no part of 
it. The great center of American sociability and organization was founded on shaky ground. In 
the end, the major social and cultural ruptures of the 1960s and 1970s should not be surprising. 
The unpopularity and uncertainty of the war in Vietnam proved too heavy a burden for the 
apparent broad religious consensus built on ideals of civility and tolerance. 
 Writing just over ten years after Herberg’s major work, Robert Bellah modified and 
complicated many of Herberg’s remarks. Like Herberg, Bellah sounded a warning to his 
audience about the potential dangers of civil religion, but Bellah was more optimistic about the 
positive role civil religion could and should play in American religious and civic life. He argued, 
“what people say on solemn occasions need not be taken at face value, but it is often indicative 
of deep-seated values and commitments that are not made explicit in everyday life.”15 In 
explicating the content of American civil religion, Bellah suggested that times of trial provided 
the clearest articulations of its uses and dangers, and he identified three key periods for the 
formation of American civil religion. Forged first in the American Revolution, civil religion 
appeared in opposition to the British system, and American leaders consistently claimed that 
                                                 
14 Richard Hutcheson identified this ideological makeup as “common denominator religion” in his book 
Churches and the Chaplaincy (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1975), 54. 
15 Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” 99. 
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God was on America’s side in the war and incorporated deism, if not Christianity, into nearly 
every aspect of the nation’s founding. The Civil War provided the first great test for American 
civil religion because it brought the themes of “death, sacrifice, and rebirth” to civil religion, and 
the Gettysburg Address was added to the canon of “civil scriptures.” Lincoln’s call for “malice 
toward none, with charity for all” seemed to mandate reconciliation, if not redemption, and 
those words sacralized both the death of soldiers and the ground on which they fell. In the late 
1960s, however, the tone of American civil religion shifted when Kennedy exhorted, “here on 
earth, God’s work must truly be our own.” The president insisted that Americans were being 
called by God: “the trumpet summons us again—not as a call to bear arms, though arms we 
need—not as a call to battle, though embattled we are—but a call to bear the burden of a long 
twilight struggle, year in and year out, ‘rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation’—a struggle 
against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.”16 God would be 
on America’s side, because America was uniquely destined to carry out God’s will on earth. 
 Recalling the rousing rhetoric and the heady statements of a slain president, Bellah 
nonetheless found himself deeply worried about the prospects for civil religion in the late 1960s. 
He believed it a short leap from practicing the positive, unifying brand of civil religion to using 
the rhetoric of civil religion to support morally reprehensible ideas and actions. Bellah warned, 
“It can be overtly or implicitly linked to the idea of manifest destiny which has been used to 
legitimate several adventures in imperialism since the early nineteenth century.” And he believed 
the danger continued into the turbulent years of the late 1960s, when the issue was not one of 
imperial expansion, but instead the “tendency to assimilate all governments or parties in the 
world which support our immediate policies or call upon our help by invoking the notion of free 
institutions and democratic values. Those nations that are for the moment ‘on our side; become 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 101. 
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‘the free world,” and thus could a “repressive and unstable military dictatorship in South 
Vietnam” become “the free people of South Vietnam and their government.” Government and 
military leaders could use the language of civil religion to sacralize the war effort, so when 
soldiers died, it would allow the state “to consecrate the struggle further by invoking the great 
theme of sacrifice.” 
 In 1975, Bellah expanded his thoughts on the issue of civil religion in the modern 
American context, specifically in light of the war in Vietnam and the apparent disillusionment of 
many Americans. Furthering his pleas from “Civil Religion in America,” Bellah exhorted his 
fellow citizens: “It is our moral responsibility as Americans not to give up the struggle at the 
national level . . . [N]o one has changed a great nation without appealing to its soul.” Bellah 
argued that in order to win the struggle, and in order to capitalize on it, Americans needed a new 
vision, for “we will not even know what we want unless we have a new vision of man, a new 
sense of human possibility, and a new conception of the ordering of liberty, the constitution of 
freedom.” Finally he pleaded with his fellow Americans, in the midst of an increasingly 
unpopular war, that “while recognizing the reality of death, we may return finally to Winthrop’s 
biblical injunction: Let us choose life.”17  
 Ultimately, “civil religion” subsumed important differences in interpretation under a 
common language, so that any time someone spoke or wrote of “God” and “Country” in the 
same breath, they were addressing or promoting “civil religion,” even when their intents were 
vastly different. Despite the patina of consensus on the spiritual and religious nature of the 
country, significant theological and philosophical differences divided Americans. In the end, 
however, these differences spoke to similar concerns, and civil religion provided both religious 
                                                 
17 Robert Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial (New York: Seabury Press, 
1975). 
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liberals and conservatives as well as more universalist or nationalist thinkers a way to participate 
in the public culture of the Cold War. Bellah had recognized a significant pattern in American 
civic and religious life: one that begged for explanation, especially in the troubled times of the 
late 1960s in which he wrote. Politicians and citizens, clergy and laymen participated in 
conversations that assumed a common religious heritage, or at least a common religious 
language, with potentially disastrous results. 
 In analyzing the utility of “civil religion” to direct discussions about the place of religion 
and state in the American context, historian of religion Martin Marty has suggested four 
manifestations of civil religion in the United States. His typology included four combinations of 
characteristics, all of which can appropriately be identified expressions of civil religion. First, 
Marty identified two categories of civil religion: the “Under-God” type and the “transcendent 
nation” type. Within each of those categories, there existed two modes of expression—priestly 
and prophetic.18 These varying ways to conceive of the concept in general as well as the different 
manifestations are all correctly understood as “civil religion.”  Marty’s typology suggested one 
way that diverse views could be conceived of in similar language, providing scholars a way to 
interpret the functions and effects (rather than the content) of civil religion. 
 The “Under God” type assumed that the United States had a special relationship to a 
deity—however defined. References to “God,” the “Divine,” a “Higher Power,” a “Creator” or 
the like referred to something greater than and outside of the state. The priestly function was 
therefore celebratory and self-assured. Marty contended that most often presidents and 
politicians played a priestly role in the discourse, assuring Americans of their consistent alliance 
                                                 
18 The Priest/Prophet distinction is originally Max Weber’s; he uses them to distinguish between “ideal 
types” in the Old Testament/Hebrew Bible. A more extended discussion of these terms, specifically as they related 
to chaplains, see Chapter Four. Marty suggested this typology in his essay, “Two Kinds of Civil Religion,” in Richey 
and Jones Civil Religion in America, 139-157. 
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with the forces of good. Particularly notable examples included Dwight D. Eisenhower and John 
F. Kennedy. The prophetic vision, however, was a dialectic one, in which the Divine and the 
nation were in constant conversation. The prophets warned that God did not necessarily 
approve of or bless American action, but that Americans, as a people set apart, should strive to 
do the work and the will of God. Abraham Lincoln was most often remembered for his 
prophetic statements in this vein. Lincoln’s statement from his second inaugural address that 
both the Union and the Confederacy believed in the same God and read the same Bible, yet they 
could not both be right clearly exhibited this sentiment. He exhorted the nation to think not 
“God is on our side” but instead to pray that “we are on God’s side.” Other prophets in the civil 
religious tradition included Jonathan Edwards and Reinhold Niebuhr, each of whom saw great 
potential in the American state and people, but who tempered these visions with more somber 
theological reflections. 
 While the “Under-God” type of civil religion was particularly based on a Judeo-Christian 
ethos, others suggested that civil religion itself might come to replace both church and 
denominational religion as the religious foundation of the United States. Here, the nation 
itself—its people, customs, and traditions—was at the center of religious devotion. For many 
Christians, then, the prospect of idolatry and blasphemy made this an uncomfortable 
proposition, whereas secular scholars often praised civil religion’s ability to supplant and replace 
traditional religious beliefs. This type employed a vaguely religious language—often talking about 
God—but their focus was on the nation and its character. For Marty, the prototypical “priests” 
of this type of civil religion were historian Sidney Mead and Richard Nixon. Conversely, those 
on the prophetic side of this civil religion, were more likely to warn against deifying the nation 
and to look to the structures and functions of civil religion for explanations of its place in 
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American society. Marty concluded that Bellah himself belonged most appropriately in this 
category. 
 These four categories of civil religion help explain how such divergent political, 
theological, scriptural, national, and ecclesiastical views could participate in a public culture that 
seemed to integrate discussions of “God” and “Country.” Marty’s typology challenged 
assumptions about a unitary American “civil religion” or a shared American “religious culture” 
based on ill-understood ideas of a “Judeo-Christian” tradition. People certainly used similar 
language to talk about different permutations of the relationship between God and Country, but 
their meanings and interpretations were vastly different. The religious consensus that appeared 
to unite the United States in the 1950s would prove, at least in part, its undoing during and after 
the Vietnam War. 
 
Public Theology and the Cold War 
 In 1955, forty-nine percent of Americans reported to Gallup that they attended religious 
services at least once in the past week—the highest percentage ever recorded—and between 
ninety-six and ninety-eight percent of Americans consistently reported that they “believed in 
God.”19 In 1952, Dwight Eisenhower declared, “our government makes no sense unless it’s 
founded on a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is.”20 Belief itself was the 
important thing—the content of that belief (though assumed to be vaguely Judeo-Christian) was 
clearly less important. Eisenhower himself offered perhaps the best example of this idea. 
Eisenhower’s opponent in the 1952 presidential election, Adlai Stevenson, spoke regularly of 
specific religious values and with theological specificity during the campaign, but he was 
                                                 
19 By way of comparison, only about 20% (at the most) of Britons surveyed with a similar question said 
they attended church. 
20 Dwight D. Eisenhower, quoted in New York Times, 23 December 1952. 
 35 
 
 
nonetheless stymied by his Unitarian affiliation and his status as a divorcee.21 Most Americans 
were unfamiliar with and wary of the Unitarian faith and remained skeptical of divorce within a 
religious context. Eisenhower, on the other hand, often spoke of religion in vague terms and 
joined the Presbyterian church (at the suggestion of Billy Graham) only after his electoral 
victory. Martin Marty suggested that Americans knew nothing about Eisenhower’s personal 
creed beyond the first two words, “I Believe.” Yet the American public seemed entirely willing 
to accept Eisenhower’s version of spirituality as a legitimate one. 22 Eisenhower was the 
quintessential priest for America’s civil religion, and he played the part for those who believed in 
a transcendent nation and those who preferred to envision the United States as having a special 
relationship with God. Eisenhower’s language was specific enough to invoke civil religion, but 
vague enough to appeal to a diverse audience.  
 Between 1955 and 1965, most religious denominations’ membership grew significantly. 
Even mainline churches experienced moderate growth, though evangelical, fundamentalist, and 
Pentecostal churches grew more rapidly. During that decade only the United Church of Christ 
saw its numbers decline. The United Methodist Church had the slowest rate of increase at 10.5 
percent, while the Assemblies of God grew a total of 43 percent during the same time.23 Church 
attendance varied according to religious affiliation. Catholics were the most consistent attendees, 
averaging around 70-75 percent weekly attendance at Mass from 1955 to 1965. Protestant 
                                                 
21 Marty, Modern American Religion, Vol. 3, Under God, Indivisible, 1941-1960 (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1986), 806.  
22 Marty, Martin E. Under God, Indivisible, 302. 
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attendance declined slowly during the period, but averaged around 42 percent, while Jewish 
attendance was significantly lower, staying between 18-27 percent, depending on the poll.24 
 But widespread belief in “God” and even increased church membership did not translate 
directly into heightened piety or observable religious practice. In the 1950s, when over nine 
million copies of the Bible were sold each year, over half of American adults could not name a 
single one of the first four books of the New Testament, the Gospels. Similarly, polling numbers 
on church attendance in any given week were likely false, the over-reporting a reflection more of 
what people had hoped to do or planned to do in the future than an accurate representation of 
their actions in the past week.25 Overwhelmingly, Americans continued to rely on some version 
of the “Golden Rule” as the primary means for salvation, rather than citing specific religious 
doctrines of sin, repentance, or sacrifice.26 
 The ways in which religion entered public discourse and public space in the 1950s 
reflected both the substance and the effects of this religious renewal on the United States. This 
“public theology” probably differed significantly from private theologies or institutional 
doctrines, but it facilitated the intertwining of civic and religious language during the Cold War. 
Two traditions of “public theology” existed historically in the United States. The first came out 
of the churches: ministers and intellectuals like Jonathan Edwards, Horace Bushnell, and Walter 
Rauschenbush worked out religious and social meaning in the public sphere, in public space. 
The second was state-oriented, where political leaders such as Abraham Lincoln or John F. 
Kennedy, used deistic or theological language, as Martin Mary explained, “in order to make 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 19-20. 
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Data,” Christian Century, 6 May 1998, 472-475. 
26 The most explicit statement of this foundation came from Herberg in Protestant, Catholic, Jew. 
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sense of the American Experience.”27 But men and women did not have to be theological or 
political giants to influence, use, and sustain this public theology; indeed it suffused the halls of 
Congress, court cases, schools, the military, and other public spaces. 
 Religious renewal offered many Americans concrete reasons for joining the anti-
communist struggle. Though not all Americans were religious, the “American Way of Life” and 
civil religious beliefs clearly valued the First Amendment protection of free religious exercise. 
Communism, by denying the existence of God and suppressing religious practice, threatened not 
only religious Americans’ worldviews but also one of the United States’ founding principles. 
Even conservative Christians, who generally supported disengagement from the political sphere, 
spoke out for the moral imperative of protecting Christians’ rights abroad, essentially entangling 
political and religious goals.28 Additionally, religion acted as a socially conservative force, 
encouraging unity and the status quo. As a social institution, religion offered American 
communities a form of “social sacralization,” by which a specific society legitimated and 
sacralized itself against another. In this case, the widespread perception of a common religious 
heritage offered a way for the United States to define itself against the Soviet Union.29  
 While religious anti-communism united many Americans in terms of language and basic 
principle, in practice, American religious groups exhibited a great variety in the style and 
expression of their anti-communist ideas.30 Seeing both the traditional tripartite grouping of 
American religious adherents into “Protestant, Catholic, Jew,” and more specific denominational 
                                                 
27 Martin E. Marty, “Reinhold Niebuhr: Public Theology and the American Experience,” Journal of Religion 
54 (October 1974), 333. See also Marty, “Two Kinds of Civil Religion.” 
28 See, for example, David E. Settje, Lutherans and the Longest War: Adrift on a Sea of Doubt about the Cold and 
Vietnam Wars, 1964-1975 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 7-9. 
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 38 
 
 
groups as inadequate for understanding the basic cleavages between religious people on political 
issues, historian Kenneth Wald has suggested that scholars move toward analyzing religious 
“worldviews.” He defined two dominant ones—liberal/progressive and 
conservative/orthodox—as better indicators of religious response to political and social issues.  
 In Wald’s analysis, conservatives generally “supported a strongly nationalistic line which 
portrayed communism as a moral enemy to be resisted wherever it appeared.” They “stressed 
active opposition, endorsed military action taken in the cause of anticommunism, and expressed 
skepticism about the prospects of negotiation with communist states.” On the other side, 
progressives and liberals believed communism could best be resisted by building more just 
societies and relying on the framework of international law to lessen tension and prevent war.” 
They believed that “military action, when unavoidable, should be pursued defensively and only 
in service of limited goals . . . To the extent Christianity had a role to play, the task of church 
representatives was to promote the social and economic development of poor countries and so 
diminish the attractiveness of radical solutions to desperate people.” Wald argued these various 
responses were best understood as “manifestations of elective affinity,” which was Max Weber's 
term “for a disposition to action based on the behavioral imperatives endorsed by religious 
values.” Thus, the nature of elective affinity in American religious history meant there were any 
number of potential responses to a certain situation. The foreign policy positions of these 
worldviews were not foreordained, and one could easily imagine a world in which both groups 
have essentially the same goal—defeat communism—but for different reasons and by using 
different methods. 
 Both religious liberals and conservatives in the United States routinely labeled 
themselves anti-communist; only a small minority of religious groups, most notably Dorothy 
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Day and her associates at the Catholic Worker, openly supported communism.31 During the early 
Cold War, several theologians and ministers alike enjoyed a national public status that allowed 
them to articulate their religious and political viewpoints. Though many religious viewpoints fell 
under the rubric of “anti-communism,” there were significant differences in the specific rhetoric 
language of religious liberals and conservatives. Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr offered specific 
expressions of the liberal viewpoint whereas evangelical minister Billy Graham best articulated 
the conservative position. As religion and the Cold War merged in public discourse, these two 
men—influential and well-respected in both political and religious circles—embodied the 
essence of public theology.32   
 Reinhold Niebuhr began his intellectual life as a socialist, but although he became 
disenchanted with its political program, he continued to be attracted to its fundamental criticism 
of capitalism and its reliance on class as an explanatory factor in history. He was the primary 
figure behind “Christian Realism,” which advocated a “tough” stance on complicated issues of 
the day—he derided Social Gospel-style liberalism for being “too soft,” and for a faulty belief 
that human action could actually change the dominant social and economic systems. Niebuhr 
instead advocated a different type of human agency and a religious philosophy that would take 
into account various evils in the world such as Communism. 
 Though quite a prolific writer in the years of the Depression and the Second World War, 
it was not until the post-war period that Reinhold Niebuhr gained his widest public audience. 
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Secular scholars, including Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., read his 1952 work, The Irony of American 
History, with great interest.33 In that book, a culmination of Niebuhr’s views on the Cold War 
and anti-Communism, Niebuhr “argued for the centrality of power in order to advocate an 
expanded, morally sensitive conception of power. In sum, Niebuhr militantly espoused liberal 
measures to counter the conservative militarists of his time and offered a realistic rationale for 
exercising moral restraint.”34 As a result, Niebuhr often found himself between competing 
camps, neither of which was wholly comfortable with his analysis. Democratic Party liberals 
were uncomfortable with Neibuhr’s wholehearted endorsement of the Cold War, even though 
Neibuhr considered the decision an extraordinarily difficult one. Neibuhr’s support precipitated 
a crisis for many liberals, and more than a few eventually chose to follow his lead, which paved 
the way for the mainstream American left to endorse Harry Truman’s Cold War foreign policies. 
Neibur’s influence and public position effectively meant that his defection probably prevented a 
political crisis within the Democratic Party.35 Later, Niebuhr would roll back some of his early 
proclamations, especially with the advent of Mutual Assured Destruction and the Vietnam War, 
but his early support for Cold War initiatives helped to secure both political and religious liberal 
support for the Cold War. 
 On the conservative side of the religious spectrum stood Billy Graham and other like-
minded voices. Whereas Niebuhr’s anti-Communism had been cautious and even a last resort, 
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Graham’s was vocal and often militant in tone. In one pamphlet, titled “Chistianism and 
Communism” Graham claimed, “Communism is far more than just an economic and 
philosophical interpretation of life. Communism is a fanatical religion that has declared war 
upon the Christian God. To a striking degree this atheistic philosophy is paralleling and 
counterfeiting Christianity.”36 Graham defined the world and the threats to it in ways that 
echoed the United States government’s position. It was a fight between good and evil, and the 
United States needed to fortify both its faith and its military in order to overcome the Soviet 
menace. Using clear millennial and dispensational Christian referents, Graham wrote, 
“Communism could be only a shadow of a greater movement that is yet to come. However, it 
carries with it all the indications of anti-Christ.”37 Faith alone, however, would be insufficient; he 
called for a religious war, perhaps a crusade: “Christianity needs a show of strength and force” 
and must “maintain the strongest military establishment on earth.”38 
 Other conservative theologians and ministers were less charitable to their coreligionists, 
and found liberal religion, particularly liberal Protestantism, to be insidious forces in the Cold 
War. Concerned that liberal Protestantism relied on principles of collective salvation, a holdover 
from the era of the Social Gospel, J.B. Matthews, a conservative commentator and Director of 
Research for House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) excoriated liberal Protestant 
clergy for being on the wrong side of the global struggle. In an article titled “Reds and our 
Churches”—inflammatory to be sure—Matthews warned, “The largest single group supporting 
the Communist apparatus in the United States today is composed of Protestant clergymen.”39 
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Citing the People’s Institute of Applied Religion, a Southern organization involved with the 
labor movement and with communist ties, Matthews charged that in the past seventeen years, 
over 3500 professors supported the Communist Party either as members, fellow travelers, spies, 
or dupes, and he claimed, “during the same . . . period, the Communist Party has enlisted the 
help of at least seven thousand Protestant clergymen in the same categories.” An ultra-
conservative Lutheran publication titled “How Red is the National Council of Churches” 
suggested that the national ecumenical group was in direct cahoots with the Soviet Union.40 
These were not accusations to be taken lightly, appearing as they did in the midst of Joseph 
McCarthy’s senate hearings and general national anti-communist hysteria. 
 The public also worried about fortifying the strength of the nation and its faith, and 
often supported policies and measures that would ensure the two worked together for the same 
end. Though there were major differences between liberal and conservative worldviews, civil 
religion provided a way for Americans and their elected leaders to profess a public faith that 
relied on the language of anti-communism and civil religion. This convergence was most clearly 
evident in two examples: one very specific—the addition of the words “under God” to the U.S. 
Pledge of Allegiance—and the other more programmatic—the cooperation between Mainline 
and Conservative Protestant groups and believers to focus on an evangelical mission. 
 On Flag Day, 14 June 1954, Congressmen and Senators gathered on the steps of the 
Capitol building, the United States flag rose over the dome, and a military band played “Onward 
Christian Soldiers.” The occasion was a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance—but now with a 
critical difference: President Dwight Eisenhower had just signed into law a bill that added the 
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words “under God” to the pledge.41 Here, publicly and clearly, the United States experienced the 
mingling of church, state, and the Cold War. From the years following World War II through 
the middle of the 1950s, the United States underwent a religious revival. Church attendance rose, 
as did financial contributions to religious organizations. The culture promoted homogeneity—at 
least on the surface—as Americans dug in for the long struggle against atheistic communism. 
 Adding the words “under God” to the pledge would, according to supporters, separate 
the United States from other nations and would reaffirm the United States’ position in the world 
as a “redeemer nation.” George M. Docherty, pastor of New York Avenue Presbyterian Church 
in Washington D.C., supported the change to the pledge. In a Lincoln Day sermon, which 
Eisenhower probably attended, Docherty argued that without the words, “under God,” the 
pledge was essentially generic, and could be used by any state, even the Soviet Union. He 
claimed that a (universal) belief in a Supreme Being distinguished America from the rest of the 
world, and therefore the pledge should say as much. In defining “American,” Docherty argued, 
the American way of life “is more than the material total of baseball games, hot dogs, Coca-Cola, 
television, deep freezes, and other gadgets, it is a way of life that sees man as a sentient being 
created by God and seeking to know His will, whose soul is restless till he rests in God.”42 But 
these words from the mouth of a Mainline Protestant minister were unsurprising since he 
viewed the state in religious terms. The United States Congress provided a different test: similar 
bills had been introduced in Congress before, but they had always failed to reach the floor. With 
the backing of a prominent protestant minister and the attention of a national audience, the bill 
passed easily, supported even by those who professed no faith and adhered to no organized or 
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institutional religion. These two words represented a national faith, a basic agreement about the 
founding principles for the United States among people with diverse beliefs. 
 The post-war religious renewal also offered Protestant churches an opportunity for 
cooperation in the evangelical mission. Though it is common for scholars to recognize a 
mainline/evangelical split, both terms lack precision. Most Protestant denominations believe in 
the importance of “evangelism” or spreading their faith, though mainline and evangelical 
churches differed on the fundamental purpose of and methods for evangelism. Mainline 
Protestants tended to emphasize collectivity and social action whereas evangelical Protestants 
emphasized conversion, individualism, and verbal witness. In the 1940s and 1950s, however, 
both mainline and more conservative Protestants laid aside vast differences over issues like 
biblical criticism and debates over modernity, and at the behest of their leaders, redoubled their 
cooperative efforts at evangelism through transdenominational councils and ecumenical 
programs.43 
 Most notably, the generally moderate to liberal National Council of Churches (changed 
in 1948 from the Federal Council of Churches) implemented new evangelism programs intent 
on “winning America to Christ.” The NCC sponsored preaching tours, training workshops for 
clergy, and advocated for a “World Day of Prayer.” National directives influenced local actions, 
and by the 1950s, Council churches were active in evangelizing local communities and national 
organizations.44 At the same time conservative Evangelical churches, particularly those 
instrumental in the formation of the National Association of Evangelicals in 1942, began to 
reexamine some of their evangelical methods and to cooperate with other Christian groups. This 
evangelical ecumenism was seen clearly and powerfully in Billy Graham’s 1949 Los Angeles 
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crusade and in the new publication, Christianity Today.45 Though Niebuhr and others spoke 
critically of the center’s move toward evangelicalism, most mainline Protestants embraced it 
wholeheartedly. In addition to the Cold War impetus for this convergence, the emergence of a 
“Protestant” identity and the belief that Roman Catholicism threatened an essential “American” 
way of life furthered the identification of a common religious identity.46 
 
Military and Religious Convergences and Conversations 
 Though religion frequently provided a language in which Americans could discuss anti-
Communist efforts, the problem of the Soviet Union was also undoubtedly a military and 
political one, and the American military prepared itself to confront the Soviet threat. Even 
though religious leaders and groups spoke with an anti-Communist tenor, they were often anti-
militarist as well. Religious leaders from many denominations and groups criticized the use of 
atomic weapons in World War II, and nearly all religious groups opposed efforts to mandate 
universal military training (UMT) for young men. The military responded to these concerns in 
part by implementing policy changes in the structure of the chaplaincy and in the nature of the 
chaplains’ mission to the military as well as employing a distinctly religious language to explain 
the military’s Cold War mission. This discourse played out during the Korean War, as military 
policies and religious ideas were put into practice.  
 At the same time, politicians responded to the concerns and priorities of national 
religious leaders. Though many believed chaplains had performed admirably during World War 
II and in their ministry to Japanese and German Prisoners of War and those being held for war 
crimes, some insinuated that chaplains were rarely the “top notch” ministers who might be 
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found in civilian churches.47 This sentiment was given voice by Major General Harry Vaughn, a 
military aide to President Truman, in a September 1945 address to the Women’s Auxiliary of 
Alexandria (Virginia) Westminster Presbyterian Church, where he stated, “You have to give the 
Roman Church credit. When the War Department requests a bishop to supply 20 priests for 
chaplains, he looks over his diocese and picks out the 20 best men. Frequently a Protestant 
[minister] does not have a church at that moment or is willing to go on vacation for about three 
years.”48 Though the General Commission on Chaplains registered a complaint, Vaughn’s 
observation was not uncommon. Because chaplains generally fell outside of traditional 
ecclesiastical structures and hierarchies, it was easy to view them as outcasts in the ministerial 
community. 
 In response to these criticisms, the Truman administration and many denominational 
organizations worked to increase the visibility and vitality of their chaplain services. The most 
significant change came in the area of chaplain training within the armed services. Though each 
service continued to operate its own chaplain school, the Army Chaplain School was as a model 
for understanding significant changes in chaplain training during the early years of the Cold War. 
At the outset of World War II, chaplain training was accomplished somewhat haphazardly at a 
school designed to train chaplains quickly—most went through only a one-month course before 
they went overseas. The school moved four times during the course of the war, which only 
increased a feeling of instability and impermanence. In 1946, the Chaplain School moved to 
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, where leaders began developing in earnest a curriculum for 
chaplains, and the School initiated distance-learning courses for Reserve and National Guard 
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chaplains. In 1947, high ranking chaplains met to coordinate between the three chaplain 
branches and began working on plans to offer an Advanced Course for career chaplains in all 
three services.49 
 When military planners chose Carlisle as the location for the Army’s War College, the 
chaplain school moved again, but its leaders continued developing the curriculum and enacting 
reforms that began in the late 1940s. The Korean War also increased demand for quick and 
effective chaplain training. In addition to training in more conventional religious and military 
topics, the new curriculum also included training on Soviet religious development, philosophy, 
and literature.50 In the late 1950s, the Department of the Army’s Education and Training Review 
Board recommended that all service schools, including the Chaplain School, establish a “career 
course.” What emerged was a nine-month course to replace the three-month Advanced Course 
and which would allow the Chaplain School to eliminate the Company Grade Course as well. 
The new course would require a permanent change of station for chaplains—and their 
dependants—attending the school, so the school moved again, this time to Fort Hamilton, New 
York. The first Career Course-trained chaplains graduated in 1963, just after the first chaplains 
were sent to Vietnam, and the course eventually provided substantial training for advanced 
chaplain-officers serving in the war.51 
 In addition to intensified and refocused training programs, the military highlighted the 
importance of chaplains when, in the face of post-World War II restructuring, the number of 
chaplains actually increased. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 changed the ratio of chaplains 
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to servicemen from 1:2500 to 1:800, significantly increasing the ideal number of chaplains in a 
wartime situation. In January 1947, the Navy had 486 commissioned chaplains, 192 of whom 
were reservists, and by 1953, they counted 892 chaplains, with 495 of those in the reserves. The 
1953 count marked the first time in its recent history that the Navy had filled its authorized 
quota for chaplains.52 The United States military made a conscious effort to recruit, retain, and 
commission chaplains during the 1950s. The fact that the chaplaincy was, for the most part, a 
voluntary service—and one for which there were usually more technically qualified applicants 
than positions—only emphasized the broad sweep of religious sentiment in the 1950s. 
 At the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, all Naval Reserve Chaplains were contacted and 
given three options: first, “To make yourself available for immediate duty, if you are within the 
age and grade limits;” second, “To notify us that you are available at this time, but wish to 
continue in the Reserve and are ready for call to duty in the case of mobilization;” and third, “To 
submit your resignation to the Secretary of the Navy, via the Commandant Third Naval District, 
if you are not available for duty at any time, due to personal obligations and commitments.” The 
goal was to ensure chaplains served, to the greatest extent possible, on a voluntary basis.53 By the 
end of 1951, 160 had volunteered for active duty and were accepted (another 140 were rejected) 
and 1486 chose the second option. Between July 1951 and 1952, a total of 620 chaplains 
resigned their commissions. By the end of the Korean War, just 119 chaplains were called to 
active duty involuntarily.54 Preserving the voluntary nature of chaplain service, especially to 
overseas and combat posts, remained through much of the American war in Vietnam as well, 
highlighting the degree to which chaplains were not necessarily typical of the clergy in their 
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denominations. In other words, chaplains could not be taken to be representative of all clergy; 
they had, by virtue of volunteering for the post, essentially made a statement on their position 
about the viability of faithful people serving in the military and might be expected to be more 
supportive of war and the military than their civilian colleagues. 
 In the years between World War II and Korea, Truman and other high-ranking officials 
such as George Marshall and John J. McCloy campaigned to push legislation that would mandate 
UMT for all male citizens. The military estimated that UMT would increase the number of men 
available for immediate military service in the event of a security crisis. In 1947, they projected 
that nearly one million men would come of age and that after accounting for physical and mental 
disability and voluntary enlistments, so UMT would compel between 750,000-900,000 men for 
training.55 Truman’s fervent support for UMT led him to address Congress on the subject in 
1945. He made his argument primarily in terms of military security, but he assured the public 
that the training would go beyond that of training only for war. He recognized the importance of 
“moral and spiritual welfare of our young people” and stated that “facilities for worship in every 
faith should be available.” Toward the end of the speech, Truman backed away from some of 
the security-driven reasons for universal training, suggesting that the objective of such a program 
would be to “train citizens, so that if and when Congress should declare it necessary for them to 
become soldiers, they could do so more quickly and efficiently. A large trained reserve of peace-
loving citizens would never go to war or encourage war, if it could be avoided.”56 Regardless of 
this significant push from the White House, UMT legislation failed repeatedly in Congress.57 
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 Yet despite the anti-communist fervor and the near-constant rhetoric of readiness and 
despite President Truman’s reassurances that military training would strengthen the morality and 
faith of the country’s young men, religious groups, liberal and conservative alike, were 
vehemently opposed to the idea, though they relied on different theological points to make their 
claims. Liberal and mainline groups and leaders feared UMT would lead to militarism and the 
militarization of American society. In 1947, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in 
America (FCC), later the World Council of Churches, reaffirmed its opposition to compulsory 
military training. Previously, the Council had supported the governmental goal “to work for a 
comprehensive system of disarmament” but argued that the proposed system of universal 
training would jeopardize this possibility. The FCC acknowledged the necessity for “adequate 
military defense,” but held that universal training was objectionable on both religious and civic 
grounds, as they held it went against the antimilitarism in American history.58 Near the same 
time, a petition signed by 652 clergy—Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish—urged President 
Truman and Congress to withdraw their proposals for universal military training: It stated, 
“clearly, a nation cannot prepare for war and prepare for peace, arm and disarm, at the same 
time” and suggested that the United States could, by committing to universal disarmament and 
the abolition of conscription “bring upon our country and its leaders the blessings of mankind.” 
The FCC feared the potential ramifications of UMT and peacetime conscription not only in 
social terms but also international ones as they wondered what the international response would 
be to the apparent increase in American militarization. 
 On the other hand, more conservative opponents of UMT couched their arguments in 
moral language. They portrayed the military as a place devoid of basic morality and a place where 
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young Christian men would become corrupted. Cardinal Dennis Dougherty, the ranking prelate 
of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States, outlined nine reasons that he was 
“unalterably” opposed to UMT in peacetime. One objection was that “it would throw them 
[young men], with all their inexperience and without adequate safeguard, into frightful 
temptations calculated to undermine their morality and physical health,” and he continued to 
charge that military officers were often corrupt and set a “bad example to those under them.” In 
addition, he claimed, that UMT would lead to a rise in venereal disease “in a frightful degree and 
break down the health of future fathers of families.”59 Only the American Council of Christian 
Churches, fundamentalist and the most conservative of the ecumenical organizations, supported 
it. The National Association of Evangelicals, in its magazine United Evangelical Action also spoke 
out against the potential militarization of American society, but it too focused on the morality of 
individual soldiers. The Editors of United Evangelical Action wondered “what might happen to our 
youth removed from home and church influences and subjected to the temptations for which 
military training camps are notorious.”60 Some evangelical groups were more supportive of 
legislation that would provide for peacetime conscription, but most liberal groups opposed this 
measure as well, citing their fear of militarism and militarization of the United States.61 Although 
plans for universal military training had failed, the Department of Defense did run a prototype 
UMT training camp at Fort Knox, Kentucky in 1947. Recognizing the opposition based on the 
loose morality of the army, the trainees received education in spiritual and moral matters. An 
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army chaplain wrote the lectures for the Fort Knox group, and these lectures later became the 
basis for the Army’s Character Guidance Program.  
 Responding especially to the morality-based critiques of evangelical groups, in October 
1948, President Truman appointed nine (later expanded to eleven) men and women to “The 
President’s Committee on Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces.” Frank L. Weil, a Jewish 
New York social worker, served as the chairman. Truman appointed the committee to 
“encourage and promote the religious, moral and recreational welfare and character guidance of 
persons in the Armed Forces.” The committee was part of a response to claims by religious 
groups that the military encouraged vice and immorality among its members and was particularly 
harmful to young men. For the most part, chaplains received a rousing endorsement from the 
Committee. The final report concluded, “The importance of the work of the chaplain is today 
recognized as never before in the history of the Armed Forces,” and continued, “Because of the 
world’s unprecedented awareness of the need for spiritual vitality, the importance of the work of 
the chaplaincy has reached an unparalleled peak.” The Committee proclaimed “that there is 
nothing fundamentally wrong with the chaplaincy” except for the acute shortage of candidates 
for chaplain positions. By most accounts, the chaplaincy had developed for itself a critical place 
within the bulwark of civic and moral education for American troops.62 In July 1949, the 
Secretary of Defense created an Armed Services Chaplains Board to advise the Secretary on 
religious and moral matters. Though the moral development and spiritual development of 
servicemen was technically the domain of the commanding officer, chaplains were called into 
service to present and implement the new program. The chaplain’s formal participation in 
Character Guidance suggested a transition in the chaplain’s role from “morale builder” to 
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“moral advocate.”63 In response to religious communities’ calls for a more concerted effort to 
promote morality in the military, chaplains became the natural conduits for this information.  
 The Character Guidance Program combined religious, civil, and moral themes, and as a 
result, the chaplain became a spokesman not only for his religious faith but also for a generic 
“American” morality and civic responsibility. As in the civilian world, military, religious, and 
moral themes were inextricably intertwined in this expression of civil religion. The basic 
program, presented by chaplains, was delivered to recruits in six parts—four lectures during 
basic training, and two more during Advanced Individual Instruction—and included the 
following topics: Religion, Basic Moral Principles, Marriage and Family Life, Sex Education, 
Citizenship, and Individual Responsibility. In addition, other personnel, excluding officers and 
enlisted men above the E-6 grade (Staff Sergeant), were required to attend monthly 
presentations by the chaplain.64 According to the Character Guidance manuals, the program was 
based on “moral” and “natural” laws, which were derived from God. Belief in one Supreme 
Being therefore provided the basis for moral (and American) action by military personnel. 
 Each of the services also produced its own materials to supplement the uniform 
Character Guidance Program. In 1953, the Navy employed a film series titled, “For Which We 
Stand” as a part of its character education program. The series included seven films, released 
between April 1949 and December 1952. Men of the World instructed soldiers on the “Conduct of 
Liberty;” Let’s Get it Straight on the virtues of moderation; To Be Held in Honor was about 
“Continence;” Pulling Your Weight instructed sailors on adjusting to Navy life; Of Monuments and 
Men addressed the issue of patriotism; You Think It’s Luck warned them about gambling, and 
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Religion in the Navy addressed the role of the chaplain and religious practice in the Navy.65 Of 
these, only one was explicitly religious in character, though all of them had religious— primarily 
Protestant—undertones and assumed a similar theistic worldview on behalf of soldiers and 
officers. 
 The chaplains who presented these programs were of various denominations and faith 
groups, and their religious organizations held different views on military service, the use of force, 
and the role of the chaplain, yet they were held together with an underlying belief in the 
importance of morality and spirituality for responsible civic and military service. The program 
guidelines hinted at the various interpretations of Herberg’s “American Way of Life” and also at 
the various manifestations of the transcendent nation/under-God-priest/prophet types that 
Martin Marty suggested. Chaplains could speak the same words with very different theological 
underpinnings.  
 By the end of the 1950s, with the Korean War behind them, the Chaplain Corps 
remained vigilant in promoting morality and character in the military. It was a primary concern 
in the fight against Communism. Baptist chaplain Frank Tobey, who was the Army Chief of 
Chaplains in 1959, asserted, “An essential deterrent against our enemy must remain the 
courageous heart, the right conscience, the clear head, the strong body fortified with the truth 
and obedient to the dictates of moral good.”66 Nuclear weapons and conventional forces would 
not be the only means of deterrence. 
 Using the language of civil religion became one way in which Americans could unite for 
a common cause. For evangelicals and conservative Christians, the military would become a 
primary ground for missionary efforts, and chaplains and extra-military religious groups 
                                                 
65 Chaplain Division, History of the Chaplain Corps, 11. 
66 Frank Tobey, “Character Guidance Program” Army Information Digest 14 (October 1949) quoted in 
Loveland, “Morale Builders,” 235. 
 55 
 
 
emphasized conversion, evangelical witness, and personal action within the armed services. They 
explicitly linked the Christian way of life to the American way of life, and they gained power and 
influence within the chaplain corps and within the military structure as a whole.67 Two examples 
in particular illustrated the character and extent of evangelical involvement with the military. 
Early in the Cold War, evangelical activists found a champion in Army Lieutenant General 
William K. Harrison, who proclaimed himself a “Bible-believing Christian.” Evangelical 
Christians promoted him as “something of a religious celebrity,” inviting him to address youth 
rallies, national religious campaigns, and broadcasts.68 The American Tract Society (ATS) helped 
him publish his personal testimony under the title The General Speaks. Over a million copies were 
distributed in the first year, making it the most widely circulated tract of any published by the 
ATS previously.69 Harrison and other high-profile evangelical Christians within the military’s 
upper echelon helped the evangelical movement gain credibility within wider circles and 
establish beachheads within the federal government and military. Second, evangelical groups 
encouraged evangelical Protestant chaplains to view their military posts as prime locations for 
evangelism. Anyone reporting to a new duty station—officer and enlisted, new recruit, draftee, 
or lifer—was required to visit the chaplain shortly after arrival. Evangelical Protestant chaplains 
looked upon this circumstance favorably. One commented, “What if every Protestant in your 
community were asked to report to your pastor?” Though some recognized the care necessitated 
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by the visit’s required nature and an individual’s right to free exercise of religion, they still viewed 
the interviews as “golden opportunities for personal ministry.”70 
 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, conservative Christians continued to identify both 
external and internal communist threats to American liberties and security. If the world were 
divided into “two distinct camps—the Communist dictatorships and the Christian democracies,” 
there could be no questioning of which side someone was on. Any hint of liberalism or 
ecumenism was met with fierce resistance and charges of Communist infiltration.71 When the 
National Council Against Conscription urged American males to refuse to register for the draft 
and “called upon the churches and people of the United States to observe a day of ‘mourning 
and repentance,’” a group of evangelical ministers denounced the dissenting clergy, calling their 
position “unbiblical, unpatriotic, un-American, [and] contrary to the historic Christian faith.”72  
 Mainline and liberal leaders, on the other hand, used the language of civil religion to 
emphasize more internationalist positions, and in some cases as a way to warn against the 
interpretation of America as God’s chosen nation. They voiced concerns about the use of 
atomic weapons, supported Civil Rights causes, and advocated dialogue with Christians in 
Communist-controlled countries.73 Yet as they staked out positions to the left of their 
conservative coreligionists, they retained the language of civil religion to prove their anti-
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Communist outlook; though these leaders did not assess an internal or domestic Communist 
threat with the same urgency as the conservatives, they frequently demonized both the Soviet 
Union and the People’s Republic of China as dangerous examples of Communist oppression 
and control. For example, when leaders from the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), a left-
leaning organization, planned a visit to the Soviet-satellite Baltic states, Soviet officials blocked 
their visit to Estonia at the last minute, claiming that the Archbishop was seriously ill. This move 
by the Soviet Union intensified LWF commitment to battling Communism in Christian terms.74 
Unlike their more conservative counterparts, however, mainline and liberal Christians tended to 
value the possibility of thawed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, its satellite states, and 
China. Historian David Settje has argued that moderate and liberal Lutherans “believed that the 
potential for mission efforts outweighed the Communist capacity for evil if Lutherans relaxed 
their criticisms.”75 
 During the early years of the Cold War, American civic, military, and religious cultures 
intersected at important and diverse points. Though most religious leaders and adherents labeled 
themselves anti-Communist, important theological and practical issues lurked beneath the 
surface. Liberal and mainline groups advocated a policy that encouraged containment, 
disarmament, and social justice while more conservative groups called for liberation of people 
under Communist rule and the annihilation of the Soviet Union. In the civic realm, additions of 
references to God in the pledge (and on the nation’s currency as well) offered a way for people 
with diverse views to rally around a single idea. For Cold War ministers like Docherty, “under 
God,” could refer specifically to the Christian understanding of God and be fully compatible 
with his understanding of the mission of the United States. At the same time, those who 
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professed no specific belief could similarly assent to the words “under God,” as they interpreted 
it to have little “real” religious significance. One historian, Lee Canipe argued that for most 
politicians and citizens, the words “under God” were actually deprived of religious meaning, and 
instead served as coded language in the rhetorical conflict of the Cold War.76 These varying 
viewpoints were easily obscured by a reliance on the language of civil religion.  
 
Initial Forays into Vietnam 
 Yet as the Cold War intensified, and memories of Korea and Joseph McCarthy faded, 
imperial, security, and religious interests combined to make Vietnam a vital point on the 
containment line. The religious divisions present, but buried, in the 1950s would come to the 
foreground during the Vietnam War as the language of civil religion and religious anti-
communism proved insufficient to mask the important underlying differences between religious 
and political communities. Conservative Christians tended to view Vietnam within the paradigm 
of Containment and tottering dominoes. They assessed the violence in Vietnam as an integral 
part of the worldwide Communist movement, and they were convinced that Americans—both 
out of Christian duty and developmental superiority—had a sacred duty to defend South 
Vietnam from the Northern aggressors. More liberal religious communities, however, 
contextualized Ho Chi Minh’s revolution in the paradigm of national liberation and argued that 
it was largely separate from the worldwide Communist movement.  
 Since Woodrow Wilson’s internationalist and idealist injunctions for self-determination 
in the 1910s and another move toward decolonization in the years following World War II, 
American policy makers had been acutely aware of the French colonies in Southeast Asia, and 
the rhetoric following both wars seemed to indicate that the United States favored independence 
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over colonialism for the Vietnamese. Yet similar rhetoric did not necessarily produce convergent 
expectations or actions.77 In the second half of the 1940s, growing Cold War tensions extended 
the deep connections between the United States and Western Europe that had been forged in 
World War II. The Chinese Communist victory in 1949 and the subsequent outbreak of war in 
Korea marked East Asia as a potential point for Cold War conflict and led many to believe that 
other Asian nations formed points along the containment line in order to counteract the 
manpower and influence of China and to prop up former colonial powers, thereby strengthening 
European democracies. 
 After the trauma of World War II in Europe, the United States recognized a key 
opportunity to prop up Western Europe’s floundering economies and weakened political 
systems.78 Early on, American policy-makers and journalists were well aware of the communist 
leanings of the Viet Minh, the underground revolutionaries who resisted French rule in 
Southeast Asia. In January 1950, the New York Times reported that the “Chinese Communist 
regime has stepped up its propaganda support of the Viet Minh (Viet Nam Ðoc Lap Dong Minh 
Hoi, which is translated “League for the Independence of Vietnam”) movement in Indo-China 
along with recognition of the anti-French republican movement there. Whether material as well 
as moral propaganda support is going to Ho Chi-minh from the Chinese Communists cannot be 
established here, but from the publicity point of view the Chinese Communist regime has made 
the Viet Nam cause its own.”79 And between 1945 and 1954, French military officers referred to 
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Vietnam as the “last rampart against Communism in Southeast Asia,” and stressed the necessity 
of American military aid to the Vietnamese fighting against Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh.80 If 
the French-supported regime fell, American officials held little hope for the South Vietnamese 
to defeat the communist forces of Ho Chi Minh. The Central Intelligence Agency warned that if 
the South Vietnamese government fell “the forces of International Communism would acquire a 
staging area from which military operations could be launched against other countries in 
Southeast Asia.”81 
 The French Far East Expeditionary Corps fought against the Viet Minh between 1941 
and 1954. The French went through a series of commanders, few of whom experienced success 
in stabilizing the regime of Bao Dai, the nominal emperor of Vietnam, or in subduing terrorist-
style attacks on military and civilian installations. In 1953, French General Henri Navarre 
worked on a plan to create an air-supported base deep in Dien Bien province to cut off Viet 
Minh supply lines to Laos and to draw the Viet Minh into what he hoped would be a decisive 
battle that would destroy Viet Minh resistance. Navarre hoped he could recreate French 
successes at the Battle of Na San, in which Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap’s forces had 
been defeated with superior French air and artillery support. The battle that eventually unfolded 
around Dien Bein Phu in the Spring of 1954, was far different from Navarre’s expectations. 
Approximately 15,000 elite French troops confronted nearly 50,000 Viet Minh combat soldiers. 
Giap had carefully stored up artillery and weapons and established positions high on the 
mountaintops surrounding the French position in the valley. By the end of the battle, the Viet 
Minh captured between 10,000 and 11,000 French prisoners, another 2,200 were killed, and the 
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wounded (including those captured) numbered over 5,000.82 Though the United States offered 
limited and covert military assistance to the French before and during the battle, both American 
politicians and military leaders agreed that direct intervention was unwise—militarily, they 
deemed the situation hopeless and politically, it could be considered an act of war. Eisenhower 
declined to intervene, and the battle effectively ended the French war for Indochina.  
 But between the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and Lyndon Johnson’s 
commitment of American combat troops in 1965, the United States had significant questions to 
answer about how Vietnam fit into the Cold War context and in American cultural contexts. The 
1954 Geneva Accords recognized the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia and decreed the cessation of hostilities and foreign involvement, namely troops, in 
Indochinese affairs. In Vietnam, the most hotly contested area, the Accords defined northern 
and southern zones, into which opposing troops were to withdraw. The country was to be 
reunified by internationally supervised free elections in July 1956. Additionally, Vietnamese 
civilians were free to move from one zone to the other; hundreds of thousands moved from the 
North to the South, while a much smaller number moved North, which enthusiastically anti-
communist Americans often cited as proof of the Vietnamese people’s basic aversion to 
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communism.83 And though several scholars report otherwise, both the Republic of Vietnam and 
the United States refused to pledge to abide by the terms of the Accords.84 
 Ngo Dinh Diem’s rise to power, however problematic, was reflective of the Cold War 
context and the American attempt to implement or stage democratic processes in the region. 
Though the extent to which American actions, as opposed to Diem’s own agency, propelled 
Diem to the Presidency of South Vietnam has been hotly debated, the significance of his 
education, religion, and political leanings to his gaining and maintaining power seems 
unmistakable.85 
 Catholic religious leaders and organizations threw their support behind the Diem 
government, and the presence of a Christian minority in Vietnam gave incentive to Protestant 
groups as well.  Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, American religious communities, 
particularly as represented in national religious periodicals such as Christian Century, Christianity 
Today, America, and Commonweal, generally reflected public sentiments about the French war in 
Vietnam and American involvement. Their attention to foreign policy matters, however, was 
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overshadowed by attention to the Civil Rights movement and religious participation in it. The 
two Catholic periodicals wrote more about Ngo Dinh Diem in the late 1950s than did the 
Protestant ones, and Christianity Today and America generally espoused more conservative and 
hard-line positions on matters like the domino theory, international communist aggression, and 
American responsibility in the face of it. 
 By 1960, however, as Vietnamese and international protest against the excesses and 
abuses of the Diem regime—including his brothers, Ngo Dinh Can, Ngo Dinh Thuc, and Ngo 
Dinh Nhu and sister-in-law, Tran Le Xuan (popularly known as Madame Nhu)—some Christian 
groups began to look at Vietnam more critically. While Diem gained support among wealthy 
Vietnamese, between 1961 and 1963, the National Liberation Front (NLF) gained ground in 
South Vietnam as it asserted itself as an attractive alternative—especially for peasants—to 
Diem’s autocratic regime. Even as the military expressed doubts in the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam’s (ARVN) fighting abilities and as Diem’s and Nhu’s abuses of religious freedom 
became widely apparent and gained mainstream press coverage, Christian periodicals continued 
to lend cautious support to the American effort in Vietnam, though they urged Diem’s 
replacement.86 Once Diem had been assassinated, liberal and conservative periodical editors 
disagreed, however, about the extent to which the United States should be involved in Vietnam. 
More liberal editors, such as those at Christian Century and Christianity and Crisis, argued that the 
United States should not involve itself in any sort of campaign against North Vietnam, fearing 
that it might provoke a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China.87 More 
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conservative Christian groups on the other hand, urged and demanded total victory over 
communism in Vietnam.88 
 Though Kennedy and Johnson enjoyed the general support of religious leaders and 
writers for American action in Vietnam through 1965, differences in the levels and types of 
support differed in significant ways. The language of anti-communism dominated early 
discussions about Vietnam, again providing an element of civil religious expression that could 
accommodate diverse points of view. As American policy makers struggled over decisions about 
Vietnamese politics, military training, strategy, and objectives, religious leaders responded 
according to their particular theologies of Christian engagement in politics, international 
relations, and military affairs. Among religious periodicals, disagreement over American policies 
and strategic objectives intensified as policy makers and officers questioned Diem’s effectiveness 
and the level of American support for regime change in Saigon.  
 Leading up to and directly after Diem’s assassination in November 1963, however, the 
United States faced another critical moment at which Vietnam policy could be altered. Historian 
Fredrick Logevall identified the period between August 1963 and February 1965 as the most 
critical for understanding the United States’ long involvement in Vietnam. During this period, 
Lyndon Johnson and his advisors worked through the decision to escalate and Americanize the 
war. Against conventional wisdom, which has suggested that American involvement in Vietnam 
represented a long, slow slide toward escalation, Logevall suggested instead that the pre-1965 
period was characterized by contingency, that the outcome was “’highly dependent on individual 
decisions” and there was “nothing preordained or inevitable about the slide into major war in 
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Vietnam in 1965.”89 Logevall argued that the widespread assertion of a national “Cold War 
Consensus,” which led policy-makers and public alike to support and defend the Republic of 
Vietnam at any cost, masks important choices that policy-makers faced and slight but important 
fissures in public opinion.90 Logevall contrasted this contingent view of the American public and 
of Congress with the rigidity of key military and cabinet-level officials.  
 Though Logevall’s analysis centered on the question of inevitability and policy, this 
more-nuanced look at the origins of the Vietnam War helps contextualize dissent. If, as Logevall 
suggests, there was significant debate and diversity of opinion over the course of American 
policy in Vietnam before 1965, the policy-oriented critiques of national religious groups in the 
early part of the war become more readily understood.91 With few exceptions, Americans during 
the 1950s and early 1960s did coalesce around an anti-communist ideology; however, 
expressions of anti-communism and opinions about how it should be carried out varied widely. 
For some, the patriotism of civil-religious language provided a way to participate in the 
dominant discourse of the day while promoting alternative visions of America’s involvement in 
the world. 
 As religious communities began to debate the specifics of American involvement in 
Vietnam, chaplains—representing a wide variety of denominations and their attendant 
viewpoints on the war—followed American military personnel to Vietnam: chaplains were 
deployed because American servicemen were stationed there. Chaplain deployment to Vietnam 
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was slow in the early years of the 1960s, appearing on almost an ad-hoc basis, with little 
sustained attention to issues of organization, supply, coverage, or assignment patterns. Official 
histories from both the Army and Navy emphasized the minimal planning involved in chaplain 
deployment to Vietnam, the Army’s volume suggests that chaplains “glided into the fury” of 
Vietnam and the Marine volume identified early chaplain missions as a “drift into turbulence.”92 
The first Navy chaplain to serve with on-shore Marine units was already stationed in Japan, 
simply waiting for orders that would take his unit to Vietnam. The first Army chaplain, 
Lieutenant Colonel John Lindvall, arrived in February 1962, and within days, two others—
William Staudt and Elmore Lester—joined him. They arrived with no support and no supplies; 
standard issue field kits, communion supplies, and hymnals had to be requisitioned on an 
emergency basis. By the end of March, eight chaplains, including one Air Force haplain, were 
stationed in Vietnam, but Lindvall lamented that coverage was scarce because the military had 
“people in scores of places scattered throughout the 600 mile [sic] length of this country.”93 
 As the MACV staff chaplain, Lindvall was tasked with coordinating increasingly 
complicated and numerous chaplains’ activities between branches, and he also established the 
features of a longer-standing chaplain section, especially for those stationed at and near Tan Son 
Nhut Air Base, such as a religious education program, regular worship services, periodic retreats, 
and a chaplain’s fund. Chaplain presence in Vietnam grew alongside the increasing military 
presence; by 1963, over 11,000 American military personnel were stationed in Vietnam. The 
Army had deployed ten chaplains, and they, along with chaplains from the Navy and Air Force, 
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established a regular, if imperfect, principle of area coverage, in which chaplains would serve any 
and all military personnel in a geographic region rather than serving only their service’s people.94 
 The first chaplains deployed to Vietnam reflected broad public support for democracy 
and deeply rooted anti-Communism, while also reflecting general ignorance of the international 
political situation and of the specific state of affairs in Vietnam. Joel Earl Andrews, who arrived 
in Saigon in 1962, recalled in a 1972 oral history interview: “I knew very little. As a matter of 
fact, Viet Nam was sort of a magical name to me . . . you know, the Pearl of the Orient type of 
thing. I thought of lush jungles and people who were very tranquil and peaceful and so forth. 
And I had not really been very serious in following the media as to what was going on in Viet 
Nam. I knew nothing of the internal political situation.” Andrews reported that his gaps in 
knowledge tracked those of the men he served. “The men,” he said, “were in the same 
predicament” given that “they knew very little . . . We didn’t even know geographically where it 
was located . . . And I didn’t know who the president was. We had a vacuum of knowledge 
concerning Viet Nam at that time.95 He, like many others, went to Vietnam because he was 
ordered to do so; they were there because there was a growing American military presence in 
Vietnam. Chaplain buildup was gradual and primarily related to the military’s personnel needs. 
 At the same time, chaplains’ activities revealed support for anti-communist programs 
and goals of the United States military. Responding to a question about the chaplain’s primary 
purpose in the military being to boost morale, Andrews replied, “all of us in the command and 
staff echelon were sorta’ caught up with this whole ideological factor. And you know, in my 
character guidance . . . lectures . . . I would hit very hard on the communist angle and on the 
attempt of the Vietnamese to maintain their freedom—sort of a general approach to 
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international type [sic] of a communism conspiracy.” Andrews emphasized that the entire 
command was caught up in these sorts of issues while many of the men serving in the field were 
unaware of such political consequences. He admitted, “as I look back now . . . I was a part of the 
propaganda effort, I think, of the command to instill some motivation in the man [sic] as to why 
they were there, their presence and so forth.”96 
 Andrews’ observations underscored the extent to which American military personnel 
and politicians at the time believed American involvement in Vietnam would be limited and 
short-lived. These illusions quickly gave way, though. Andrews reflected, again in the 1972 
interview, that upon his return to the United States, he “was convinced it was going to be a long 
and drawn-out struggle.”97 The vacuum of knowledge that accompanied the first American 
military personnel into Vietnam would continue to affect future service members. The rapid 
turnovers especially meant that accumulated knowledge was hard to establish and maintain. 
  
 During the early years of the Cold War, American military and religious cultures 
intersected at important and diverse points. Though most religious leaders and adherents called 
themselves anti-Communist, important theological and practical issues lurked beneath the 
surface. Liberal and mainline groups advocated a policy that focused attention on conditions in 
the United States along with containment, while more conservative groups called for liberation 
of people under Communist rule and the annihilation of the Soviet Union. Yet most of these 
viewpoints were obscured by a reliance on the language of civil religion and the anti-communist 
fervor that swept the United States. As religious groups criticized military policies in the late 
1940s, the administration and military officials responded with a conscious attempt to integrate 
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religious and moral concerns into the structure and character of the military. The Korean War 
provided a test for this relationship, and the chaplaincy emphasized a common American moral 
and religious heritage as a weapon for the Cold War. In the second half of the 1950s, American 
involvement in Vietnam increased slowly, but steadily. Imperial, security, and religious interests 
combined to make the Southeast Asian country a vital point on the Containment Line, even 
though Americans disagreed on specific policies and strategies for dealing with Vietnam. 
Religious divisions present in the 1950s would come to the foreground during the Vietnam War 
as the language of civil religion and religious anti-Communism proved insufficient to mask the 
important underlying differences between religious communities and as more and more religious 
communities found themselves unable to align patriotic and civic ideals, their religious beliefs, 
and American action in Vietnam. Vietnam, then, acted as a crucible in which military and 
religious interests mingled, interspersed, and collided. Those interactions would have a lasting 
effect on American religious culture, the military chaplaincy, and the place of religion in the US 
military.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO  
 
BUILDING A NETWORK OF RELIGIOUS SUPPORT 
 
 As he rode with the convoy back to the base after a Civic Action trip in June 1967, 
chaplain Paul Mitchell—scheduled to return to the United States the following day—reflected 
on his time in Vietnam. He had conducted three general Protestant services that morning, and 
he later recalled that throughout the year he “had traveled many miles by land and air, led men in 
many worship services, visited, prayed, and counseled with them.” Together, he helped them 
deal “with their fears, hurts, and sorrows, trying to help them find answers to whatever 
questions and problems they had.” And yet these activities reflected only his official chaplain 
duties. “There was another side to my life in Vietnam,” he reported. Civic action projects had 
“consumed a goodly portion of [his] time and energy.” Mitchell’s unit worked with local 
orphanages, a leprosarium, and a local normal school. They collected and distributed monetary 
and material donations from the unit’s members and from congregations, organizations, and 
relatives in the United States. These activities crossed geographical, cultural, and religious 
differences and in large part made up the “other side” of the Vietnam War.1 Chaplains stationed 
in Vietnam performed a variety of official and unofficial roles, both as military officers and 
clergymen.  
 Chaplains first arrived in Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) in February 1962, coincident 
with the official formation of the Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV) that same 
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month.2 By April, as the American military became increasingly embroiled in the armed conflict 
in Vietnam, eight chaplains had arrived at MACV Headquarters, including seven from the Army 
and one from the Air Force.3 Additionally, one Navy chaplain was stationed in Saigon by 
September 1962 as the Support Activity chaplain; he fell under administrative command of 
Naval Forces Philippines and under MACV operational command.4 Navy chaplains had begun 
to serve marines and sailors on ship and shore, yet chaplains’ duties and numbers remained 
limited until the introduction of American ground forces to Vietnam in March 1965, and their 
numbers grew until active drawdown of American forces began in 1969. Army chaplains’ 
numbers peaked in October 1968, when there were 1,924 chaplains on active duty, with over 
600 serving in Vietnam.5 The Navy deployed over 1100 chaplains between 1962 and 1971, 
approximately 700 with Marine Corps units, and 400 with naval units in the theater.6 In 1966, the 
Navy established a new command, Naval Forces Vietnam, which operated as a major command 
under MACV.7 The last military chaplain left Vietnam on 28 March 1973. Like others who 
served in the war, chaplains experienced life in combat, in surgical hospitals and aid stations, on 
ships and riverine vessels, with engineer battalions, on air bases, and at various headquarters. 
Even so, chaplains’ daily lives featured some peculiar characteristics and general patterns based 
on their function and purpose within the military, and as a group, chaplains differed 
demographically from both the soldiers they served and their civilian counterparts. 
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 Even at the height of the war, chaplains served at least a year at a stateside post before 
deploying to Vietnam, and chaplains reported that this experience was critical to successful 
Vietnam service.8 William Goldie, United States Army Vietnam (USARV) Command Chaplain in 
1967, explained that this policy was designed to increase chaplains’ effectiveness and safety while 
they were in Vietnam. He argued that chaplains who were assigned to troops in the United 
States would “be much more effective as counselors and as pastors to the soldiers in Vietnam” 
because they would be familiar with soldiers’ training and circumstances. But his second concern 
recognized the potential liability of sending unarmed, untrained men into combat situations. He 
reasoned that if chaplains spent “a good amount of time in the field . . . learning how to stay 
alive we will have much less likelihood of running up the high score on Purple Hearts.”9 
 Once in country, however, chaplains’ experiences varied widely. Those who were 
assigned to combat units had to make important decisions about whether they would 
accompany troops in combat, visit troops in the field, or stay primarily in the rear and wait for 
the wounded to return to camp. Chaplains assigned to Combat Support or Combat Service 
Support units had quite different responsibilities and experiences. Navy chaplains’ experiences 
varied widely as well. Chaplains assigned to marine units faced many of the same challenges as 
Army infantry chaplains, while chaplains stationed on aircraft carriers dealt alternately with 
intense boredom and the frequent loss of pilots’ lives. Still others, serving on hospital ships, 
were well-acquainted with the destructive aftermath of war. A chaplain’s assignment had 
significant implications for his safety, ministry, and schedule. Toward the end of the war, with 
chaplains’ physical and mental safety in mind, and to match the practice of other branches, the 
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offices of the Chiefs of Chaplains began rotating chaplains so they would spend no more than 
six months with a combat unit. But at least until 1970, many chaplains spent a full year in their 
original assignment, even with infantry or artillery brigades. 
 Their duties in Vietnam included a wide variety of pastoral and administrative tasks. In 
addition to conducting public worship services for troops of their faith groups, carrying out 
sacramental rites, counseling troops on moral and personal matters, and advising commanders 
on morale and morality, chaplains were also responsible for tasks apparently more suited to 
stateside service, for example giving character guidance lectures, and maintaining a religious 
education program. The importance of Sunday Schools and Character Guidance lectures 
lessened in importance the nearer one was to a hostile zone: for example, James Johnson, a 
chaplain with the 9th Infantry Division, recalled that he never gave a single Character Guidance 
lecture while he was in Vietnam. On aircraft carriers, however, Character Guidance and religious 
education programs were integral parts of a chaplain’s ministry. In addition to these proscribed 
duties, chaplains also assisted in Civic Action Programs, worked with Vietnamese religious 
congregations and leaders, and coordinated delivery of holiday gifts and packages to troops and 
to Vietnamese civilians.  
 What chaplains did in Vietnam and their day-to-day experiences affected how chaplains 
understood both the Vietnam War and their participation in it. Unfortunately, the record for 
recreating chaplains’ day-to-day experiences is difficult to access, so this chapter addresses 
representative moments and questions that the chaplain corps faced as it dealt with ministry and 
policy in Vietnam.10 The composition and numerical strength of the chaplain corps in Vietnam 
                                                 
10 The evidentiary gaps are significant. The central files from the Army Chief of Chaplains’ Office lack 
significant information about the Vietnam War and chaplains who served there, and the MACV files are 
incomplete. Several isolated units preserved chaplains’ daily journals and general correspondence with their unit 
records, but these are scattered throughout the Army and are usually complete for only six months to a year. The 
record is better during the later years of the war, particularly from 1971-1973, but much of this chapter relies on the 
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revealed some of the demographic characteristics of the chaplaincy and the difficulties of 
ministering to troops in a spread out area of operations. In Vietnam, the chaplain corps also 
confronted policy-related questions about the chaplain’s proper role in military policies such as 
drug rehabilitation and conscientious objection as well as the chaplain’s formal place in the 
command structure. With these official roles delineated, chaplains also involved themselves with 
non-chapel activities such as Civic Action Programs and work with local Vietnamese religious 
communities and orphanages. Chaplains worked together, across denominational lines and 
across service lines to create a complex and intricate network of religious support for American 
military personnel in Vietnam, and throughout the war, chaplains’ primary duties remained in the 
realm of pastoral care for their soldiers and officers. Chaplains’ official positions thrust them 
into the role of cultural mediator by making them full members of military and religious 
institutions, by authorizing them to administer non-appropriated chaplain funds, by mandating 
ecumenical cooperation, and by involving them in policies that mixed military and moral 
considerations. Unofficially, chaplains acted as cultural mediators by serving as liaisons between 
officers and enlisted personnel and by participating in Civic Action Programs and engaging with 
local civilian populations. Though they completed administrative tasks and participated in non-
religious functions, their actions centered on their mission of bringing God to men and men to 
God. 
 
Providing Chaplain Coverage 
 As the American commitment in Vietnam expanded, so did the number of chaplains. 
The Army operated with a large number of Reserve and National Guard chaplains who could be 
                                                                                                                                                       
official histories of the three services’ chaplain corps as well as several interviews with and memoirs of former 
chaplains. 
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activated by necessity, or occasionally by request. Often, chaplains who wished to obtain a 
Regular Army position first fulfilled chaplain duties within the Reserve or National Guard 
branches. When they were called to active duty, some obtained the necessary Regular Army 
commissions and made the chaplaincy a career. Anticipating the buildup in Vietnam and the 
requisite increase in chaplain requirements, the Department of the Army implemented a 
“Program for Appointment and Ordering to Active Duty of Chaplains of Reserve Components 
of the Army” in December 1963, for implementation in fiscal year 1964.11 Designed to meet the 
Active Duty requirements of the Army, the Chief of Chaplains Office designed a procurement 
program for company-grade officers, whereby “qualified individuals may apply for appointment 
as Reserve commissioned officers, Chaplains Branch, with concurrent active duty, and chaplains 
of Reserve components of the Army not on active duty who meet the requirements outlined 
herein may volunteer for active duty.” 
 Applicants for the program had to be younger than thirty-three and able to qualify for 
retirement under Department of Defense guidelines. Alternately, they could gain waivers from 
the Department of the Army and be younger than forty years old at the time of appointment. 
Generally, however, age wavers would “be granted only for clergymen of those denominations 
which are unable to fill authorized quotas with fully qualified individuals. Additionally, the 
directive noted that “A vacancy must exist in the denominational quota for an applicant to be 
ordered to active duty.”12  
 Even before the commitment of ground units to Vietnam in 1965, the chaplain branch, 
specifically in the Army, but in the other services as well, experienced shortages in several critical 
                                                 
11 “Program for Appointment and Ordering to Active Duty of Chaplains of Reserve Components of the 
Army,” DA Circular 601, Department of the Army, Chief of Staff, RG 247, National Archives II, General 
Correspondence 1962-1963, 201-45 – 1003-01, Folder 705-03, “Military Personnel Procurement Instructions Files 
(63) DA Cir 601-3, PERM COFF 31 Dec 63. 
12 Ibid. 
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categories. In fiscal year 1964-1965, ten Protestant denominations had “failed notably” to meet 
their quotas for Army chaplains, according to the Office of the Chief of Chaplains (OCCH) 
Historical Review. The ten denominations in question “had quotas totaling 214, but only 42 
chaplains in the active army, leaving altogether 172 vacancies.” And new chaplains did not 
appear to be forthcoming; seven of the ten had not provided any new chaplains to the Army 
during that year, and the other three had provided only four chaplains total.13 Additionally, the 
Roman Catholic Church, with a quota for nearly one-third of all available chaplain positions, 
consistently fell short of its mark. In 1965, the Roman Catholic Church had filled only 308 of a 
total 450 Army chaplain positions, filling only 68.4% of its quota. The Chief of Chaplains 
regularly and personally corresponded with Cardinal Francis Spellman, the bishop of the Military 
Ordinate, and other Roman Catholic archbishops to encourage the appointment of more Roman 
Catholic Chaplains to Regular Army, Reserve, and National Guard posts. Such shortages 
compounded when troop numbers increased— demand for chaplains far outstripped supply, 
and the quota system provided inadequate numbers of some chaplain denominations and an 
overabundance of others.  
 Other denominations also experienced severe chaplain shortages, including the National 
Baptist Association, which filled just twelve of ninety-six appointments, the Eastern Orthodox 
Church (two of twenty-six appointments), the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (four 
of twenty appointments), and African Methodist Episcopal Zion (two of ten appointments). On 
the other hand, several denominations contributed more than their quota of chaplains. These 
churches included the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, the United Church of Christ, the 
Presbyterian Church in the United States, the National Association of Evangelicals, the 
                                                 
13 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Historical Review: 1 July 1964-30 June 1965, 
129. 
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Episcopal Church, the Disciples of Christ, the United Presbyterian Church, the American 
Baptist Convention, the National Lutheran Council, the Methodist Church, and the Southern 
Baptist Convention. In all, these denominations filled nearly 159% of their collective quotas. 
Within the early numbers, however, discerning a pattern between “evangelical,” “conservative,” 
“liberal,” or “mainline” contributions to the chaplaincy seems difficult. Throughout the war, 
obtaining a chaplain’s commission remained easier in the underrepresented branches, but most 
qualified men eventually gained appointment as chaplains, even if it took several rounds of 
applications. 
 Yet more important were the very small denominations—those with quotas of fewer 
than five chaplains—that consistently supplied more than their allotment. Recognizing the 
disparities in denominations supplying adequate numbers of chaplains, the Office of the Chief of 
Chaplains reported, “a considerable number of the numerically smaller denominations have 
shown a great willingness to make their clergymen available for the Army chaplaincy, while some 
of the larger denominations have not always shown themselves capable of doing so.” As the 
chaplaincy expanded, the services relied on smaller denominations—often more conservative 
(theologically and politically) to fill vacant chaplain commissions. The goal for the Chief’s office 
was to maintain the quotas of “small and miscellaneous denominations at current strength as far 
as this is possible without depriving another denomination that it is able to fill with suitable 
candidates.”14 
 Throughout 1965 and 1966, the demand for extended active duty chaplains increased as 
the Army expanded and the number of troops in Vietnam grew. As of 30 June 1965, 1,275 
chaplains were serving on active duty in the Army, and by the end of 1966, there were 1,601, 
most of them in the grades of Major (453 chaplains) and Captain (787 chaplains). Over 1,100 of 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 129-130. 
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these men were in the Army Reserves. The increased demand placed pressure on the Chief of 
Chaplains’ Office and on denominational indorsing agencies to identify and process potential 
qualified applicants. In September 1965, the OCCH issued new denominational quotas based on 
the most current Yearbook of American Churches, to provide for one chaplain for every 66,165 
church members; the new quotas also took into account a particular denomination’s history of 
supplying adequate numbers of qualified chaplains. In addition to appealing to the 
denominational endorsing agencies, the Chief of Chaplains also appealed directly to divinity 
schools and seminaries, “soliciting their cooperation in recruiting seminarians.”15 Even with 
these appeals and calling up Reserve component personnel, the Chaplain branch faced severe 
shortages. 
 On the other end of the spectrum, the OCCH also dealt a willing, but technically 
ineligible supply of chaplains who volunteered for service. During this period of rapid build up, 
clergymen from around the world wrote to the OCCH to request a commission. However, many 
of these volunteers had to be rejected because of “age, lack of sufficient formal education, or 
past history in the military service.” Another group consisted of former chaplains “who had 
twice failed to be selected for promotion to the next higher commissioned grade,” or who were 
“nationals of foreign countries, and members of the retired reserve.” When necessary, the 
chaplain branch sometimes waived the age requirement: for some, this qualification could be 
ignored based on previous service as a commissioned officer in the military, and others 
essentially waived their right to retirement eligibility in order to gain a commission. Later in 
1966, this policy was formalized to accept from certain denominations volunteer candidates 
between the ages of forty and forty-five for five-year tours, “without renewals and without 
                                                 
15 Letter from Chief of Chaplains to Rabbi Henach Leibowitz and other addressees, 5 April 1966 (ff), 
quoted in Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Historical Review, 1 July 1965-21 December 1966, 
210. 
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retirement benefits.”16 In isolated cases, generally for Roman Catholic chaplains, the OCCH also 
waived weight and disability requirements.17 In the end, by maintaining fairly strict, if looser by 
peacetime standards, the Chaplain branch assured it could achieve its mission of providing 
professional, ecumenical, and well-qualified religious support to military personnel. 
 In addition to the influx of interested, but technically unqualified personnel, the OCCH 
also had to deal with changing expectations and procedures for chaplain assignment. In the 
months immediately following American troop commitment to Vietnam, “so many chaplains 
continued to volunteer for service in Vietnam that this Office disapproved some volunteer 
applications on the ground that a sufficient number of more suitable chaplains were available.”18 
The OCCH also announced that chaplains serving in long-tour areas should be prepared for 
possible transfer to Vietnam. By August 1966, the Army had stationed 219 chaplains in Vietnam: 
47 Roman Catholic, 170 Protestant, and 2 Jewish. The abundance of volunteers for Vietnam 
assignment suggests that early in the conflict, Vietnam was a respectable, even desirable, 
assignment that would appear favorably before promotion and review boards. As the war 
progressed, many chaplains viewed assignment to Vietnam as inevitable, so they volunteered for 
assignment in order to exert as much control over the situation as possible.19 
 Total branch strength by June 1967 reached 1,857 Army chaplains, and the numbers 
continued to rise until October 1968. At the peak of the Vietnam War, 1,924 chaplains served 
on active duty with the Army. After that date, however, chaplain strength began to decline, albeit 
slowly, as American involvement in Vietnam receded. By December 1969, 1,844 chaplains 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 212-213. 
17 Ibid., 217. 
18 Ibid., 234. 
19 James Johnson, interview by author; Jackson Day, interview by author, 19 December 2007, Columbia, 
MD, transcript in possession of author. 
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served on active duty, and by June 1970, the Army boasted just 1,760 chaplains. To complicate 
the quota system, the Army’s rapid growth obviated the OCCH to constantly revise its working 
quotas to reflect the need for chaplains and to account for denominational history and reliability 
in providing qualified chaplains. Throughout the period of escalation and rapid chaplain 
procurement, old problems remained—Roman Catholic and Jewish chaplains were in critically 
short supply, as were chaplains from traditionally black denominations, while (white) Baptists, 
(white) Methodists, and Disciples of Christ consistently supplied more than their working quotas 
required. Filling vacant chaplain positions took precedence over careful consideration of a 
chaplain’s denomination. As a result, great disparities existed between the chaplain population, 
the authorized chaplain quotas, a denomination’s membership in the United States, and a 
denomination’s representation in the Army.20 By the end of the war, as mainline and liberal 
religious denominations balked at sending more chaplains to a war they did not support, the 
number of conservative religious adherents in the chaplain corps’ ranks increased considerably, a 
change that portended important post-Vietnam changes for the chaplaincy.  
 For most of the war, MACV and United States Army Vietnam (USARV) chaplains 
operated under a system of area coverage, designed to ensure that they visited and ministered to 
most, if not all, American troops in Vietnam, particularly within a brigade Area of Operations 
(AO). Chaplains were assigned to units upon arrival in Vietnam, and though they were not 
formally attached to units below the brigade level, they often informally claimed a smaller unit as 
their own by splitting primary responsibilities for coverage among all of the brigade’s chaplains. 
In addition to performing chaplain functions within their unit and service, as time allowed 
chaplains also ministered to service members of other units and even other branches. Especially 
                                                 
20 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Historical Review, 1 January 1967-30 June 1968, 
121. 
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early and late in the war, when small units were scattered across the country, chaplains had to 
travel frequently to visit units, and when they did, most visited all the units in their area. 
 Earl Kettler, a field chaplain, recalled that in early 1964, when there were about ten 
chaplains in Vietnam, his AO covered nearly a fifth of Vietnam, from Bien Hoa to Di Linh. 
Kettler estimated there were just 250 Americans in his area, which was well below the troop to 
chaplain ratio, but visiting them in such spread out locations required most of a month.21 When 
chaplains did form close relationships with men in their units, they often felt responsible for 
visiting and ministering to those men, regardless of a unit’s location in or out of the chaplain’s 
technical zone. Samuel Hopkins likened himself to his “circuit riding forefathers who 
evangelized the . . . American frontier” as he visited his unit in forty-two different locations 
around the corps area. He recalled that it took six weeks or more to visit them all. When he 
visited, he filled several roles. In the field, chaplains conducted worship services, devotions, and 
personal counseling. In addition to their ministerial roles, they may have brought the latest 
gossip and comfort items from the rear or home.22 
 The concept of area coverage was not without its problems, especially because the 
chaplain was not assigned at the battalion level. Chaplains who later attended the Army War 
College wrote that “under the old concept the chaplain did not work directly for the battalion 
commander, was not part of the unit, and only showed up in the unit area to conduct services, 
perform counseling or conduct classes. The battalion commander did not “own” the chaplain,” 
and as a result the relationship between commander and chaplain remained undefined. They 
concluded that “in many cases, commanders and chaplains did not communicate as commander 
                                                 
21 Earl Kettler, Chaplain’s Letters: Ministry by “Huey” 1964-1965, The Personal Correspondence of an Army Chaplain 
from Vietnam (Cincinnati: Cornelius Books, 1994), 3, 18. 
22 Samuel Hopkins, A Chaplain Remembers Vietnam (Kansas City, MO: Truman, 2002), 81. 
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to staff officer.”23 The area coverage policy effectively addressed one problem—units were 
spread out over large geographical distances and chaplains could not be formally attached 
battalion, platoon, or company sized units—but created others: chaplains below the brigade level 
often felt like outsiders within the staff structure and commanders were occasionally reluctant to 
allow their chaplains to operate outside of their brigade’s Area of Operations. 
 Although area coverage, in theory, provided for regular, if infrequent, chaplain visits to 
all units in Vietnam, some units seemed chronically undercovered. In particular, commentary 
and analysis of the My Lai incident frequently mentioned the paucity of chaplain presence as a 
potential underlying cause for the American atrocity. Martin Gershen, the author of Destroy or 
Die: The True Story of Mylai, maintained that Charlie Company, the perpetrators of the massacre, 
had not seen a chaplain until the day before the incident.24 Chaplain (MAJ) Harry Kissinger, who 
served with the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Division, 11th Brigade, of which Charlie Company 
(the perpetrators of My Lai) was a part, interpreted the situation differently. In an oral history 
interview, he recalled that Task Force Barker was stationed north of his technical zone of area 
coverage, so his commander discouraged him from visiting, even occasionally. He exclaimed, 
“I’m sure he [the author of Destroy or Die] doesn’t understand about the area coverage concept     
. . . And I was following my orders from the brigade chaplain.” Kissinger’s actual zone of 
coverage was perhaps sixty miles south of Quang Ngai (the province in which Son My hamlet 
was located). Kissinger claimed that Task Force Barker was the only unit from the 1st of the 
20th to be stationed that far north. He remembered that the day before he “went up there 
                                                 
23 Herman Keizer, Jr. (COL), Kenneth A. Seifried (COL), David L. Howard (LTC), and Joseph E. Miller 
(LTC), “An Overview of the Role of the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm with 
a Critical Evaluation of Religious Support Activities and Technical Doctrine and Command Team Assessment of 
UMT Actions, Capabilities and Effectiveness” AWC Student Paper, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1992, 
USMHI AWC Student Papers 1991/1992 – Jones to Roach, filed under Keizer. 
24 Martin Gershen, Destroy or Die: The True Story of Mylai (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1971). 
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knowing that other chaplains were covering it, but I still wanted to have a contact with this 
particular company—Charlie Company.”25 Though Kissinger’s statements did little to address 
the problem of infrequent chaplain coverage, they illustrated the problem of chaplains not having 
consistent personal relationships with the men in their units. 
 The scarcity of chaplains also presented problems for faith groups with small quotas and 
small numbers of personnel. Because of their small numbers, area coverage was particularly 
important for Jewish chaplains, as they coordinated and provided for all Jewish military 
personnel and civilians in Vietnam. Jewish service members frequently expressed displeasure, to 
both the Chiefs of Chaplains and their respective congressional representatives about the 
scarcity of Jewish chaplains in Vietnam; until late 1968, only three Jewish chaplains covered the 
entire country, including two from the Army and one from the Air Force.26 Given the small 
numbers of Jewish chaplains and the dispersed locations of Jewish personnel, the chaplain 
branches worked to maximize their utility. Jewish chaplains were usually posted in central 
locations, such as Saigon, Tan Son Nhut, and Long Binh. They covered even larger geographical 
areas than their Protestant or Catholic counterparts and relied more heavily on lay leadership to 
provide religious support for personnel in the field.  
 Rather than conducting many field services, Jewish chaplains concentrated on organizing 
services for the High Holy Days (Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur) and other important religious 
observances (e.g. Passover, Sukkoth, Chanukah, Purim) in central locations and then 
encouraging and arranging for soldiers to attend. As troop levels declined, the Jewish chaplain’s 
dilemma became more acute. Albert Dimont, a chaplain in 1972, recalled that his area of 
coverage was so large that he was able to visit each major installation only once a month, and the 
                                                 
25 Chaplain (MAJ) Harry P. Kissinger, Interview by Rodger R. Venzke, 1 November 1973, Transcribed 
Patricia L. O’Connell, US Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, Chaplains-Oral History, 3-0838-044527-1, Box 1. 
26 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Historical Review, 1967-1968, 44-45. 
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smaller units/installations not at all.27 In February 1970, to further assist Jewish and Christian 
chaplains in serving Jewish personnel and civilians, the Commission on Jewish Chaplains created 
a set of “procedure guides” or suggestion sheets to cover some of the activities expected of 
Jewish Chaplains, and to educate Christian chaplains on how they could help. Their materials 
included specific materials on a variety of topics of interest to both chaplains and lay leaders, 
including pamphlets titled “Organizing Groups to Support the Chapel Program,” “Maintaining a 
Roster of Jewish Personnel,” “Chapel Bulletins,” “Kosher Food Supplies,” “The Oneg 
Shabbat,” “Passover Observances,” “Counseling,” “Conversions,” “Torah Convocations,” 
“Adventure with Jewish Books,” “Field Visiting Programs,” and “Overseas Tours of Duty.”28 
 Area coverage remained chaplain doctrine throughout the Vietnam War, and by the end, 
again became critical in practice. By the time of major troop withdrawals, the decline in the 
number of chaplains decreased the level of religious support available to troops. Even though 
the chaplain corps remained at or above its authorized strength, the number of small 
detachments across the country meant that chaplain coverage was infrequent, and it was unlikely 
that a soldier could see or speak with a chaplain of his own denomination, except by chance. In 
order to cover the widest area possible, and to keep personnel safe, chaplains were heavily 
consolidated in the Saigon-Tan Son Nhut-Long Binh area. They could travel to detached units 
only as transportation and free time allowed. In response to the reduced level of religious 
support, the MACV staff chaplain office began sponsoring other religious support activities in 
order to accommodate these changes, for example “Religion in the News,” daily radio 
devotionals, Component Meetings, training conferences, newsletters, and luncheons. These 
                                                 
27 Albert Dimont, “Jewish Report,” Appended to After Action Report, USACHCS “Vietnam Files,” Box 
8, Jewish Report; Leonard Stegman, interview by Henry Ackermann, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle 
Barracks, PA, RG: Chaplains-Oral History, 3-0838-044528-3, Box 3. 
28 “The Jewish Chaplain,” Jewish Welfare Board, February 1970, USACHCS, Vietnam Files, Box 7. 
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activities were designed to support religious activities in ways that did not always require a 
chaplain to be present. At Headquarters and on other major installations, the MACV office 
continued to use the Human Self-Development material as the subject for monthly briefings and 
Continental Army Command (CONARC) training.29  
 Along with decreased coverage, United States Army Vietnam (USARV) Chaplain 
Leonard Stegman recalled that morale problems for chaplains increased as drawdown 
commenced as the chaplain branch went from 400 chaplains to 150 in a short amount of time, 
meaning that some chaplains had to be transferred several times because their original units 
would leave Vietnam for the United States. He also recalled running out of “volunteer” 
chaplains, and by the end of the war, many chaplains had been returned involuntarily to Active 
Duty and/or to Vietnam. Especially as the American public dissent grew louder and more 
impatient, chaplains naturally began responding to the difficult questions of faith and war. 
Stegman, as a supervisory chaplain recalled that he “made it very clear that whenever anybody 
came to Vietnam they had to close their minds to that [doubt and protest] because they were not 
here because of individual beliefs or convictions. They were here because of the men. If they 
could not serve under those conditions, I did not want them, and I made that clear in the Chief’s 
office also.”30  
 Though the Navy assigned its chaplains in a different way based on the naval mission in 
Vietnam, it also practiced a form of area coverage with many of its chaplains. Most naval 
chaplains who served on shore worked within the MACV chaplain system; this group 
constituted about 44% of naval billets in Vietnam. The other 56% of chaplains were ship-based, 
                                                 
29 USARV/MACV SUPCOM Staff Chaplain Briefing, Bangkok, Thailand, 13-14 January 1973 (slide 
presentation transcript), 7, USACHCS Vietnam Files, Box 8, “Briefing for Chief.” 
30 Leonard F. Stegman, interview by Henry F. Ackerman, transcript, United States Military History 
Institute, Carlisle, PA, Chaplains-Oral History, Box 3 (3-0838-044528-3). 
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and this division reflected a reversal of the normal ratio of shore to ship chaplains. The ship-
based chaplains who were assigned to the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) ministered to 
military personnel from all of the armed forces. On the long sea passage to Vietnam, these 
chaplains established counseling programs and formal character guidance and religious education 
regimes.31 Nearly twenty percent of naval chaplains in Vietnam served on aircraft carriers. 
Chaplains with the fleet could be responsible for covering as many as forty or fifty ships in the 
battle group. They recalled that one of their primary functions, however, was conducing 
memorial services for pilots and servicemen killed in action.32  
 Other ship-based naval chaplains had looser assignments that covered between fifteen 
and twenty ships but also allowed for short-term assignments to naval groups with pressing 
need. One of these “circuit riders,” John Senieur, recalled that he and others “were frequently 
called upon to do additional duty where chaplains were not available or where tragedy had left a 
void.” Senieur then went through a laundry-list of his various Vietnam assignments: “I spent six 
weeks with the swiftboats and the Coast Guard cutters along the southern coast of Vietnam. I 
spent almost eight weeks in the USS Repose (AH-16) when the Catholic chaplain took ill, I was 
assigned to the USS Oriskany (CVA-34) following the tragic fires, I was in a battle with the 
Carronade and spent some time in destroyers during coastal bombardments.”33 These chaplains, 
dispatched in times of need, probably would not have had the time or sustained contact with 
specific units to form lasting personal relationships, but their ministry highlighted the 
importance that commanders and chaplain leaders placed on a chaplains’ presence in the face of 
danger or tragedy. 
                                                 
31 Moore, Chaplains with Naval Units, 41. 
32 Ibid., 48. 
33 John Senieur quoted in Ibid., 42. 
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 Throughout the twentieth century, because they served military personnel of many faiths 
(and those with no religious affiliation), chaplains placed a high value on the ecumenical nature 
of their work and ministry. This focus was especially strong after World War II, as Americans 
chose to emphasize their common religious characteristics instead of theological, doctrinal, or 
ritual differences. Chaplains and the broader public found a key example of this ecumenicalism 
in the sacrificial and heroic deaths of the “Four Chaplains” aboard the USAT (United States 
Army Transit Ship) Dorchester when it sank in the North Atlantic during the Second World War. 
According to eyewitness accounts, the chaplains—two Protestants, a Catholic, and a Jew—
offered others their lifejackets and warm clothes and were last seen on the deck of the ship, 
holding hands, praying, and singing. They quickly became icons of religious cooperation and 
chaplain-ideals. In 1948, they were memorialized on a U.S. postage stamp and in 1960, Congress 
authorized a “Four Chaplains” medal, which was later awarded posthumously to the four 
chaplains. Private organizations remembered them as well: in 1951 the “Chapel of the Four 
Chaplains” was dedicated at Temple University, and in 1997, family members of two of the 
chaplains and survivors from the Dorchester founded the “Immortal Chaplains Foundation.”34 
Chaplains serving in the Vietnam War operated in the shadow of these iconic figures. 
 As the diversity within American religious groups expanded, so too did the chaplain 
corps’ understanding of ecumenism. From its earliest inception in the late 1700s, American 
chaplains had come from an increasing variety of denominational and faith backgrounds. Early 
legislation about chaplains mandated they be ordained Christian ministers, but Abraham Lincoln 
successfully lobbied for that distinction to be removed in 1862, requiring instead that they be 
                                                 
34 See, for example, Kurzman, No Greater Glory and www.immortalchaplains.org, the webpage of the 
Immortal Chaplains Foundation, accessed 17 March 2008. 
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ordained clergy of a “religious denomination.”35 Still, in the nineteenth century, the Army 
chaplain corps was dominated by Episcopalians, who filled between forty and sixty percent of 
chaplain posts, even though the “combined total of Episcopalians, Unitarians, Presbyterians, and 
Congregationalists amounted to only fourteen percent of America’s population.”36 During World 
War II, the military recognized Roman Catholic priests, Jewish rabbis, and ministers of six major 
Protestant denominational families as chaplains. By 1964, the Army recognized fifty-four 
denominations and faith groups to supply chaplains, and the number of qualified denominations 
and endorsing agencies grew throughout the 1960s and 1970s. By the end of the Vietnam War, 
the military recognized over 100 religious denominations and faith groups, and by the early 
1990s, that number had grown to over 150.37 
 In policy terms, the offices of the Chief of Chaplains and other military leaders had a 
stake in promoting ecumenicalism, equality, and respect for the growing diversity of chaplains 
and military personnel. Army Regulation 210-115, for example, prohibited “the engraving or 
permanent installation inside or outside of chapels, or the display on chapel grounds, of religious 
symbols and statues,” to include crosses, crucifixes, or Stars of David. In the United States, 
where chapel construction was ongoing and generally well-regulated, this posed few problems. 
In Vietnam, however, military chapels had a more ad-hoc feel. Engineer companies, with the 
assistance of other soldiers and officers, erected chapels quickly and with whatever materials 
were available, either locally or through channels; regulations rarely seemed to come into play. 
As a result, the Christian majority thought little of placing a cross on the steeple of a newly-
constructed chapel. When, in 1968, one such chapel was photographed, the Director of Field 
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Operations of the National Jewish Welfare Board (NJWB) contacted the Army Chief of 
Chaplains. The Staff Chaplain at USARV Headquarters investigated, and the chaplains there 
solved the problem with a minimum of conflict. The various interactions demonstrated the 
chaplains’ principle of “cooperation without compromise.”38 
 One way that the chaplaincy formalized ecumenicalism as policy was by mandating that 
chaplains were to “be addressed as ‘Chaplain’” and “identify themselves by this title in all official 
communications pertaining to their status as military officers or relating to their performance of 
duty as staff officers.” The title obscured differences in faith group, denomination, and rank and 
highlighted the chaplains’ religious and staff officer responsibilities. In more informal settings 
(both personal and pastoral), chaplains could use ecclesiastical or academic titles as appropriate.39 
In a study of the constitutionality of the chaplain corps, as a response to a 1979 lawsuit, lawyers 
concluded “the term ‘chaplain’ is here used to describe those clergy who engage in specialized 
military ministries which often take them outside and beyond their own particular 
denominational faith groups.”40 Directives such as these served to formalize and standardize the 
role of chaplains in the military while recognizing various denominational and personal 
considerations.  
 Even as ecumenism remained a primary goal of the chaplain corps, some situations 
presented a definite organizational and personal challenge to the model. Many Protestant groups 
were unhappy with the fact that Mormon chaplains were assigned as general Protestant 
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chaplains because a good number of Protestant churches did not consider the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS or Mormon) church to be Christian. Given the ecumenical 
tenor of religious conversation in the 1960s, however, critics usually couched their objections in 
terms of qualifications and education. In 1962, President Johnson ordered the Chiefs of 
Chaplains to accept “a limited number” of Mormon clergy as chaplains without the requisite 
educational requirements, in part because the LDS church did not have officially ordained clergy 
or require seminary education for would-be chaplains.41 The assignment of Mormon chaplains 
caused significant rifts within the chaplain corps and among civilian supporters of the 
chaplaincy. Critics vocally accused the Department of Defense of unnecessarily watering down 
requirements to the detriment of the chaplaincy. The Christian Century, by the 1960s a leading 
voice for mainline Protestant progressivism, protested that “Whatever the caliber and quality of 
the military chaplaincy may now be, a recent presidential order threatens to lower them.”42 The 
unsigned editorial insinuated that Mormon chaplains, by receiving a waiver, would not be held to 
the same educational standards as other denominations that did not require seminary training for 
clergy, such as the Christian Science church. The General Commission on Chaplains and Armed 
Forces Personnel took up the issue in a January 1967 meeting. The Commission insisted that the 
Department of Defense had not offered a “satisfactory” solution to the Commission’s 
complaints, and did nothing to quell rumors that it and the National Association of Evangelicals 
(another major endorsing body) might refuse to endorse chaplains unless they were satisfied 
with the solution.43 
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 In the field, Mormon chaplains had to negotiate the type of ministry that was possible 
given strict constraints—officially on the minister and unofficially on Christians of many other 
denominations. Claude Newby, an LDS chaplain who served two tours in Vietnam, wrote two 
long and detailed memoirs of his experience as a chaplain. His memoirs illuminate some of the 
complexities that faced Mormon chaplains. Throughout his memoirs, Newby emphasized his 
efforts to provide for the religious needs of all the men in his unit, in particular, finding another 
chaplain to offer Communion to non-Mormon Protestants.44 At the same time, Mormon 
chaplains were often expected to proved denominationally-specific services to other LDS 
personnel. Early in his first Vietnam tour, Newby was placed with a medical unit, but the 
division chaplain made it clear that another of Newby’s primary missions was to provide 
division-wide support for LDS soldiers.45 When, for example, the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Later Day Saints organized a religious retreat for all LDS personnel in Vietnam, it fell on Newby 
to coordinate transportation and leave for all the Mormon soldiers in the division Area of 
Operations.46  
 This level of negotiation and inter-denominational cooperation, especially between 
Mormons and other Protestants, was not without tension. When Newby was stationed at Fort 
Bragg between tours of duty in Vietnam, he met significant hostility from a chaplain, whom he 
called “Chaplain Blanke” (an alias) in his memoir. According to Newby, Blanke was skeptical of 
Mormon chaplains’ credentials and abilities after a bad experience with Newby’s LDS 
predecessor. Newby recalled him saying the dislike was “nothing personal” but that Blanke said 
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he couldn’t “understand how your church has the audacity to place you men in the chaplaincy to 
compete with professional clergy.”47 Later, Newby accused Blanke of filing a report of 
grievances in order to get Newby removed from his post for cause.48  
 In Newby’s second tour of duty, he faced a situation where his responsibility to minister 
to all troops was apparently in conflict with his duty to minister specifically to Mormon soldiers. 
When Newby’s weekly report occasionally showed more LDS services than general Protestant 
ones, chaplains at the Division level worried. Newby explained that this was because “another 
chaplain came into my battalion and provided communion services, while I went about the 
division AO conducting sacrament services for as many LDS troopers as I could reach.” 
Newby’s Division Chaplain was considering moving him out of the division and into a 
headquarters slot, so he could minister to LDS personnel over a wider area and have more 
Protestant chaplains with whom to coordinate. Newby, however, protested. He explained that 
“LDS members were well organized and empowered to care for one another,” but also that he 
took his orders to provide spiritual support to men of all faiths seriously, and that his church 
required no less of him. Eventually, the division chaplain relented, and Newby remained with his 
battalion.49 Mormon chaplains especially had to walk a fine line between ecumenism and specific 
denominational support, and they relied on other chaplains and official channels to facilitate the 
balancing act. 
 At other times, the doctrinal differences between Mormons and other Christian 
chaplains provided for more productive exchanges. Again at Fort Bragg, Newby recalled that 
Chaplain Virgil Wood and some of the other chaplains had enrolled at a class at Duke University 
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on “Offbeat Religions in America,” where each chaplain was assigned to write and present a 
report on another religious group. Wood enlisted Newby’s help, though Newby consented only 
if his involvement were “limited to a presentation followed by questions and answers” and 
would not involve “argument over points of doctrine.” The chaplains cooperated and showed 
good-natured humor about the differences in their religious faith and practice. Chaplain Wood 
joked that he was jealous of Newby and other Mormons because the Baptists had chosen as 
their vice coffee and the Mormons plural wives.50 Newby and Wood maintained a close 
relationship even after they were not stationed together. Major Wood was the one to inform 
Newby that he had been selected for promotion to major below the zone, a particularly happy 
moment for both after Chaplain Blanke’s maneuvering.51 Back in Vietnam, Newby established a 
particularly good working relationship with a Catholic chaplain from his brigade—Newby 
considered this “cross-pollinating” approach beneficial to both soldiers and chaplains.52 
 
Professional Guidelines and Policy Directives 
 As the Chaplain Corps placed itself on a wartime footing, policy directives, both from 
the Chief of Chaplains offices and from their respective services, appeared and required 
chaplains serving overseas to negotiate perhaps onerous or seemingly irrelevant requirements. 
For example, in January 1964, the Secretary of the Army, via the Adjutant General’s office, 
issued a new set of “Professional Guidelines for Chaplains,” and the distribution list included 
not only the MACV Commander and the Commanders in Chief in Europe and the Pacific, but 
also the Commanding Generals of USCONARC, Air Defense Command, and the Army Civilian 
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Data Center, the Surgeon General, and the Superintendent of the United States Military 
Academy. Yet the new directives recognized that in an Army at war “the field is the normal 
environment for Army worship both in training and in combat.” Chaplains, regardless of their 
assignment, were to prepare soldiers for war. The Secretary of the Army directed all chaplains to 
conduct a “minimum of one Sunday/Sabbath service and one weekday service by each chaplain 
serving troops” and to spend at least 50% of their duty time with troops. In reality, most 
chaplains serving in Vietnam exceeded these mandated standards. On the other hand, the 
chaplain was also required to avail himself for personal or pastoral counseling in his office or 
“other suitable place” at least one evening a week. This directive would have been far easier in a 
non-combat post, where offices and “suitable places” abounded and where soldiers had easy 
access to such spaces. In Vietnam, however, few of these conditions would have been 
common—chaplains lived in similar quarters to other officers, often sharing a tent with another 
officer, or using his tent as an office, and soldiers in the field could not be reasonably expected 
to find a chaplain on a designated evening.53 
 Commanders and the Chiefs of Chaplains recognized the unique spiritual, mental, and 
physical pressures that the chaplaincy created, and as such authorized chaplains, both in the field 
and in garrison posts, to take one half-day per month for “spiritual exercises such as retreats and 
days of recollection” with an additional retreat period of up to ten days each year. This remained 
policy throughout the war, and chaplains in Vietnam often attended religious retreats for 
chaplains of their faith group or even their specific denomination. The vagaries of combat 
occasionally meant that scheduled retreats were cancelled or relocated, which complicated some 
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chaplains’ abilities to attend them.54 Frequently chaplains assigned to combat units—ostensibly 
the ones who might benefit most from such leave—were unable to get away for even short 
periods of time.55 In 1971, a Religious Retreat Center opened at Cam Ranh Bay, the first of its 
kind in a combat area; the center’s opening demonstrated a significant commitment to the 
religious and spiritual wellbeing of men in combat, chaplains and laypersons alike. The Center 
housed an extensive library, over 20,000 volumes, of religious and spiritual books and print 
materials and provided meeting and living space for retreatants. Chaplains could also use the 
facility on an individual basis for personal days of recollection or longer periods of spiritual 
retreat, as allowed by military regulations.56 
 In addition to caring for the spiritual needs of chaplains, the Chiefs of Chaplains, 
through their respective departments, also issued directives intended to define the chaplains’ role 
as a staff officer and as a clergyman in the military context. The Chiefs of Chaplains recognized 
that chaplains needed to maintain their religious identities, but the ecumenical and staff-officer 
functions of military chaplains had to be considered as well. In order to balance these two needs, 
chaplains were permitted to wear “appropriate vestments to conduct religious services,” but 
were also reminded that “civilian suits, etc. are not vestments” and that all chaplains “should 
wear their appropriate uniform going to and from the place of religious services.”57 
 The Army Chief of Chaplains also set out to establish firm rules for chaplains’ behavior 
in combat zones, particularly as it related to carrying weapons. Although in practice chaplains 
had to make these sorts of decisions on personal and practical levels, the official policy of the 
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chaplains branches was clear: chaplains could not carry weapons under any circumstances. After 
Curt[is] Bowers appeared in a January 1966 picture carrying a weapon, The Chief of Chaplains’ 
office grew increasingly frustrated by inquiries from Congress and civilians who were concerned 
with the actions of chaplains as portrayed in media depictions. Chief of Chaplains Jack Brown 
told Theodore Koepke, the MACV Staff Chaplain, “Some of these letters, and the time-
consuming replies, could be avoided if our chaplains used a little discretion in their statements to 
representatives of the various news media.” Brown reiterated the Geneva Convention protocol: 
“Chaplains are noncombatants . . . They will not be required to bear arms” and continued 
“Weapons will not be provided for female personnel or chaplains.” The Army Field Manual 
stated “The chaplain is a noncombatant. He should not bear arms; he will not be required to 
bear arms.” At the same time, Brown wished to contextualize the significant pressures facing 
chaplains serving in combat situations. “It is understandable that a chaplain in the stress of the 
kind of war being waged in Viet Nam faces an individual dilemma and I hesitate to judge him 
from my position of apparent security. However, I can and do pass judgment on the 
unwarranted publicity that reflects immaturity and indiscretion, and necessitates explanation 
after explanation to the effect that we have not given up our traditional role of noncombatants 
and protected personnel.”58 
 In response to these issues, the Army OCCH directed that chaplains would “under no 
circumstances let themselves be led into a discussion of the pros and cons of the noncombatant 
status of chaplains or permit themselves to be interviewed for a personal opinion or general 
discussion of the subject.” If a chaplain could not avoid such an interview, the Chief of 
Chaplains expected him to “uphold the traditional position set forth in the Geneva Convention, 
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Army Regulations nos. 165-15 and 310-34, and Field Manual No. 16-5.” After the uproar over 
the photograph, the Chief declared “under no circumstances will a chaplain admit that arms 
have been issued to him, or that he has arms in his possession, or be photographed carrying 
arms.” The policy, as stated officially, went even further, addressing the common rebuttal that 
unarmed chaplains placed an undue burden on their enlisted assistants and military companions 
in combat, and stated “the chaplain will not argue that without arms he is not carrying his proper 
load and is a burden to others; the wielding of weapons is the responsibility of his enlisted 
assistant.”59 Chaplains frequently ignored these directions or altered them to fit their purposes, 
but the official policy set out to define a chaplain’s position well within the boundaries of 
established international law and national policy. 
 One of chaplains’ major duties, both in stateside and overseas posts, was to counsel men 
who believed they were conscientious objectors (CO) and thus might be eligible for separation 
from the military or reassignment to a non-combat unit. Army Regulation 635-20 directed that 
individuals “applying for discharge receive a counseling interview by a chaplain and that the 
chaplain submit a report of the interview to include the sincerity of the individual in his belief 
and an expression of his opinion as to whether the individual’s objection to military duty is 
based on religious beliefs.”60 Whereas earlier CO policies required membership in a historic 
peace church, during the Vietnam War one could declare CO status on the basis of any “deeply 
held” religious belief that precluded military service. Chaplains, then, themselves members of the 
clergy and the military, were placed in a position to judge the sincerity of a soldier’s religious 
belief and to make a decision about the content of that belief. 
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 In 1964, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Seeger defined “religious 
belief” to include “a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a 
place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption.” This 
expanded definition could be used to allow atheist or agnostic soldiers to claim secular 
philosophical beliefs as the foundation for their objection. The Chief of Chaplains Office 
directed that the Seegar decision and its implications for chaplains be incorporated into the 
curriculum at the Chaplain School.61 Yet the Army Chief of Chaplains also insisted that “mature 
ordained clergymen do not need detailed instructions on how to perform their pastoral functions 
in every conceivable situation; that each chaplain is free to counsel each individual as he deems 
appropriate.”62 Chaplains in the field used the Office of the Chief of Chaplains as a source of 
information about new or unfamiliar denominations when a soldier claimed CO status. For 
example, one chaplain wrote to the Chief of Chaplains Office to inquire about the legitimacy 
and views of the Radio Church of God (Worldwide Church of God). “We are interested because 
a young 2LT MSC [Medical Service Corps], and ROTC graduate, and a member of the 70th 
Medical Battalion here, became involved with the church when he heard a radio broadcast in San 
Antonio while attending an army school. Since his arrival here, he has applied for a discharge 
under the provisions of AR 635-20. This was refused. Now he may apply for a discharge as a 
conscientious objector. He refuses to do any detail which involves carrying a weapon.” Ever 
vigilant in the struggle against communism, the chaplain also wondered if the church might even 
be subversive “because of the nature of some of the teachings the Lieutenant’s Commander says 
the young man has expressed.”63 The OCCH replied that the church was recognized and that its 
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members did, in fact, “conscientiously refuse to bear arms or to come under the military 
authority.”64 
 As dissent against the Vietnam War escalated, the American Friends Service Committee 
(AFSC)—a subsidiary organization of the Religious Society of Friends (Quaker)—issued advice 
for service members who wished to claim CO status and for the chaplains who interviewed 
them. In a pamphlet titled, “Are you a conscientious objector to war?” the AFSC defined in 
simple, accessible language, the Supreme Court’s definition of “religious belief” and “religious 
training” which made it clear that attendance at or membership in a formal church or religious 
organization was not required by law. It also explained the “Supreme Being clause” of the stated 
policy, which required a belief “in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to 
those arising from any human relation.” The AFSC pamphlet made it clear that military 
personnel did “not have to believe in a Supreme Being in some anthropomorphic sense of a 
personality having a corporeal existence, because the 1965 Seeger case allowed for a ‘parallel 
belief’ for those who hold a ‘sincere and meaningful’ belief that ‘occupies a place in the life of its 
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the 
exemption.” Finally, it offered practical advice for those who were considering applying for CO 
classification: “If you hold liberal, questioning, or more unorthodox views on religion, you 
should apply for a CO classification. If you cannot conscientiously answer yes to the Supreme 
Being clause, answer with an I don’t know or Depends on what you mean, or leave it blank. Then 
follow with a clear, simple statement of what you do believe. If you answer no to the Supreme 
Being question, you will probably be denied the special appeal procedure available to CO 
claimants.”65 
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 As the issue of selective conscientious objection—objection to a war in particular rather 
than to war in general—came to the forefront of discussions for chaplains and others, the 
Department of Defense and Department of the Army worked to set out strict criteria for 
establishing “religious belief.” Top military officials determined that “objection to a particular 
war or to a particular armed conflict is not sufficient” but that an “applicant’s objection must be 
founded on religious training and belief.” Furthermore, the policy determined that “a mere 
personal moral code” was an insufficient basis for objection as was objection based on 
“essentially political, sociological, or philosophical considerations.” The applicant’s belief must 
be “sincere” but it’s “reasonableness or orthodoxy” was irrelevant.66 Following the policy’s 
nebulous and meandering specifications was difficult enough without the added ambiguity of a 
subjective judgment as to the origin, content, and sincerity of an applicant’s objection. So in 
order to assist chaplains in interviewing soldiers, the OCCH issued a guide with “seven factors 
that would help them to determine the apparent sincerity of the applicant’s belief” as well as a 
series of “questions that they might use as a guide.”67 When the application was brought before a 
full review panel, many of the questions again hinged on religious belief and commitment. Such 
questions ranged from the simple “Did the applicant attend a church school” to the esoteric 
“What outward actions verify the sincerity of the applicant’s religious belief” including “public 
expression of his belief,” “sacrifices [made] in pursuit of his belief” or “patterns of conduct” that 
would signify his belief. The chaplain’s evaluation was considered in two further questions: 
“What was the chaplain’s evaluation of applicant’s sincerity?” and “Did the chaplain determine 
conscientious objection to be based on the applicant’s religious belief?”68  In the end, several 
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people had to evaluate and sign off on a CO’s religious convictions in order for a service 
member to be released from service or reassigned.  
 Even though the suggested questions—for both chaplains and review boards—were 
long and complicated, the guidelines issued concerning the chaplain’s interview of a 
Conscientious Objector applicant advised above all, “Keep the report simple!” Previous reports 
“submitted by chaplains in accordance with references 1a and 1b show a tendency to include a 
great deal of verbage [sic] in support of the final opinion of the chaplain,” which led to some 
applicants using the chaplain’s assessment as a basis for an appeal. “To this end,” the guidelines 
proposed that the chaplain’s report “should be limited to a simple statement relating to the 
sincerity of the applicant’s belief and an opinion as to whether the objection is based on a 
religious and/or a philosophical belief/conviction. Reasons for the opinion of the chaplain need 
not be stated.”69 Chaplains were in an unenviable situation indeed—they were asked to evaluate 
and comment on another’s sincerity of belief based on nebulous guidelines in the midst of an 
unpopular war in which they were voluntarily participating. 
 Another issue that demanded significant attention by individual chaplains and by the 
chaplaincy as an institution was drug use among American military personnel, especially in rear 
areas of Vietnam. The issue had perplexed American military leaders long before the 
engagement in Vietnam. Soldiers in the Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century 
found abundant and cheap sources for opium, and alcohol use and abuse among service 
members had long concerned the top brass. Lax Vietnamese drug laws, especially related to 
marijuana, which was illegal in the United States but not in Vietnam, presented special challenges 
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to commanders.70 Dealing with drug use among American military personnel provided a clear 
example of the chaplain’s role in his unit’s moral and military life; the situation called for staff-
officer support from a moral and spiritual perspective, which was the chaplain’s primary job 
description. 
 While the use of marijuana was frowned upon and discouraged, and a court-martial 
offense in the marines, heroin caused much greater concern. One report claimed that “In 1970 
there were 1,146 arrests for hard drugs. The following year arrests in this category increased to 
7,026.”71 However, heroin users in Vietnam differed from those in the United States: Users in 
Vietnam were likely to be from small towns (rather than urban areas), and the racial composition 
of heroin users was similar to the military service as a whole.72 Most used the drug casually, but 
were probably addicted: the purer form of Vietnamese heroin allowed it to be ingested directly 
or smoked, which reduced the risk of overdosing as well as the risk of infection from 
injections.73 
 Recognizing that drug use was becoming an increasing concern in the military, especially 
in Vietnam, the Army Chaplain School began to address the issue more directly, in 1972 
beginning a supplemental course about drug counseling and working with drug users for 
chaplains and their enlisted assistants. The introductory materials focused primarily on alcohol 
and marijuana as the most pressing substance-dependence problems for the military. In addition 
to supplying statistics about alcohol and drug use, the course emphasized the role of “youth 
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culture,” particularly for understanding marijuana use and rationalization for use among young, 
male soldiers. The course took care to differentiate between the legal status of alcohol and the 
illicit status of marijuana and other drugs, but it treated the two part of a wider problem. 
 The “drug scene” in Vietnam received significant attention in the new course, as did the 
ramifications of addicted soldiers returning home. The drug problem, the curriculum asserted, 
resulted from “loneliness, boredom, fear, peer group loyalty, ease of access, and the low cost of 
purchase.” Yet soldiers often expressed a desire to get off drugs as well, if for no other reason 
than the cost of continuing a habit in the United States. A $3-a-day habit in Vietnam would 
easily translate to a $150-a-day habit “back in the world.”74 The drug problem in Vietnam was 
pervasive and insidious, involving not only American soldiers but also Vietnamese children who 
sold the narcotics everyday. Once soldiers returned, the problems continued: kicking the drug 
habit was difficult, especially given the emotional stress of returning home, drugs were 
prohibitively expensive in the United States, and doctors worried that malaria infections would 
rise due to needle-sharing and infested blood donations. Clearly, it was a problem that needed to 
be addressed from both a military and a moral standpoint, and chaplains again found themselves 
in the middle.  
 In 1970, AR 600-32 established that commanders were responsible for carrying out an 
aggressive preventative program, including orientations, refresher courses, and special briefings 
“before departure to and on return from overseas areas” and insuring that “limited rehabilitation 
of restorable drug abusers [was] initiated at the lowest unit level.” Chaplains were further 
involved because the chaplain, along with a medical officer, could be reasonably expected to 
assist soldiers and officers in finding and participating in appropriate individual and group 
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therapy or counseling. Furthermore, the regulation stated that a “soldier seeking rehabilitation” 
who presented himself voluntarily to a commanding officer, chaplain, surgeon, or other 
designated person would “not be punished merely for admitting the use of drugs.” For many 
commanders, however, the most immediate and expedient response often appeared to be 
separation from the military. Thus, chaplains (and other officers) walked a fine line between 
military policies, legal responsibilities, and personal counseling for drug abusers. 
 A limited amnesty program, instituted in 1970, aimed to curtail drug use among casual or 
experimental users. Frank Bartomo, Assistant General Counsel of Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs in the Department of Defense, spoke before a congressional subcommittee on 
“Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs” of the Committee on Armed Services in September of 1970. 
He noted that the Amnesty program, which allowed soldiers to turn in any drugs or 
paraphernalia without fear of recrimination and then to receive counseling, moral, and medical 
support, had been especially successful in Vietnam. The amnesty program used a four-step 
process that included peer-mentoring and evaluation in addition to professional help from 
chaplains and surgeons.75 
 Within the paradigm of rehabilitating soldiers and reducing drug-use and dependence, 
the Chaplain School course offered specific suggestions and techniques for chaplains to use in 
dealing with drug users. The course suggested that a chaplain’s first responsibility was to 
understand himself and “his own ability to handle conflict and transference of the drug abuser.” 
Second, the course advised that the chaplain could help provide an essential part of the “value 
system” for an addicted soldier. The chaplain could help a soldier identify and deal with his 
“religious strivings, a fear of death, loneliness, and a sense of meaninglessness.” Alcohol (or 
drugs), the course suggested, “provides something to fill the value-vacuum in the abuser’s inner 
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world;” thus the chaplain can help re-establish quality relationships and a soldier’s self-image in 
order to fill that void. Third, the chaplain should seek to “provide a relationship in which trust 
can be built, acceptance offered, and the grace of God made evident.” Finally, the course 
emphasized that the chaplain’s response to drug and alcohol abuse must be person-centered: the 
chaplain’s focus is the “personal problem” rather than the “chemical problem,” emphasizing the 
connection between the spiritual and the psychiatric. The course material concluded with the 
charge that chaplains should “provide an open, warm, responsible atmosphere in which the 
person in need of help can take a new look at himself and try out a new life style in the safety 
and encouragement of one who brings [the] spiritual dimension into focus.”76 
 By the end of the war, however, the drug problem—especially heroin—was so acute that 
the Army decided to treat soldiers before they ever left the field. Chaplain (MAJ) Billy Lord had 
completed a tour with the 1st Cavalry, 1st Brigade in Vietnam in 1965. He returned to a stateside 
post but later returned to Vietnam with the 101st Airborne Division. Soon after, however, he 
was assigned temporarily to the Detoxification Center at Long Binh. His assignment was unusual 
because he was assigned as a counselor rather than a unit chaplain, a significant departure from 
typical Army personnel procedures. At the Detox Center, all men had to pass a urinalysis drug 
test before they rotated home. Command detained those who failed for treatment. After a 
briefing and intake interview, the addicted (or using) soldiers were placed into a residential 
detoxification and treatment program. Enlisted intake technicians referred some with severe 
mental problems to psychiatrists for further care and others to chaplains. Doctors and nurses 
conducted physical exams and monitored the soldiers as they went through withdrawal. After 
the soldiers were sufficiently detoxed, they were medically evacuated to Japan and then to the 
United States for further treatment. According to some chaplains, however, centers like these 
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had limited effectiveness. As chaplain Llewellyn Murdock commented in the official history 
survey, “people on drugs need[ed] much more than we could provide.”77 
 A third area in which chaplains’ official and non-religious duties overlapped with 
unofficial and religious ones was the host of Civic Action Programs (CAP) that constituted a 
major part of the American effort in Vietnam. In the Chaplains’ Orientation guide, CAP 
activities were designed “to use military resources for the benefit of civilian communities, such 
as assisting in health, welfare, and public works project, improving living conditions, alleviating 
suffering, and improving the economic base of the country.” These were campaigns focused on 
winning the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people: the orientation program stated 
specifically that “such programs seek to gain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for 
the Armed Forces and to emphasize the concept of freedom and worth of the individual.”78 
Chaplains would play critical, though often unofficial, roles within Civic Action Programs carried 
out by their units. 
 U.S. divisions had three basic civic action/civil affairs requirements within their AOs, 
including “to establish a civic action program in the vicinity of the division base; to provide 
support for tactical operations; and to assist the government of Vietnam in winning the support 
of the Vietnamese people and in being more responsive in meeting the needs of the people.”79 
In specific terms, CAP initiatives included “short-range, high impact” projects to gain rapid 
acceptance in an area as well as long-range projects undertaken by units permanently stationed in 
a particular area. Short range projects included activities such as “providing sick-call in hamlets 
and villages; distributing relief supplies; repairing bridges, roads, and culverts; constructing 
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shower facilities, latrines, wells, and bulletin boards; and distributing candy to children.” On the 
other hand, long-range projects included activities such as “the improvement of district 
dispensaries; the construction of schools, libraries, village dispensaries, and playgrounds; the 
training of midwives and medical technicians; conducting classes in hygiene, sanitation, first aid, 
and the English language; and the sponsoring of orphanages, refugee camps, communities, 
leprosariums, and Boy Scout troops.”80 
 The most significant way in which chaplains contributed to Civic Action Programs was 
through the collection and apportionment of donations—officially, non-appropriated funds—
usually collected at services and other venues.81 Chaplains in Vietnam, the United States, and 
other overseas posts made collective and concerted efforts to raise money for various causes in 
Vietnam. One successful campaign, for the Go Vap Orphanage resulted in total offerings of 
$32,736.48 by mid-1965.82 On some posts, chaplains conducted informal collection drives, and 
at others (mainly stateside posts), friendly competitions between Protestants and Catholics 
emerged to see which group could raise the most money. 
 The Army Chief of Chaplains was quick to point out, however, that Civic Action 
Programs were not within the realm of chaplains’ duties and suggested that chaplains should not 
become too entangled in them. In response to a MACV chaplain who wished to begin a 
program of sponsorship of ARVN units in order to meet the “immediately urgent demands of 
dependents of Vietnamese servicemen for clothing, shoes, certain kinds of food, personal 
hygiene items, and so on,” the Chief replied that there was considerable merit in such assistance, 
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81 Chaplains used non-appropriated funds for non-official purposes and to purchase denominationally 
specific religious accessories, such as candlesticks or processional crosses. Frequently, however, chaplains misused 
appropriated funds for the second purpose. 
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but that the chaplain should contact the USARV Staff Chaplain and the MACV chaplain to 
arrange for such assistance through recognized and supported channels. The Chief was 
apparently wary of longstanding commitments, such as those entered into in Korea, from which 
chaplains found it difficult to extricate themselves and their units.83  
 Chaplains frequently reported that their interactions with local Vietnamese civilians were 
among the most significant of their tours. These efforts also increased goodwill in the United 
States among religious congregations and organizations. In 1971, for example, a United 
Methodist chaplain newsletter ran a picture of chaplain Ralph VanLandingham, installation 
chaplain at Bien Hoa Air Base, giving an offering to the sisters of Ke Sat Orphanage in Ho Nai. 
The picture was titled “So Children Could Have Eggs for breakfast,” and the caption told 
readers that the $239 gift, used to purchase chickens, had been given by the Protestant 
congregation at Bien Hoa.84 A Navy chaplain, Francis Burchell, reported that his unit was 
involved in various Civic Action projects: “Benches were built and placed in the Cat Lo town 
library; repair three class rooms and dig a well for a school at Vung Tau; rebuilt playground 
equipment and built desks and chairs for a school at Cat Lo.”85 Chaplains also accompanied 
doctors, nurses, and medics on Medical Civil Action Programs, where they distributed treats to 
children and made contacts with local leaders.86 The reports were not, however, free of 
paternalist attitudes. A chaplain at the Third Surgical Hospital reported to his colleagues at home 
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that he was always “pleased to see the dedication and enterprise demonstrated by the educated 
and committed folk” at the “Catholic school and orphanage in Can Tho.”87 
 Other congregations focused their efforts at supporting local religious communities. 
Donald Concklin’s battalion donated their chapel to “Go Gong Village when [the] unit was 
relocated. The building was reassembled on its new location by personnel of the unit.” The unit 
newspaper reported that the “donation of the chapel in tact, is believed to be the first of its kind 
in Vietnam.”88 Donald Rich, assigned to a MAG Team, reported that he had considerable and 
sustained contacts with American missionaries and Vietnamese churches. Because he was a 
Protestant chaplain assigned to a remote area, he often relied on Vietnamese Catholic priests, 
most of whom spoke English, to provide coverage for his Catholic unit members.89 James 
Johnson forged a long-lasting relationship with a local Vietnamese clergyman, “Pastor Ha,” 
while he was in Vietnam. Ha was killed in the aftermath of American withdrawal, and thirty 
years after the war, Johnson was able to contact and reconnect with Pastor Ha’s daughter, who 
still lived in Vietnam.90 
 
Pastoral and Military Relationships 
Chaplains, as staff officers responsible to a Commanding officer, often ventured into 
scenes without particularly religious consequences but which dealt more generally with troop 
morale and effectiveness. Their status as officers gave them access to command and their status 
as clergy helped them remain accessible to enlisted personnel. Others believed that the chaplain’s 
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advice—especially if it came from a former “military man”—may have held special moral 
weight. Chaplains performed a variety of duties, including giving character guidance lectures and 
counseling conscientious objectors, and also performed several unofficial functions as well.  
 One role that many chaplains reported was that of a mediator between enlisted 
personnel and their commanding officers. In a speech to history students at Regents University 
in Denver, Colorado, James McClements gave an extended example of this role. McClements 
served as an infantryman before becoming a chaplain, and he understood the “chaplain’s job was 
to be with his men in combat—the Private in the trench as well as the Commander in the 
lead.”91 He resolved to be a spiritual and moral advisor to both his enlisted personnel and his 
officers. Toward soldiers, he often cast his concern in a paternal or spiritual terms. He recalled 
finding one soldier who “looked awfully tired when I stood by him in the chow line. I asked him 
what was happening. He said he was just doing his duty. Upon my prying, he told me he was 
assigned to night guard duty every night for the past two weeks.” McClements then switched 
modes and approached the private’s commander, who told him that the soldier was a “goof-off” 
and a “cry-baby,” at which point McClements returned to the soldier. 
 The soldier supplied additional information—namely that he had a vision problem that 
prevented him from seeing well in the dark, but there was nothing in his medical records. The 
soldier reported that he had tried to alert his commander of the issue, but encountered serious 
resistance. McClements kept talking and discovered that this soldier had worked as a medic on 
an emergency response team at home and wished to eventually become a doctor. The chaplain 
then went to the squadron surgeon to discuss the possibility of getting the Private transferred to 
the medics, who were always in high demand. When McClements returned to the commander to 
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offer this solution, McClements was careful to frame this advice and argument in terms of 
military effectiveness by suggesting that the commander would be guilty of negligence if the 
soldier were to fail during guard duty and it came to light that he had reported his vision 
problem. By that point, when McClements suggested the transfer, the commander assented 
quickly. Later, McClements reported, the soldier earned the Distinguished Service Cross, the 
Army’s second highest medal for valor in combat, for pulling a soldier from a burning 
helicopter.92 Here, the chaplain’s military experience, his view of the soldier’s and the 
commander’s perspective, and his understanding of military channels and the chaplain’s advisory 
function enabled him to act as an effective intermediary for an unhappy soldier and commander. 
 Other chaplains used their flexible schedules and ability to travel away from a command 
post in order to report first-hand about a unit’s personnel after an engagement. James Johnson 
recalled that after any unit suffered casualties, he took the first available opportunity to visit 
evacuation and surgical hospitals to see the men. He acted as a chaplain—offering comfort and 
spiritual counsel to wounded soldiers whom he knew—but also as a commanders eyes and ears, 
gathering information about the severity of a soldier’s wounds and the prospects of his return to 
duty. Johnson recalled that upon his return to Headquarters, he would brief the commander 
about the status of each soldier who had been wounded.93 Though Johnson’s official role did not 
require him to act as a liaison between wounded soldiers and his commander, his being chaplain 
gave him access to both groups that other officers or enlisted personnel might not have enjoyed. 
 At its best, the chaplain’s relationship with a commander was one of mutual respect and 
support and the staff shared a common sense of mission. One chaplain, who wished to remain 
anonymous, wrote in his survey response regarding the influence of his first commander: “I was 
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blessed—my commander held chaplains in high esteem—every one knew it—not because he 
preached by word but by action—consequently we were very much a part of the team—had all 
the support one could expect.”94 Generally, officers appreciated chaplains accompanying their 
units, as long as provisions for the chaplain’s safety were in place, believing that it increased 
troop morale and occasionally brought luck in battle. On the other hand, commanders could 
frustrate a chaplain’s efforts by impeding or limiting his ability to visit troops, conduct services, 
or perform other religious tasks.  
 But not all commanders appreciated chaplains. Conflicts between chaplains and their 
commanding officers over moral issues, performance evaluations for chaplains, the nature of 
religious services, or expectations about a chaplain’s primary duty played out in a variety of ways. 
In some cases, a contentious relationship resulted in a neutral to negative Officer Efficiency 
Report (OER) for a chaplain. But more often, commanders simply complicated instead of 
facilitated the chaplains’ role. In cases like these, chaplains identified themselves as right and 
perhaps even righteous, and thus supported by a “higher” authority. In their reflections, 
chaplains were nearly always successful in convincing their commanders of the positive effects 
of their presence. Claude Newby wrote that one of his first combat commanders, Captain Dave 
Root, disliked the chaplain’s presence and went out of his way to hamper Newby’s activities. 
Root used his position as a battalion staff officer to give Newby false flight schedules and 
otherwise make his life difficult. In a brief confrontation, Root told Newby, “I’ve been an atheist 
all my life. As far as I am concerned, you are a bad influence on the troops, and I am duty-
bound to protect them from you. I’ll do everything I can to make you miss flights and otherwise 
hamper your activities.” Newby responded with a threat of his own: that if Root gave him any 
more “false information about flights or interfere[d] in any other way with religious support,” he 
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and Newby would “be standing before the battalion commander.”95 According to Newby, after a 
communication breakdown between three platoons where Root’s unit could have suffered heavy 
friendly-fire casualties, the captain declared his atheism shaken, and thereafter requested that 
chaplains accompany his men as often as possible.   
 Other commanders, while not openly hostile to the chaplains’ activities, doubted that 
religious faith was an asset in battle. Curt Bowers recalled a specific unit commander who 
refused to attend field worship services, but who “faithfully put the word out when divine 
worship was conducted for his troops.” Once when Bowers noticed him standing nearby and 
asked the officer, “‘Harry, what’s going on? I thought you said you didn’t want to go to church 
because you are not in sympathy with what I am preaching—the love of Christ and love of your 
neighbor.’” The officer responded, “‘Naw, Chaplain, I don’t want my men to get too loving. 
They have to be fighters, and I don’t want them to get too much of this Christianity stuff.’” The 
commander assured Bowers that he believed “a little bit won’t hurt them” but he did not “want 
the guys to think I am getting soft.”96 Combat required men to harden their hearts and minds, 
and to some, religion was an unnecessary and even dangerous distraction from the business of 
making war. 
 For many chaplains, however, it seemed that their relationships with their supervisory 
chaplains were more problematic than with their commanders. Supervisory chaplains were to 
provide spiritual support and guidance for chaplains under them, but this role was largely an 
unspoken one, and some chaplains handled this part of their jobs better than others. Albert 
Hanson, a Roman Catholic chaplain, reported that his supervisory chaplain was “Useless—He 
was caught up in his own need to please the commander. In an 8 month period [he] never 
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visited my AO, nor asked how I was doing.”97 Other chaplains were more charitable in their 
explanations. Douglas Edward reported that “in Combat situations, each Chaplain was busy 
taking care of his own units that he didn’t have much time for socializing or giving much 
support to other chaplains, other than rare occasions. Most of the ones I knew were busy ‘doing 
their own thing,’ and trying to stay alive.”98 Joseph Beasley, who was posted at USARV 
headquarters and saw little if any combat action, remembered a similar feeling: the goal was to 
finish the year and get out alive. Aside from this sort of focus, Beasley also emphasized that 
there were rarely large concentrations of chaplains in any one area—even at Long Binh, one of 
the largest military installations in South Vietnam, only three chaplains were stationed 
permanently at the base.99 Many chaplains reported receiving little spiritual or professional 
support from chaplaincy channels.  
  Regardless of their administrative and official functions, however, chaplains, especially 
those serving in combat units and in non-administrative positions, viewed their primary role as 
pastoral. They were in Vietnam to “bring God to men, and men to God.” Donald Shea wrote 
simply that “Ministry is people where they are.” Though US-based clergy and laypeople 
frequently chastised chaplains for not taking a more prophetic stance on the Vietnam War, 
chaplains themselves insisted this was not their primary responsibility and some argued that to 
take a prophetic role would undermine their pastoral effectiveness.100 
 In addition to advising commanders on moral and spiritual matters that affected the unit, 
the chaplain also offered counsel to officers on personal matters. In the official history survey, 
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most chaplains recalled that officers came to them regarding a variety of issues, including both 
personal and family situations and about command and leadership issues. Officers’ top concerns, 
as identified by chaplains included “home and family problems,” “leadership problems; stress of 
command,” “homesickness, separation, and loneliness,” “marital/romantic problems,” and “the 
morality and ethics of war, particularly Vietnam.” For enlisted personnel, the concerns were 
largely the same. Chaplains identified the top concerns of enlisted men as “homesickness, 
separation, and loneliness,” “home and family problems,” “Fear (not getting home again, danger, 
death, etc.),” “marital/romantic problems,” “personal problems (stress, anxiety, anger, 
depression, etc.,” and “drug and alcohol problems.”101 For enlisted personnel, problems and 
questions about the morality of war and the reasons for American involvement in Vietnam 
presented themselves less frequently than for officers. 
 As the war went on, many chaplains became disillusioned by soldiers’ apathy toward 
religion and with their behavior in general. Whereas earlier chaplains viewed the potential for 
ministry and their own effectiveness positively, chaplains during the drawdown phase were 
generally more despondent. One wrote in an unofficial “After Action Report,” filed in 1973, “As 
the total number of men diminishes, the relative paucity of those attending religious services 
becomes even more apparent. A spirit of killing time of simply waiting out one’s DEROS [Date 
of Earliest Return from Overseas], a sense of boredom, etc. all contribute to make men apathetic 
and lackadaisical.” He continued that many of the men were “religiously immature and grossly 
uninstructed,” which meant they “fail[ed] to see any relevance or applicability of religious 
practices.” On top of spotty attendance at religious services and attention to spiritual concerns, 
chaplains increasingly voiced complaints about the “sinful” and hedonistic lifestyles of many 
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soldiers and officers in Vietnam. John Kenney wrote that “the overwhelming majority of men 
are either actively engaged in excessive drinking habits, cohabitation, or recourse to prostitutes, 
drugs, etc. or, at least they are immersed in a milieu of continual and inescapable blasphemy, 
profanity, obscenity which pervades their consciousness and renders them feeling ‘unfit’ and 
‘unworthy’ to come into contact with the sacred or whatever represents it and so they stay away 
in droves.” 102 He estimated that “less than one per cent of enlisted men . . . participated in 
formal religion” and lamented the fact that a “chaplain may spend an entire day in getting to an 
isolated area (at considerable expense to the government and possible danger to himself), 
advertise time and place for services to be held, personally contact the majority of those present 
and then have no one show up.”103 This was a sense of defeat and frustration that simply was 
not consistently and visibly present early in the war. Chaplains, like others who observed US 
action in Vietnam, frequently came to believe the war was a colossal mistake, and a terrible waste 
of lives.  
 Kenney in particular provided a clear voice of opposition and frustration in the late 
stages of the war. The chaplain, in his estimation, was frustrated by the war and the behaviors it 
engendered, but the angst was deeper. Chaplains, of whom many had concluded that “a sincere 
approach to God could possibly help any man to solve his problems and live a better life,” faced 
a feeling of uselessness and helplessness because the soldiers’ and officers’ “indifference 
prevent[ed] and preclude[d] that.”104 Kenney continued, “this experience, repeated continuously, 
can make him feel that he himself and what he has to offer are about as useful and appreciated 
as another wart on the proverbial toad, and the disappointment in proportion as he himself takes 
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the role of clergyman seriously, bears all the more heavily on his own morale,” and the chaplain’s 
morale, according to Kenney’s interpretation, was critical for the chaplain personally but also for 
the unit—a demoralized and ineffective chaplain could only damage the military mission.105 
  
 Chaplains performed both official and unofficial functions when they served in Vietnam, 
and both types of duties contributed to chaplains’ roles as cultural mediators. The complicated 
system of quotas, coupled with chronic shortages and overages of chaplains in some faith 
categories, necessitated ecumenical cooperation whereby chaplains crossed denominational and 
faith-group lines to minister to a diverse military audience. Chaplains combined their roles as 
religious and moral advocates and as military officers as they helped commanders deal with 
issues such as drug use and conscientious objection. They acted as liaisons between officers and 
enlisted personnel and between the military and Vietnamese civilians. And most chaplains 
seemed to welcome these opportunities to bridge cultural divides. Rather than precipitating 
internal conflict because their roles demanded contradictory commitments, chaplains functioned 
well in a system that required them to combine their religious and military identities.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CONTESTED MEANING AND IDENTITIES: CHAPLAINS RESPOND TO 
CONFLICT IN COMBAT ZONES 
 
Somewhere in Vietnam, in a bomb crater filled with water, Joseph Dulany baptized 
soldiers, and in those moments, remnants of death and destruction became fonts for the 
symbolic waters of life. On another military base, James Johnson grieved as he held the lifeless 
body of a friend, having missed the mission in order to baptize another soldier and was left 
pondering the significance of trading a new birth for a death. Later, Johnson recorded in great 
detail the mutilation of a Viet Cong corpse by American servicemen with C-ration plastic 
spoons, and in his diary agonized over his inability to respond according to his moral beliefs. On 
a ship, Joseph O’Donnell blessed the mangled remains of eighteen marines with the Catholic 
Sacrament for the Sick, a blessing as much for those left alive as for the dead. Curt Bowers 
baptized soldiers of different races, ethnicities, and backgrounds as others armed with automatic 
weapons stood watch to ensure their safety. Orris Kelly offered Communion to soldiers 
returning home, regardless of their religious preference, as a symbol of community and 
reconciliation. James Hutchens participated in every aspect of his unit’s initiation ritual, though 
he substituted lukewarm water for alcohol. Chaplain Tumkin went AWOL when conditions at 
camp got too rough.  
In the midst of day-to-day work—holding services, filling out paperwork, traveling to 
units, counseling soldiers, and visiting troops—and perhaps as a result of it, chaplains 
confronted a variety of problems on the battlefield. As chaplains worked through complex and 
intense moral, theological, and pastoral dilemmas, using a variety of strategies, they fulfilled their 
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roles as cultural mediators within the military community as they adapted traditional religious 
practices and interpretations into the context of war and conversely as they reframed the 
experience of war within religious language and imagery. Doing so brought together two sets of 
cultural norms and values that frequently appeared opposed to one another. Most often, 
chaplains—like those to whom they ministered—made decisions based on the exigencies of 
particular moments. In war, chaplains not only faced broad questions of morality and identity 
but also struggled with apparently more mundane issues such as alcohol use and profanity. 
Moral, theological, and pastoral tensions tested chaplains’ beliefs and world-views and demanded 
that chaplains work out ways to reconcile potential conflict. In response to these tensions, 
chaplains managed their dual identities as clergymen and officers by developing practical 
solutions to moral questions and crisis-based theologies that helped them identify meaning in 
war. This process was a fundamentally creative one, requiring chaplains to rethink their own 
identities and ministries in light of their wartime experiences. As they addressed theological 
problems and reconceived of their ministries, chaplains also responded to changed liturgical and 
worship settings, and again, they engaged in a creative process to participate in the creation of 
diverse and dynamic liturgies of war, or community acts of worship, which were particularly 
suited to the war zone. 
This chapter relies primarily on chaplains’ first-person accounts to reconstruct the 
experiences of some of the American military chaplains who served in Vietnam. Broadly, these 
accounts include published memoirs or autobiographical essays, published and unpublished 
letters and diaries, chaplain-authored articles and reports in various denominational and 
ecumenical publications, oral interviews, and Army chaplains’ responses to official history 
surveys. At best, these sources that deal with chaplains’ experiences during the Vietnam War 
allow us to look through a glass darkly. Even though chaplains did not usually participate in the 
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actual fighting, their reflections about combat are as problematic as others. As historians have 
undoubtedly learned from the long tradition of using personal sources like memoirs and diaries, 
the human memory is fallable; the pen can be used as a weapon; and time and audience are often 
unwanted filters that stand between historian and subject.  These sources, however, are critical 
to understanding the human experience, and there is significant insight to be gained from them.1  
If experience and interpretation—rather than simply structures and forces—are central to telling 
military and religious history, then these are rich archives indeed. 
Each of these types of sources brings strengths and limitations to historians. Memoirs, 
narratives, surveys, and interviews are all subject to the distortions of memory and time. 
Memoirs and narratives were written with an audience in mind and for specific purposes, which 
may be political, religious, therapeutic, or familial, among others. Within the area of first-person 
autobiographical writing, the combat memoir or narrative has held a particularly important 
place.2 The combat memoir frequently employed specific tropes and images that serve to relate 
the experience of combat to an unfamiliar audience. And within this broader category of war 
memoirs, chaplains’ first person writings have received scant scholarly attention—they have not 
usually been considered in compilations of combat memoirs, because chaplains did not 
participate as combatants, and in other collections, such as those that focused on gender, racial, 
or ethnic minorities’ experiences in war, chaplains—mostly white and all male until the 1970s—
voices were excluded as well. The significant exception was Bradley Carter’s 2004 PhD 
dissertation, “‘Reverence Helmeted and Armored’: A Study of Twentieth-Century U.S. Military 
                                                 
1 Joan W. Scott presents an extended analysis of and challenge to historians’ use of “experience” as a 
foundational concept in knowledge production. Scott argues that rather than asserting “experience” as the “origin 
of our explanation,” we should instead view it as “that which we want to explain.” Joan W. Scott, “The Evidence of 
Experience,” Critical Inquiry 17 (Summer 1991), 797. 
2 On the sub-genre of twentieth-century (primarily) Anglo-American combat memoirs see Samuel Hynes, 
The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War (New York: Viking, Penguin Press, 1997). 
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Chaplain Memoirs,” which examined these accounts as a distinct sub-genre of autobiographical 
writing in order to draw conclusions about chaplains’ roles and attitudes in the twentieth-century 
United States.3 
Other sources, such as diaries, letters, and period publications, which seem closer to 
capturing “actual” experience, also have attendant limitations and constraints. Even diarists and 
letter-writers produced texts for audiences—whether the audience was themselves, family 
members, or a broader public. In the course of writing, they chose what to record and what to 
leave out. After experiencing combat situations, they often choose to write nothing, insisting 
that words were inadequate to relate the experience or that the words would be too much for the 
intended audience to handle. If letters and diaries were published, the issue of editorial selectivity 
must be factored in, and if they remained unpublished, they were normally still subject to 
archivists’ decisions and the permissions of the collection holders. Accounts in publications 
during the Vietnam War were also subject to editorial decisions about relevance, content, style, 
and length.4 Furthermore, many of these documents were subject to security and classification 
review by government and military officials. 
Nevertheless, these sources bring scholars as close as possible to the experience of 
chaplains in the Vietnam war zone. Wherever possible, I relied on texts produced at the time of 
the war, but given their relative scarcity, I also use memoirs, narratives, surveys, and interviews 
produced long after the fact. Often, I chose to take chaplains at their word, especially about 
events and practices during the war; however, their interpretations of those events and practices 
                                                 
3 Bradley L. Carter, “Reverence Helmeted and Armored”: A Study of Twentieth-Century U.S. Military 
Chaplain Memoirs,” (PhD diss. University of Kansas, 2004). 
4 For an extended discussion of the limitations of various types of first-person accounts of war, see Alex 
Vernon, “Introduction: No Genre’s Land: The Problem of Genre in War Memoirs and Military Autobiographies,” 
in Arms and the Self: War, the Military, and Autobiographical Writing (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2005), 
1-40. 
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I have read more skeptically, and the production and significance of many of those 
interpretations is explored in greater detail in Chapter Five.5 Due to the specific and personal 
motivations of chaplains who chose to record and make public their wartime recollections, the 
practices and events presented in this chapter should not be interpreted as normative or even 
typical; they do, however, reveal a broad range of responses to theological, moral, pastoral, and 
identity-related conflicts. A more representative sample might reveal an even more complicated 
picture. 
 
Theorizing the Chaplain’s Experience: Role Conflict 
Though limited, the historiography on chaplains in modern militaries has emphasized 
role conflict or tension as the central problem for chaplains. Based on sociological role theory, 
role conflict emerged when competing and incompatible expectations were placed on a single 
person. Consequently, scholars have argued, this conflict must be resolved—most often by 
compartmentalizing the roles, rationalizing away the roles’ incompatibility, or abandoning one of 
the roles. According to many observers, the American chaplaincy system, conceptually and 
practically, was rife with contradictions, ironies, and conflicts. Role conflict, and the corollary 
conclusion that it resulted in chaplains abandoning their religious identities does not fit 
chaplains’ experiences during the Vietnam War. Though chaplains faced intense moral and 
theological questions—often about their admittedly dual roles or identities—those questions did 
                                                 
5 John Towes has suggested that the work of intellectual history, and I argue, by extension, cultural history 
as well, has been to “reaffirm . . . that human subjects still make and remake the worlds of meaning in which they 
are suspended and to insist that these worlds are not creations ex nihilo but responses to, and shapings of changing 
worlds of experience ultimately irreducible to the linguistic forms in which they appear.” John E. Toews, 
“Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience,” 
American Historical Review 92 (October 1987): 881. Though Scott offers a compelling critique Towes’s essentializing 
“experience” as separate from language, his statement reminds historians that the production and texts and language 
surrounding experience does not originate without the sensual and visceral knowledge of events. Scott writes, on 
the relationship between experience and knowledge: “Writing is reproduction, transmission—the communication of 
knowledge gained through (visual, visceral) experience.” Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” 776. 
 123 
 
 
not necessarily arise from conflicting role expectations or even the various identities they were 
expected to assume. Whereas the “role conflict” model asserted a fundamental incompatibility 
or tension embedded within the roles and expectations themselves, in reality, chaplains actively 
made choices about their identities, roles, and responses to tension, either real or perceived. 
Chaplains confronted dilemmas that called into question both their functions in and 
interpretations of war. They managed their identities as soldiers, clergy, and officers in a variety 
of ways, few of which demanded the black-or-white decision to support or oppose the war. Like 
others in the war, chaplains experienced success and failure, heroism and cowardice, certainty 
and hesitation, faith and doubt as they confronted moral, spiritual, and physical uncertainties in 
Vietnam.  
Shortly after World War II, against the tide of Christian Realism that sanctioned military 
action in the face of overwhelming evil, sociologist Waldo Burchard suggested there were five 
basic tenets of Christianity that would induce role conflict for chaplains. He argued the Christian 
doctrines “of love, of universal brotherhood, of peace, and of non-resistance to evil, and the 
commandment, ‘You shall not kill” were “manifestly incompatible with the aims of a nation at 
war. Therefore it is impossible for the Christian in military service to put them into practice.”6 
He concluded, then, that chaplains compartmentalized their roles when conflict occurred and 
most often subordinated their roles as ministers of religion to their roles as military officers. 
Burchard’s basic assertion that chaplains experienced and were unable to adequately resolve role 
                                                 
6 Christian Realism was a theological concept originated by Reinhold Niebuhr in response to World War II 
and the emerging Cold War. It held that humans occasionally had to forego the “Kingdom of God on Earth” 
because of human fallibility; instead, humans were required to confront evil wherever they found it. For Niebuhr’s 
writing see Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Scribner, 1953); for commentary and analysis see Robin 
Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Russel F. Sizemore, 
“Reinhold Niebuhr and the Rhetoric of Liberal Anticommunism: Christian Realism and the Rise of the Cold War,” 
(PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1987); Gary Dorrien Soul in Society: The Making and Renewal of Social 
Christianity (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995); and Ronald H. Stone, Christian Realism and Peacemaking: Issues in 
US Foreign Policy (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1988). It is critical to note, however, that Reinhold Niebuhr turned 
away sharply from supporting the Vietnam War in the 1960s. Waldo Burchard, “Role Conflicts of Military 
Chaplains” American Sociological Review 19 (October 1954): 529-530. 
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conflict has remained a persistent one in the literature dealing with chaplains in the late twentieth 
century. 
More recently, historian Anne Loveland has argued that much of this line of 
argumentation stemmed from the rise of secular theology in the late 1960s, as ministers were 
expected to take on prophetic, rather than pastoral roles when dealing with moral and social 
issues. Many liberal theologians and ministers believed military chaplains left this role unfulfilled 
in their responses to and participation in the Vietnam War. Loveland further argued that while 
mainline churches may have emphasized the prophetic role of the minister during war, chaplains 
viewed their roles as primarily pastoral, requiring them to minister to troops in Vietnam 
regardless of their personal attitudes toward the war.7 Toward the end of the war, Loveland 
claimed, chaplains and the chaplaincy moved to a third model, one of institutional ministry, 
which made the military itself a primary focus for chaplain activities after the Vietnam War.8 Yet 
even this more sophisticated model that took into account the theological and religious ferment 
of the 1960s placed the primary source of conflict for chaplains in their various roles or 
expectations of external forces.  
Conflict was often central to chaplains’ experiences, but the idea of role conflict, per se, 
assumed a fundamental incompatibility between religion (specifically Christianity) and war (and 
specifically the Vietnam War.) Far earlier than widespread secular dissent, non-pacifist religious 
                                                 
7 Anne C. Loveland, “Prophetic Ministry and the Military Chaplaincy during the Vietnam Era,” in Moral 
Problems in American Life: New Perspectives on Cultural History, ed. Karen Halttunen (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1999), 245-260. For examples of role-conflict based argument see, Clarence Abercrombie, The Military 
Chaplaincy (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977); Leonard Ahrnsbrak, “Civil Religion and the Military: Are 
Chaplains Ministers of Two Religions?” Christian Century, 20 February 1974, 206-208; Waldo W. Burchard, “Role 
Conflicts of Military Chaplains” American Sociological Review 19, no. 5 (1954): 196-210; Michael T. Jones, “The Air 
Force Chaplain: Clergy or Officer?” (Maxwell Air Force Base, Air War College, Air University, 1996); Margaret 
Kibben Grun, “The Military Chaplaincy: Defining the Tension, Discovering the Opportunity” (DMin. diss., 
Princeton Theological Seminary, 2002); Clarence L. Reaser, “Military Chaplain: God’s Man or the Governments?” 
Princeton Seminary Bulletin 62, no. 3 (1969): 70-73; Gordon H. Zahn, The Military Chaplaincy: A Study of Role Tension in 
the Royal Air Force (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).  
8 Loveland, “Prophetic Ministry.” 
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dissent emerged when Lyndon Johnson escalated the war by inserting American combat troops 
into Vietnam in 1965, and it intensified until the eventual withdrawal of American troops in 
1972. Historian Mark Toulouse argued convincingly that even major Evangelical and 
conservative Christian periodicals had turned against the war, or at least softened their support 
for it, by the early 1970s.9 Given the cultural forces that aligned in opposition to the war, it was 
indeed difficult to imagine significant Christian responses to the Vietnam War that fell outside of 
this paradigm. 
But the vision of Christianity and Christian mission that would make role conflict most 
likely or acute was generally not the vision held by chaplains. Understanding the process by 
which chaplains participated in the Vietnam War, and their own descriptions of their wartime 
experiences revealed a different picture. At the most basic level, their writings demand a 
reinterpretation of the meaning and sources of conflict for chaplains. If the conflict arose from 
contradictions and inconsistencies within a chaplain’s religious beliefs rather than from inherent 
role conflict, then how the chaplain resolved that conflict in both military and religious terms 
becomes more readily apparent. Rather than compartmentalizing or subordinating certain 
identities, the process of conflict resolution became an exercise in identity management that 
involved both religious and military concerns. 
Through combat experience and subsequent reflection, Christian chaplains worked out 
solutions to conflict created by theological, pastoral, moral, and identity-related dilemmas. 
Regarding moral questions, chaplains formulated practical solutions to conflicts as they arose, 
and in so doing, created a complex and sometimes ambiguous identity for themselves in the 
military community. When they did confront conflict or tension between their clerical and 
                                                 
9 Mark G. Toulouse, Christian Responses to Vietnam: The Organization of Dissent,” Religion and Culture 
Web Forum, June 2007, http://marty-center.uchicago.edu/webforum/062007/vietnam.pdf, accessed 29 February 
2008. 
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military roles, they did not often resolve them in favor of the “military” solution.10 Rather than 
using “role conflict” as the sociological and theoretical basis for understanding chaplains’ 
experiences, “cultural mediation” allows for a wider range of beliefs and responses. Chaplains 
worked to reconcile two worlds: sometimes those worlds converged and strengthened one 
another, and at other times, those worlds seemed to collide. In either case, however, chaplains 
worked to articulate the conflicts and to resolve them in ways that recognized the validity of 
both their experiences in war and their experiences of religion. Cultural knowledge and structural 
position afforded chaplains a range of flexible responses to these situations. 
 
Morality and Identity 
Even as chaplains carried out their official duties, which involved both secular and 
religious functions within the military, and wore uniforms of their respective services, complete 
with the unit patches for their assignments, chaplains’ religious identities were never far away. 
They wore religious insignia—a cross or shepherd’s staff—on their uniforms, conducted 
services in appropriate religious vestments, and were addressed as “chaplain” rather than by their 
ecclesial titles or military rank. They embodied the two worlds in which they operated, and by 
extension, they confronted questions about their proper place within the military. By involving 
themselves in the moral and military life of their new communities, chaplains created identities 
for themselves that incorporated both military and religious characteristics. Whereas role conflict 
or role tension has featured prominently in the literature on chaplains, closer examination of 
chaplains’ behaviors and reflections revealed a more complex process of identity formation. This 
                                                 
10 See Clarence Abercrombie, The Military Chaplaincy (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1997); 
Abercrombie’s book was a sociological cohort study on chaplains, non-chaplain military officers, and non-chaplain 
clergy. He concluded that chaplains, in terms of their views about the military, war and peace, and theology, fell 
somewhere in between non-chaplain clergy and officers of similar rank, experience, or denomination, but that they 
were generally closer to the “clergy” mindset than the “military” mindset. 
 127 
 
 
process relied on both religious and military language and ritual, and both military and religious 
cultures contributed to the formation of the chaplains’ identity.  
Chaplains considered their roles as clergy and officers as they made decisions, but their 
identities were ultimately neither uniform nor unambiguous. In the combat zone and on post, 
chaplains walked a fine line between their two worlds. If they could not be held up as moral 
examples, they risked losing credibility as clergy. But if they could not relate to soldiers—in mess 
halls, or clubs, in the field, or around base—they risked losing credibility as soldiers. In practice, 
chaplains had to make decisions about which issues were worth fighting over, set moral and 
ethical standards for themselves, and adapt to different situations.  
At times, chaplains confronted moral questions common in military life, including 
alcohol, profanity, and sexual behaviors. Chaplains responded to these situations differently, 
usually based on a combination of their own religious views, their understanding of the 
“military” situation, and their perceived relationship to the soldiers and officers with whom they 
worked. For many evangelical and conservative chaplains, alcohol proved to be a serious testing 
ground. For some chaplains, especially for those in conservative denominations that declared 
drinking alcohol to be sinful, the choice seemed easy enough. In response to a query about the 
Southern Baptist position on chaplains imbibing alcohol, the SBC Chaplains Commission stated 
in a newsletter, in all capital letters: “THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION 
CHAPLAINS COMMISSION WILL NOT ISSUE DENOMINATIONAL 
ENDORSEMENT FOR A CHAPLAINCY POSITION TO A DRINKING MINISTER, OR 
ONE WHO IS REPORTED TO BE A DRINKER. FURTHER, THE COMMISSION WILL 
NOT CONTINUE DENOMINATIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF A KNOWN DRINKING 
SOUTHERN BAPTIST CHAPLAIN.”11 The position seemed unequivocal. 
                                                 
11 USACHCS Vietnam Files, “The Chaplaincy,” TRADOC Issues, unnumbered box. 
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On the ground, however, chaplains made decisions about their own use of or abstention 
from alcohol, and most believed that successful chaplains would operate so that neither their 
personal beliefs nor their ministry was compromised but so they could still relate to troops. In 
one apparently unsuccessful case, Joseph Dulany heard that his replacement was ill-received by 
the troops when he allegedly refused to enter the Officer Club “because the men were drinking 
beer.”12 Faced with a situation in which new unit members went through an induction ritual full 
of alcohol, James Hutchens decided to participate in the ceremonies, but he replaced the potent 
drink with lukewarm water.13 Hutchens understood the significance of initiation into the unit but 
chose not to abandon a central tenet of his religious belief. Curt Bowers, upon returning from an 
extended period in the field, reported that he found nothing but beer at the base camp when 
sodas had been promised as well, but concluded after some contemplation, “I knew they [the 
troops] were looking, and I had made my stand in terms of alcohol, so I thought to myself, You 
haven’t drunk up to this time, so don’t start it now.”14 Bowers framed his dilemma as one of 
setting and meeting expectations rather than as one over the morality of a chaplain drinking, 
believing that his actions would reflect his character and even the character of other chaplains. 
Although the chaplains responded differently, each of these three ultimately chose not to drink 
alcohol. Others most certainly made different decisions, but clearly some chaplains held their 
personal religious beliefs above the value of fitting in within the military. Chaplains struggled to 
become part of the military community and still set themselves apart as religious and moral 
leaders. 
                                                 
12 Dulany, Once a Soldier, 41. 
13 James Hutchens, Beyond Combat (Chicago: Moody Press, 1968), 81. 
14 Bowers, Forward Edge, 60. 
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Profanity and prostitution also tested chaplains; soldiers and officers frequently 
apologized for using expletives in a chaplain’s presence, and again, chaplains responded 
differently. Some defused the situation with humor, others confronted the issue as a problem, 
and still others ignored it or dismissed it as an insignificant offense given the circumstances.15 
There were similarly different, though generally negative, responses to prostitution and to 
officers’ tacit or explicit approval of it. Some protested loudly, others accepted it as an 
unavoidable if regrettable fact, and still others reflected on the strength of their own 
relationships with their wives at home.16 Chaplains who served in combat and close to troops 
wrestled with the issues in a much more delicate way than their colleagues who served in the 
civilian community or in rear areas of the military. Chaplains consistently recognized the moral 
ambiguities and stress brought about by combat. Issues that may have been black and white in 
“the world” became gray in Vietnam. 
Chaplains dealt with moral and religious issues and their connection to war even before 
troops deployed. James Hutchens recalled that the sermons he gave before his unit deployed 
centered on the “responsibility to our government (Romans 13), the sixth commandment (‘Thou 
shalt not kill’), and the problem of the Christian serving in the Army.”17 Hutchens crafted his 
sermons to reassure soldiers going into combat that what they were doing was not only right, 
                                                 
15 For responses to profanity see, Samuel Hopkins, A Chaplain Remembers Vietnam (Kansas City, MO: 
Truman, 2002), 163; and John W. Schumacher, A Soldier of God Remembers: Memoir Highlights of a Career Army Chaplain 
(Winona Lake, IN: Grace Brethren North American Missions, 2000) 57-60. 
16 For responses to prostitution and other sexual activities see, Hopkins, Chaplain Remembers, 165-168; J. 
Robert Falabella, Vietnam Memoirs: A Passage to Sorrow (New York: Pageant Press International, 1971), 135-136; and 
Hutchens, Beyond Combat, 55-57. 
17 Hutchens, Beyond Combat, 17. The first two verses of Romans 13 read, “Let every person be subject to 
the governing authorities; for there is no authority except from God, and those authorities that exist have been 
instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists authority resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will 
incur judgment.” Exodus 20:13 reads, “You shall not murder” (NRSV). The shorthand numbering of the 
commandments (the way in which individual verses are grouped together to derive a list of ten), however, is usually 
dependent on denomination and Biblical translation. Thus, most Protestant and Eastern Orthodox Christians label 
this commandment as the sixth one, while Roman Catholics and some liturgical Protestants label it the fifth 
commandment. 
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but also their duty. In the cramped quarters of troop ships, isolated at sea for three or four 
weeks, soldiers, sailors, and airmen had ample time to question the morality of war and to 
participate in worship and Bible study. Curt Bowers recalled that the most common question 
asked was, “Can I be a Christian and still kill?” He answered using various examples from the 
Old and New Testaments to reassure soldiers of their duty and morality.18 Yet he cautioned 
readers of his memoir not to frame this question solely in philosophical or theological terms. In 
combat, soldiers did not enjoy the “luxury” or safety of classrooms; they “were wrestling to find 
the real flesh-and-blood answers,” for their battles would soon deal in flesh and blood rather 
than pen and paper.19  
As in other wars, soldiers faced acute questions about morality, killing, and faith. In 
combat, neither chaplains nor soldiers were given to asking moral questions, and chaplains did 
not expect moral ambiguities to cloud or color the judgment of soldiers in the field. “In the 
midst of battle, everything seems impersonal,” wrote Raymond Johnson. “Survival is a man’s 
primary concern. Therefore, it’s not fair to really pose the question of whether or not you can 
love your enemy under such conditions. You can’t really require a black and white answer in the 
gray of conflict.”20 But once survival was no longer in question, Johnson concluded that morality 
and theology must necessarily re-enter a soldier’s (or chaplain’s) conscience. Johnson suggested 
that while the New Testament commandment to “Love your enemy” could not be a fair 
question in the field, it became immediately relevant as soon as that enemy was captured. In 
such a case, a soldier was “responsible for rendering an answer to the question, ‘How do I treat 
my enemy?’ He becomes a real person. You must treat him as one who deserves to be called a 
                                                 
18 Bowers, Forward Edge, 34. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Raymond Johnson, Postmark: Mekong Delta (Westwood, NJ: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1968), 49. 
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creature of God.”21 Johnson’s language implied that combat, even for chaplains, dehumanized 
the enemy; if the enemy was not fully human, killing was simply a means for survival.  
Chaplains’ status as non-combatants complicated their understanding of their identity 
and raised significant moral, religious, and practical questions as well. According to the Geneva 
Conventions, as non-combatants, chaplains were not permitted to carry weapons.22 US military 
regulations stipulated that a chaplain “should not bear arms; he will not be required to bear 
arms.” Shortly thereafter, however, the Army field manual added that, “This nation, has, 
nevertheless, expected that chaplains accompany their troops into combat.”23 According to the 
chaplains, the American experience in Korea proved to many that the enemy did not respect 
chaplains’ non-combatant status. In Korea, no chaplain who was captured survived as a Prisoner 
of War; they died with soldiers in POW camps or were executed, as the closest communist 
equivalent to a chaplain was a party political officer.24 
Carrying weapons raised all sorts of legal, moral, religious, and safety issues. Had all 
chaplains and commanders reached the same conclusion, it would have revealed a certain level 
of clarity (on theoretical and practical levels) about the place of the chaplain in combat. Instead, 
the problems and their solutions remained ambiguous. Al Arvay concluded that “even our own 
military people . . . didn’t know exactly where we were to belong.” He recalled a particular 
incident where his commanding officer asked him to carry a weapon. He refused, but 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Chaplains are considered protected persons under the first Geneva Convention. They may not renounce 
these rights (Convention I, Article 7), and these rights may not be negotiated away (Convention I, Article 6). 
Chaplains who are captured are not considered prisoners of war (Convention I, Article 28). The Additional Protocol 
I states again that chaplains are non-combatants and have no right to participate in hostilities (Article 43, Section 2). 
For text of Geneva Conventions see http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/lawwar.htm, accessed 20 
February 2005.  
23 United States, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Field Manual 16-5: The Chaplain 
(Washington D.C., August 1964). 
24 Newby, Cavalry Chaplain,, 23-24, and Venzke, Confidence in Battle, 64-100, especially 82-83.  
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remembered the officer “getting very angry with me.” Arvay went into his hooch and 
remembered, “when I was leaving there was a rifle, an M-16 that was placed there and the 
sergeant telling me the colonel wanted me to carry it because nobody else was going to defend 
me. I had to defend myself.”25 Some chaplains refused to go into hostile combat situations 
because they would not carry a weapon and did not feel it fair or safe to rely on others for their 
defense. Others tried to ensure they remained with company-sized units at all times, but they 
occasionally found themselves attached to platoon-sized units when a company split up for 
tactical reasons. Some chaplains carried weapons openly, though other chaplains generally 
looked down upon this practice. In one instance in 1964, a photograph of a chaplain armed with 
a .45 caliber pistol and a fragmentation grenade ran in US newspapers.26 Some decided they 
would pick up the weapon of a wounded man if they had to. Others relied on their enlisted 
assistants for defense, though many questioned “school-trained” assistants’ abilities to protect 
them or the fairness of asking for such a sacrifice. Commanders, on the other hand, seemed to 
worry little about potential conflicts with the Geneva Conventions. Newby concluded that 
“most field commanders . . . smiled on the chaplain carrying a weapon for his own protection, 
and some of them on occasion allowed or forbade a chaplain to go into a hot situation, 
depending on whether the chaplain was prepared to ‘take care of himself.’”27 A chaplain’s 
usefulness in combat could have been immediately reversed if his presence endangered the unit. 
Chaplains also had to address moral and military issues regarding war crimes and 
atrocities. Often chaplains acted as moral compasses for soldiers and officers. Generally having 
reconciled, on the most basic level, the ability of Christians or other faithful men to participate 
                                                 
25 Al Arvay, interview by Henry Ackermann, quoted in Ackermann, Always There, 11. 
26 Venzke, Confidence in Battle, 149. 
27 Newby, Cavalry Chaplain, 23-24. 
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in some wars, chaplains often confronted situations in which the question had to do with 
morality in or the conduct of war. Chaplains responses to war crimes challenged and 
complicated their identities in both religious and military communities. In some cases, chaplains 
effectively used their religious or moral force to inform commanders about possible war crimes 
and to effect changes in policy; at other times, chaplains’ emotions took over and their responses 
were distressing to them. Within civilian circles, religious leaders asked what the chaplain was 
doing to address war crimes or atrocities. How could a chaplain allow atrocities such as the 
massacre at My Lai to occur, when a group of American soldiers murdered several hundred 
Vietnamese men, women, and children in cold blood?28 If chaplains, as representatives of 
religion and morality, were unable to stop these crimes, what kind of witness did they present?29 
On the surface, it seems that a chaplain who responded ambivalently to war crimes had clearly 
subordinated his religious identity to his military one. Yet again, chaplains’ reflections on similar 
issues reveal a more complex situation. 
At My Lai, the concept of area coverage and a general shortage of chaplains meant that 
Charlie Company, 11th Brigade, Americal Division—the company responsible for the 
massacre—saw a chaplain only occasionally. Though no chaplains were present at the incident, 
division chaplains quickly became embroiled in the deeply flawed investigation and subsequent 
cover-up. The Peers Commission, charged with the formal investigation and reporting 
responsibilities, placed significant blame on division personnel for not following through with 
their obligations to report potential violations of military law and conduct. The division’s 
chaplains were not spared this judgment, and the Peers Commission advised that the two 
                                                 
 28 The official US estimate from the Peers Commission report is 347, while the Vietnamese memorial at 
My Lai lists 504 names. 
29 On the My Lai massacre and subsequent cover up, see Joseph Goldstein, Burke Marshall, and Jack 
Schwartz, United States Department of the Army, The My Lai Massacre and its Cover-up: Beyond the Reach of Law? : The 
Peers Commission Report (New York: Free Press, 1976). 
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division chaplains most directly involved, Captain Carl Creswell and Lieutenant Colonel Francis 
Lewis, be court-martialed.30 In Section Six, “Suppression and Withholdings of Information,” the 
report stated that Hugh Thompson “went to the Division Artillery Chaplain, CPT Carl Creswell, 
with a report of what he had seen at My Lai. Chaplain Creswell in turn, without reporting the 
matter to his commander, went to the Division Chaplain, LTC Francis Lewis, with the story. As 
previously discussed, LTC Lewis' efforts at investigation were futile and he allowed the matter to 
pass without substantive effort to bring it to the attention of his superiors.” Though neither had 
witnessed the action, and Creswell did inform Lewis, his superior, the Commission concluded 
that both chaplains’ duty went beyond their actions. 
The chaplains’ actions after the fact notwithstanding, My Lai and the cover-up led many 
to question the chaplains’ effectiveness in promoting moral and ethical behavior in the military. 
Surely, observers assumed, troops with adequate moral and spiritual guidance and instruction 
would not have committed such heinous acts. In 1972, the New York Times used Creswell and his 
involvement with the My Lai massacre to open an article about the controversy surrounding 
chaplains serving “two masters.” Creswell contended that he “should have done more,” but that 
he had—albeit to a minimal extent—followed the Chain of Command and reported it to his 
supervising chaplain. The article claimed, “Such incidents, along with general frustration about 
the conduct of the war, have served to revive the old “two masters” problem concerning 
chaplains in the armed forces.”31 The edited volume, Military Chaplains, published by Clergy and 
Laymen Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV) and edited by Harvard theologian and historian 
Harvey Cox, only served to further this sentiment. According to many of the volume’s authors, 
                                                 
30 W. R. Peers, The My Lai Inquiry (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1979), 214-215. 
31 Edward B. Fiske, “The Perils of Serving Two Masters” New York Times, 30 January 1972. 
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chaplains could not be expected to adequately fulfill their religious duties if they were saddled 
with military ones. 
Yet other circumstances, which failed to reach the notoriety or publicity of the massacre 
at My Lai, still required chaplains to respond to potential war crimes or atrocities, especially 
those committed by Americans. For many chaplains, atrocities were simultaneously religious and 
military issues, and neither system benefited from their commission. A chaplain with the 1st 
Cavalry recalled an incident in 1967 in which chaplains observed an atrocity and took action to 
which commanders responded in their favor. Parker Thompson remembered that a chaplain 
reported to him that soldiers in the 1st Cavalry had been cutting off the ears of North Vietnam 
Army (NVA) soldiers for souvenirs. Thompson reported it to the Chief of Staff, who reported it 
to the Division Commander. The chaplain recalled that “two days later our [Division] 
Commander had an officers’ call. It was the only one of its type I ever experienced in the 1st 
Cavalry. He directed that every officer be present, down to platoon leaders, at one of several 
sessions. There were no exceptions.” At the meeting, the commander warned: “‘what constitutes a 
crime in the United States of America, constitutes a crime in the 1st Cavalry. And I will 
prosecute anyone violating proper conduct to enemy personnel, living or dead. It’s a short step 
from mutilating a corpse to mutilating a person.”32 In this instance, the chaplain did not address 
the issue himself, but by going through the military command structure, he ensured the problem 
would be addressed.  
At other times, chaplains witnessed soldiers participating in ethically and militarily 
questionable behavior on the battlefield but chose not to respond. Afterward they questioned 
their reactions to war and combat. Some chaplains were surprised and disturbed by their capacity 
to hate the enemy, to feel little remorse for Viet Cong deaths, and to stomach the horrors of 
                                                 
32 Parker C. Thompson, survey response, quoted in Ackermann, Always There, 181. Emphasis in original. 
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combat. “I admit I’m glad to see these dead VC but as a Christian, I’m not proud of my 
feelings,” remembered James Johnson. “These guys all have mothers and wives and girlfriends, 
but after what they did to the civilians I don’t have positive feelings for any of them.”33 As 
chaplains confronted possible atrocities they also confronted internal conflicts about their 
response to war and their feelings toward other humans.  
Sometimes battlefield actions resembled religious rituals, and in these cases, chaplains 
were especially conflicted. After a firefight, James Johnson recorded there were “two dead VC . . 
. sprawled on their backs. Each dead VC must have at least twenty holes in his face and other 
exposed parts of their bodies. Someone in the column takes his white plastic spoon from his C-
rations and sticks the handle into a wound made by the fragments. The next soldier in line does 
likewise. By the time I pass the position, each dead VC has a dozen or more plastic spoons 
protruding from his body.” Though the scene was gruesome, its quasi-religious ritual and 
solemnity struck Johnson. “There’s no shouting or cheering as we pass the bodies. The defiant 
symbolism of ‘sticking it to them’ may be desecration of the dead, but this is a way of 
emotionally coping with what’s happening each day of this god-awful war.”34 Johnson remained 
ambivalent, recognizing the action for what it was in a legal sense, but understanding and even 
sympathizing with the motive.  
After the war, chaplains often regretted not doing more to stop morally objectionable 
behaviors in combat. Joseph Dulany recorded several instances where he witnessed or heard 
about questionable behavior but did not report them or confront the men involved. Among 
others, Dulany recalled seeing soldiers dragging women behind huts followed by screaming and 
crying; a truck driver intentionally running over someone on the side of the road; violent 
                                                 
33 Johnson, Combat Chaplain, 198-199. 
34 Ibid., 216. 
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interrogation techniques; and the construction of “sin-city,” a specified location where 
prostitutes would be housed and checked for disease by military doctors. Dulany interpreted his 
inaction as a failure to fulfill his duties as a clergyman and an officer, and he confronted this fact 
after the war as well. “Atrocities? I’m not confident that any I witnessed or knew about achieved 
this level, but morally questionable? Probably.” He asked himself, “What should my response 
have been? How could I have responded and maintained my stature and effectiveness as a unit 
chaplain? What can be learned from these instances that might be helpful to a chaplain in future 
combat settings?”35 Ultimately Dulany had no answers for these questions, and he remained 
conflicted. In his memoir, Dulany doubted he had the rank, training, or authority to question 
effectively practices (some of which were de facto policies), and he concluded he would be most 
effective as a chaplain if he did not report them. In these cases, he defined his role not by moral 
or religious absolutes, but by his devotion to minister to the men serving in Vietnam. In 
Dulany’s mind, the conflict arose from conflicting religious expectations: to set a moral standard 
and to be a minister to men in war, rather than conflicting expectations in his roles as a pastor 
and an officer. 
 Other chaplains recalled instances in which they witnessed possible war crimes but did 
not report them. Newby “saw two confirmed VC, a seventeen-year-old female and a VC Master 
Sergeant (or equivalent rank)” taken as POWs. He continued, “while the medics treated enemy 
patients, I wandered about camp. . . . I looked through a window into an almost empty room. 
Inside, two [ARVN] soldiers were interrogating a VC or native suspected of being VC. Wires ran 
from a hand-cranked generator to the suspect’s bare genitals. The Vietnamese interrogators 
seemed unconcerned about me watching them, which led me to conclude this type of 
interrogation might be a common practice. One of my great regrets is that I didn’t interfere with 
                                                 
35 Dulany, Once a Soldier, 73. 
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this interrogation.”36 If the perpetrators were Vietnamese, what were the chaplains’ moral 
responsibilities? What were their military responsibilities? The various permutations of military 
and pastoral situations prevented chaplains from drawing simple or uniform conclusions about 
their identities in war. Each chaplain had to manage a series of roles and expectations. Some 
chaplains chose to report possible atrocities, others kept quiet; some anguished over their 
decision, for others the decision was simple; some relied on a religious orientation, while others 
relied on their understanding of military effectiveness to justify their decisions. 
Learning about atrocities after the fact only exacerbated conflict for chaplains. Their 
responsibilities in such cases were to act as spiritual advisors to soldiers who may have been 
involved in the crime, to seek justice on behalf of the victim, and to uphold military and legal 
regulations. Newby, a trusted spiritual advisor to a man in whom another soldier had confided 
about witnessing a war crime, learned of an atrocity after one soldier persuaded the other to 
speak with the chaplain. As a result, Newby found himself in the middle of the subsequent 
investigation and trial.37 In cases that might appear to an observer to be morally clear, some 
decisions of religious leaders and officers suggested otherwise. However, chaplains did not have 
the luxury to operate solely within the parameters of their own religious or personal convictions. 
Combat, emotion, duty, and perhaps even necessity shaped chaplains’ responses just as it shaped 
the responses of soldiers and officers.  
The tenor of the war and its reception in the United States had changed dramatically by 
the early 1970s due in part to increased drug use by American service members, fragging 
incidents, racial tensions, and protests, but also because the very nature of the war had changed. 
                                                 
36 Newby, It Took Heroes, 30. 
37 For a detailed account of this story, see Newby, Cavalry Chaplain, chapter six. This incident was reported, 
using aliases, by Daniel Lang, in “Casualties of War,” New Yorker, 18 October 1969, 61. Lang later wrote a book, 
Casualties of War (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969). And the incident was the basis for the feature film of the same 
name, Casualties of War, Dir. Brian DePalma (RCA/Columbia Pictures Home Video, 1990). 
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In addition to changing chaplain doctrines and policies, individual chaplains recalled the 
profound effect these issues had on their ministries. To most military personnel, including 
chaplains, President Richard Nixon’s announced policy of Vietnamization signified eventual 
American withdrawal and that the war could not be won. Chaplains, like other personnel, 
believed their goal in Vietnam was to do their job and come home alive.38 Claude Newby, who 
did not want to leave his troops in 1967, experienced quite a different reaction at the end of his 
second tour in 1970. “In 1967 I had returned to an America where patriotism was still somewhat 
in vogue,” wrote Newby, “now, in 1970, I returned to an America where both patriotism and 
America’s heroic young soldiers were increasingly held in disdain.” Newby also commented on 
changing race relations among troops: “where in 1966-67 and early 1969 infantrymen were 
infantrymen without regard to race or color, by 1970 even they showed evidence of succumbing 
to civilian and rear-area trends, of dividing into us and them.”39 Other chaplains who served 
toward the end of the war also recognized the changes. Thomas Confroy identified the change 
in the civilian attitude toward the war and soldiers as one from “respectful support” in the mid 
sixties to “outright hostility” in the early seventies when “drugs, antiwar sentiment, and racial 
conflict . . . affected the troops.” Confroy determined that his “work as a chaplain was greatly 
affected by these changes,” as it went “from positive ministry during the first tour to a 
sometimes defensive ministry in the second.”40 During his second tour, Confroy recalled that he 
had to approach his ministry as one of restricting immoral or improper acts instead of 
encouraging religious faith and positive action.  
                                                 
38 Joseph Beasley, interview by author. 
39 Newby, It Took Heroes, 521. 
40 Thomas Confroy, Survey response, quoted in Ackermann, Always There, 198. 
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Chaplains’ roles were complicated in part because they were at once a part of and outside 
of life within their units. And like other soldiers and officers, chaplains often bonded with their 
units and formed lasting attachments to the men and their families. One group of marines 
dubbed their chaplain, Vincent Capodanno, the “Grunt Padre.” “Grunt” was a term generally 
reserved for enlisted infantry, Marines and Army, at once a symbol of pride and recognition of 
the toughest, most dangerous duties faced by enlisted men. Chaplains, as officers and volunteers 
would not qualify for this label. But Capodanno’s biographer explained that, “what set Father 
Vincent apart was the way he lived his ministry with the Marines. He was not a religious leader 
who did his job and then returned to the comfort of his own circle.” Capodanno “lived as a 
Grunt Marine. Wherever they went, he went. Whatever burdens they had to carry, he shared the 
load. No problem was too large of small to take to Father Vincent—he was available to them 
day and night. . . . The Grunt Marines recognized Father Vincent’s determination to be with 
them and one of them.”41 Though Capodanno was certainly not unique in these qualities, his 
nickname suggested that the chaplain was simultaneously “one of the men” and a leader. Some 
troops could identify closely with their chaplains, especially those who served in combat 
situations alongside them, and could accord them the status of a buddy or fellow “grunt” rather 
than that of an officer. But the chaplain also commanded deference and respect as evidenced in 
the second part of the nickname. “Padre” represented the chaplain’s position as a clergyman, but 
it also reflected the chaplain’s paternal role.42 Though separated from enlisted men by rank, 
                                                 
41 Daniel Mode, The Grunt Padre: The Service and Sacrifice of Father Vincent Capodanno, Vietnam 1966-1967 (CMJ 
Marian Publishers, 2000), 77. 
42 The reasons “padre” became the default name for many chaplains, regardless of their religious 
affiliation, are unclear. Some speculate that Catholic chaplains, due to their vows of celibacy, were more likely to 
take risks in combat because they did not have wives and children to return to. Catholic chaplains were also the 
numerically largest group of chaplains from a single denomination or faith group, so nearly every unit would have 
some contact with a Catholic chaplain. A final speculation is that Catholic chaplains were simply more likely to use 
their ecclesial title of “Father” than were other ministers, which would have made the informal “padre” a signal of 
both deference and respect. 
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status, and often age, chaplains (even those of Protestant and Jewish faiths) became “padres,” 
and soldiers sought them out for counsel, wisdom, comfort, and reassurance.  
Indeed, just as bonds formed between soldiers during combat, they also formed between 
soldiers and chaplains. Chaplains held and comforted friends as they died; suffered through 
many of the same hardships as their men, and missed their wives and families. In evaluating his 
Vietnam experience, Raymond Johnson identified the relationships he formed with his unit as 
one of the most important things he gained from the war. “I have attended to their needs both 
physically and spiritually when the walls were crumbling and their ‘cool’ was beginning to shatter 
under the wake [sic] of genuine fear. . . . These were some of the same men I would pray a final 
benediction over. I suppose I can say with all honesty that I have never felt closer to a group of 
men before.”43 But chaplains’ military identities set them apart from their civilian counterparts 
because they lived and worked in a secular institution that civilian clergy rarely understood. 
Within their units, chaplains found comfort, emotional release, and a renewed sense of 
faith. Richard Heim recalled a particularly cathartic moment after troops had “carried many 
wounded back to the LZ. I stayed with [one soldier], prayed the Lord’s Prayer, and quoted the 
23rd Psalm until the dust off chopper arrived.” Afterward, he remembered, “When I got back, I 
remember seeing some body bags outside the aid station. . . . I went over and opened one, and 
there was the body of one of my trooper buddies. . . . We made many a jump together, and 
when I saw his body, I literally fell apart and cried.”44 In war, chaplains witnessed nearly every 
conceivable kind of physical and emotional trauma, and they had to find their own releases as 
well. 
                                                 
43 Raymond Johnson, Postmark, 9. 
44 Richard L. Heim, Survey response, quoted in Ackermann, Always There, 169. 
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Chaplains’ effectiveness over a long period of time may have deteriorated, which was, in 
part, the reason for rotating chaplains to the rear. If a chaplains’ presence was good for morale, 
what might a demoralized chaplain, the removal of a chaplain from a post, or even the death of a 
chaplain do to a unit? After seeing a chaplain’s interaction with a wounded soldier and 
witnessing the chaplain’s subsequent breakdown, a medic recalled, “I observed [their] . . . 
compassion for the sick and dying a dozen times a day. . . . I now understand how their hearts 
must have been broken again and again as they served God in that terrible conflict.”45 This 
particular soldier attributed his later turn to religion in part to this chaplain, but to others, the 
humanization of chaplains may have been detrimental. To recognize that chaplains experienced 
emotional and physical turmoil was to recognize their humanity; their divine calling and military 
purpose did not shield them from the full range of emotions associated with combat. Chaplains 
had to find a balance between knowing and socializing with their troops, maintaining themselves 
as spiritual and physical examples, and supporting the military institutions of which they were a 
part, all without sacrificing personal or religious-institutional standards.  
Chaplains confronted a host of conflicts that revolved first around their place in the 
military community and second around moral issues. Yet their duties left many of them without 
a definite place either in the military hierarchy or in the civilian world. Newby wrote that he felt 
“alienated” from various groups by Vietnam, unable to participate fully in any one of his roles. 
As an officer Newby felt himself alienated because he disagreed (vocally) with army policies “like 
six-month commands in combat, that all too often deprived soldiers of experienced officers.” 
Unable to protest the war outright or to see the war from the “outside,” he felt separated from 
other clergy and civilian communities because he could not understand how they could send 
men “off to war with our hands tied and later welcomed home the draft dodgers before 
                                                 
45 Anonymous enlisted man (E-2), Survey response, quoted in Ackermann, Always There, 81-82. 
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expressing thanks to the faithful who served.” Nor did he understand how “the American 
people . . . participated in or tolerated public abuse of its faithful sons and daughters.” Bur 
Newby also could not fully consider himself a soldier. Convinced he had served both units to 
the best of his ability, he concluded “the soldier in me had been expressed. I realized that I was a 
soldier by virtue of wearing the uniform, holding rank, and experiencing hostile fire.” Yet “In 
reality . . . I was an observer and not a true warrior. Above all, I was not a hero.”46 In this self-
deprecating assessment, Newby differentiated himself from other soldiers and enlisted men. He 
could not comfortably fit in with any group and left the war without a firm sense of his identity.  
As chaplains confronted moral and religious questions they worked to retain both 
religious and military authority and credibility. In the first stage of resolving conflict, chaplains 
used religious language and beliefs to define their entry and assimilation into a new culture. They 
worked out practical solutions to the problems presented to them, and were concerned primarily 
with the intricacies of how to carry out their dual roles as clergy and officers. Their identities and 
place in the military community became especially important as they accompanied troops into 
battle where religion and combat came face to face. Whereas proponents of role conflict or role 
tension have argued that chaplains’ primary source of conflict was between military and religious 
roles, chaplains’ understandings of conflict in the Vietnam War was more specific. They 
generally understood the conflict as a pastoral one, and occasionally a theological one. On one 
hand, they were to act as ministers to soldiers and in support of command—they were 
counselors, spiritual advisors, worship leaders, and mediators—and on the other hand, they were 
to remain faithful representatives of their denominational/confessional and personal beliefs. 
When their two missions appeared in conflict, most chaplains settled on flexibility as their 
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primary response. They would respond situationally and contextually to the problems and issues 
they confronted. This flexibility allowed them to remain in liminal positions within both military 
and religious communities and offered them a broad range of responses rather than narrowly 
proscribed ones. 
  
Liturgies of War 
As they confronted the moral and military dilemmas of Vietnam, chaplains, along with 
enlisted personnel and officers, responded to these pressures by enacting practical solutions that 
would help them reconcile their religious faith with their military experience. Throughout 
Vietnam, conducting worship services and administering sacramental rites occupied a significant 
portion of chaplains’ attention. Beyond the organizational and structural considerations of 
chaplains, religious practices in the field allowed chaplains and other service members to actively 
recreate and redefine what it meant to be religious in the military and how wartime experiences 
affected one’s faith and religious practices. 
This section responds, in part, to the call for historians of religion to study the lived 
experience of religion as it was practiced outside of the confines of the institutional church. 
Though the focus of such studies often centers on lay practice, chaplains, as clergy, played a vital 
role in the way militaries experienced religion in war. Furthermore, the chaplains themselves 
each possessed a unique experience as they participated and served at the intersections of two 
cultures and institutions.47 Bradley Carter has argued that such religious practices constituted a 
new form of “vernacular religion” or “popular religion,” which may or may not carry with it 
                                                 
47 The attention to the lived experience of religion often falls under the rubric of “Lived Religion,” an idea 
that first gained traction in the academy as a result of a seminar coordinated by David Hall. On theoretical and 
methodological perspectives as well as a sample of this type of work see, Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of 
Practice, ed. David G. Hall (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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traditional “official” meanings. Carter was particularly concerned with the reinvention of 
common materials into “holy hardware,” in which objects of war became objects of religion and 
with the phenomena described as “foxhole faith.” Chaplains, Carter argued, were surprisingly 
ambivalent or positive about these processes.48 
Chaplains’ lived experiences of religion in war are best understood by the creation of 
dynamic “liturgies of war,” which were those public acts of worship and community ritual that 
served to assign meaning to the combat experience.49 Chaplains, as the primary liturgists—
official leaders of these public acts—played a key role in this process. Chaplains and soldiers 
together reinterpreted familiar traditions and created new liturgical forms in part to make 
religious ideas compatible with combat and with the circumstance of war, but they also provided 
a direct link to familiar religious traditions “back in the world.” These wartime liturgical practices 
involved reassessing and reconfiguring the practice, and also the meaning, of sacrament, 
scripture, song, and space. In the end, these created and often-improvised liturgies were uniform 
in neither content nor meaning, but they allowed fighting men to interpret their combat 
experiences in religious ways in order to resolve potential conflicts between faith and war.50 
Examining liturgies of war as both militarily and religiously significant also clarified the 
ways in which the two interacted. It would be easy to write off confluences as simply borrowing 
                                                 
48 Carter, “Reverence Helmeted and Armored,” 170-211. 
49 Michael McCormick uses the term “liturgy of war” to describe a particular wartime-liturgy used in 
European armies from late antiquity until the Crusades. I adopt this term in its plural form in order to emphasize 
the multiple and dynamic worship practices that emerged over the course of the American war in Vietnam. See 
“The Liturgy of War from Antiquity to the Crusades,” in Bergen, Sword of the Lord, 45-67. 
50 The focus in this section is necessarily on Christian liturgical traditions. In the decade of heaviest troop 
involvement in Vietnam only twenty Jewish chaplains served in country, and at the time there were no provisions 
for Muslim, Buddhist, or Orthodox chaplains. The small number of Jewish chaplains renders substantial analysis of 
Jewish worship practices in the context of combat difficult; usually, Christian chaplains were charged with the 
spiritual welfare of their Jewish men and were responsible for coordinating appropriate food, leave, or visitation to 
another unit for services. Additionally, to my knowledge, no field-grade Jewish chaplains have left memoirs or other 
records of their service in Vietnam. Only one high ranking Jewish chaplain, Saul Koss, has been interviewed under 
the Army’s Senior Officer Oral History Program.  
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language and meaning from another sphere of experience—to say that the language of blood 
sacrifice in war had no religious significance, or to say that the song “Onward Christian Soldiers” 
had no military meaning. Yet taking into account both sets of cultural norms and values revealed 
more about each of these cultures than a single analytical perspective would. What conclusions 
can be drawn when “God” and “Country” appeared interchangeable in some liturgies of war, or 
when a Jewish soldier participated in a Christian celebration of Communion? Considering these 
simply as corruptions of “true” religion would disregard any sort religious meaning that may 
have existed by asserting that only traditional religious interpretations deserve analysis as such. 
On the other end of the spectrum, dismissing the potential military significance of such events 
would downplay the intimate connections between religious and military experiences.  
Studying wartime worship or liturgical practices only from the chaplain’s point of view 
does pose certain analytical problems. Most notably, such an approach ignores participation in 
and responses to these liturgies by enlisted personnel and officers. Though they participated in 
the creation and execution of wartime liturgical practices, chaplains’ interpretations were not 
necessarily indicative of the meanings that non-chaplains assigned to them. Furthermore, 
chaplains’ interpretations of the liturgies of war were not uniform. Based on their own 
theological ideas, education, background, and military experience, chaplains interpreted religious 
practices in diverse ways. Therefore, individual interpretations were not necessarily 
representative or typical accounts of wartime liturgy, but instead offered proof of the dynamism 
and diversity in interpretation and practice available to chaplains. 
Liturgical practices varied widely among the religious groups represented in the military, 
but perhaps none more than sacramental practice and interpretation. Though only Catholics and 
Mainline Protestants would claim the centrality of sacraments to their worship, “sacrament” 
defined more broadly may mean any act of ritual or ceremony that served as an outward sign or 
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manifestation of inward grace. Thus, evangelical and low-church Protestants took part in 
sacramental practices, even if they would not label them as such. For the most part, liturgies of 
war did not create new sacraments—though soldiers and chaplains occasionally spoke of 
“baptism by fire” as the “sacrament of war”—but instead reinterpreted more traditional ones.51  
The issue of sacramental ministry and denominational or faith-group specificity as 
opposed to ecumenicalism elicited strong opinions on the part of chaplains and their 
denominational organizations. Some denominations insisted their chaplains maintain strict 
standards in their sacramental ministries, practicing, as much as possible, the discretion expected 
of ministers in the United States. Chaplains from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
(Mormons) usually followed their denominational rules exactly, while other chaplains adopted 
more liberal policies in the war zone. Addressing some of these challenges, the Lutheran 
Church-Missouri Synod issued a statement to its chaplains regarding the practice of the Lord’s 
Supper. It began, “in all circumstances the Lutheran chaplain shall administer Holy Communion 
in accordance with the scriptures and the Lutheran Confessions.” Yet the chaplains’ manual 
recognized that “exceptional cases arise in ministering to the men and women in the armed 
forces” and that “in such situations, a Lutheran chaplain may administer the Sacrament of Holy 
Communion to such personnel as have been baptized; are able to examine themselves; are 
conscious of the need of repentance; hold the essence of faith, including the doctrines of the 
Real Presence and of the Lord’s Supper as a means of grace; and profess acceptance thereof.” 
Though on first reading even this policy seems exceptionally rigid, it can be understood as a 
doctrinally closed denomination’s attempt to balance competing interests—on one hand to 
uphold the sanctity of Communion by “withholding participation in the Sacrament from those 
                                                 
51 See, for example, David Knight, “Supreme Six,” in Vietnam: The Other Side of Glory, ed. William R. 
Kimball (Canton, OH: Daring Books, 1987), 70. 
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who reject scriptural teaching regarding it” and on the other hand to welcome one who 
“devoutly believe[d] his Lord’s Word of promise as conveyed through and in this Sacrament.”52 
Yet despite the occasional injunction against an ecumenical practice of certain 
sacraments, traditional religious rituals took on different meanings in combat especially because 
chaplain coverage was often infrequent and usually irregular. With troops spread over four major 
Corps areas, chaplains practiced a loose form of area coverage while still attached to specific 
units.53 In practice, this meant some men only saw a chaplain once every four to six weeks and 
for some the wait was even longer. Most chaplains tried to establish some kind of rotation 
schedule to ensure equal coverage for worship services, but these plans were always flexible and 
altered to meet specific needs. Because the rotating schedule ensured fair but infrequent chaplain 
coverage, it is little surprise that men of many faiths attended field services when they were 
offered. James Johnson wrote that, “soldiers of all faiths attend the service, as usual, including 
several Catholics and one Jew. They all take communion. War and the daily threat of death is a 
great equalizer.”54 For the chaplain in question it appeared that confessional particularities 
mattered little. Ecumenicalism that would have been nearly inconceivable “back in the world” 
was accepted and even celebrated in battle. Though it is impossible to say how the participants 
might have interpreted the same event, the chaplain felt that worship and the sacrament of 
communion represented not a particular faith tradition, but instead a divine presence in war. 
                                                 
52 National Lutheran Council Division of Service to Military Personnel, Newsletter for Lutheran Chaplains 6, 
no. 4 (1963). 
53 Earl Kettler, Chaplain’s Letters: Ministry by “Huey” 1964-1965, The Personal Correspondence of an Army Chaplain 
from Vietnam (Cincinnati: Cornelius Books, 1994), 3. All four Corps areas had chaplains assigned to them, but units 
were often split apart and assigned to geographically disparate areas. In theory, chaplains were therefore responsible 
for providing religious services for men in a particular area, regardless of which unit they were a part. 
54 Johnson, Combat Chaplain, 125. 
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Often communion served as a location for religious reinterpretation in battle. Most 
chaplains took Eucharistic elements (wine and communion wafers) with them in the field all the 
time. Many Protestant denominations, however, served communion only once a month or 
quarter. Their worship instead emphasized scripture and proclamation through preaching. But 
John Schumacher felt that in Vietnam, “I simply felt that I could not follow the tradition of a 
once a month communion, which is the practice of many denominations. I knew that this could 
possibly be the last time a soldier would take communion. Things are different in a combat zone 
and this was one of those differences.”55 Gary Baxter remembered celebrating Communion with 
soldiers at Nui Ba Den. He said, “twelve people out of that company had been killed. The battle 
was still raging within eyesight of where we were. It was an intense battle yet these young 
soldiers were able to shut out the death and dying for a few moments in the communion event 
as they turned from death to life in the elements of the Eucharist. They were able to grasp hope 
in the midst of despair, life in the midst of death, resurrection in the midst of dying.”56 Here, 
rather than communion simply representing a divine presence in war, the chaplain had 
interpreted the Eucharist in a combat-specific way, emphasizing the significance of life and 
resurrection—not only of Christ, but of humans—as experienced through Communion. The 
presence of death and destruction, instead of acting as wedges that separated soldiers from their 
faith, became means through which religious beliefs became more meaningful. 
At other times, chaplains interpreted their sacramental ministries as possibly influencing 
soldiers’ wellbeing and sense of safety. Chaplain Thomas Des Champs recalled one occasion 
when he, his driver and gunner fell under a rocket attack while waiting for their jeep to be pulled 
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from mud. Quickly, the men were pinned down in a bunker as the enemy zeroed in their fire. In 
that moment, Des Champs remembered one of the soldiers calling out, “Can we have 
communion, Chaplain?” Des Champs had some communion wafers and a flask of wine in his 
pockets, so he agreed. He reminded the men that he was a Protestant chaplain, but he told them 
that all were welcome to Communion. He continued his story: “At that moment, another rocket 
exploded overhead. More dust and dirt fell. After removing the wine and wafers from my leg 
pockets, I stood up and blessed them. I passed the bag of wafers around to the men and then 
the flask of wine. Some men made the sign of the cross before taking communion, others did 
not. But there was not a man who did not take communion that afternoon.” To this point, Des 
Champs’s story tracked that of other chaplains who served Communion to men of different 
faith groups, but Des Champs took his analysis one step further. In his memoir, he asserted, “By 
the end of the short service, the rocket attack ended. God must have been watching over us that 
afternoon, because no one in the entire firebase had been hurt or killed by the attack.”57 
Yet the meaning of communion was not constant throughout the war. The chaplain’s 
role as an interpreter of religious meaning continued as soldiers left the field and prepared to 
return to the United States. The military strove to ensure that soldiers had religious support from 
their time in basic training to their re-entry into civilian life. Orris Kelly, a chaplain with the 4th 
Infantry Division, reflected on his role in the soldiers’ spiritual, physical, emotional journey that 
took them from combat in Vietnam back to civilian life in the United States, where by the late 
1960s, protest against the war had strengthened in numbers, rhetoric, and action. He recalled 
that as soldiers left Vietnam, the base chaplains met with them. He recalled that one chaplain 
would tell the men, “We don’t know how you feel about Vietnam or what happened to you 
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personally. We don’t know what your sense of the church is, or what your sense of your 
relationship to God is. We don’t know what you are going to face when you go home. We can’t 
explain all those things. But one thing we came to do before you left was to offer our faith 
through Holy Communion and the Eucharist.”58 Most of the soldiers took the chaplains’ offer. 
Kelly believed that at this moment, the ritual of communion was more significant than its 
traditional religious meaning. In such a spirit, the chaplains offered communion to the soldiers 
as a symbol of the Christian faith as well as a symbol of reconciliation and transition back home. 
The second interpretation could stand regardless of a soldier’s individual religious beliefs.59 Here, 
communion represented something potentially different from what it had on the battlefield. In 
the midst of combat Communion was a reminder of Christ’s resurrection, of the victory of life 
over death, and of God’s presence in all circumstances. In preparation for return to “the world,” 
however, it represented reconciliation, connection with the divine and with humanity, and 
healing. And when chaplains were unsure of a soldier’s faith, they offered their own in its place. 
Combat also amplified baptismal rituals—a stark symbol of new life amidst death. 
Chaplain Joseph Dulany recalled baptizing men wherever possible, even in bomb craters filled 
with water.60 Once signs of death and destruction, craters became founts for the waters of life 
represented by baptism. For Curt Bowers, the baptism of several soldiers of different ethnicities, 
backgrounds, and denominations represented “a time of great rejoicing and blessing as we who 
were brothers in warfare became brothers in Christ.”61 Christian baptismal rites represented 
                                                 
58 Orris E. Kelly, interview by Henry Ackerman, 21 October 1985, quoted in Ackermann, Always There, 
183. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Dulany, Once a Soldier, 51. 
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entry into a religious family akin to the family ties that war’s sacrament—baptism by fire—had 
formed.  
Occasionally baptism and death were closely linked as chaplains baptized many men just 
before they died. At other times the two stood in marked contrast to one another. James 
Johnson recalled that just after he had baptized a soldier and held services, another of his close 
friends had been killed on a MEDCAP (Medical Civilian Assistance Program) mission that he 
too would have been on if he had not been holding services. Johnson’s memory of the 
circumstances reflected the intensity of the situation. He wrote, “I’m alone with Stiver’s body. I 
feel a sense of rage boiling up in me. I can’t take his death! He seems so alone here in the open 
air. His body is waiting for transportation to Saigon for graves registration and then back to his 
grieving family. It is all too final, too quick. He chose to live a good life. He didn’t get a chance 
to choose how to die.” Johnson, thinking about his own mortality and about Stiver’s death, 
simply stood there. Sad, relieved, and angered that Stiver had died when he had not been there, 
Johnson ultimately resolved to move on: “I sat with Stiver for perhaps five minutes, 
mesmerized. Butch’s baptism and Stiver’s death are such a stark contrast. It’s not fair. I hate it. 
But I must go on.”62  
As chaplains and soldiers faced death, they also used religious rituals and sacraments to 
bless the dead and to heal the living. Joseph O’Donnell, a Catholic chaplain, recorded such an 
incident after a helicopter returned from combat with eighteen dead marines. “About thirty 
marines and sailors stood around the body bags on the elevator, waiting for me. These eighteen 
men had been dead for two days; I knew that. The Catholic Sacrament of the Sick is for the 
living; I knew that too. But I knew what I had to do.” As men watched and waited, O’Donnell 
remembered, “one by one, I unzipped each body bag, and anointed whatever I found there. It 
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was not pleasant. But it was the most solemn and powerful prayer service I have ever 
experienced. In the midst of all the action, there was absolute silence and lots of tears.”63 
Blessing the dead with a sacrament for the living provided a sense of finality to death, but also 
served as a healing service and a prayer for those who were still alive.  
 The uncertainties of combat also seemed to ratchet up the significance of the constant 
and quick availability of a chaplain to administer sacraments. Andrew Shimek recalled an 
incident where a soldier was killed within minutes of saying confession and receiving the 
Eucharist. The chaplains’ presence also allowed for the soldier to receive the Sacrament of the 
Sick before he died.64 Chaplains embodied a religious presence on the battlefield. Some troops 
interpreted a chaplains’ accompaniment on a mission as a literal manifestation of the idea of 
“going with God,” while others were certain that the chaplain brought heavy fire and danger—
one unit apparently nicknamed their chaplain, “the right reverend magnet ass”—an obvious, if 
crude, expression of the intersections of the sacred and profane. 
Usually field services combined sacramental, scriptural, and musical elements. Curt 
Bowers wrote about a typical field service: “Communion was a very worshipful, meaningful time 
to all of us. I remember dirty, grubby, battle-scarred hands reaching up toward heaven as I 
would gently place a wafer in their hand. They would take it with tears in their eyes, thanking 
God for keeping them safe thus far.” Afterward, they often sang “Amazing Grace,” a hymn 
originally connected to the abolition movement in England. In its new context, the second verse 
became particularly important. Soldiers and chaplains sang, “through many dangers, toils, and 
snares/I have already come/‘Tis grace hath brought me safe thus far,/And grace will lead me 
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home.” Curtis Bowers reflected, “some of them did go home—to their eternal home.” The 
hymn and communion together “took on special significance for the combat soldier and for this 
chaplain who celebrated it with heaviness in his own heart, yet with gratitude to Jesus who drew 
near to us on the battlefield.”65 As chaplains led soldiers in worship on the battlefield, they 
interpreted their experiences in religious ways. Soldiers who died went to their “eternal home;” 
chaplains appropriated an abolitionist hymn (“Amazing Grace”) to fit a combat circumstance; in 
the midst of combat, soldiers reached toward heaven to receive communion. Perhaps, though, it 
was just as likely that soldiers simply died, that the hymns they chose were simply familiar, or 
that soldiers reached up to another human to receive a ritualistic symbol of faith. But chaplains 
chose not to interpret these experiences in secular ways; their analysis remained religious. 
Other hymns relied on more militaristic themes to provide the soundtrack for battle. For 
Claude Newby, “The Battle Hymn of the Republic” took on different meanings depending on 
the situation. While filling a stateside post, his commanding officer ordered the song sung at 
every service prior to a live-fire infiltration course.66 In this case, the song, which blended 
militaristic and Christian themes, served to instill a sense of courage and duty in often-reticent 
trainees. On the battlefield in Vietnam, though, Newby recalled Easter services in which he and 
his men changed the words of the familiar song to “as He died to make men holy, let us live to 
make men free.”67 The song, infused with new lyrics and meaning, offered hope and reassurance 
that their efforts were worthwhile and good. Combat soldiers used the song to reinforce their 
commitment to life rather than the nobility of death, though one suspects the original lyrics were 
never far from their minds. 
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As with the “Battle Hymn of the Republic,” many chaplains used a civil-religious 
language to interpret their mission and motives for serving in Vietnam. By explicitly relating 
their combat experiences and religious language, chaplains connected the military mission in 
Vietnam with their faith. Before the war, David Knight wrote that he was “caught up with the 
same naive idealism” regarding combat as many others, considering himself not only an officer 
and minister in the United States Army, but also “an officer and minister in the Army of God, 
with a mandate to carry that ‘terrible swift sword.’”68 Knight had conflated God and Country, 
and had used a line from the “Battle Hymn of the Republic” to make the connection. The 
“terrible swift sword” encompassed literal and physical meanings in Vietnam. 
In addition to the obvious civil-religious themes and tropes in the Battle Hymn of the 
Republic, other patriotic songs also worked themselves into the repertoire of chaplains 
conducting field services. Wendell Danielson recalled that for many of his troops “God Bless 
America” became the benediction for many field services where personnel of diverse faiths 
attended. He acknowledged that the song “for us, is difficult to sing,” that he “knew the Doc 
wouldn’t make it past the fourth line. He never finished, ‘From the mountains, to the prairies,’” 
because “tears come to his eyes and he stops singing. Nobody, however, notices.” Danielson 
wished for each man to express his feelings and faith, and if the song allowed him to do that, so 
be it. He pleaded “God help us if the words become simply words and the love is reduced to 
sentiment,” and concluded “For my men this song becomes a prayer.” At the same time he 
recognized the song as a different kind of prayer from a sectarian or explicitly religious one. In 
combat, a secular song was offered as a prayer in part because “it is difficult to find a prayer that 
will be accepted by everyone. One is too long, another too short. Also there are Jewish and 
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Roman Catholic personnel present. This song bridges the gap. It says what we want to say.”69 
Thus, a hymn generally reserved for the Fourth of July celebrations in the United States took on 
new meaning in Vietnam as men thought about their homes and their purpose for fighting. In 
place of specific theological or doctrinal language, this hymn offered common ground on the 
basis of patriotism and civic duty. In the context of a religious service, it may have exemplified 
the intense connections between faith in one’s god and faith in one’s country, or it may have 
conflated the two. 
As the war in Vietnam dragged on, the aids available for conducting field services 
improved, sometimes as a result of improved military supply, and other times because of the 
independent efforts of chaplains or denominational groups. The Army published a new hymnal 
for service members, and one was especially designed for use in the field. It included classic 
hymns, such as “Amazing Grace,” and short prayers for individual prayer and meditation. 
Additionally, military branches published extensive materials for lay leadership of worship in the 
field. Especially for remote units and small denominations, lay leaders took on significant 
ministry roles. The Offices of the Chiefs of Chaplains oversaw much of this material and made 
sure it aligned with the service’s overall chaplain program, but these field manuals provided 
invaluable religious support when chaplains were unavailable. 
Civilian religious groups also published materials for use in the field. In addition to the 
ubiquitous testaments and pocket Bibles that religious groups of all sorts distributed—usually 
through their chaplains—some took a more creative approach. Relying on the popularity of folk 
music and guitar masses, especially among young people in the late 1960s and early 1970s. One 
denominational press published and distributed a “Vietnam Songbook” that took tunes from 
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folk songs and rock music and revised them with Christian lyrics. Chaplains and churches alike 
recognized that the potential congregation in Vietnam was quite unlike that in the United 
States—it was overwhelmingly young and male, a near antithesis of the predominantly female 
and older population of churchgoers back in the world. 
Supply shortages—especially of chaplain kits, field organs, and portable tape players—
were fairly constant, so chaplains often resorted to creative uses of materiel or provided their 
own supplies for conducting worship services. One chaplain, planning ahead for a second tour 
in Vietnam, wrote in his denomination’s chaplain newsletter that “things were a bit hectic this 
quarter,” and that he had been preparing for a second tour since he received his orders. He 
wrote, “I missed organ accompaniment for worship during my last tour in Vietnam, and 
determined not to be without it again. I had our organist record some hymns and spliced those 
together to form tapes that includes [sic] a prelude, hymn, Gloria Patri, Doxology, hymn, and 
postlude. I then recorded those on cartridges, and brought a portable cartridge player to use in 
the field. I then found a company that sells pipe organ music commercially, and proceeded to 
put it in the same format.”70 Chaplains recognized the comfort that familiar music might bring to 
soldiers in the field; chaplains’ services often bridged soldiers’ religious experiences in Vietnam 
and back in the world by supplying common, yet slightly varied, forms of religious practice. 
This fusion of military and religious themes arose in many situations and often involved 
interpreting combat experiences through scriptural references. When Knight was caught alone 
with a platoon, the soldiers looked to him for both military and religious support. Knight 
recalled that while the soldiers looked to him, “I was looking to someone else for answers. In the 
blackness, I silently prayed for God to guide us. Without knowing where I was I said, ‘Go that 
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way!’ Our backs were so up against the proverbial Red Sea that I had no recourse but to simply 
trust that He who makes a way where there seems to be no way would lead us safely out of the 
snare.” While Knight only implicitly compared himself to Moses, the connections were clear. 
After the event was over, Knight recalled another scripture and asserted, “The whole experience 
had been a walk through ‘the valley of the shadow of death’ under the guiding hand of the Great 
Shepherd.”71 Though it was unlikely that Knight made these connections explicit in the heat of 
battle, his post-war reflections revealed how chaplains interpreted combat situations. For Knight 
and others, biblical stories and scriptures were the most obvious way to make sense of two 
apparently disparate worlds.72  
Combat situations consistently reminded chaplains of biblical references and lessons. 
Chaplain Stanley Beach remembered that he and Chaplain Vincent Capodanno “spent Easter 
Sunday morning ministering to those men. It made a deep impression on both of us and those 
moments of looking into the eyes of Marines who were experienced with death, gave us a 
greater appreciation of the hope of the Resurrection in Jesus Christ.”73 Regardless of the 
soldiers’ experience of Easter in combat, chaplains like Capodanno and Beach articulated their 
belief that war amplified religious meaning. 
Near death experiences and the juxtaposition of worship and battle pointed to the heart 
of philosophical and theological questions that involved life and death. Understanding these 
experiences required reexamining scripture and tradition in terms of combat. The question of 
why certain men died in battle while others lived haunted soldiers and chaplains alike, and they 
came up with varied answers. Some chaplains adopted the idea that combat was an uncontrolled 
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experiment, where safety could not be guaranteed to the faithful and where weapons and 
ammunition served no other purpose than to kill any with whom they came in contact. Samuel 
Hopkins agreed with the old soldiers’ adage that “sometimes the bullets have our name on them 
and sometimes they are addressed to ‘to whom it may concern.’”74  
Other chaplains, however, took exception to this theology. One response was to 
attribute everything in battle to God’s will, and this conclusion allowed for easy, if not 
emotionally satisfactory, answers to the question of death. After a friendly fire incident in which 
an American soldier was killed, James Hutchens argued against the common conception of such 
accidents as tragic, and reassured himself and others that “for the Christian, these ‘accidents’ 
have a different meaning.” Recalling Psalm 91:5, which states: “You will not fear the terror of 
the night, or the arrow that flies by day,” he determined that “a sovereign God in absolute 
control directs not only the enemy’s ‘arrows that fly by day’ but also the ‘arrows’ of his own 
company.” Hutchens’ time in Vietnam convinced him that there was “no such thing as a bullet 
inscribed ‘To whom it may concern.’ God alone determines the length of a man’s days.”75  
Still other chaplains viewed both of these interpretations as fatalistic, and preferred 
instead to allow for more human agency in wartime. James Johnson argued that such fatalism 
was “poor theology” which revealed a “kind of predestined attitude that people have begun to 
voice here in Vietnam.” He contrasted it with his own theology in which “God helps those who 
help themselves,” and in Vietnam, they helped themselves “by staying low and hopefully, out of 
harm’s way.” He reasoned that “if there’s nothing you can do about your destiny, then one 
would never buckle a seat belt, have a fire alarm, or get a medical checkup.” In rejecting a 
Calvinist theology and instead accepting the doctrine of free will, Johnson concluded, “It’s not 
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brave to needlessly expose oneself to the enemy . . . . It is better to err on the side of safety than 
to be killed because of faulty theology that gives no power to the God-given position of the right 
of self-determination.”76 Chaplains used scripture to explain, justify, or rationalize their 
experiences in war, but they also used their experiences in war as interpretive devices to read 
scripture in new ways. 
 Liturgies of war also provided opportunities to interpret scripture in ways that were 
relevant to soldiers in battle. Before an important battle, David Knight reread a psalm, and 
recorded that Psalm 91:3-8 “seemed to leap right off the page. They were speaking directly to 
me, saying ‘You will make contact with the enemy, but I will be with you and, as you trust in Me, 
not a single bullet will hurt you.” Knight told the unit’s captain, who then told the men of Echo 
Company, “God had promised to shield them in the coming battle.”77 Whether by providence, 
fate, or luck, none were wounded in the battle, even under heavy enemy fire. Knight’s faith was 
affirmed.78 In this way, Knight followed a long tradition of political leaders invoking religious or 
spiritual protection for troops before combat. In this way, the particular circumstances were 
unremarkable. However, for Knight, the incident gained spiritual significance. 
For evangelical chaplains, services before and during combat also provided particularly 
relevant situations for emphasizing the need for individual salvation through Jesus Christ. The 
official mission of the Chaplain Corps, however, was not to proselytize or promote religion or to 
ensure the good behavior of military personnel, but to provide religious support for those who 
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wanted it. This distinction between ministry and mission was most significant away from the 
battlefield, but it provided the basis for some controversy between liberal and evangelical 
Protestants. One draftee who had served his tour with the 9th Infantry Division wrote to the 
Chief of Chaplains to volunteer to return to Vietnam in order to evangelize soldiers. Noticing 
that the services lacked emphasis on salvation, he wrote, “none of [the chaplains] that I heard 
ever gave the reason why and how to be saved.”79 Most chaplains, however, used field services 
as opportunities to reconcile faith and combat and to provide a connection between soldiers and 
their religious traditions. 
Conrad “Connie” Walker, nicknamed the “Leapin’ Deacon” by his troops, recorded a 
series of combat-ready sermons based simultaneously on an evangelical view of salvation and the 
eight jump commands used during an airborne jump. He believed the lessons had served him 
well, and wanted to share them with his troops. The first, “Get Ready” was based on Luke 
12:35-37; Psalm 46; Hebrews 10:19; Matthew 24:36-44, which Walker summarized as saying, 
“Get ready for a deeper walk with the Lord; all that we have prepared and trained for is at hand. 
The ultimate and urgent time is here!” The others—“Stand Up,” “Hook Up,” “Check Static 
Line,” “Check Equipment,” “Sound Off Equipment Check,” “Stand in the Door,” and 
“GO!”—followed in similar fashion, primarily drawing from New Testament texts and 
encouraging soldiers to cultivate a personal relationship with Jesus Christ.80 
No scriptural reference, it seemed, was off limits for reinterpretation through the lens of 
war and Vietnam. Wendell E. Danielson, in an article for The Chaplain magazine, offered an 
extended exegesis of Psalm 46, in light of the war and the struggles that American troops faced 
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in Vietnam. Danielson’s hermeneutic of war allowed him to address the common doubts of 
soldiers and chaplains, to reinforce the confidence of the Psalmist, and to assign larger meaning 
to the apparent meaninglessness of Vietnam. He began with the basic conflict of men about to 
embark in battle: 
God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble. 
This, I thought, is what we need to hear. Tomorrow there would be trouble, 
perhaps more than anyone realized. 
In several hours these men would helilifted into the jungle. For some of them 
this would be a new experience; most of the men had done it many times. Some troops 
would not return to this sand again but no one talked about this. Each man knew it 
would be someone else. 
 
The next part of the psalm indicated that God remained changeless, so men should not fear the 
problems attendant in this world. The psalmist invoked imagery of earthquakes and violent 
storms, which Danielson equates to the barrage of demoralizing news from home. Letters that 
began “‘Dear Jimmy . . . I don’t want to cause you any worry but they’ve taken the phone away, 
cut our electricity off, and we’re two months behind with the rent. We’ll make out okay, don’t 
worry about us.’ . . . or ‘Dearest . . . I’ve had it. When you return the children and I will be 
gone,’” quickly became the chaplain’s domain as a primary counselor dealing with personal 
problems. And Danielson expressed his frustration with the homefront’s apparent detachment 
from the war. He exclaimed, 
There is the common enemy, Charlie. But what about wives who can’t wait? Or parents 
who won’t write? Or friends who don’t seem to care? How does a young man perform 
24 hours a day when he has received two letters in the past seven months? 
Charlie should be our only concern yet it doesn’t work that way. 
 
Danielson’s interpretation of the first verse of the psalm revealed deep frustrations with the 
factors that influenced soldiers morale and an intimate understanding of the uncertainty of men 
facing combat.81 
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 Danielson continued his exegesis, expressing a more general sense of the futility of war 
and the power of God. When the psalmist wrote, “He makes wars to cease to the end of the 
earth; he breaks the bow, and shatters the spear, he burns the chariots with fire!” Danielson 
questioned his God’s will for all of humankind. He wrote “the modern spear and bow are far 
more effective than the psalmist ever imagined.” And he wanted God to act, to intervene: “Why 
doesn’t God do something? Soon? Like today?” Danielson pleaded. Yet even in the face of such 
doubt, Danielson interpreted the psalmist’s final lines, “I am exalted among the nations, I am 
exalted in the earth. The Lord of hosts is with us; The God of Jacob is our refuge,” as a 
statement of God’s sovereignty and as a sort of mission statement for chaplains and other 
ministers. He concluded there was work to be done if God were to be exalted: “There is much 
that must be done—instruction to give, an example to set. Who will do this? For my men this is 
my responsibility. They must be shown faith and love and courage. If my example in living these 
virtues is not louder than my words I become the tinkling symbol [sic].” Danielson, in this 
writing, appropriated and accepted the language of 1 Corinthians 13 as central to his mission. 
The so-called “Love Chapter” in the Christian New Testament, exhorts followers to exhibit love 
in all they do and declares that actions without love are meaningless. At the same time, 
Danielson called on his chaplain training and his understanding of the Chaplain Corps’ mission 
to define his role. He wrote, the chaplain’s “responsibility remains the same whether in 
Garmisch [Germany] or Vietnam or the United States. The opportunity is always here to bring 
men to God and God to men. This is and always will be the high calling. To do less is to do 
nothing.”82 By engaging in scriptural interpretation, both in services with troops, and in a 
publication for chaplains, Danielson created pieces of a wartime liturgy that allowed for the 
reinterpretation of scripture while still acknowledging God’s power and sovereignty. 
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As they engaged in sacramental and worship traditions, chaplains, along with soldiers 
and officers, carved out sacred space in the midst of battle, so that the two were not wholly 
separated, but experienced together. One chaplain recalled baptizing a soldier in the Saigon 
River while others from his platoon guarded the area from hostile fire. The liturgical space was 
defined not only by the actions of the chapel and of worshippers but also by the ostensibly 
inviolate perimeter formed by armed soldiers.83  
Combat forced some chaplains and soldiers to reconsider the meaning of physical space 
as it related to religious experience. James Johnson described a Christmas Eve service, far 
different from the ones being held in the United States on the same occasion. “It’s time for the 
service. We’re muddy. No white shirts, ties, high heels or stained glass windows in church today. 
I hope there will be no blood stains either.” But beyond noting the physical differences, Johnson 
experienced “a warm feeling reflecting on God’s intervention in life through Jesus Christ. 
Sometimes, though it’s hard to see or evaluate how or when his intervention comes to this god 
forsaken place.”84 Johnson believed the meaning of the service could be the same no matter the 
circumstance. But whereas the inherent goodness of Christmas and of God perhaps went 
unquestioned in a church, the battlefield required men to find a deeper level of trust and faith in 
order to arrive at the same truth.  
War also altered the spaces in which worship took place. Liturgical colors and ornate 
vestments were replaced with jungle fatigues, makeshift altars and chapels, and portable mass 
and communion kits. While many chaplains and soldiers believed that God revealed himself in 
battle, the sacred space created by a simple alter, hymns and prayer books, sacramental elements, 
or a chaplain’s combat vestments, was separated—at least psychologically—from the war going 
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on around it. Worship services and the chaplain’s presence provided a connection to “the 
world,” the past, and offered a brief, albeit incomplete, respite from battle. And though 
chaplains served in the midst of war, they also set themselves apart from it. Earl Kettler wrote to 
his wife, “my goal each day is to live and teach the love of God, remembering that I’m not an 
extension of a machine gun. When a man comes to my Services I feel he has a right to have a 
few quiet moments to hear the love of God. There is still love.”85 In field services, chaplains 
created a space between war and civilization. The nearness of combat gave their words, their 
presence, and the acts of worship new meanings. 
Occasionally combat left no time for worshipful reflection. The liturgical space was 
frequently invaded by artillery fire, by helicopters and airplanes, or by unexpected attacks. 
Newby recounted an Easter service in which a resupply chopper interrupted his sermon, which 
was not unusual. The situation, however, changed when the helicopter crashed nearby, at which 
point the “worshipers abandoned the service and dashed to the crash site, fearing troopers were 
being cut to pieces by the spinning main rotor. Amazingly no one was hurt. Even more amazing, 
about the time we made that happy discovery, a 105mm artillery round exploded in the burning 
vegetation about a hundred feet behind where I’d stood to conduct the service. The falling 
chopper had drawn Easter worshipers from the ‘kill zone’ just in time!” Though it is hard to 
imagine any minister simply continuing on with a service if a helicopter crashed nearby, the 
exigencies of worship in combat required an extraordinary level of flexibility and a heightened 
sense of situational awareness that civilian clergy could hardly imagine. One could easily imagine 
such a story being exaggerated, but by accounting this story, Newby stressed the potential 
dangers of serving in combat and his interpretation of the constant grace and mercy of God. 
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In rear areas, soldiers and chaplains built makeshift and semi-permanent chapels all 
across Vietnam. Chaplains recalled some of these structures being raised in three or four days. 
Construction involved found materials, misdirected supplies, and the occasional budget 
allocation. Chaplain Robert Hess recalled the construction of a chapel outside of Ban Me Thuot 
from “‘scrounged’ material and a Bronze cross made from ‘duster’ shells, pews of ammo boxes 
and ‘home made’ chandeliers of tinted Plexiglas, and even a ‘bell’ in the steeple (with nobody 
supposed to ask where it came from).”86 More so than in combat areas, soldiers used materials 
available to them to recreate recognizable worship spaces. The chapel represented a piece of the 
world they knew and understood. 
Be it in the field or in the rear, liturgical space in combat was rarely well-defined, and 
many chaplains saw their ministry as one of simple presence; thus the chaplain himself 
represented sacred space. Joseph Dulany believed that his most important opportunities for 
ministry came in letting soldiers know he “struggled at times with my faith as they did.” He 
wrote, “I invited them to join the journey as together we looked to God for faith and assurance. 
I shared from my heart and conviction with the men. I wept with them at memorial services. I 
prayed, as best I could, in the worst of situations at hospital bedsides and after enemy contacts. 
Sometimes, the only thing that I could do was sit with a person.”87 Dulany and other chaplains 
understood that the liturgies of war that were being created did not have to be formal, 
organized, or standard to be meaningful. 
However and wherever they were carried out, liturgies of war returned power to God 
and agency to humans, and these liturgies allowed those who participated to experience worship, 
healing, and reconciliation in the midst of combat. Chaplains led the service members and 
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officers who joined them in worship in the effort to reconcile their faith with their experience in 
war. As they confronted moral questions and the horrors of combat, soldiers and chaplains 
found that liturgical experiences centered on sacrament, scripture, songs, and space, which 
linked them with the world outside of Vietnam and at the same time created new spaces in 
which these elements transcended boundaries created by traditional religious interpretations and 
denominational or faith-group divisions. 
 
The Morality of the Vietnam War 
As chaplains dealt with internal conflict over their identities and created new liturgical 
interpretations to resolve theological and doctrinal questions, they also had to confront the basic 
morality of the Vietnam War. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, chaplains were increasingly aware of 
religious dissent at home, demoralized troops, and apparently waning chances for military 
success. Thomas Des Champs recalled thinking, “During that spring of 1970, I knew what the 
national news back home could not tell; we were not winning this war.” He, and other chaplains, 
had to respond to this understanding. Des Champs chose to reassure soldiers, even though he 
thought the situation hopeless: “As God’s emissary to the troops, I found myself telling them 
everything would be ‘all right.’ But in my heart, I knew that everything wasn’t or couldn’t be ‘all 
right.’ No words can describe the horrors of war or the effects that it can have upon men’s 
souls.” In deciding to reassure soldiers, some would argue that he abdicated his religious 
responsibilities in favor of military ones. Yet Des Champs disagreed. Rather than ignoring a 
religious conviction, Des Champs’ religious interpretations changed to accommodate new 
circumstances. He wrote, “To combat the impact of the horrors of war, I adopted a philosophy 
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of divine confidence that even while the world appeared to be going to hell, God was still in 
control.”88 
 Other chaplains confronted the morality of warfare and their role in it when they were 
called upon to minister to Vietnamese civilians, often the victims of American military action. 
One Christian Scientist chaplain, Richard Kemp, wrote that these instances “have been quite 
challenging to my metaphysical position.” After holding the head of a wounded Vietnamese 
man, and later learning he was an NVA regular, Kemp was reminded of the scriptural injunction 
“Love your enemies . . . pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you,” which had 
been highlighted in that week’s lesson-sermon.89 Ultimately, Kemp concluded “truly our enemy 
is that which defiles man, and not person,” expressing a new theological understanding of 
scripture in light of war.90 Kemp’s understanding of the enemy also affected his relationship to 
the war. His interpretations of the morality of war and of his relationship to the Vietnamese 
enemy shows a case in which a chaplain might be seen as undermining a national or military goal 
and upholding his religious convictions. Role conflict or role tension did not cause Kemp to 
abandon or even question his faith or ministerial duties; rather, moral conflict and religious 
reflection allowed Kemp to reach a different conclusion about the nature of the war.  
The war in Vietnam represented a pivotal moment for chaplains and for the chaplaincy. 
In previous wars, chaplains had faced only limited criticisms from a relatively small population 
of religious and civic activists who argued for the vigorous separation of church and state. Yet 
the moral ambiguities and lapses of American military action in Vietnam called the chaplains’ 
military and religious position into question. As these moral, religious, and military questions 
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converged, chaplains confronted conflict that stemmed from apparent contradictions within 
their own belief systems. They responded to these conflicts in practical ways and by creating new 
liturgical practices to make sense of the war. Chaplains found it was possible for Christians to 
serve in the Vietnam War, to believe fundamentally in its ostensible purpose, to find war morally 
abhorrent, and still to interpret it in religious ways so that their God emerged in control and 
their faith intact or strengthened. They reached these conclusions by sorting out questions 
related to their identities in and interpretations of war.  
During the war, they addressed moral, military, and religious issues pragmatically. Their 
resolutions were dissimilar but based on personal and religious convictions. As they addressed 
issues such as war crimes or the chaplain’s role in combat, chaplains also formed for themselves 
identities within the military community. These various identities contributed to the moral life 
and the morale of the troops they served. Conflicts over moral issues and religious interpretation 
often manifested themselves in apparent confusion about chaplains’ roles as clergy, soldiers, and 
officers. In the end, chaplains had to resolve their experience in combat so that their faith and 
their religion did not give way to cynicism, despair, and nihilism, a process that began in Vietnam 
but continued as they returned home. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
CHAPLAINS AND HOMEFRONT DEBATES ABOUT VIETNAM 
Chaplains, positioned as they were between the sacred and secular, the civilian and 
military, often served as mediators or interpreters for diverse communities in the Vietnam War, 
but they also played this role within American communities in the United States. Chaplains 
entered discussions about Vietnam, American religion, and the chaplaincy itself in specific and 
meaningful ways. Sometimes chaplains themselves participated in these, and at other times, 
chaplains emerged as subjects and symbols in these debates, rather than participants. When they 
participated, chaplains’ words about the war in public and published discourses provided 
experientially grounded terms for the debate because their words and their actions represented 
the complex intersections of different cultures and points-of-view. They held authority and 
credibility in the eyes of religious and military communities by virtue of their position as both 
officers and clergy. Though chaplains’ writings were unlikely to affect military policies or 
practices in Vietnam, their words reveal some of the fundamental tensions between the military 
and American society that developed over the course of the war. Often, chaplains became 
symbolic subjects in a debate where one’s position on chaplain participation in war roughly 
coincided with one’s opinion of the Vietnam War.  
 While their official status granted them full membership in the military community and 
in the religious community, their position outside of traditional parish settings and their rank-
without-command status in the military, occasionally left them on the margins of both 
institutions. This simultaneous position as insider and outsider thrust chaplains into positions as 
both spokesmen and symbols, and the chaplaincy became a symbolic ground over which to hash 
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out ethical, theological and practical questions that related to the intersections of religion and 
war. In a war that challenged American religious, cultural, moral, and military ideas, the military 
chaplaincy occasionally emerged as a sort of safe battle ground for these quite-intense debates. 
Chaplains were never central to debates about American policy in Vietnam, but conversations 
about chaplains revealed important fissures within the homefront religious community and 
illuminate one way in which debate over chaplains foreshadowed larger debates over Vietnam 
and an American national destiny. 
 Discourse by and about chaplains in various communities, particularly (though not 
exclusively) those formed and shaped by publications, highlights the multiple ways in which 
chaplains related to such communities in the homefront. Communities of readers and writers 
formed around and were shaped by the public discourse of newspapers, weekly periodicals, 
newsletters, and denominational conventions. James W. Carey, a Communication Studies 
scholar, has proposed that “news reading, and writing, is a ritual act,” in which the reader 
confronts not “pure information” but “a portrayal of the contending forces in the world.” 
Newspapers, periodicals, newsletters, and even denominational resolutions did not merely 
present “facts” to an audience, but offered a specific way of understanding certain facts within a 
culturally determined context.1 Thus, publications both shaped and reflected the values and 
culture of the communities around them. When chaplains, religious leaders and laypeople, and 
secular journalists wrote about chaplains, the chaplaincy, and Vietnam, they demonstrated the 
various sets of norms and values that held weight within each community. Chaplains 
themselves—both current and former—contributed important voices to the debate. They 
offered experientially grounded observations and conclusions, and they acted as cultural 
mediators by linking civilian and military communities. They operated comfortably within each 
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world, using the language and culture of each one to establish their credibility and to 
communicate one community’s cultures and values to the other. 
 While limited, discussions about chaplains centered around two related themes: First, 
there was an abstract, philosophical discussion about the morality of war (and the Vietnam War 
in particular) and the chaplain’s role in war. Second, there was a policy-oriented discussion about 
civilianizing the chaplaincy, which would remove (or at least significantly lessen) federal funding 
and military entanglement for chaplains. Chaplains, ex-chaplains, and civilian observers 
participated in both debates, though not always on the same terms or using the same 
assumptions. The debate’s frame frequently depended on where the conversation was taking 
place—in other words, writers to the Christian Century assumed certain things about the audience 
of that periodical, and the New York Times’ coverage revealed a different set of assumptions for 
its audience. In any case, proponents of both positions argued forcefully, and the divide over 
chaplains was indicative of broader cultural and political divides within the American public.  
Finally, the narrative of religious dissent during the Vietnam War has been well-told by 
historians, but looking at discourse about chaplains illuminates a wider range of religious 
responses and interpretations of the Vietnam War than might be popularly imagined. In addition 
to widespread dissent, religious beliefs also prompted some faithful people to support the 
Vietnam War and induced deep ambivalence and uncertainty in others. The diversity of 
responses—all “religious” in nature—emphasized both the diversity of religious beliefs in the 
United States and underscored the extent to which American religion had been reconfigured 
along political rather than denominational lines. 
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Priest versus Prophet: Defining the Chaplain’s Role in War 
Though chaplains had served with American military personnel from the country’s 
founding, the historical role of chaplains had never been constant. George Washington and 
other commanders apparently valued chaplains for their morale-boosting function among 
troops; in the Civil War, chaplains on both sides assured men of the fundamental righteousness 
of their cause; on the Western frontier, chaplains also doubled as library officers, post teachers, 
bakery and commissary managers, and even medics; and in the early Cold War, chaplains played 
a central role in character guidance instruction in the military.2 As the chaplaincy increased 
professionalization and education-levels within its ranks, chaplains’ duties became more focused 
on specifically religious endeavors, and because chaplains were usually drawn from a pool of 
civilian clergy, developments within American religious communities affected the military 
chaplaincy. 
In the 1960s, as the wave of religious revival and adherence peaked and began to decline, 
politically and theologically liberal Americans began to reconsider the role of religion in public 
life. They took cues from World War II hero Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who advocated a sort of 
“religionless Christianity” in which God’s people on earth undertook earthly tasks without 
looking to the Supernatural for guidance or support. Liberal religious adherents and secular 
activists took one of Bonhoeffer’s most-quoted statements to heart: “God would have us know 
that we must live as men who manage our lives without him.”3 Harvard sociologist and 
theologian, Harvey Cox, published The Secular City in 1965. He argued passionately and forcefully 
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that secularization and urbanization were not the enemies of Christianity, but rather its product. 
Cox’s book became a handbook of sorts for liberal activists and seminarians; Christians could 
better the world by working in it, by engaging with American culture.4 Thus, there were 
significant calls to move away from the “institutional” church, grounded in ornate and well-
established buildings and steeped in tradition, and into communities, where liturgical innovation 
and inclusion would be the norm. 
At the same time, conservative and evangelical Christians involved themselves with 
American culture and politics as well. Evangelical ministers were among the first to use radio to 
reach mass audiences, and Billy Graham’s revivals harkened to evangelical camp meetings of the 
nineteenth century. By 1940, Charles Fuller’s Old-Fashioned Revival Hour was broadcast on 450 
radio stations each week, and by 1943 boasted a weekly audience of more than twenty million.5 
Between 1952 and 1971, Southern Baptist Convention churches gained more than 6,300,000 
adherents, a 78% increase; the Presbyterian Church in the United States, the conservative wing 
of American Presbyterianism, experienced an 80% increase in that same time.6 Though old 
mainline denominations gained numerically more adherents and were generally larger than their 
conservative counterparts, evangelical and conservative denominations clearly had greater 
momentum. 
In many ways, official chaplaincy channels echoed the growing cultural concern for 
ecumenical cooperation and respect for religious pluralism by emphasizing its historical roots, 
yet conservative groups continued to influence the military’s character guidance programs and to 
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cast the Cold War in explicitly religious terms. How to provide spiritual support for American 
military personnel became an important issue as the Cold War solidified and as disagreements 
over the Cold War emerged between conservative and liberal religious groups.  
An old distinction from Max Weber’s sociology of religion became the frame for the 
debate that ensued; some writers referred to Weber’s typology explicitly, but even those who did 
not engage Weber’s theory directly described their positions in analogous ways. In Economy and 
Society, Weber identified three ideal types of religious authority: the priest, the prophet, and the 
magician. (In the chaplaincy debate, only the first two were ever considered with any 
seriousness.) Each held a particular place within a given society, and they each fulfilled a specific 
role and religious need. The priest was essentially a functionary of a “regularly organized and 
permanent enterprise concerned with influencing the gods.” The priest received his authority by 
virtue of tradition, ritual, and law, and he was bound by the same. The priest’s most important 
relationships on earth were social. Weber wrote that a priest was “actively associated with some 
type of social organization, of which they are employees or organs operating in the interests of 
the organization’s members.” Priests drew on systems of religious concepts, and they were 
usually learned and educated within the confines of a particular religious system.7 Prophets, on 
the other hand, were process agents. They appeared when a community was threatened and 
revealed divine truth to men on earth and interceded on behalf of a community. Weber 
identified two main methods of prophetic witness, ethical and exemplary. The first was based on 
proclamation and the second on modeling. Whereas priests operated within formal structures 
and traditions, prophets usually emerged from the outside or margins of formal religious 
authority. Prophets were, by divine calling and personal charisma, to speak truth to power and to 
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trans. Ephraim Fischoff, et al. (New York: Besminster Press, 1968), 425 ff. 
 176 
 
 
attract followers.8 Generally, those who doubted the ability of Christians to serve in war and 
questioned the morality of American intervention in Vietnam thought chaplains should play a 
prophetic role in war and that their close ties to the military compromised their ability to reveal 
perhaps unpopular truths to military authorities. Those who found Christian service in war 
acceptable and who emphasized the spiritual needs of military service members thought that 
chaplains’ primary role should be priestly or pastoral; they were functionaries who acted in the 
best spiritual interest of their flock. 
In 1970, near the height of American involvement in Vietnam, in response to growing 
concerns that a chaplain’s conscience was unnecessarily and detrimentally fettered by his 
institutional position within the military, the General Commission on Chaplains and Armed 
Forces Personnel (GCCAFP) released a set of “Guidelines for Free and Responsible Expression 
of Conscience in the Military.” The four guidelines were widely circulated, both in General 
Commission publications and within other denominational publications. The guidelines 
recognized the tension between a chaplain’s position as clergy and his position as officer—that 
he held dual responsibilities to church and state, never an easy combination to reconcile. The 
first guideline suggested that a “chaplain’s presence among his men is a constant reminder of the 
fact that the church is identifying with all persons in all conditions.” The second stated more 
emphatically that “Holy Scriptures require the church to minister to men wherever they may be 
found.” The third outlined the expectations and demands on chaplains by both the church and 
the state. The fourth and longest guideline set out a recommended course of action if the other 
three seemed in conflict. It concluded, officially, at least, contrary to the beliefs of chaplain 
critics that “If after exhausting all efforts the chaplain finds that reconciliation still is not 
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possible, the dictates of his faith and denomination determine his course of action.”9 According 
to the GCCAFP, the chaplain’s primary role was a priestly/pastoral one, but the chaplain’s 
spiritual conscience demanded a role for the prophet as well—if faith and war conflicted 
irreconcilably, faith should prevail. 
The debate over the chaplain’s primary role, however, began years before. In November 
1966, toward the beginning of a long buildup of American forces in Vietnam, the Christian 
Century published a three-part series on the military chaplaincy, and the issue of the Vietnam War 
echoed throughout. Framed as a dialogue about the chaplaincy, two of the three articles were 
clearly opposed to the military chaplaincy—either in principle or in its current form. On the 
other side, Navy Chaplain Albert Ledebuhr took the lead to defend the chaplaincy to a liberal 
and skeptical audience.  
William R. Miller, a layperson in the United Church of Christ, began his article by 
referring to the Anabaptist chaplain in Joseph Heller’s Catch-22: “The chaplain was sincerely a 
very helpful person who was never able to help anyone.” The critique that followed was based in 
this sense of irony; the fundamental problem with the chaplaincy was the “sheer incongruity of a 
pious imitator of Christ trying to be relevant while acting as part of a system for which the 
Gospels made no provision whatever.” The best the chaplain could do, according to Miller, was 
to punch a young enlistees “T.S. Card,” as the chaplain’s “powers of exorcism are greatly 
diminished in our matter-of-fact secular age.”10 When it came to Vietnam, Miller concluded that 
the chaplain could not seriously preach about pacifism, but he could “ever so cautiously, ask 
whether indeed God is the co-pilot of our bomber pilots as they rain death on Hanoi and 
Haiphong.” Miller was skeptical, though, that chaplains would even go this far, preferring 
                                                 
9 “Chaplains Guidelines for Free and Responsible Expression of Conscience in the Military,” The Chaplain, 
May-June 1970, 3. 
10 Miller, “Chaplaincy v. Mission,” Christian Century, 2 November 1966, 1336. 
 178 
 
 
instead to “wrap such questions in impenetrable abstractions and couch them in a letter to the 
Link or the Chaplain rather than risk demoralizing our Christian fighting men.”11 Miller 
recognized that chaplains were constrained by the system in which they operated, and that their 
primary outlet for dissention or disagreement with “policy” often came only in the form of 
dialogue with other military chaplains.  
Ultimately, Miller concluded that the military was having far too great an effect on 
religion, and specifically on the prophetic ministry of the church and its leaders. Miller wished to 
take a broad view of the chaplaincy’s mission, and in some sense, disentangle the chaplains’ 
mission from the mission of the military itself. In fact, he wrote, “quite emphatically, I do not 
wish to call attention to the fact that the principal function of the armed forces is to kill people,” 
yet this critique was implicit throughout. Serving as a uniformed officer of the armed services 
required the chaplain to “harmonize his beliefs and what they imply with the objectives of a 
secular enterprise, particularly one predicated on unswerving loyalty to the state . . . an effective 
army cannot countenance sedition among its officers and men.”12 Conflicting allegiances most 
certainly made for conflicting outcomes as the chaplain balanced his military and religious duties, 
but the impetus for change would originate with churches more fully seeking to serve the 
Church in the world. 
A former Navy chaplain, Norman MacFarlane, wrote the most scathingly critical article 
in the series, focusing on the political and military characteristics of the chaplaincy system. 
MacFarlane charged that chaplains who worked to uphold moral integrity within the military 
“have drunk the cup of hemlock,” essentially sacrificing their careers for their moral bearings 
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and integrity. He went so far as to charge that “no chaplain who challenged the command on a 
moral issue has survived the next selection board,” citing that in December 1965 only 67% of 
chaplains who were up for promotion to lieutenant commander were selected, as opposed to 
95.7% of other officers. MacFarlane’s view, though a minority position for chaplains, was 
nevertheless evidence of the diversity of chaplain viewpoints and opinions. Chaplains, even with 
their common cultural and social characteristics and a shared position, could not be expected to 
respond unanimously to the challenges presented by war. 
MacFarlane’s critique extended to the fact that chaplains were often expected to take on 
duties that other officers would not. He reported that at sea he had become the “library officer, 
tours officer, movie officer, public information assistant,” he became “publisher of the ship’s 
newspaper, organizer of children’s parties in foreign ports” among other duties unrelated to the 
chaplain’s specific work. But he lamented the fact that many navy chaplains were “rotting 
professionally in the navy when there are 60,000 empty pulpits in America.”13 Yet MacFarlane 
also critiqued the Navy’s tendency in his mind to write off religion, complaining that 
commanders prohibited or impeded active chaplain activities and undermined the religious 
program that chaplains offered.14 
The Century also gave space to a pro-chaplaincy article. Stationed at the Armed Forces 
Staff College at the time of the article’s publication, Ledebuhr framed his primary argument for 
the military chaplaincy as one of ministry to those outside of traditional parish life. Social 
movements of the 1960s exhorted Christian leaders to take their faith and ministry outside of 
church walls—to take the Church to the people, rather than forcing people into a church. 
Ledebuhr positioned himself and his fellow chaplains in the company of anti-poverty and Civil 
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Rights activists in believing that “the ministry of the church is at its best where the clergyman, 
armed with the gospel, comes face-to-face with people where they work, sleep, eat and play.” He 
believed that war was part of human nature, which led him to think that the military chaplain 
was needed to provide “spiritual ministry for people where thy are and as they are.” Ledebuhr 
dismissed what he determined were major objections to the military chaplaincy and took 
especially careful aim at those who he terms “idealists” who argue that chaplains should not 
associate themselves with men or an organization that is trained to kill. Ledebuhr challenged his 
fellow clergymen to similarly abandon any in their congregations who served as police officers, 
government workers, or industrialists as they were similarly implicated in the war effort. He 
acknowledged the spiritual dangers of the chaplaincy—including the competition for rank and 
prestige and the conflation of Christianity and “Americanism”—but concluded that the potential 
rewards far outweighed the risks. Chaplains, Ledebuhr argued, were no different from civilian 
clergy; they were imperfect, but their work was critical.15 
 As Ledebuhr continued, he moved his argument closer to the conflict at hand and 
chaplains’ participation in Vietnam. Concluding that the chaplains’ presence was most effective 
when soldiers were at the greatest risks, he opined, “Risk is especially present these days, . . . 
Navy chaplains serving marines in the Pacific . . . recorded well over 9,000 counseling cases from 
April to June [in 1966].” Even in the early stages of US troop buildup, chaplains provided critical 
support for troops overseas. Ultimately, though, Ledebuhr thought the rewards were more 
personal than institutional or military: “Such a personal ministry of total identification is one of 
the real joys of the military chaplaincy.” He closed by recounting some of his own experiences in 
Korea, and he reminded readers of current chaplain activities in Vietnam. In addition to 
counseling, he reported that between April and June over 500,000 men had attended worship 
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services—proof, he said that even “‘professional killers’ are also moved by the gospel.”16 
Ledebuhr used his personal experiences as a chaplain to establish credibility with Century’s 
readers, and his references to the social justice movements of the 1960s, ecumenicalism within 
the chaplain corps, and racial integration in the chaplain service established his bona fides as a 
progressive thinker rather than a militant participant in the war. 
The series prompted several letters to the editor that expressed a variety of viewpoints 
on the issue. Most of the letters came from chaplains, and most of them adamantly defended 
their ministry in response to Miller’s and MacFarlane’s articles. Two chaplains wrote from 
Vietnam, indicating that chaplains retained some of their connections to civilian religious 
communities even when they were overseas. Richard McPhee, stationed in Bein Hoa, Vietnam, 
wrote to defend the position that simply changing chaplains’ uniforms or rank structure would 
do little to address the underlying difficulties that Ledebuhr and MacFarlane noticed. McPhee 
also emphasized his personal satisfaction with his job and wrote that “better than two-thirds” of 
the counseling cases he saw had “legitimate problems.”17 Expressing an alternate view, J. George 
Hilton, assigned to the 6th Battalion, 71st Artillery, wrote that as the church re-examined its 
mission to the military, the chaplaincy would be fundamentally changed. He declared that it 
would, in fact, be possible to envision a civilian chaplain corps, and that such ministers could 
“just as effectively plough through the mud and march in the dust and carry on his mission as do 
the journalist and technical representative and Red Cross director in the thick of things in their 
soiled jungle combat fatigues.”18 Such responses from chaplains in the field demonstrated an 
understanding that issues surrounding the chaplaincy could not be separated from current US 
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military actions. At the same time, their responses offered evidence that chaplains were not 
walking lock-step together in their views on the future of the chaplaincy. The debate, though 
nuanced, was dynamic.  
 Reserve and retired chaplains also chimed in, usually defending chaplains and the 
chaplaincy. Donald Shaner, former line officer in the Navy and at the time a reserve chaplain, 
disputed MacFarlane’s point of view, but admitted that Ledebuhr “perhaps paints the picture a 
little too rosy.” Shaner suggested taking longer view of the historical developments of the 
chaplaincy in the United States to emphasize the advantages of the modern chaplains’ cultural 
skills and structural position.19 Retired Chaplain Willaim Sodt believed the problem to be 
“chiefly with chaplains and supervisors in the chaplain corps who were unwilling to accept this 
lowly role as servants and mediators.”20 Sodt’s analysis upheld the liminal structural position and 
flexible cultural role within the military as an admirable one, modeled on Christ and Paul, in 
which chaplains would become all things to all men. Another retired chaplain went so far as to 
accuse MacFarlane’s article as a “sorry reflection on the state of the chaplaincy in the navy or an 
unconscious commentary on his own inadequacy as a chaplain and a clergyman.” Chaplain 
Alfred Klausler assured “those whose sons are in the armed services, whether in Vietnam or 
some other theater, that by and large our chaplains are doing their tasks as servants of God.” 
Then, addressing the theologically well-read readership of the Century, Klausler reminded the 
editors and the magazine’s readership that Paul Tillich had served as a military chaplain in the 
First World War and that Karl Barth had served as a reserve in the Swiss Army.21 Klausler’s 
                                                 
19 Donald W. Shaner, Letter to the Editor, Christian Century, 30 November 1966, 1476 
20 William G. Sodt, Letter to the Editor, Christian Century, 30 November 1966, 1478. 
21 Alfred P. Klausler, Letter to the Editor, Christian Century, 30 November 1966, 1478. 
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references to two renowned twentieth century theologians helped to establish his credibility as a 
religious authority, especially with the generally liberal audience of the Century. 
Of the letters that were more critical of the chaplaincy or supportive of Miller’s and 
MacFarlane’s observations, none that were published came from chaplains. While such letters 
responded to articles about the military chaplaincy, they introduced new terms to the debate. 
One letter addressed both the series of articles and the subsequent letters that had been 
published. John Sayre, who identified himself as writing from the Episcopal Peace Fellowship, 
argued that the primary difference between the military chaplaincy and the civilian pastorate was 
that the “essential business of the war machine is to kill, burn and destroy.” This environment, 
Sayre concluded, made it impossible for military chaplains “to say a word of Christ against their 
army’s share in the massacre of a people, or against escalation.” Sayre’s letter changed the terms 
of debate from the theoretical responsibility of the church to minister in the world to an 
argument about the morality of the war in Vietnam. Though subtle, the difference in emphasis 
was significant. In many conversations about the war and the chaplaincy, the two sides began 
from fundamentally different points of view as to the nature and purpose of the chaplaincy. 
 Even civilian pastors who were more sympathetic to the church’s ministry to the armed 
forces questioned the chaplain’s total involvement, in both life and death, with the war machine. 
Carl Landes, who identified himself as pastor of First United Church of Christ in Franklin, 
Ohio, wrote: “News accounts tell us that the first Protestant chaplain to lose his life in Vietnam 
was buried in Arlington cemetery ‘with full military honors,’ and that the chief of chaplains 
referred to him as one who ‘always reflected confidence and ability, which seemed to radiate 
religious graciousness.’  Isn’t it a rather sad commentary on the sickness of our society, and of 
the church, that a representative of the Prince of Peace is buried ‘with full military honors’?” His 
letter did not presume that chaplains had no place in the war, but he questioned that giving a 
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chaplain “full military honors” was appropriate. The writer relied on Jesus’s teaching to love 
one’s enemies to make his point. The letter continued: “If Jesus were speaking to his ministers 
today, would he not say:  ‘If you radiate graciousness only upon those who are your friends, 
what are you doing more than others? Even the communists do that.’ . . . Whatever the church’s 
responsibility to the men we conscript to kill our “enemies,” isn’t it time at least to separate the 
church of the Prince of peace from the cult of the glorification of war?” In the minds of many 
civilian responders to the issue at hand, there was clearly a line to be drawn between a chaplain’s 
ministry and his involvement with the military mission and protocol. 
 After the first round of responses was published, however, the debate continued into 
early 1967. In January MacFarlane—the author of one of the original articles—wrote a letter to 
the Century, responding to the chaplains’ letters. He claimed that there was a “remarkable 
disparity” between the letters he had received and the ones that the editors had published. He 
concluded, “certainly no active duty chaplain who despises the system is going to let you publish 
his feelings for all the world to see,” essentially making his case based on the lack of self-
criticism by active-duty chaplains. MacFarlane reported that he had received five letters from 
chaplains, only one of which contained significant disagreement with his main points. He noted 
instead the “many letters and phone calls from nonchaplain [sic] military people,” that suggested 
he was correct on most, if not all, counts. At the end of his rebuttal, he claimed that “no one 
outside the chaplain community has come to the defense of the chaplains, and the chaplains 
have not done very well in defending themselves. If there was ever any doubt about the veracity 
of what I have written, I think the chaplains have pretty well dispelled it. . . .”22 
Between 1967 and 1970, the period of the most intense fighting in Vietnam, editorial 
content in Christian Century about chaplains dwindled, even as the Century’s opposition to the 
                                                 
22 W. Norman MacFarlane, Letter to the Editor, Christian Century, 4 January 1967, 18 
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Vietnam War—as a matter of cause and practice—increased. Then, toward the end of the war 
and immediately after American withdrawal from Vietnam, such debate began again. Recalling 
earlier critiques of the chaplaincy, Robert Kiltgaard wrote an article that placed significant blame 
on chaplains for the dehumanizing and militarist nature of the modern American armed forces. 
Beyond simply suggesting it was impossible for chaplains to play a prophetic role in the military, 
Kiltgaard, a former enlisted man in the Army, insisted that chaplains were actually part and 
parcel to the problems inherent in military service. Far from being “muzzled” by command, he 
claimed that chaplains’ self-assumed priestly role made them “all too happy to take part” in the 
military mission.23  
 Kiltgaard’s article had all the marks of a polemic of a disgruntled soldier. Titled “Onward 
Christian Soldiers: Dehumanization and the Military Chaplain,” the article was deeply critical of 
the war in Vietnam and similarly critical of those who made such a war possible, including 
military chaplains. The article began by addressing a hypothetical “you”—a soldier about to 
enlist in the military: “One of the first officers you meet at army basic training camp is the 
military chaplain.” Then, Kiltgaard shifted to the third person: “Basic training is a pretty 
harrowing experience for most people. Its goal is to turn individuals into a homogeneous, 
obedient, malleable group.” But he quickly reverted to the first person as the soldier went 
through basic training: “As our cattle trucks arrive, harassment begins. We are attacked by the 
training cadre.” The confused voice of the piece added to its sense of urgency, in no uncertain 
terms reminding the reader of what was at stake: “the average trainee knows that within four or 
five months he will be in Vietnam. [He] finds himself compelled to take the Vietnam situation 
                                                 
23 Robert E. Kiltgaard, “Onward Christian Soldiers: Dehumanization and the Military Chaplain,” Christian 
Century, November 1970, 1379. 
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seriously.” 24 It was utterly unlike the impassioned, but well-considered, and in most respects 
fairly balanced, trio of articles from 1966. Kiltgaard’s essay reflected more clearly the editorial 
slant of Christian Century in 1970.  
For American denominations, concern over the chaplain’s place and role within the 
military took slightly different form, but it coalesced around questions of how chaplains could be 
effective pastoral ministers—priests—rather than how chaplains could work to change the 
military system or affect the trajectory of action in Vietnam—prophets. In order to explain how 
chaplains, generally disconnected from institutional hierarchies, conventions, and cultural 
contact, could operate effectively in the field,  chaplains emphasized the missional nature of their 
work, and their writings drew parallels to civilian ministry, especially that of missionaries, who 
were charged with evangelizing unchurched populations. The Baptist General Conference, an 
organization that brought independent Baptist and evangelical churches together, featured 
stories by chaplains as a way to emphasize mission work being carried out around the world. 
Roger Bradley said he wrote to “inform our Conference family of the work of their military 
chaplains with a view toward arousing a sense of urgency in prayer in their behalf.”25 Bradley’s 
bold statement of purpose indicated his position as a cultural mediator because he relied on his 
position as a chaplain and as a pastor to urge a specific response to new information. Bradley 
emphasized the missional role of chaplains as a way to create a common vocabulary for thinking 
about chaplains; according to the Baptist General Conference’s views, they were more like 
missionaries than simply pastors or military officers.  
At other times, especially when chaplains’ audiences were other chaplains, the debate 
between priestly ministry and prophetic ministry appeared more complicated. Many chaplains 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Roger L. Bradley, “Our Military Chaplains: A Plea for Prayer,” The Standard (Baptist General Conference), 29 
December 1969, 8. 
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believed they were called to both tasks. The Chaplain, published by the General Commission on 
Chaplains and Armed Services, frequently included first-person accounts of the chaplain’s work 
in Vietnam as well as preaching, counseling, or teaching advice, short book reviews, and stories 
of general interest to military chaplains. One common feature in nearly every issue was the 
“Preaching Clinic,” written by James Cleland, Dean of Duke Chapel at Duke University in 
Durham, NC. Cleland wrote on topics ranging from “The Twenty Minute Sermon,” to using 
anecdotes effectively, to selecting scripture passages outside of the lectionary readings. These 
articles showcased the Protestant thrust to this publication, and emphasized chaplains’ preaching 
and pastoral roles. Another story suggested that chaplains take up running or some other form 
of physical activity as a way not only to meet military requirements but also to invigorate one’s 
body and mind.26 The Chaplain, as a publication concerned itself with the minutiae of a minister’s 
life, focused almost exclusively on his or her priestly role, as a functionary for a religious 
community.  
 In late 1970, Chaplain Wendell Wright wrote a reflective piece titled “The Problems and 
Challenges of a Ministry in Vietnam.” While he did not claim that his experience was universal 
or even typical, Wright addressed his article to chaplains who had not served in Vietnam (and 
perhaps to civilian readers who took an interest in the subject.) Like chaplains who wrote in 
denominationally-specific contexts, Wright concluded “the problems and challenges of the 
ministry in Vietnam are not really so different from those experienced by a Christian minister or 
priest anywhere serving his people.” Though he acknowledged the differences—the “situation,” 
the “environment,” and “the circumstances” in which a chaplain worked—Wright focused on 
the similarities. “There is much more intensity and tension because of the war, but the chaplain 
still brings to his people the basic message of the love of God through Jesus Christ and it is this 
                                                 
26 Hayden Gilmore, “They Shall Jog and Not Faint,” The Chaplain, March-April 1971, 36-40. 
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redeeming, releasing, and freeing good news of the gospel that brings life to men in combat just 
as anywhere else in the world.”27 Wright’s message stood squarely in the face of civilian critics 
who claimed that the military chaplaincy was fundamentally different from civilian ministry 
because of its institutional setting. He also emphasized the chaplain’s pastoral role to provide for 
the spiritual care of a specific group of people within a specific social context. 
 As the American drawdown in Vietnam occurred in the early 1970s, contributors to The 
Chaplain engaged more consciously in the wider religious debates about the ethics, practicality, 
and ultimate future of the chaplaincy in the United States military. The editors recognized the 
cultural force of arguments that criticized the chaplaincy and wanted chaplains to be aware of 
issues facing the wider community and act accordingly. Yet the articles were not all one-sided 
defenses of the status quo. Jack Boozer, a professor of Religion at Emory University in Atlanta, 
Georgia, wrote there was “considerable justification” for the criticisms leveled against clergymen 
and chaplains, that they had been “either absent or indecisive in the high-risk struggles for 
human dignity and community since the early 1950s,” and he exhorted chaplains to change their 
course.28 A later article addressed specifically the question of the chaplain’s role in prophetic 
ministry. While the article concluded that such attacks on the chaplaincy were generally 
unfounded and represented a misunderstanding of the chaplain’s primary role, the essay 
nonetheless demonstrated that chaplains—both individually and organizationally—were aware 
of and concerned with broader public debates.29  
  
                                                 
27 Wendell T. Wright, “The Problems and Challenges of a Ministry in Vietnam,” The Chaplain, September-
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28 Jack S. Boozer, “The Military Chaplaincy: One Calling, Two Roles,” The Chaplain, November-December 
1970, 3. 
29 Richard B. Cheatham, Jr., “The Prophetic Role of the Military Chaplain,” The Chaplain, January-February 
1971, 22-30. 
 189 
 
 
Civilianizing the Chaplaincy 
Implicit in debates about chaplains’ roles were policy discussions about the chaplaincy 
itself. Not until the early twentieth century, concurrent with the wider Root Reforms within the 
entire Army, were chaplains fully integrated within the military’s systems of uniform and rank, 
and these two issues—the most visible signs of a chaplain’s military status—drove discussions 
among chaplaincy critics and supporters during the Vietnam war era. From the Revolution to 
after the Spanish-American War, chaplains operated only within a loose hierarchy, reporting 
directly to the Adjutant General rather than to a Chief of Chaplains or Chaplain General. During 
the Mexican-American War of 1848, the first war in which American chaplains accompanied 
troops outside of the United States, the Army also experimented with a civilian chaplain corps, 
but deemed it a logistical and tactical failure.30 Although chaplains had served alongside 
American soldiers since the Revolution, there were significant variations in the historical models 
that could be followed.  
Most notably, during the Vietnam War, the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod 
(WELS) called upon its civilian pastors to serve one-year “tours-of-duty” in Vietnam as civilian 
chaplains. WELS leaders believed that the theological and doctrinal integrity of their church 
would be compromised by asking its pastors to perform military or government functions in 
addition to religious ones, and they also argued that the specific spiritual needs of WELS service 
members would go unmet by a non-Christian, Catholic, or general Protestant chaplain.31   
Even denominations that endorsed a significant number of chaplains worried about the 
chaplain’s spiritual wellbeing in the midst of the military structure. Leaders of American religious 
                                                 
30 Charles W. Hedrick, “On Foreign Soil: The Tragedy of a Civilianized Chaplaincy During the Mexican-
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31 Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Topical Q&As, “Other Military Chaplains,” 
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groups were concerned that chaplain’s relative detachment from institutional structures might 
weaken a chaplain’s theological or religious foundations. They concluded that ongoing spiritual 
training and support was essential to a chaplain’s success. While chaplains in hierarchical or 
episcopal churches basically operated within certain boundaries, churches and denominations 
with a looser ecclesiastical structure needed to exercise some supervision or control over their 
chaplains. Denominations such as the American Baptist Convention worked to find a balance 
between freedom and control for chaplains. The Convention recognized that chaplains (and 
others without congregational commitments) were participating in “a new form of mission” and 
deemed them “pioneers in new fields of service.” Yet the Convention worried that “the 
permissive attitude” of the denomination toward chaplains’ work would be “misunderstood by 
some,” when in reality it was “an expression of confidence and the freedom of ministry enjoyed 
by Baptists.” 
 Yet this freedom did not come without cost, according to the article’s author, Reverend 
William Flood. “We can readily see how strong the structures are in which we work” and that a 
“pastor is generally called to a congregation because he seems to ‘fit” or at best can meet their 
needs.” Within the military, however, assignment was at the discretion of military officers and 
the “congregation” was not a denominationally specific one. Thus, chaplains were “equally 
influenced by the structure in which they serve[d].” He continued “the atmosphere is charged 
with tensions for most individuals,” including chaplains and non-chaplains. The concern of 
civilian ministers was “reflected in the suspicion” of military chaplains and other “unstructured 
ministers,” and in the question “when are you coming back into the ministry?” Flood 
determined that the real question at hand was this: “If the shaping of a pastoral identity is the 
concern of a local congregation, who shapes the identity of the chaplain?” Civilian ministers 
could not help but conclude that the chaplain was left to his own devices because his 
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institutional structure was military rather than religious. But Flood, himself a chaplain, asked his 
colleagues to reconsider. He wrote that the structure of chaplain service would “indeed shape his 
ministry” but could not “create his spiritual image.” The challenge, then, for the chaplain was to 
struggle to maintain a “ministerial image and identity.”32 
The option of civilianizing the chaplain corps entered public debate infrequently, but it 
resonated strongly as moral and religious opposition to the Vietnam War increased. As early as 
1962, Christian Century ran an article that advocated the military chaplaincy be transferred to 
civilian control. In the 1960’s the opening volley over the correct place for chaplains in 
contemporary military service, was fired by Rabbi Martin Siegel, who served as a navy chaplain 
for two years; he argued that with the “emergence of a permanent military establishment, the 
military aspects of the chaplaincy have begun to take precedence over the religious.”33 Siegel 
blamed a good part of this change on the fact that “in recent years a substantial number of line 
officers and enlisted men have left the service for a short time, taken the requisite religious 
training (often not too rigorous), and immediately returned to the military as chaplains.” He 
continued that “such chaplains are essentially ‘military men’” who had “thoroughly internalized 
the professional military pattern.” Siegel also lamented the fact that chaplains often lost “contact 
with their own religious tradition” due to frequent reassignments and deployments. He even 
used the chaplains’ widely-touted focus on ecumenism as a point of criticism, arguing that the 
widespread cooperation among chaplains of different faith groups occurred not because they 
“have suddenly learned to get along but because most chaplains are out of touch with their 
particular religious tradition.”34  
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Siegel, like others before him, suggested that the chaplaincy be civilianized, essentially 
returning to an earlier American model when chaplains were “civilian clergymen who 
volunteered or were assigned to service with the military.” He pointed to the success of the West 
German model for the chaplaincy, where chaplains were un-uniformed and served for a 
maximum of five years. Chaplains could then operate without fear of “military reprisals” and 
would be better able to counsel young men and women who were new to the military. Siegel 
further argued that a civilian chaplain corps would reduce the likelihood of professional 
concerns getting in the way of ministerial ones, so the chaplain would be “free to use the weight 
of his moral and religious tradition rather than his rank to get things done.” Though he did not 
mention American involvement in Vietnam explicitly, Siegel anticipated that chaplains would 
soon be serving “personnel who are for the most part ‘short timers’ used to ‘civilian’ religious 
traditions,” and that a military chaplain corps would increase the divide between professionals 
and draftees in the modern military.  
Siegel criticized the military chaplaincy at a time when there were few chaplains deployed 
with military personnel—the first chaplains had arrived with MACV staff in late 1962, and 
chaplains did not serve in Vietnam in large numbers until 1965. He objected to the chaplaincy 
on a variety of grounds but fundamentally assumed there was a potential problem with military 
service by “a basically civilian-oriented and often pacifistically inclined body of men.”35 Articles 
such as Siegel’s foreshadowed debates that would make similar assumptions long before the 
majority of Americans turned against intervention in Vietnam. 
Public response to Siegel’s article was significant: The Century chose not to publish 
individual letters, but rather offered a summary of the various responses in a later issue of the 
magazine. Titled, “Whither the Military Chaplaincy,” the article revealed the editors’ generally 
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negative view of the chaplaincy in its current form, though they attempted to give an unbiased 
overview of the letters to the editor on the topic. The editors opened with an attempt at humor 
that indicated the gist of letters from chaplains: “Volleys of protest were shot in this direction by 
military chaplains of high rank and low from almost every branch and subdivision of the armed 
forces. (The marines have not yet landed, but we expect them any minute.)” This analysis, 
though, belied the fact that the original article had been written by a Rabbi who had himself 
served as a chaplain. His critics, the editors concluded, believed that Siegel had “used a 
blunderbuss on a delicate and complex problem and with his broadsides slew the innocent as 
well as the guilty.”36  
The editors proceeded to analyze the responses. In one section, the editors compiled 
responses to the tone and content of Siegel’s argument, most of which came from chaplains 
themselves. First, they observed that the letters in support of the chaplaincy did not seem to fall 
along denominational or sectarian lines, nor did the “one-sidedness of the chaplains’ rebuttals 
suggest that they were expressing a military or official position.” Rather, the responses were 
more personal; they resented the implication that the military “always has an adverse effect on 
the clergymen who serve within it.” Chaplains, too, emphasized their education and extensive 
training as evidence of their ability to navigate complex institutional positions. Ten chaplains 
stationed in Texas reminded readers that in the US Air Force chaplains could not “receive a 
commission without the ecclesiastical endorsement of his own church, or an agency designated 
to have this authority by his own church.” In relation to Siegel’s critique of professional 
ambition within the chaplaincy, the editors quoted several chaplains’ responses. One chaplain 
wrote, “The ‘professional ambitions’ of career chaplains have their counterpart in the civilian 
ministry’s competition for status. . . . One may still recall the civilian seekers of deanships, 
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bishoprics, ‘First Churches,’ lucrative synagogues and denominational offices.” Another 
responded that “the man of God in the armed forces is no more in tension with his milieu than 
is the man of God in suburbia or the inner city.” Ultimately, the Century reported that though 
none agreed with it, only one chaplain denounced Siegel’s central thesis.37   
The second section of the editorial summary dealt with the broader issue of the Church’s 
responsibility to men and women in the armed forces. On behalf of the magazine’s readers, the 
editors declared that “with an unpardonable indifference the churches have let the chaplaincy 
develop in its own untended way, leaving a vacuum which the military has had to fill. Many 
conscientious chaplains are aware of and saddened by the weakness and ambiguity of the 
churches’ relation to their ministry.” They exhorted American Protestants to pay close attention 
to the military and their chaplains who served there. The editorial article encouraged continued 
discussion about the chaplaincy and the churches’ relationship to the armed services. However, 
as the war in Vietnam dragged on, editorial content about military chaplains in Christian Century 
became increasingly critical. 
In the 1966 Century series, discussed above, former Navy Chaplain Norman MacFarlane 
suggested the most radical changes to the current chaplaincy’s structure. Whereas Ledebuhr and 
Miller recommended primarily religious-based initiatives to transform the chaplaincy, 
MacFarlane relied more heavily on the military. To address a problem that he determined 
stemmed from chaplains’ structural positions as officers, MacFarlane advocated that the military 
abolish the system of rank and promotion for chaplains. He suggested that the number of 
active-duty chaplains be decreased—even as the level of American armed forces in Vietnam 
expanded—and that those who remained be consolidated under a single chaplains’ service in 
order to increase efficiency and consistency across the various branches of service. While 
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MacFarlane recognized the impact such changes might have on the relationship between the 
churches and the chaplaincy, his focus remained on eliminating the tension between chaplains 
military and religious duties. Along with the other two articles, this series on the military 
chaplaincy laid out most of the critical issues involving the chaplaincy for the next decade. 
 As the war in Vietnam dragged on, the military chaplaincy emerged as one location to 
reconsider the morality of religious participation in war. Even as the war wound down and 
opposition to the war reached a fever pitch, liberal and mainline religious groups continued to 
call for the civilianization of the military chaplaincy. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) declared 
“The Church and its Chaplains must be keenly sensitive to the erosion, exploitation, or softening 
of its witness.”38 The Episcopal Church issued a more strident statement which endorsed the 
“necessity for a ministry to the military community,” but maintained that it must be “a ministry 
for which both priestly and prophetic roles are stressed.” The resolution conceded that the 
chaplain was responsible for ministry to military personnel in a variety of situations but also 
declared “the Chaplain is also the public voice of conscience who introduces a self-critical 
dimension within all institutions. His responsibility therefore is to ask the difficult moral 
question, whether this particular kind of participation is allowable from a Christian moral 
perspective. The dilemma is whether the Military Chaplaincy can ask these questions, given its 
dependence on the military structure.”39 In 1968, the American Jewish Congress voted 
unanimously to terminate its participation in the military chaplaincy system in its current form. 
Reporting in the national press also reflected deep division on the issue of military 
chaplains’ positions within the military. In one 1968 New York Times article that presented fairly 
balanced viewpoints on the chaplaincy, the headline still highlighted the reform position, which 
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urged civilianizing the chaplaincy, and led with a former Jewish chaplain who agreed with this 
position. In many ways, this Rabbi’s call reflected long standing debates about the possibility of 
civilianizing the chaplaincy, whereby individual denominations or organizations would be 
responsible for the salary and material support of chaplains.40 Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg told the 
Times reporter that he was “terribly grateful” for his time as a chaplain “because it made it easier 
now to be an out-and-out dove on Vietnam.” Others that the author interviewed, however, 
disagreed. Representatives of the Presbyterian Church, the Southern Baptist Convention, and 
the General Commission on Chaplains remained skeptical that American denominations would 
have the financial resources to fund a civilianized chaplaincy, and they doubted that such a move 
would actually alleviate the tensions that Hertzberg and others identified.41 
 Ensuring the chaplain’s effectiveness, regardless of his formal position or level of 
integration with institutional structures, would require close cooperation between the military 
and American religious organizations. Chaplains and their advocates frequently cited their 
liminality and structural positions as advantageous for their ministry to the military, yet this very 
structural position was the primary location for debate over the chaplaincy during the Vietnam 
war. Critics of the chaplaincy and of chaplains charged them with complicity in an immoral and 
unjust war, insisting that their positions as officers prevented them from performing critical or 
prophetic functions within the military. Supporters of the chaplaincy, on the other hand, insisted 
that the chaplain’s structural position was the very thing that allowed him to be an effective 
minister within the military hierarchy.  
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Using Chaplains Symbolically 
 Beyond considerations of a chaplain’s formal role or position in the military, the national 
mainstream press frequently relied on chaplains as symbolic figures in the coverage of the 
Vietnam War. First, Time Magazine ran two substantial articles on chaplains in Vietnam that 
offered a longer-term view of the institution and its members. Published three years apart, these 
two articles revealed a trend that as opposition to the Vietnam War increased, so too did 
criticism of military chaplains. Second, in the New York Times, four main types of stories 
involving chaplains emerged. First, the Times sometimes ran short AP Wire or Religious News 
Service stories that highlighted the specific accomplishments of chaplains vis-à-vis military 
honors or civilian recognition from organizations such as the Military Chaplains Association.42 
Second, the Times reported on major speeches or talks by chaplains in the New York area or by 
chaplain leaders. Third, the newspaper covered chaplain activities when military chaplains died in 
Vietnam, especially if they died performing their religious duties. Coverage did not, for the most 
part, focus of chaplains’ daily activities or their theological understanding of the Vietnam War. A 
fourth type included chaplains for the sake of juxtaposing the supposed peace of religion and the 
overt violence of war. The second two categories demonstrated that chaplains held significant 
symbolic weight in discussions about the Vietnam War, even if their day-to-day actions were 
largely irrelevant to the war effort. 
 The first feature in Time appeared in 1966 and focused on the increasing number of 
chaplains and their relationship to the men serving overseas. After reminding readers that 
chaplains had served with US military troops since the Revolutionary War, the unnamed authors 
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asserted that “Viet Nam is a new kind of war,” where “chaplains have become airborne circuit 
riders.” The decentralized fighting meant that chaplains were holding far more services than in 
the past. According to Army Chief of Chaplains Charles Brown, “We used to hold three or four 
or maybe ten services a week. Now our chaplains are saying services in the combat area to at 
least ten and sometimes as many as 50 separate detachments of soldiers.”  
 But while the number of services increased, chaplains held few illusions that more men 
were attending their services—in fact, the chaplain corps estimated that about seventeen percent 
of troops attended services regularly on Sunday and about sixty percent never attended at all. 
Chaplain Frank Vavrin said he didn’t “believe for one minute that old saw about there being no 
atheists in foxholes,” while others attributed scarce service attendance to decreased mortality 
from combat wounds. Air Force chaplain Robert Cortez suggested that “the Viet Nam war is 
considerably less deadly than World War II,” where he recalled “there was constant fear in so 
many cases—sitting all alone in a foxhole getting shelled, or on a rolling ship scanning the sky 
for kamikazes. The fear was there and it made you think of God. Here, relatively few guys are 
confronted with death every day.”43 The article ended with two stories of chaplains who had 
earned the respect and admiration of their troops. Both chaplains sustained wounds in their 
efforts to minister to soldiers on the front lines. One soldier even insisted “I can't talk about him 
. . . you just wouldn’t understand. You haven’t been with us.” This view of combat religion 
avoided entirely the morality of the war at hand—it assumed that chaplains would serve with 
soldiers and that soldiers would come to respect their chaplains, and there was no question of 
whether chaplains could serve both God and men.  
 Three years later, a second article assumed a far more critical tone. Like other 
mainstream press articles, it focused on increasing religious protest and calls for the chaplaincy 
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to be civilianized. The article cited the San Francisco Conference on Religion and Peace, and its 
co-chair, Rabbi Joseph Glaser, as primary advocates for abolishing the military chaplaincy. 
Glaser told Time that chaplains “do not have freedom of movement, and they do not even have 
freedom of conscience” within the military, given their official functions to support the military 
mission, as outline in the Army Field Manual. Along with Glaser, the article also cited Neuhaus, 
a long time critic of the Vietnam War, as saying that chaplains “expose[d] themselves to ‘spiritual 
prostitution’” and concluded that Neuhaus believed there was an “unresolvable contradiction 
between Christianity’s gospel of peace and a minister’s participation in war . . . in trying to 
resolve the contradiction . . . many chaplains simply arrange their values along military lines, like 
good soldiers.” Though it did not cite specific names, the article suggested that some ex-
chaplains had become disenchanted by the war and military service and now worked in 
opposition to it.44 
 The article countered this anti-war view by asserting that “the majority of chaplains 
serving in Viet Nam, however, are convinced of the justice of the American cause, and a few 
have gone out of their way to support it in a somewhat untraditional manner.” The essay related 
stories of chaplains who liked “to take a turn firing M-60 machine guns from Huey helicopters,” 
and another who “wears a shoulder holster and a .45 even when in Saigon,” and a third who said 
“‘I could kill a man in a second. After you see how vicious the V.C. can be, it’s hard to separate 
yourself from it.” Rather than making all chaplains sound like gun-toting militarists, the article 
insisted that occasionally the “nature of the war” called on chaplains to perform otherwise 
forbidden acts in combat. In one instance, a chaplain with previous military experience, Jerry 
Autry, landed in a Viet Cong village with an inexperienced platoon “commanded by an equally 
green lieutenant,” and “when they froze, Autry rallied them and led the charge.” The author of 
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the article rationalized: “Like many chaplains who go on patrols or fly on combat sorties with 
airborne troops, he has discovered that his unarmed presence can make the men jittery.”45 
 In between the two extremes of wholehearted endorsement and participation and 
dissent-driven activism, the Time piece recognized that military chaplains faced a difficult moral 
situation. The article quoted Navy chaplain John A. Rohr at length. He argued that “in a world 
where peace is still unattainable the fact of wars’ existence ‘must be borne even as we strive to 
abolish it.’” He said that Christianity “needs both kinds of ministers—the civilian picketing for 
peace and the chaplain serving ‘those brave young men who bear so disproportionate a burden 
of the sins of the world.’” The authors also acknowledged that “most chaplains, of course, are 
far more appalled at the cruelties of the war than fascinated by its glory—yet few have asked for 
release from service.” Even in the face of an unpopular, even immoral war, one chaplain, Philip 
Seeker chose to return to his unit “convinced” that the war “was still ‘unwise’—but not evil 
enough to keep him away from his men.” 46 Ultimately, the quite-critical article ended on an 
ambiguous note. 
 Like the changing tone of the Time magazine features, two New York Times articles in the 
early 1970s highlighted the extent to which the tenor of debate within the national press had 
changed. Whereas early in the war, chaplains’ accomplishments were recorded and their 
contributions to military missions mentioned either symbolically or perfunctorily, by the end of 
the war, chaplains’ very abilities to serve both God and Country were called into question by the 
national media. A June 1971 article reported on growing opposition with liberal and mainline 
churches to the chaplaincy system. The article accused chaplains, even in the face of growing 
opposition at home, of refusing to speak out even against morally clear issues such as killing 
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civilians. Though the article presented some viewpoints of current and former chaplains, the 
quotations served to back up the basic assertion that chaplains kowtowed to military authority 
and reasoning when confronted with a moral choice. One chaplain was quoted as saying, “That’s 
not our job” when asked if he would preach against killing civilians. Another said that his time in 
Vietnam “gave me sorrow,” but “most of all it gave me a tremendous hatred of Communism. 
Man I hated those spasticks [sic]!”47 
 The second, titled “The Perils of Serving Two Masters,” relied on chaplains’ responses 
to the My Lai massacre and the growing public outcry for radical reform to frame ongoing 
arguments about the proper place of chaplains in the American military. Though the article 
conceded that calls for reform had little support within the chaplaincy and even within many 
denominations, the tone was clearly sympathetic to those who saw inherent problems and 
conflicts between the roles of clergy and officer.48 
 Even when chaplains’ roles were not in question, chaplains’ themselves represented 
sympathies and tensions between military and religious values. In the New York Times, articles 
that directly concerned chaplains’ activities in war generally concerned chaplains who were killed 
in combat, especially if they were killed as they performed a religious function. Chaplains acted 
as symbols for religious practice in war, and again, the juxtaposition of a chaplain dying as he 
performed religious rites served simultaneously to highlight the senselessness of the war and the 
savagery of the enemy. Articles that employed this trope usually emphasized that the chaplain 
chose to go to the front, often in defiance of advice from commanders. The stories related by 
these articles were often dramatic and laden with emotional references about the chaplain’s 
relationship to his men and the depth and sincerity of his vocational calling. The first such article 
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appeared in late 1966, when Michael Quealy, a Catholic chaplain with the First Division, died in 
combat. The memorial article praised Quealy as a hero: 
 As Father Quealy was leaning over the last of the small group of dying men and 
giving him last rites, a Vietcong soldier burst from the bush with a machine gun and hit 
the chaplain with a burst of fire in the head and stomach. 
 Father Quealey lived for only moments after that. He did not know that the line 
had held and the Vietcong had been pushed back . . .  
 A diary slipped from Father Quealy’s pocket. The last entry reads: “So will my 
heavenly Father treat you unless each of you forgives his brother with all his heart.”49 
 
Other articles that dealt with chaplains’ combat deaths relied on similar imagery and symbolism 
to convey their points.50 Early in the war, the Times noted the death of Jewish chaplain, Meir 
Engel, who died of a heart attack, but later in the war, the Times did not report on the deaths of 
chaplains who died in accidents.51 Chaplains’ deaths warranted serious attention and praise only 
when they died in combat situations. 
 At other times, chaplains’ religious services and ministrations were juxtaposed with the 
violence of the war. In late December 1966, the Times reported that midnight masses on 
Christmas Eve, including the traditional mass said by Cardinal Francis Spellman, had been 
canceled due to worries that the late-night services might give away sensitive positions and 
increase the chance of attack.52 Though Christmas services would still be held, the article relied 
on the contrast of the supposed peace of Christmas with the overt violence of the war. In 
another article, ostensibly about a battle in which sixty-seven marines died, two unrelated 
photographs appeared at the bottom of the page. In one picture, a chaplain comforted a 
wounded man, and in the other, a Marine sniper took aim at an unseen target. The pictures were 
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captioned: “Two Faces of the War in Vietnam,” an analytical statement that would suppose that 
chaplains and snipers operated in different circles, perhaps with two different moral codes.53 
 
Implications for Wider Debates about Religious Responses to Vietnam  
The American war in Vietnam also involved intense connections between the 
“homefront” and the “battlefront.” In addition to short tours of duty that rotated veterans back 
to the United States rapidly and the intense social pressures of the late 1960s that deeply affected 
the US military, the images of Vietnam were (and still are) ubiquitous and striking. The first 
“televised war” brought the American public unprecedented access to some image of the 
battlefront, even though much of the action occurred in dense jungle and mountainous terrain 
half a world away. Extensive press coverage of the war made wartime images real and iconic: 
Thich Quang Duc’s self-immolation on the streets of Saigon in 1963; war-protesters placing 
daisies in homecoming-soldiers’ guns at a 1967 anti-war demonstration at the Pentagon; carnage 
at My Lai, revealed in 1969; the publication of the Pentagon Papers in the New York Times in 
1971. These words and images would become the weapons of the war at home, pitting 
policymakers against students against family members against veterans. 
 When the mainstream national media portrayed religious people in relation to the war in 
Vietnam, the images were overwhelmingly of religious protest. William Sloane Coffin, Yale’s 
antiwar chaplain, and other prominent religious leaders formed the group, Clergy and Laymen 
Concerned About Vietnam (CALCAV); the Berrigan brothers, Daniel and Phillip (both Catholic 
priests), burned draft cards and aided draft resisters; and mainline religious bodies such as the 
National Council of Churches released increasingly critical statements about the war in 
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Vietnam.54 For perhaps the first time, an American war seemed to cause a deep and very public 
divide among religious communities in the United States. Though the historic peace churches 
had consistently offered vocal criticisms of war in general and of previous American military 
conflicts, “Christian Pacifism” received a sound drubbing during the Second World War as 
theologians such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer asserted that Christians could join in resistance against 
evil regimes such as the one in Nazi Germany, and others such as Reinhold Niebuhr proclaimed 
a message of Christian Realism, which plainly stated there were times when war was morally 
necessary. For the most part, American Christians and Jews supported the basic premises of the 
Cold War—to contain and eventually defeat atheistic Communism—but on the specific issue of 
Vietnam religious communities split over the execution of Cold War policies.55 Coverage of the 
war in national publications such as the New York Times or Time frequently focused on growing 
religious opposition to the war, especially in 1968, when eminent national leaders, both religious 
and secular, were arrested for aiding draft resisters. 
 Even when the mainstream press granted space to more conservative views, they were 
quickly overshadowed by a liberal editorial stance. In 1966, the New York Times, even with a fairly 
liberal editorial stance, gave substantial column space to remarks by a Reform Rabbi who had 
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recently returned from a tour in Vietnam as a chaplain. Though unnamed, the Times reported 
that the rabbi “asserted that those seeking peace in Vietnam by attacking the Johnson 
administration are helping to prolong the war.” Though the chaplain acknowledged that 
Vietnam War “doves”—including those in “the Congress, among the clergy, or among the 
people in general—may be “well-meaning and patriotic,” they are “doing what the ‘hawks’ in 
Hanoi most desire” by portraying an image of the United States “as the aggressor and the 
Vietcong and the North Vietnamese as the ‘innocent victims’” of a “sinister” American plan. 56 
Reports such as this one revealed a deep divide among religious communities, yet religious 
dissent and protest received far more attention from the New York Times and other national 
publications. A 1966 article on the general religious atmosphere of the day summed up the 
newspaper’s editorial position well: “The compliance with Governmental policy that was widely 
expected from the religiously affiliated in the 1950s has been almost reversed. Church protests 
against the war in Vietnam are now massive and substantial, for example.”57 By 1968, most Times 
coverage of religious response to the war centered on war protests and religious dissent, such as 
that of Yale University chaplain William Sloane Coffin or Philip and Daniel Berrigan.58 Such 
coverage left little room for alternate viewpoints. 
But even some outspoken critics of the war recognized that many religious Americans 
supported the Vietnam War and the U.S. government. Richard John Neuhaus, the pastor of the 
Church of St. John the Evangelist Lutheran Church in Brooklyn, New York, and Protestant co-
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founder of the group, Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam ( “Clergy Concerned” or 
CALCAV), wrote an extended analysis of the church’s role in the Vietnam War for the Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, a secular, academic journal.59 Neuhaus, by virtue 
of his pastorate, his scholarship, and his involvement with Clergy Concerned, emerged as an 
important public voice of the critical mainline stance against Vietnam.  
 Writing in October 1969, Neuhaus envisioned this article as a response to the broad 
question:  What effect has Vietnam had on organized religion, and what are some of the possible 
implications for civil religion in America?” Neuhaus claimed that with few exceptions “no 
publication in the mainstream of the American religious conversation has supported the war.” 
He continued, “The war policies of the Johnson and Nixon administrations have, on the other 
hand, received almost consistent support from the self-consciously conservative (fundamentalist 
or “evangelical”) Protestant publications” including “a host of avowedly rightist publications of 
the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade genre.”60   
 Neuhaus clearly recognized that the war prompted a variety of responses from religious 
people, yet the “mass media” had helped form an image of “relentless religious opposition to the 
war.” He wrote that in the national media, “religion’s attitude toward the war comes across in 
terms of clergy leading protest marches, granting sanctuary to draft-resisters, abetting military 
deserters, and burning draft cards collected in raids on Selective Service offices.” He 
acknowledged that the Protestant base of the National Council of Churches had been “officially, 
if often mildly, critical of war policy at least since late 1966.” On the other hand, church bodies, 
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like the Southern Baptist Convention, “pursue[d] an avoidance course, assuming that unless 
there is an indication to the contrary, the churches will do what comes naturally, which is to 
profess neutrality, but, in effect, to support government policy.” 61 For Neuhaus, official 
neutrality was just as problematic as outright support. 
 While Neuhaus was deeply critical of such support, his underlying assumption was 
nevertheless correct: many Americans continued to support the military effort in Vietnam by 
invoking the language of civil religion that pervaded the 1950s and by encouraging chaplains’ 
ministries within the military. And they did so in public venues—consistently gaining political 
ground that liberal and mainline Christians had conceded. In 1966, Southern Baptist Convention 
president, William Dehoney, in a speech to the convention, proclaimed that “our nation’s 
purpose in Vietnam is right, our motives are righteous, and our cause is just.” In addition to 
fighting “Communist aggression,” he claimed, “we are working to win a peace.” But he saved his 
highest praise for the work of chaplains and Christian soldiers in Vietnam who contributed to 
the “untold story of Vietnam—what we are doing for the people.” Dehoney praised them for 
their extensive “humanitarian activities” including “building schools and churches, and 
establishing village hospitals, and opening market places, and planting gardens, and financing pig 
projects.” To end his speech, he quoted Southern Baptist chaplain Francis Garetts who said “We 
have such a good feeling about what we are doing for these people, like rescuing someone from 
a burning building.”62 For Garetts and Dehoney, the war in Vietnam was simultaneously a 
geopolitical, ideological battle and a salvific mission.  
 At other times, fundamentalist preachers cast the war in religious and anti-communist 
terms; Carl McIntire declared the Vietnam War a “righteous and holy cause,” and Billy James 
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Hargis argued that Americans were fighting “for freedom . . . security and protection of the 
United States” against a serious and able “aggressor.”63 Even more moderate evangelicals 
frequently endorsed military action and weighed in on strategic decisions. Editors at Christianity 
Today, an interdenominational evangelical weekly, advocated the continued bombing of North 
Vietnam in order to stop its aggression.64 
 In the face of growing arguments from liberal and mainline camps that compulsory 
service in Vietnam violated Christians’ rights to make moral decisions against the orders of their 
government, the National Association of Evangelicals adopted a “Law and Order” resolution in 
1966. It derided this “unamerican [sic] mood which has invaded our society,” as “godless, 
revolutionary, and disloyal to government.” The NAE resolution, on the basis of Romans 13, 
then committed evangelicals to obey scriptural injunctions “to respect the authorities over us.”65 
Not until after My Lai and the Cambodian incursion did Christianity Today soften its editorial 
position. In 1971, an editorial called for “honesty in government,” and in May conceded 
“perhaps we should never have gotten into Viet Nam in the first place.”66 Yet, many 
conservatives continued to call on Americans to support the government and the war through 
the end. 
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 In 1968 John O’Connor, a Navy chaplain, published A Chaplain Looks at Vietnam, 
arguing, from a Catholic, pro-war standpoint, for the inherent morality of the United States 
effort in Vietnam and to support the military efforts there. O’Connor consciously used his 
position as a chaplain who had served in Vietnam to gain credibility with an increasingly 
skeptical American audience. Though O’Connor later admitted that he regretted publishing the 
book and that it was a “mistake,” at the time, O’Connor was responding to biases that he saw 
within the American media. He went on a lecture circuit to promote his book and to present, 
from his perspective, the side of the war that had gone uncovered.67  
 Regardless of official denominational statements, though, individual chaplains who 
served in Vietnam—even those who belonged to mainline and liberal churches defended at least 
some parts of the American effort in Vietnam. Overwhelmingly, chaplains who wrote for 
denominationally specific audiences, in newsletters or other publications, focused on 
organizational and pastoral issues that they faced as chaplains, rather than prophetic ones, as 
they explained their functions and requested support from their home congregations and 
religious groups. Chaplain James Thompson, nearing the end of his tour in Vietnam summed up 
his thoughts on his experience in a simple paragraph: “I have a great respect for the men I have 
served. I believe them to be the unsung heroes of this war—the advisors, who in groups of two 
and three live with the ARVNS and depend almost totally on them for everything. It is a 
frustrating job at best, and lonesome. They were always glad to see the chaplain. I am only sorry 
that it was so hard to get around to see them.”68 Few, if any, chaplains ever mentioned the 
morality of the Vietnam War as a major consideration for them in the field when they wrote in 
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denominationally-specific contexts. They commented on the loneliness of deployment, or on the 
destructive nature of the war, but their responses were ambivalent at best. 
 For Neuhaus, and others, the lines seemed clear. The theological mainline and liberal 
churches and leaders lined up on one side, and conservative and evangelical churches and leaders 
on the other. Yet, adding chaplains’ voices to this mix revealed a more complicated picture. 
Despite a growing number of conservative Christian chaplains in the military, there were, 
throughout the war, a significant number of chaplains from the very denominations that 
criticized the war so harshly. Whether they agreed politically and theologically with the American 
war effort in Vietnam, the fact of their continued service demands reconsidering traditional 
narratives of religious response to the Vietnam War. Faced with questions about the potential 
tensions and contradictions between faith and war, between religiosity and Communism, 
religious people responded in a variety of ways. Some denounced war and the United States 
government, and others supported the U.S. government and its efforts in Vietnam without 
question. Most, however, fell somewhere in between. Some tried to balance dissent against the 
Vietnam War with allegiance to the United States. Others questioned the strategy and tactics of 
Vietnam without doubting the righteousness of its fundamental aims. And chaplains fell on all 
points on the spectrum.  
 
 Throughout the Vietnam War, chaplains occupied specific positions as participants and 
symbols in debate about the war. In a war that inflamed political, religious, and ideological 
passions, arguing about chaplains offered a safe battleground on which to hash out opposing 
views about the Vietnam War itself. Chaplains’ actions were unlikely to affect the outcome of 
the war, but they represented one logical intersection between faith and war. Mainline, liberal, 
and conservative religious groups alike had to work out the role their ministers would play in 
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ministering to the military. By the end of the war, evangelical and conservative Christians 
especially, had embraced the pastoral/priestly role for chaplains, and they supported chaplain 
ministry with significant numbers of men and unofficial support. Mainline and liberal groups, on 
the other hand, clung to a prophetic ideal for their chaplains. When it appeared that the Vietnam 
War was evidence of prophetic failure, mainline and liberal groups chose to withdraw their 
chaplains rather than engaging the military directly. Because military chaplains were usually 
sympathetic to the war—at least on the surface—mainline and liberal chaplains did not match 
their denominations’ expectations for appropriate religious response to war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
PERSONAL REFLECTION, RECONCILIATION, AND REVELATION  
AFTER VIETNAM 
 
 
Chaplain David Knight entered Vietnam with romantic visions of war, wishing for a 
“baptism by fire;” he returned with a more sober view of it. “I saw the horror, the brutality, and 
the sinfulness of a nation raped by [war]. I witnessed war as the ultimate breakdown of human 
morality.” Nevertheless, Knight concluded that his wartime experiences allowed him to return 
“home with a greater understanding of the Lord than ever before.” Knight wrote, “I discovered 
that, regardless of man’s sin and rebellion, we are not at the mercy of an impersonal God. We 
are not subject to chance or fate. Regardless of circumstances, despite the tragedy, He is very 
much in control.”1 Far from subordinating his religious identity to his military one or even 
separating the two, Knight’s reflection on the war fundamentally linked his religious beliefs with 
his military experience. Knight’s interpretation of the war embodied both his religious self and 
his military self. He defined the war in hybrid terms because he worked and lived in the middle 
of two cultures; his position demanded it. 
Many other chaplains also chose to cast their wartime experiences in a religious frame—
in memoirs, published diaries or letters, on Internet sites, or in interviews. When chaplains set 
out to reflect upon their experiences as chaplains and as servicemen in Vietnam, they did so in a 
way that brought the religious and moral conflict of that war to the forefront. In Vietnam, 
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chaplains generally turned to pragmatic solutions to conflict and acted as cultural mediators 
between diverse groups. After the war, they became more reflective, and their accounts of 
Vietnam can be read as the public reconciliation of their roles, identities, theologies, and 
behaviors in Vietnam. In their first-person accounts, chaplains acted as cultural mediators in a 
new way: by providing, even if unconsciously, a counternarrative of redemption to the dominant 
narrative of defeat in Vietnam. 
  The theological interpretations, conflict resolution, and identity formations that began in 
Vietnam continued when chaplains returned home, as they began to make sense of the war and 
to share their experiences with others. While chaplains’ responses to the war varied widely, some 
patterns emerged. Bradley Carter, in a study of twentieth-century chaplain memoirs, suggested 
that “perhaps the most significant rhetorical strategy of this subgenre is its quest to redefine 
combat in spiritual terms. This pervasive spiritualization does more than meet its audience’s 
expectations of how a religious figure should write. It also offers a sweeping resolution of 
conflicts identified in the chaplain problematic.”2 Rather than revealing deep-seated role conflict, 
chaplain memoirs suggest that chaplains, at least in retrospect, privileged their religious identities 
over their military identities. Whereas Carter defined the central issue as the “chaplain 
problematic,” it is more likely that these memoirs signified chaplains’ continual working out of 
their identities as cultural mediators. As they returned home, they addressed new audiences and 
new questions, and writing gave them a way to reconcile conflicts that emerged from their 
experiences in Vietnam.  
 When they told their stories publicly, chaplains related their experiences and interpreted 
combat using religious language, images, and ideas so that their faith was affirmed and their God 
remained in control, even when their faith in the military, fellow chaplains, or the government 
                                                 
2 Bradley Carter, “Reverence Helmeted and Armored.” 
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faltered. Back in the relative safety of the United States, chaplains viewed their experiences 
through religious filters. The conflict resolution that began on the battlefield continued in the 
process of healing and assigning religious meaning to the war after the fact. 
 
Bad Chaplains and the Challenges of Genre 
 Chaplains’ responses to the Vietnam War come through most clearly first in chaplains’ 
first-person accounts, some of which were published almost immediately after the Vietnam War 
ended, and others as recently as 2006, and second, in chaplains’ responses to an official survey, 
sponsored by the historian’s office at the US Army Chaplain Center and School, which formed 
much of the evidentiary base for Henry Ackermann’s official history of the Army chaplaincy in 
Vietnam, He Was Always There. More than 600 chaplains responded to the survey request, and 
the study included quantitative measures as well as open-ended questions. Taken together, these 
sources revealed chaplains’ interpretations and reflections after the Vietnam War. They were not, 
however, representative of chaplains’ views. Those who published book-length works (either 
memoirs, diaries, or letters) were generally career chaplains who tended to hail from 
conservative, evangelical, and/or Pentecostal denominations, and they usually had some 
significant experience with a combat unit in Vietnam. The survey responses represented a wider 
group of chaplains, though chaplains who were very disillusioned by the war and by the 
chaplaincy would probably not have responded to an official request. Thus, these sources limit 
the diversity of chaplain voices available to the public, particularly from chaplains who had 
negative feelings about their time in Vietnam. Nevertheless, they demonstrate a fairly broad 
range of responses to the war and to the military chaplaincy. 
 Additionally, these sources portrayed chaplains in a near-universally flattering light; 
chaplains writing about themselves—either for publication or in response to an official survey—
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rarely shared or admitted instances where they themselves performed poorly or acted contrary to 
their training as clergymen and officers. Yet, surely some chaplains failed in Vietnam. Accounts 
about chaplains from others help to contextualize chaplains’ words about the Vietnam War. 
While some service members held their chaplains in high regard—over eighty enlisted soldiers 
deployed to Vietnam later became Army chaplains, many because of the positive example they 
saw in their own chaplains—others presented more skeptical, even cynical portraits of chaplains. 
Both cynical and respectful reactions from the people chaplains emphasized the diversity of the 
chaplains’ experience. Chaplains were neither uniformly good nor uniformly bad.  
Chaplains who received the Congressional Medal of Honor have been, fairly 
consistently, singled out for praise among the men they served. One of them, Vincent 
Capodanno, a Catholic Navy chaplain who served with Marines in Vietnam, was honored on 21 
May 2006 with the title, “Servant of God,” a first step on the way to canonization in the Catholic 
Church. A reporter for the National Catholic Register interviewed some of the men in his unit. Ray 
Harton witnessed Capodanno’s death in September 1967 during Operation Swift, which pitted 
about 300 marines against 2,000 North Vietnamese regulars. Harton was seriously wounded 
during the battle, and recalled that Father Capodanno found his way to Harton’s side, according 
to Harton, comforting him by saying, “‘Stay calm, Marine, someone will be here to help soon. 
God is with us all here today.’” Harton credited Capodanno with giving him a sense of peace 
like he “never witnessed before and never witnessed since” and believed Capodanno’s touch 
“really had something to do with me still being here.” Harton continued, “I do believe the 
second Father Capodanno leaned over and touched me, that was God touching me through 
him.” During the battle, Capodanno was also wounded on his face and hands. As he went to 
 216 
 
 
another wounded man, Harton recalled “a machine gun opened up and killed both of them.”3  
Harton’s recollections about Capodanno were not unusual. Daniel Mode, a Catholic seminarian 
(and later a priest), wrote a biography of Vincent Capodanno, titled The Grunt Padre. Mode’s 
biography relied heavily on the testimony of Capodanno’s fellow service members, and 
presented a very positive picture of the chaplain. 
Other enlisted personnel spoke highly of their chaplains as well. As part of the official 
history research, Henry Ackermann placed advertisements in the American Legion Magazine and 
others, requesting responses from and about chaplains who served in Vietnam. Amos Shumway, 
who identified himself as an “Administrative NCO,” wrote Ackermann to praise one chaplain in 
particular. Shumway did not hold chaplains in universally high regard: he wrote, “most Chaplains 
with whom I came in contact were field grade, either in staff offices or at the Chaplains School. 
Many of them were content to play the part of a staff officer—attending social activities and 
functions, making TDY trips of questionable validity, and generally enjoying the benefits of their 
rank.” Then Shumway noted an exception and praised Gene Little for his work. Shumway 
recounted Little’s actions in Germany and elsewhere, but focused especially on Little’s actions in 
Vietnam, writing: “Chaplain Little served in Viet Nam with distinction—going into Cambodia 
with his troops.”4 
 While many had positive interactions with chaplains, more colorful stories of chaplains 
rounded out the view of chaplains as saints and battlefield heroes. Chaplains, though tasked with 
supporting service members of all faiths as well as atheists and agnostics, did not always provide 
such help. Countering the widely-held view that “there are no atheists in foxholes,” Philip 
                                                 
3 Joseph Pronechen, “He Died with His Men – Sainthood Cause Begins for Vietnam Chaplain,” National 
Catholic Register (Catholic Online), 26 May 2006, http://www.catholic.org/national/national_story.php?id=1983, 
accessed 18 March 2008. 
4 Letter from Amos F. Shumway to Henry Ackermann, 1 September 1985, USACHCS Vietnam Files. 
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Paulson, an atheist soldier, expressed disappointment with the chaplains with whom he came 
into contact. He questioned, at a basic level, his ability to express his non-belief without fear of 
reprisal. He believed such statements might prejudice promotions and that declaring an atheist 
position would be “perceived as tantamount to being a communist.” The unit’s chaplain was a 
“fundamentalist Christian who saw the devil in virtually everything he didn’t believe in.” Paulson 
may have credited the chaplain with more military authority than he traditionally or officially 
had, but he expressed the belief that “Army chaplains wielded a lot of power; their opinions 
could make the difference between whether or not you got promoted. So, I was quiet about my 
nonbelief in God.”5 Paulson’s experience with chaplains led him to question the institution and, 
in his interpretation, to clarify his self-identification as a “humanist” rather than an adherent to 
any organized religious group.  
 James May, in the newsletter publication of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, wrote a 
scathing critique of some of the chaplains he knew in Vietnam, associating them irrevocably with 
the militaristic, racist, and hyper-patriotic views that he also attributed to the American 
government and military hierarchy. May’s article homed in especially on one “large, fat, 
loudmouthed Everything-else,” who, according to May, “prated about being on a crusade against 
the ‘Chicoms’ while chomping a cigar,” and “most of the troops hated him.” In a “vain appeal to 
the troops” the chaplain’s “prayer was often obscene,” May wrote. One that stood out was 
“Please, God, let the bombs fall straight on the little yellow motherfuckers.” May’s overall 
assessment was that the chaplain “must have had a fun war, slept when he wanted, plenty of 
chow and no danger ever, except when four black troops beat the stuffings outta him once.”6 
                                                 
5 Philip K. Paulson, “I was an Atheist in a Foxhole,” The Humanist, American Humanist Association 
(September/October 1989) http://www.americanhumanist.org/humanism/foxhole.html, accessed 25 February 
2008. 
6 James May, “Chaplains,” Vietnam Veterans Against the War, The Veteran, Fall/Winter 2000, 
http://www.vvaw.org/veteran/article/?id=119, accessed 25 February 2008. 
 218 
 
 
The chaplain came to represent what was wrong with the military’s mission in Vietnam—the 
chaplain, for May (and likely for others) could not be separated from the military. 
 Jerry Lembke responded to May’s piece in a later issue of The Veteran. Lembke authored 
The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam, which refuted the pervasive story of 
veterans being spat on in American airports upon their return from Vietnam.7 Lembke’s well-
known critique of the Vietnam legacy adds credibility to the debate about chaplains. Lembke 
began, “May’s portrayal of chaplains was not too flattering, but I wouldn’t quarrel with it.” Then, 
he went on to describe three chaplains he worked with, only one of whom retained any of 
Lembke’s respect. One chaplain, assigned to Headquarters of the 41st Artillery Group, was 
Chaplain Elsie, a “character out of Joesph Heller’s Catch 22.” For Elsie, “ministering to troops 
was only a day job for this career man,” who also became the “unit’s self-designated procurer.” 
On one occasion he “did an enlisted man a ‘favor’ by taking a contraband AK-47 off the 
soldier’s hands before he got caught with it,” later explaining to Lembke that the weapon 
“would become a war trophy” for another officer. Lembke reported that a second chaplain, 
Tumkin (Lembke provided no first name), went AWOL when he couldn’t take the conditions in 
Vietnam.8 
 Lembke’s interactions with a third chaplain were more positive, though not in terms of 
the chaplain cultivating positive feelings about a specific religion or for the United States. This 
chaplain, a Catholic and former missionary, would tour firebases around LZ Betty, near Phan 
Thiet, each week. Lembke reported that during his visits, the chaplain “really deepened my own 
understanding of what the war was about.” The chaplain thought the “United States would not 
                                                 
7 Jerry Lembke, The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam (New York: New York University 
Press, 1998). 
8 Jerry Lembke, “Recollections: ‘Render Unto Caesar . . .,’” Vietnam Veterans Against the War, The Veteran 
31, no. 1 (2001): 31, http://www.vvaw.org/veteran/article/?id-95. 
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win the war because the Vietnamese people did not want us there” and that the war could be 
thought of “as an act of American imperialism.” In the end, Lembke wrote, the chaplain “gave 
me a deeper respect for the beliefs of other people and even ‘relativized’ for me the very notion 
of religion.”9  
 Lembke’s final analysis of the chaplaincy was grim: “I left Vietnam pretty disgusted with 
the chaplaincy as an institution.” When he wrote the Chief of Chaplains office to report his 
experience with chaplains, he received a reply, which he recalled as a “classic upbraiding of 
dissident behavior, and a chastising of my bad attitude and lack of commitment to the mission.” 
He was troubled by the very justifications chaplains themselves often gave for their service—
Romans 13, which directed Christians to “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s.” 
Chaplains frequently interpreted this to justify Christian service in war and to separate moral 
from military considerations. Lembke, however, was unsatisfied with this response, which he 
thought discounted the soldiers who were troubled by the war.10 
 To be sure, few chaplain narratives included incidents such as the ones reported above, 
unsurprising given the incentive toward self-preservation in published material. Chaplains, 
especially in the wake of the Vietnam War, had good reason to present themselves in a positive 
light. They needed to justify their ministry and actions in Vietnam, and they needed to 
successfully navigate between the worlds of Vietnam veterans and of religious communities. 
Additionally, chaplains’ narratives were in no way free from the issues of memory and selectivity 
that haunt other first person narratives. 
 Many chaplains, however, were themselves aware of some of these issues as they wrote, 
addressing the issue of memory explicitly in their retellings. They did not, however, assess the 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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situation uniformly. In the official survey, Henry Ackermann, the volume’s author, posed an 
open-ended question near the end of the survey, asking chaplains to recall “two brief narratives 
of what you consider the most significant events of your Vietnam ministry.” The responses 
varied from blank pages to a few scribbled sentences to pages of dense typeset copy. Some 
chaplains, however, commented on the question itself: Donald Shea responded “These ‘war 
stories’ cannot help but be enhanced by age and apocryphal valor. Ten years is too long to 
expect credibility to last in these “story” narratives. Sorry.”11 Shea, who answered all of the other 
questions on the survey, assessed the purpose and accuracy of the stories he could tell and chose 
not to narrate, surely as important a choice as the one made by chaplains who published books. 
 On the other end of the spectrum were chaplains who attested explicitly to the accuracy 
of their memory, and thus of their memoirs. Claude Newby first addressed his sources for It 
Took Heroes: a personal journal, his memory, interviews, and “personal and official journals,” 
among others. He then assessed the issue of memory and asserted “Not to brag, but my memory 
is verifiably exceptional, especially for directions, lay-of-the-land and chronology. This ability 
I’ve validated through research and revisits to places of long ago. Almost always, my 
recollections of sites and events are accurate as to geographic orientation. And usually sites and 
layouts are the way I remembered them—schools, houses, farms, streams, roads, and dates and 
sequences.”12 Newby offered this assessment as proof of his credibility as an author in imploring 
the reader to take his narrative to be factual and true. However, even this direct statement did 
not mention which events, people, or reflections he left out; though the book is long—more 
than 500 pages—Newby, as others, certainly made authorial choices about what to include and 
what to expunge, and on this issue he was less forthright. 
                                                 
11 Donald W. Shea, Survey Response, USACHCS, Vietnam Files. 
12 Newby, It Took Heroes, ix-x. 
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 Most, however, fell somewhere between the two extremes. They recognized the fallibility 
and selectivity of memory, yet chose to record personal narratives and reflections in spite of 
those limitations. After several failed attempts at recording his Vietnam experience, Dulany 
eventually wrote his memoirs while recovering from a hip replacement. Though he “utilized 
records, notes, letters and journals” to “verify time-lines and experiences,” Dulany admitted he 
was “confident that there are many errors in this document,” and “apologize[d] in advance for 
the most obvious” errors, for which he blamed his “memory or lack thereof.”13 He continued 
that he was unsure that he had much to add to the vast, and ever-expanding, literature on the 
Vietnam War, but he claimed authority and credibility nonetheless: “I have written as I 
experienced it.” He acknowledged that the reader would be “experiencing this glimpse of my 
reality through [an] admittedly marred, imperfect, scratched, and chipped lens.”14 Even with the 
caveats, however, Dulany essentially asserted that his memoir is “true”—that is, that it accurately 
reflected his experiences, observations, and reflections of his military service. 
 For many, the authority of personal experience was crucial to the credibility and 
verisimilitude of their memoirs. Few made claims to be historians or to represent a larger group 
with their writing, but many claimed the essential truth of their personal experience. Jerry Autry, 
a memoirist who has also been active on Internet sites and who has given at least one public 
interview, also asserted his desire to “share the truth” in his memoir. He recognized, however, 
the problem of identifying what is true. “Sometimes I have to ask, ‘What is the truth?’ My 
recollection and the recollection of my Vietnam buddies do not always mesh. Who is right? Or is 
there a right?” He concluded that more often than not “the stories and facts are the same, but 
details are often different.” He recalled one instance where he met a veteran “who was with 
                                                 
13 Dulany, Once a Soldier, 4. 
14 Ibid. 
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another unit who said he was attached to our unit for a bit.” Autry did not remember the man, 
but several others did, and the veteran had “constructed an entire scenario” around being 
attached to Autry’s unit. Autry asked, “Is this untrue; true? I simply don’t know and don’t know 
whether it matters.” With his concluding sentence, Autry reached the heart of these intense 
methodological and philosophical questions. For Autry, and most other chaplains, “Truth is not 
relative.” He defended the basic reliability and veracity of his account, even though memory, in 
the words of his buddies may be “like a vinyl record that is worn and may skip a bit.” Autry’s 
experience was “Truthful,” because his experiences deemed it so: “This is my story and how it 
was,” he concluded.15  
 James Burnham also lamented that he “did not keep a daily diary during [his] year in 
Vietnam,” because “so much has faded or been lost in the decades since—people’s names 
forgotten, locations uncertain or confused.” He contacted several of his old acquaintances, and 
used the weight of collective memory to reconstruct the past, but Burnham recognized that most 
memories are “irretrievably gone,” in part because of the vagaries of memory, but also because 
he could not access the collective memories of his native Vietnamese acquaintances—crucial 
witnesses to Burnham’s ministry and to the war as a whole were simply unavailable. 
Nevertheless, Burnham also claimed the authority of personal experience: Some of the 
memories may be inaccurate, but, he wrote, “they are as I remember them.”16 
Chaplains, like others, were prone to acts of heroism and cowardice and were likewise 
susceptible to war trauma and the romanticization of war. Both during the war and after, for 
many veterans, chaplain and non-chaplain alike, writing provided an avenue for communicating 
                                                 
15 Jerry Autry, Gun-Totin’ Chaplain: A True Memoir (San Francisco: Airborne Press, 2006), xviii-xiv. 
16 James Burnham, God’s Squad: Pages from a Chaplain’s Vietnam Diary, 1967-1968 (n.p.: n.p., n.d.), 1. 
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their wartime experiences to a wider public and for personal reflection and healing—what 
Samuel Hynes called the simultaneous need for first-person accounts to report and remember.17  
As they published memoirs and diaries, and as they addressed post-war audiences, 
chaplains situated themselves within three traditions of autobiographical writing: combat 
memoirs, spiritual autobiography, and trauma writing. First, they wrote within the context of 
combat memoirs: although chaplains were non-combatants, most who published first-hand 
accounts were assigned to combat units and experienced the Vietnam War close to the fighting.18 
Whether or not chaplains were aware of these conventions as they wrote is, to some degree, 
immaterial—isolation from a literary tradition is, in fact, one marker of the combat memoir. 
Samuel Hynes, author of an insightful book about Anglo-American combat memoirs from the 
twentieth century, wrote that for most combat memoirs, “there is nothing to suggest that the 
author is aware of any previous example: no quotations or allusions or imitations of earlier 
models. . . . War writing, it seems, is a genre without a tradition to the men who write it.”19 
However, whereas traditional narratives of this sort focus almost exclusively on combat—
“drums-and-bugles” or “blood-and-guts”—chaplain narratives contained relatively little combat, 
                                                 
17 Hynes, Soldiers’ Tale, 4. 
18 On military memoirs and first-person narratives, see especially Samuel Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing 
Witness to Modern War (New York: Penguin Press, 1997). Hynes examined combat memoirs from Anglo-American 
military personnel from World War I, World War II, and Vietnam, with an excursive discussion of “survivor 
memoirs” from the Holocaust. 
19 Hynes, Soldiers’ Tale, 4. He also concluded that this sort of isolation was reflected in the fact that war 
narratives have not generally conformed to “the literary fashions of their time. Tellers of Victorian wars have not 
been notably Victorian, narrators of modern wars have not been Modernists. Whatever their dates, they have nearly 
all been realists, adopting a common style that would come as close as language can to rendering the things of the 
material world as they are.” (p. 25-26) This goes equally well to the point that combat memoirs were generally not 
aware of the generic conventions in which they operated—most were written without reference to other combat 
memoirs. One notable exception to this within the sub-genre of chaplain memoirs is Autry’s Gun-Totin’ Chaplain, 
which specifically mentions memoirs and books by other Vietnam chaplains. Autry wrote, “They’re good. Mine may 
be a little more philosophical. I’ve tried to convey the contributions chaplains make in war and peace.” (p. xi). 
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even for those who served with forward units.20 With some exceptions, chaplains tended to 
focus on worship, sacrament, and counseling as the primary markers of their time in Vietnam. 
 Compared to Vietnam combat narratives, chaplain memoirs differed strikingly. The 
literary antecedents, merits, tropes, and recurring images and themes have been widely and 
vigorously discussed in scholarly literature, particularly within the fields of Comparative 
Literature and American Studies.21 For the most part, however, these works, like Hynes’s, 
focused on combat and the combat soldier as the primary narrator of Vietnam war stories. 
Nevertheless, the Vietnam narrative, as it has been recreated within this scholarship remained an 
unfinished one. The stories often devolved into chaos and provided the narrator not with a 
sense of closure, but rather a profound loss of innocence. These narratives were profane and 
often explicitly concerned with sexual metaphors of war. They were frequently dystopic and 
played off simultaneous and contradictory images of the soldier as victim and perpetrator. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, scholars worked to contextualize Vietnam War literature 
within a broader American cultural context. 
 Not surprisingly, chaplains (and their memoirs) have been almost entirely absent from 
these scholarly discussions. Chaplains did not usually participate directly in combat; they have 
not produced much writing about the war, nor do their publications bear the same critical weight 
or display the literary panache of Tim O’Brien’s or Michael Herr’s work.22 Professor of English 
                                                 
20 A notable exception here is James Johnson’s Combat Chaplain. 
21 See, for example, Don Ringnalda, Fighting and Writing the Vietnam War (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1994); Jim Neilson, Warring Fictions: American Literary Culture and the Vietnam War Narrative (Jackson: 
University Press of Mississippi, 1998); Philip K. Jason, Acts and Shadows: The Vietnam War in American Literary Culture 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Philip K. Jason, ed., Fourteen Landing Zones: Approaches to Vietnam War 
Literature (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1991); Tobey C. Herzog, Vietnam War Stories: Innocence Lost (London: 
Routledge, 1992); Milton J. Bates, The Wars We Took to Vietnam: Cultural Conflict and Storytelling (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996). 
22 Michael Herr, Dispatches (New York: Knopf, 1977); Tim O’Brien, If I Die in a Combat Zone: Box Me Up and 
Ship Me Home (New York: Delacorte Press, 1973); Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried: A Work of Fiction (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1990). 
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and American Studies Alex Vernon argued that “personal narratives by male noncombatant 
military persons—white males especially—are easily the most neglected of all military life writing 
in Anglo American criticism, because they are ignored both by scholars who concentrate on the 
combat memoir and by those who focus on historically marginalized voices (women and 
minorities).”23 Thus, considering chaplains narratives within a broader context of first-person 
Vietnam War accounts allows for chaplains’ words to be considered as part of a whole literary 
tradition, and the differences are immediately apparent. Chaplains, even those who saw 
significant action when they were attached to forward operating units, did not discuss combat in 
great detail. Here, it would appear that traditional views of authority hold true—those who 
participated in combat may write about it; those who did not, may not do so. The issue is not 
one of proximity but involvement, and thus legitimacy and credibility.24 
Second, chaplains wrote in the tradition of spiritual or religious autobiography, which 
has been a significant part of religious practice, from Augustine of Hippo to the Puritans of 
colonial New England and beyond. Augustine of Hippo’s Confessions modeled confessional 
writing as a way to experience God’s grace, and public accounts of conversion were required for 
membership in the Puritan church community. Puritan autobiographies therefore related to 
broader social, political, and cultural concerns within their communities—they signified that an 
individual “had come into alignment with certain linguistic, behavioral and cultural 
expectations.”25 Some chaplain memoirs and publicized diaries assumed the conventions of the 
conversion narrative or spiritual autobiography, in which an author reported not only on daily 
                                                 
23 Alex Vernon, “Introduction,” Arms and the Self: War, the Military, and Autobiographical Writing, ed. Alex 
Vernon (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2005), 3. 
24 See especially, Philip K. Jason, “Vietnam War Writing and Authenticity,” in Acts and Shadows, 41-52. 
25 Peter A. Dorsey, Sacred Estrangement: The Rhetoric of Conversion in Modern American Autobiography (University 
Park: The Pennsylvania State University press, 1993), 9; see also Paul John Eakin, ed., American Autobiography: 
Retrospect and Prospect (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991). 
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experiences but also provided theological and religious reflection on those events. Chaplains also 
wrote for clearly religious audiences; they frequently used religious vocabulary, images, and 
references, which might seem alien to a secular reader. Furthermore, their books were often 
published by small denominational or religious presses. These publications were part of a 
chaplain’s reentry into the civilian religious community, ties to which their chaplain careers may 
have weakened, and were written to reassure readers that the authors retained, understood, and 
remained committed—as the Puritan authors of conversion narratives before them—to the 
“linguistic, behavioral and cultural expectations” of their respective religious communities.26 
Even among the chaplain memoirs within this literary tradition, the focus varied. 
Thomas Des Champs, who emphasized his Vietnam service in his memoir’s title—“The True 
Story of a Highly Decorated Vietnam-era Chaplain”—nevertheless began by writing: “I believe 
that where you come from and how you were raised has a great influence on whom and what 
you become. For this reason, I would like to tell you about my hometown, my parents, the 
people I knew, and the culture in which I was raised.” Des Champs wrote of his family and his 
early religious experiences before moving on to his military experiences.27 Jim Ammerman, on 
the other hand, buried his Vietnam experience deep within the middle of his book, Supernatural 
Events in the Life of an Ordinary Man. Ammerman also began with his childhood, focusing on his 
belief that God called him to minister to “Army officers,” a pledge which Ammerman believed 
fulfilled when he was assigned to the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas. Finally, Connell J. Maguire’s memoir, Follies of a Navy Chaplain, clearly focused on his 
military service, but his tour in Southeast Asia appeared as only one of many subjects. Like the 
                                                 
26 Dorsey, Sacred Estrangement, 9. 
27 Thomas Des Champs, Christian Soldier: The True Story of a Highly Decorated Vietnam-Era Chaplain, as told to 
Philip McGee (Baltimore, MD: PublishAmerica, 2004, 7; Jim Ammerman, Supernatural Events in the Life of an Ordinary 
Man (Enumclaw, WA: WinePress Publishing, 1996), 17, 140; Connell J. Maguire, Follies of a Navy Chaplain 
(Maywood, NJ: ChiChi Press, 2003). 
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others, Maguire began with his childhood and the call to become a chaplain. Each of these 
authors contextualized their pastoral and military lives differently, but the spiritual-
autobiographical components of each are quite clear. 
 Chaplain Jack Brown viewed his personal writing (in journals) and his public writing (in 
the form of his book Another Side of Combat) in religious terms. He began writing as a spiritual 
discipline when one of his “college or seminary professors encouraged [him] to keep a daily 
journal,” which he began doing just before deploying to Vietnam as a chaplain with the 101st 
Airborne Division.28 Then, Brown situated his memoir as a “devotional book of memories” 
where “Each devotional chapter is based on my day-to-day journal that was kept faithfully 
during that memorable year. I also share my philosophy about war, the American serviceman or 
woman, and the Christian faith as it relates to military service.”29 Brown hoped his spiritual 
journey might be of help to others in a similar situation. 
Finally, much of chaplains’ writing can be understood in the context of trauma writing or 
therapeutic writing, even when not begun for that explicit purpose. Writing, both fiction and 
non-fiction, has been explored extensively in context to therapeutic treatment of Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD).30 James W. Pennebaker, a research psychologist, conducted 
experiments in the area of post-trauma writing in order to assess the idea that if a “trauma is 
cognitively prolonged and, because the person cannot talk to friends and relatives about the 
distressing subject, they can become socially isolated” and that writing may provide a way to 
                                                 
28 Brown, Another Side of Combat, vii. 
29 Ibid., ix. 
30 See, for example, Gillie Bolton, The Therapeutic Potential of Creative Writing: Writing Myself (London: Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers, 1999); Christina Baldwin, Life’s Companion: Journal Writing as a Spiritual Quest (New York: 
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“organize and assimilate” the traumatic memories. In his study, Pennebaker worked with 
students and found that those who wrote about traumatic events and the emotions and feelings 
associated with them sought medical attention for illness less than their control-group 
counterparts, which suggested improved immune function and ability to withstand infection. 
Most of the subjects, over 75%, described the long-term benefits of the writing in personal 
terms—they concluded that writing “made me think things out” or “helped me look at myself 
from the outside/sort out my thoughts.”31 Pennebaker concluded that “narrative expression, 
whether written or spoken, has a naturally organising (controlling and structuring) effect. But 
‘writing permits subjects to engage their traumas to a degree and at a rate at which they feel 
comfortable.’”32 
 Clinical understandings of PTSD, its diagnosis, and treatment also highlight the extent to 
which chaplains, especially those who joined combat infantry units on patrols and those who 
served in hospitals, could experience deep psychological trauma as the result of the war. For 
several years, scholars and clinicians assumed that “war trauma” was roughly equivalent to 
“combat trauma.” More recently, however, the distinctions between “combat exposure” and 
exposure to or participation in “abusive violence” may affect PTSD rates and responses to 
treatment. The primary concern in combat is survival because the primary threat was being 
killed, whereas with abusive violence, which might include rape, the killing of civilians, or 
constant exposure to the wounded and dying, victims confronted a different problem of 
persistent violence against human beings, where the primary threat was to one’s moral 
                                                 
31 James Pennebaker, “Overcoming Inhibition: Rethinking the Roles of personality, Cognition, and Social 
Behavior,” in Harald C. Traue and J[ames] W. Pennebaker, eds., Emotion, Inhibition and Health (Seattle: Hogrefe and 
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32 Ibid., 200.  
 229 
 
 
sensibilities and psychological wellbeing.33 In Vietnam, in large part a guerrilla war, these 
boundaries were occasionally murky: the threat of death was pervasive, and abusive violence was 
prevalent in many sectors of the war. Chaplains, regardless of their assignments, were unlikely to 
be immune to the abusive violence of the Vietnam War.  
 However, many experts agree that “normal developmental factors are also relevant: the 
soldier who is a few years older than the average combatant and possesses a more integrated 
sense of self and purpose has greater insulation against serious trauma than does a late 
adolescent who is still in the process of more active maturation.”34 Thus, chaplains should be 
expected to suffer from markedly lower rates of PTSD than enlisted personnel. Again, this is not 
to suggest that some chaplains, especially those who served with combat units and went into the 
field, did not experience extreme trauma, but rather to suggest that chaplains, in comparison to 
other service personnel had more intrapersonal and emotional skills with which to deal with 
trauma. 
 James Johnson began writing his memoirs as a therapeutic exercise to help him deal with 
PTSD and his memories from combat. “A friend who knows about some of my combat 
experiences suggests I write a book about them. I immediately discount his suggestion. I am not 
certain why, but soon, I do begin writing. I had kept very detailed diaries and journals in 
Vietnam and now I begin a process of what l later will refer to as a therapeutic journal. And 
when feelings resurface due to dreams, or in my waking moments, I record these feelings. I 
simply record what I’m experiencing.” Johnson continued writing over the next year, and in so 
doing he wrote “my pen becomes my therapist.” “Eventually,” continued Johnson, “the 
                                                 
33 Robert S. Laufer, “War Trauma and Human Development: The Viet Nam Experience” in Stephen M. 
Sonnenberg, Arthur S. Blank, Jr., and John A. Talbott, eds. The Trauma of War: Stress and Recovery in Viet Nam 
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vividness of my dreams begins to diminish. My feelings aren’t gone, but do begin to heal. The 
longer I am away from Vietnam, the less preoccupied I am with the trauma that I experienced 
there.”35 Of the chaplain accounts that focus specifically on Vietnam, Johnson’s was the most 
self-aware and self-reflective about his purpose in writing a memoir. Johnson was keenly aware 
of the therapeutic nature of autobiographical writing after trauma—the benefits for him would 
be both spiritual and psychological. In the introduction, Johnson acknowledged, however, that 
his memoir was “about more than just trauma. . . . It’s also about coping, feeling, growing up, 
bonding, being cynical, loving, being loved, being vulnerable, placing values in perspective, and 
even humor.”36  
 Other chaplains also wrote frankly about PTSD and trauma, and some also addressed 
the spiritual nature of their healing. Curt Bowers’s conclusion combined the trope of 
spiritualized combat with healing from PTSD. After narrating his own flashback to Hill 65, 
where he saw his friends die and experienced combat firsthand, his final sentences addressed 
Vietnam Veterans explicitly: “In summary, let me say to those who read this book—to those 
who identify with its story—the men, the places, the emotions, and to those who have, to some 
degree, suffered from PTSD: There is help and there is hope.” He encouraged them to seek help 
from the Veterans Administration hospitals, where they would find clinicians “well versed in the 
syndrome,” but he also emphasized the spiritual dimension of healing after trauma. He wrote, 
“In addition, and I believe of greater importance, is the recognition that Jesus Christ our Lord is 
the ultimate healer and the Great Physician.”37 Bowers believed that his Christian faith, his 
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understanding of PTSD, and his retelling his story all played a significant part in healing the 
lingering wounds of Vietnam. 
 Beyond distinct literary contexts, chaplains wrote within historical contexts as well. 
Memoirs often tell readers about the social, political, and cultural worlds of the publication date 
as much as they do about the past. Chaplains, like other memoirists of the Vietnam era, grappled 
with the broad geopolitical issues of the Cold War, the domestic politics of Vietnam, and 
ongoing questions of American involvement in the world. In the 1980s, then, as Americans 
began to recover from the immediate trauma of Vietnam, new stories gained prominence in the 
public mind. By the mid-1980s, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial had been designed and built, 
and the nation sought to exorcize the demons of Vietnam, among other ways through literature 
and movies. Vietnam became a symbol of the political and cultural battles of the 1960s and 
1970s. The co-author of Curtis Bowers’ memoir reflected that during those decades “there were 
many battlefronts, not all in Southeast Asia. Some were on college campuses. Others intruded 
on the sanctity of our homes. Sharp differences of opinion divided us. We found that a nation 
divided against itself could not stand against the enemy. Like it or not, those of us who lived 
during those years found ourselves thrust into the fray.”38 The veteran, chaplain included, was a 
victim of these battles, demonized by anti-war demonstrators, marginalized by the veterans of 
World War II, and traumatized by the experience of war. 
 Others, also in the 1980s, placed the trauma of Vietnam into the heightened Cold War 
tensions of the Reagan years. Bowers himself wrote, “It has been over twenty years since I flew 
out of Tan Son Nhut Airfield on my way home from Vietnam to the United States. That country 
has now been swallowed up by the forces we had fought against.” Then he moved to wider 
global concerns: “There are still wars and rumors of wars in that region and all over the globe. 
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Central America is a focus of our efforts against the Marxists. The Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) is the hotly debated defense against the Soviet missile threat. Star Wars is a household 
word. The Soviets are bogged down in Afghanistan and no doubt will be for the foreseeable 
future. The Middle East is a tinder box waiting to be lit. Mothers everywhere still pray that their 
sons will not go to war. Things have not changed much—certainly human nature has not 
changed at all.”39  
 After a lull in the 1990s, and since renewed military activity after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, several chaplains have published memoirs or devotional collections.40 
Indeed, chaplains have received renewed attention in that war; as in Vietnam, the chaplaincy has 
emerged as a site for examining the functions and compatibility of religious belief and practice 
during war. Vietnam-era chaplains have responded to this increased attention by speaking out 
about the chaplains’ role in war, about the Iraq war, and about the nature of religious practice 
during war. Jerry Autry addressed the issue explicitly in his memoir: “Writing about Vietnam 
while the Iraq War is going on has been excruciating. Day by day, as I sat, watched, read—it was 
Vietnam revisited.”41 Autry used his experiences in Vietnam to become a “constructive critic of 
the war,” intent on separating support for the soldiers from the political objectives of the war. 
He concluded “We learned our lessons, and this fact alone may be the lasting legacy of Vietnam 
if there is one—the soldier is just doing his job.”42 As he wrote, Autry revealed, “I decided to 
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intersperse my own thoughts and writings . . . about Iraq in the middle of my Vietnam story.” 
For Autry, the two stories could not be separated.43  
 Jack Brown’s book also took a long historical view of the Vietnam War; he only 
obliquely referred to Iraq—insisting that a nation’s leaders, serving “their citizens and soldiers 
well” should “do their utmost to avoid war”—and instead reminded readers of the origins of the 
Vietnam War itself. “Now since this book is about mortality and the Vietnam conflict, a bit of 
history should not be forgotten. In 1945, Ho Chi Minh spoke in Hanoi to an estimated half 
million Vietnamese. American military personnel stood on the stage with him as he declared 
Vietnam’s independence from French and Japanese rule. He began his speech by quoting the 
first few sentences of America’s Declaration of Independence. He sought friendship with 
America.” For Brown, the tragedy of Vietnam occurred between the hopeful declaration of 
Vietnamese independence and the 1995 opening of the American embassy in Vietnam. The 
lessons of Vietnam, to be debated “endlessly” by historians, must be learned in order to avoid 
too-costly war or peace.44 
 
Chaplains Write the Vietnam War 
As with other authors of first-person narratives, chaplains demonstrated a range of 
motivations for recording and publishing their recollections about Vietnam. James Johnson 
presented his experience as a series of diary entries, supplemented by memory, letters and tape 
recordings he sent to his wife, and his journal entries. While most of the book’s action took 
place during Johnson’s tour in Vietnam, the title revealed a wider significance for Johnson. His 
war did not end on the flight home—it was, for him, a “Thirty-Year Vietnam Battle,” and the 
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story of the war was fundamentally wrapped up in the story of his life, and the lives of his 
friends and family. Samuel Hynes, in The Soldiers’ Tale, contended that there are two types of 
“personal narratives” (his generic term for first-person accounts) about war, which “correspond 
to two quite different needs: the need to report and the need to remember.”45 Occasionally the 
two needs merged particularly when the writing was therapeutic and revelatory in nature, the two 
needs merged. 
Other chaplains published their experiences because friends and family members 
suggested it.46 In most cases, chaplains believed they had important, legitimate stories to tell. 
Claude Newby wrote that he began writing his Vietnam memoirs “as part of my autobiography. . 
. . I listed several good reasons for writing my life story. These reasons included a desire to leave 
a chronicle of my life that my posterity may ‘know’ me, gain some advantage from the lessons 
life taught me, and cherish their heritage.” Newby was troubled, however, by the sentiment of 
some that the Vietnam War should not make up a significant part of the memoir, and he cited a 
letter from a “military man” who expressed his view that the “Vietnam War is over, and it’s time 
to forget it. Please quit telling war stories and leave the war behind us.” Newby, however, asked 
“Can we forget the event and still remember those who served and sacrificed so much?” When he wrote down 
his “chronicle” of his experiences in Vietnam, he wrote, “Suddenly, a great weight lifted from 
me—a mental, emotional, spiritual burden of near tangible proportions.” Thus, “with my war 
memories on paper and in the computer . . . the gnawing almost ceased for the first time in more 
than a quarter of a century, and I felt free of a vague melancholy. . . . I don’t have to remember 
anymore. Now, whatever happens to me, the story is preserved, lest we forget.”47 
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 Chaplains also wrote to memorialize. Jack Brown claimed, “In a real sense, this book is 
also a memorial tribute to the tens of thousands of American men and women who served their 
country and who lost their lives in Vietnam during that unpopular war.” The war memoir, 
published for all time, would attest to the sacrifice Brown witnessed others make—by virtue of 
his memories, written down, Brown would make sure that others were not forgotten. The 
memorial would also be for “the family members and friends of those who served there, of 
those who died there, of those who were wounded there, of those who were imprisoned there, 
and of those who are still listed as missing in action.” The devotional written word would 
become, in the words of Jay Winter, writing about World War I, “sites of memory” and “sites of 
mourning.”48 Finally, Brown identified one last audience, one not directly connected to the 
Vietnam War or to the people who served there. Brown identified them as interested 
observers—those who might have specific questions about how chaplains functioned during the 
war, about how chaplains could serve both God and Country simultaneously.49 
Not only did chaplains hope their stories would be significant to others who served in 
the war, but also to religious audiences who were unsure what to make of the war and of the 
chaplaincy. Often, Christian chaplains left readers with religious messages that emphasized the 
importance of faith in times of struggle and the significance of the Christian evangelical mission. 
“While it was my privilege to serve on a very real battlefield at the front, many who read this 
book have battlefields and front lines of a different nature,” Curt Bowers wrote. “Those of us 
who follow Christ are all called to immerse ourselves in the battle of life. None of us are called 
to stand on the sideline or retreat to some quiet, secure place while life-and-death struggles are 
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taking place all around us.”50 Bowers’s introduction clearly associated actual warfare with 
spiritual warfare: the same skills he needed as a military chaplain, Christians would need as they 
encountered resistance and conflict in their own lives. 
Other chaplains used their personal stories to help other veterans deal with their 
experiences in Vietnam. William Mahedy, an Episcopal chaplain in Vietnam, pioneered 
counseling and therapy efforts with Veterans’ centers and counseling after the Vietnam War. He 
believed that Vietnam represented for many veterans a “dark night of the soul” from which 
many of them had not returned.51 Though Mahedy’s work was not about his experiences as a 
chaplain per se, his commitment to the spiritual lives of Vietnam veterans was significant. 
Having witnessed war, he was able to relate to them, and he could appreciate more fully the 
trauma brought on by combat. He understood their needs in part because he understood his 
own. Mahedy believed he wrote so that others could experience the journey out of the dark 
night of Vietnam.52 At the end of his book, Mahedy printed a liturgy of reconciliation that he 
compiled for a healing service that was part of a Veterans’ retreat. Mahedy noticed that many 
soldiers had not dealt with the grief, loss, anger, or guilt that remained from Vietnam. As a 
veteran and clergyman, he was able to aid others in this process of resolution and closure. 
Mahedy designed the liturgy so “the three Scripture readings used were relevant to the issues of 
war and peacemaking. The prayers, including the prayer of consecration, were written around 
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this theme. We confessed our sins, especially those of ‘violence and hatred,’ receiving for these 
sins the forgiveness of God . . . Hymns were selected according to the theme. The unity and 
deep yearning for the peace of mind that only reconciliation can achieve was more evident at the 
service.”53 Mahedy had evaluated his Vietnam experience in religious ways and used his 
experience as a veteran, a counselor, and a clergyman to help others do the same.  
In their narratives, chaplains saw themselves change in ways that reflected their identity 
and their faith. For many, their tours in Vietnam represented a time of physical, emotional, and 
spiritual challenge and change. “I was forty pounds lighter. My hair was sprinkled generously 
with gray. I had long scars to remind me always where I had been,” James Hutchens reflected. 
But he recognized that these were merely physical changes and that the deeper changes occurred 
because “for nearly a year I had lived and worked beside many fine men, some magnificent men. 
Together we had seen good men suffer and die. Together we came out to find life very precious 
and more purposeful and meaningful that we had ever known before. Because of the living and 
dying, I would never be quite the same again.”54 But even though these were important, 
Hutchens believed, “above all this there was another difference. Now I knew by what I had 
witnessed that the living God still reveals Himself to men who truly seek Him. Before, I had 
been taught it and had read it. Now I had experienced it.” He concluded that in the end, “God 
still makes Himself known. He still makes His presence felt just as surely as He did to Moses and 
Abraham, to Paul and to John. Now as a minister of the gospel of Jesus Christ I could stand to 
declare what I had seen and heard.”55 Many chaplains changed physically, and some carried 
battle scars and wounds. They remembered the men and officers with whom they served. They 
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reacted to institutional problems and situations. But through their experiences, they wrote that 
they continued to find strength in their religion and faith. Surely, some chaplains lost their faith 
or were unable to reconcile their faith and their Vietnam experience, but they have not recorded 
this displacement publicly. Chaplains who chose to write about Vietnam did so for personal and 
public reasons and were willing to expose their experiences and selves in ways that others could 
not or would not. 
Because their reactions to and experiences of war were not uniform, in their reflections 
on the war itself and its purposes or meanings, chaplains disagreed. For some, battle and 
Vietnam renewed their sense of calling and of purpose. In the midst of carnage, they found a 
real place in which the things of “this world” fell away, and only God could remain. Raymond 
Johnson wrote, “My batteries are re-charged, ‘My youth is renewed like the eagle’s.’” He found 
his “soul is filled with a new surge of inner strength. I must return to that real arena where the 
living paradox of life’s humor and tragedy, love and hate, is lived out before the eyes of men. 
This is where I belong!”56 Johnson’s revelations at the end of his tour of duty recognized 
paradox, not irresolvable conflict. His faith was not shaken, yet what he saw changed him. 
Towards the end of his tour, he was not deflated or defeated, but hopeful and even uplifted. In 
the midst of war, Johnson believed his God had revealed himself. 
 Jackson Day struggled to reconcile his Vietnam experience with a traditional theology of 
an all knowing, all powerful, and all loving God. His experiences taught him that in war God 
could not be all three. He wrote that God could encompass “any two out of the three, perhaps, 
but not all three, it’s just too contradictory. If God was all powerful and all knowing, he couldn’t 
be all loving or else he would do something to stop what was going on. If he were all powerful 
and all loving, then he couldn’t know what was going on, or he would do something.” To 
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resolve the conflict, Day reasoned “that God was all loving and all knowing, but had given up 
the power, as God gave up the power on the cross. We weren’t helped because God couldn’t 
stop what was going on, but God suffered with us, and perhaps that was enough.” The 
resolution came full circle thirty-five years later when he returned to Vietnam and concluded 
after “looking at the regeneration of the country of Vietnam” that “perhaps God has some 
power after all, and we simply had too short a horizon.”57  
Day was also challenged to rethink some of his recollections about the nature of life and 
death and his mission in Vietnam. He returned to Vietnam in 2004 for an educational tour. 
During his trip to Vietnam, Day was showing the tour guide, Dr. Ed Tick, a specialist on PTSD 
and Vietnam, pictures from his combat tour. Tick noticed that Day was the only living thing in 
one picture. Day recalled this scene and others like it, when “soldiers welcomed a break from the 
work of preparing a firebase. The denuded trees were part of the package—an explosive charge 
would be set off which would at once clear an area in the center where helicopters could land, 
and farther from the explosion, clear the trees of leaves, improving the line of sight.” Day was 
reminded that for soldiers in combat “all of these things meant life, or a better chance of life, for 
those here.” He “saw no death in the picture. Ed Tick, who wasn’t there, saw no living things 
but the chaplain, and to view the picture fresh through his eyes was a revelation into a new 
truth.”58 Even in scenes full of death, Day had resolved his experience to find the redemptive 
quality of life.  
This process, however, took years. Upon returning to the United States, Day joined 
Vietnam Veterans Against the War and eventually resigned his commission with the National 
Guard. Rather than continuing in ordained ministry, Day returned to graduate school for a 
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degree in Public Health and worked in the private healthcare sector for several years before 
eventually returning to the pastorate in Maryland and becoming involved with Vietnam Veteran 
Ministers, a group of veterans and clergy who work together to minister to Vietnam War 
veterans. In retrospect, Day said it was possible to see the experience of Vietnam as a rich 
source for personal growth, renewed faith, and strengthened personal relationships, however, at 
the time, he insisted that he saw or felt few of those benefits.59 
Others interpreted their Vietnam experiences with a different theology, in which God 
was neither responsible for, nor necessarily revealed in the horrors of war. Instead they found a 
source of hope for the future in the war. For James Hutchens, the Battle Hymn of the Republic 
served as a symbol of his beliefs. During the Civil War Julia Ward Howe wrote the hymn, which 
has served as a religious justification for a call to arms for American military men ever since. 
“Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord;/He is trampling out the vintage, 
where the grapes of wrath are stored;/He has loosed the fateful lightning of His terrible swift 
sword;/His truth is marching on.” The song called soldiers to join the Army of God as he wiped 
out his enemies. “What did Mrs. Howe see?” Hutchens asked. “She saw . . . what every soldier 
ought to see. I saw it, as did many others. . . . Coming events have a way of casting their 
shadows before them. The wars of the ages have all pointed to it. The insatiable cry for peace 
demands it: The glory of the coming of the Lord, the Prince of peace, who alone can establish peace.” 
He concluded that Vietnam was a “vivid foreshadowing of the unprecedented glory and wrath 
of God that shall be unleashed upon a ‘crooked and perverse generation’ at the coming of the 
Lord.”60 But the hymn also demanded response: “Oh, be swift, my soul, to answer Him!/Be 
jubilant, my feet./Our God is marching on./Glory, Glory, Hallelujah!” And Hutchens replied, 
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“Even so, come Lord Jesus.”61 Hutchens evaluated Vietnam and his particular combat 
experience from a pre-millennial eschatology, wherein the horror of war was a precursor to the 
return of Christ on Earth, a sign of the coming triumph of the Christian God and the imposition 
of a millennial peace. He and others endured not because God had already been revealed, but 
because he would be revealed.  
 Yet others were more pessimistic about the war and the potential lessons that could be 
gained from the war. Earlier than most, chaplains seemed to criticize the war as pointless and 
wasteful, even if they supported its purported anti-Communist goals. As Robert Falabella left 
Vietnam, he was “filled with mixed emotions.” He recorded that he felt “a certain joy . . . that 
the nightmare was over” for him. But he agonized over this emotional response: “It may have 
been over for me but it was not over for so many others still there. How could I be happy, when 
my friends were still there?” His connection to the soldiers ran deep and as he looked at his 
watch, he saw that it was “about two thirty in the morning, a dangerous time for those boys in 
the field; a lonely, fearful time for the boys on ambush; an agonizing time for those seriously 
wounded and in the intensive care ward at the 12th Evac Hospital, and hospitals like it all over 
the corps area.” In a matter of hours, Falabella would be home, but in Vietnam, a few more 
hours would bring daylight, and “the boys, still shivering from the chilly rains will then have 
another day to be scorched by the sun, bitten by insects, and revolted by the leeches that will be 
drawing their blood when they ford the canals. They will be wondering who will get the job of 
point man this day, and whether there will be many booby traps in the areas they must enter.” 
Falabella repeated his question, “How can I be happy when some of those young men who are 
now alive will be dead before this day is out, others perhaps without their limbs, their arms or 
their sight?” Like Dulany’s questions about his responses to atrocity in combat, Falabella had no 
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answers. He left in agony. He determined, “I had come to Vietnam in apprehension, but with 
hope. I find I left it in disappointment and with sorrow.”62 Falabella saw no redemption or 
salvation in war, but he believed he saw the essence of humanity in it. The relationships he had 
formed with soldiers sustained him, and prompted him to be an outspoken critic of the war and 
its effects. Falabella’s experiences underscored the conflict between the positive and negative 
aspects of war, for what he believed war could accomplish—the ability to equalize men and 
venerate humanity in the image of God—it also threatened to take away by its equal application 
of death and destruction. 
While many of the men who served in Vietnam may have found solace, comfort, or 
reassurance in their faith, chaplains were in a unique position because they were the ones who 
actually represented that faith physically. Chaplains were intimately connected to ministry, 
mission, morale, morality, and faith. Henry Ackermann, a chaplain who served in Vietnam, and 
an official historian for the Army Chaplain Corps, titled his book on chaplains in Vietnam, He 
Was Always There, for the phrase expressed the sentiment of many officers and soldiers and 
demonstrated a certain level of fulfillment of the chaplains’ mission. While they recognized their 
ministry as important, for chaplains the phrase “He was always there” applied not to other clergy 
or humans, but to God. Hutchens wrote, “When I sought Him on the ship to Southeast Asia, 
He was there. . . . When I cried out to Him for men who were suffering pain and death, He was 
there. And one day when I lay on the ground with nothing to offer but blood and pain and 
desperate pleas, He was there. . . . He was always there.”63 However, what chaplains may have 
given to others by their presence and their ministry, they could not provide for themselves. 
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 In the end, chaplains were clearly not uniformly satisfied with their experience in 
Vietnam; many faced severe trauma and doubt about their faith, the chaplaincy, the United 
States government, and the American people. Billy Whiteside, a Methodist chaplain, recalled 
personal hurt and professional hindrance when the United Methodist church publicly 
announced its support for draft resisters going to Canada. He recalled one young soldier who 
told him it was “terrible when your own church turns against you,” and Whiteside had little to 
say. When he returned from Vietnam, by his own words Whiteside was “screwed up,” he told a 
newspaper interviewer, “I was filled with rage and doubted God’s love—God’s love was the last 
thing I felt.” Whiteside said that another chaplain eventually helped him find his faith again by 
listening and understanding. After the war, Whiteside continued in the chaplaincy, for seven 
years at the disciplinary barrack at Fort Leavenworth, where he developed a holistic pastoral care 
program.64 Whiteside’s Vietnam experience tested his faith and his ministry, and while he 
eventually found his faith and ministry sustained, Vietnam was not, in and of itself, redemptive. 
For some, fellow chaplains played a critical role in their post-war healing and reflection, 
but others left Vietnam with serious doubts about the chaplain corps and the chaplains with 
whom they served, particularly their supervisory chaplains. Kiyo Hokazu, a Southern Baptist 
chaplain, wrote in his official survey response that the Vietnam experience “made me realize the 
diversity of chaplains’ ministry. Some really cared and ministered, some cared only for self-
aggrandizement, and some seemed to enjoy the war, i.e. priest carrying a grease gun from place 
to place.”65 Jan Friend reported an “Alcoholic Catholic chaplain” who hindered unit coverage.66 
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Chaplains, no more than enlisted personnel or officers, could be expected to behave in or 
respond to Vietnam in the same ways. David Kent concluded that by the end of his tour in 
Vietnam, “some of the idealism wore off. I saw chaplains as more human, fallible, and self-
seeking.”67 
 The “self-aggrandizing,” “promotion-seeking,” and “self-serving” supervisory chaplain 
emerged as a consistent counterpoint to the image of the combat chaplain accompanying his 
troops into battle. Jan Friend wrote that a major hindrance to his ministry was the “unusually 
self-serving supervisory chaplain who nevertheless had the [Brigade Commander] convinced he 
walked on water.”68 Friend continued, “Precious little was provided by senior chaplain, prior to, 
during, and subsequent [to] my ministry in Vietnam that aided preparation for that ministry or 
processing it, meaning afterwards, leaving the distinct impression that everyone was equally 
ignorant of what to expect, how to deal with it or debrief from the experience.” Though deeply 
critical of his supervisory chaplain, Friend echoed Hokazu’s sentiment that “some chaplain 
colleagues were impressive in their ministry and creativity under the circumstances while others 
broke under the pressure and were sent home and were clearly more interested in how the tour 
would serve their ‘careers’ than in facilitating ministry to soldiers or encouraging supervisees.”69  
Even more than lost faith in their fellow chaplain clergy, chaplains who responded to the 
official history surveys reported significant doubts and anger about their civilian counterparts. 
For some, it was a question of practice. Robert Hess wrote, “I tend to be ‘angry’ with the church 
in the civilian community for not being as ecumenical as I witnessed the church worshipping 
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together in the mud of an artillery hill in 3-tiered Jungle.”70 Said another, “I was hurt by the 
hostility I encountered from ministers in my home presbytery . . . I felt, and I still do, that they 
judged me and 98 percent of others who served without appreciating our position.”71 
 Others expressed deep resentment toward the media and the public for undermining 
what they saw as a justified—if operationally flawed—mission in Vietnam. “I was proud to be a 
part of a totally moral and courageous effort by my country to preserve liberty for a weaker 
nation. It should have been done. It should be done again if needed anywhere in the world. The 
agenda of the media to demean America’s involvement in VN had the reverse effect with me,” 
wrote Charles LeClair.72 One chaplain expressed concern with media distortions of actions in 
Vietnam. “I became convinced . . . that the public is unthinking, uncaring, and all too easy to 
fool. The news reporting what people believed was distorted beyond belief. In my hometown 
newspaper, I read about several actions in which I had participated. The accounts were so 
distorted that except for dates, names of people and places I would have never recognized them 
as being the actions in which I was present.”73 
 Still others expressed a profound crisis of faith in the United States government and the 
civil religious principles that seemed to guide the country before the war. On one hand, some 
chaplains blamed the government for losing the war, for not committing adequate resources to 
defeating Communist forces in Southeast Asia. Marvin Trott, for example, wrote, “My faith 
remained unchanged toward God. However, my faith in our government and our leaders 
dramatically changed for the negative.” He justified his distrust in religious terms, “I believe God 
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gave the US the best nation on earth to follow after righteousness and peace and we failed to use 
our power to annihilate Hanoi and bring it to its knees.” Ultimately, Trott concluded “We had a 
right to be there and help the South Vietnamese to win the war against the North Vietnamese 
invaders.”74 
 Other chaplains reported seriously diminished faith in the American government and in 
their own system of beliefs as a result of their experiences in Vietnam. James Juhan, a Southern 
Baptist minister who at the time of the survey was in the process of converting to Roman 
Catholicism, wrote an anguished reflection of the effects of Vietnam on his intellectual, spiritual, 
and ministerial life. Juhan had served two tours in Vietnam—in 1967-1968 with the Infantry and 
then in 1970-1971 with a Signal battalion. In Vietnam he “became very realistic.” Juhan 
continued, “I did not think the world was full of hope any more – I became a humanist – I left 
my church, my belief system, and my God.” He concluded that he could no longer “feel all is 
right with the world.” Whereas Trott believed the government prevented the military from 
winning the war by refusing to annhilate the North Vietnamese, Juhan believed the primary 
mistake was “Being there” in the first place. His despair was both corporate (“We should not 
have been there”) and individual (“I should not have been there.”) In the context of the 
turbulent 1960s, Juhan thought his service in Vietnam put him on the wrong side, literally and 
figuratively: “Martin Luther King and [Robert] Kennedy were killed while I was in Vietnam, and 
I was on the wrong side of the ocean.” Juhan’s refrain, “We should not have been there,” 
peppered his entire response. By the end, he concluded, “I died a thousand deaths for each 
memorial service I held.”75 
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 Occasionally, chaplains wrote in direct opposition to the traditional narrative of the war. 
In one paragraph, Samuel Hopkins remembered Vietnam as “a futile war in an exotic land” and 
simultaneously “the most exciting year of my life.” Hopkins wrote that he often remembered 
these “stories and pictures in my head” with “blissful revere [sic],” a phrase unlikely to appear in 
soldiers’ and officers’ accounts of the same war. He concluded the introduction with a sort of 
historiographical plea: “May the opening and recording of these mental files broaden and 
balance the perspective about serving in Viet Nam.”76 Charles LeClair concluded that his service 
as a chaplain in Vietnam was “the most significant role of my life,” which made him feel 
“satisfied,” “adequate,” and “properly utilized.”77 Lloyd Kincade concluded that his Vietnam 
ministry was “the greatest thing I have ever [done] or will ever do. I would do it again 100 times 
if necessary.”78 
 Even when they were disillusioned by “Vietnam,” many chaplains concluded that the 
experience had been a spiritual testing ground, a crisis out of which they had emerged with a 
stronger faith. When he was in Vietnam, Sowards felt “patriotic and willing to serve” his 
country, but later concluded he “had wasted two years” of his life “along with thousands of 
other Americans” and that “those who died did it in vain.” Even in the face of this damning 
conclusion, however, Sowards wrote that Vietnam helped him learn “about important 
priorities,” that “living close to death or a crippling injury” changed his life, that he “learned to 
share [his] faith in Christ in a better way.”79 “Vietnam” became a site in which Sowards, upon 
reflection, could eventually find his spiritual resolve renewed. Jack Moyar became convinced that 
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the longer he “was in Vietnam the less [he] believed about the ‘rightness’ of the war,” and he 
concluded that he was “there to be a pastor to the military.” Moyar had to remove himself from 
any proclamation of the morality or inherent rightness of the war. And like Sowards, Moyar 
reflected upon the effect that proximity to death had on a chaplains’ faith; War changes faith, he 
concluded, “had my faith not grown, it would have died.”80 Donald Shea remembered that by 
the end of his tour in 1972, he “felt good about the ministry but bad about the inane war.”81 
 Others also recounted broken and rebuilt faith. Lloyd Kincade, a Disciples of Christ 
chaplain, placed three heavy “X’s” by the survey option that indicated “strengthened faith” as a 
result of Vietnam. Yet he also observed that “the old WASP American religion was shot down. 
My faith had to be rebuilt to the real world we live in and not the TV world of today.”82 Larry 
Wedel determined that the stresses of Vietnam made his “prayer life bec[o]me more 
meaningful” and revealed the “reality of God’s mercy, love, and presence.”83 Jack Brown wrote 
that Vietnam forced him “to go to the grass roots of [his] faith time and time again and 
concentrate on life and death issues on a one-to-one basis.” Many chaplains could not accept 
easy answers that traditional views of faith might provide. 
 Still other chaplains concluded that Vietnam clarified their religious beliefs and what they 
considered “important.” “My dependence on God as a direct source of strength was increased,” 
wrote David Kent, whereas “‘Organized’ religion became less significant.” The experience of 
Vietnam liberated his spirituality from the “traditional” type he had “learned in seminary.”84 
Floyd Lacy, a National Baptist Convention chaplain who deployed from December 1968 to 
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December 1969, reported that “in combat, I quickly sorted out what was real, what was 
important, what was vital as opposed to some of the seemingly unimportant things we argue 
about in our private little theological corners.” Lacy wrote that he “would not trade [his 
experience in Vietnam] for anything,” but also “would not care to repeat [it] any time soon.”85 
Jack Brown, responding to the survey, wrote “I believe that my religion was stripped of the 
nonessentials. The love of god, the abiding presence of God, the care of God and the promise 
of abundant and eternal life through His Son Jesus Christ were emphasized over and over again 
in my own life and in my ministry to my men.”86 The ambivalence about organized, official 
religion and about the Vietnam War was a persistent characteristic of chaplains’ reflections. 
 Chaplains’ basic faith in God’s redemptive powers extended beyond the war. Samuel 
Hopkins, in concluding his book, attributed the potential for lasting peace to humanity’s faith in 
God and in the restorative power of that faith. “Vietnam has changed since we were there, and 
so have we. The story once lived has not ended, but continues onward. And that is how it 
should be. Life goes on, and we can too if we place our faith in God and promise to love each 
other more dearly in the days still allotted to us. Shalom.”87 
 When they lost faith in their government, their church, or the American people, 
chaplains usually retained faith in God. Even with his grim assessment of his senior chaplain and 
of certain aspects of his ministry, Kiyo Hokazu, who served with an engineering battalion, 
reflected that “Vietnam was a critical event in my life. Crisis is a turning point. It either 
strengthens of weakens. For me it strengthened my faith by relying more on God and myself.”88 
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Donald Robinson discovered “that in moments of crises, religion—theology especially, breaks 
down; that is, denominational differences, whether it is form of worship or what actually 
constitutes the sacrament, goes by the wayside. Catholic, Protestants, and others come together 
with one common goal, to gain strength and courage from one another and from God—no 
matter what their beliefs about him may be.”89 William Trotsauch echoed these reflections: 
“Dealing with the crisis of a hot combat situation, seeing your friends killed or maimed forced 
me into either abandoning faith or finding consolation in my faith. Fortunately, it was the 
latter.”90 Indeed, fully eighty-two percent of the chaplains who responded to Ackermann’s 
survey reported that their faith had been strengthened by their Vietnam experiences; only two 
percent responded that their faith had been weakened in Vietnam.91 
Chaplains confronted conflicts surrounding morality and war and their own place in the 
military community, and ultimately answered these questions in specifically religious ways. In his 
final analysis of war and its lessons, Samuel Hopkins emphasized that his “perspective as a 
faithful believer in God is that with humility and hopefulness we can endure the vagaries of 
warfare, without minimizing the horrific waste of lives or savage destruction of property that 
infernal fighting inflicts upon us. The world is full of conflict and tragedy, yet we must find a 
way to live confidently and joyfully amidst personal and collective suffering.” In his work as a 
hospital chaplain, Hopkins used his experiences in Vietnam to form a connection with suffering 
patients. “I frequently assure the afflicted that the day of the Lord will surely come, and that 
justice will ultimately prevail; a certainty in the next life, if not in this world. . . . I have learned to 
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celebrate the positive aspects of my tour in Vietnam, while being respectful about the many 
sacrifices suffered there.”92  
 
Chaplains’ post-war reflections formed the final part of a complex personal conflict 
resolution process that began in combat, and their own reflections signified their primary role as 
mediators by taking ideas, roles, and beliefs that could be in tension and reconciling them to one 
another. These first-person accounts played a significant role in a chaplain’s reentry into a 
civilian religious community and modeled one method of post-war reconciliation that lay outside 
the traditional Vietnam narrative of defeat and despair. In this way, their memoirs can be read as 
mediating between popular images and perceptions of the Vietnam War and between the lived 
experience of it for many American servicemen and women. Eventually, many chaplains 
assigned religious meaning to their wartime experiences and reaffirmed their faith in God. 
Certainly there must have been chaplains for whom war did not affirm their faith, but generally, 
they have not made their accounts public. In this way, it is clear that writing about and reflecting 
upon the religious meanings of Vietnam was vital for many chaplains’ healing process. Writing 
and reflection themselves became religious rituals that chaplains used to spread their beliefs and 
to reconcile religion and war, especially for conservative Christian chaplains. Chaplains’ conflict 
resolution process involved personal and communal healing. By sharing their accounts with 
others, chaplains also provided soldiers and other religious people with alternative ways of 
interpreting the war. 
Though faith—in God, in the United States, and in other humans—had often faltered, 
in many chaplains’ accounts, what was perhaps most striking was the clear and pointed 
divergence from the traditional Vietnam-era personal narrative. The collective narrative formed 
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by chaplains’ first-person accounts and responses to the official history survey stood as a 
counternarrative to the traditional interpretation of Vietnam. Within American collective 
memory, “Vietnam” was the source of confusion, sorrow, failure, and disillusionment; it is code 
for all that went, according to the myth, horribly wrong in the 1960s and 1970s. The United 
States lost its way; it lost credibility on the world stage; it lost its innocence; it lost an air of 
invincibility. This mythic portrait of Vietnam has been perpetuated in memoirs, histories, art, 
cinema, and journalistic accounts.93 Whereas soldiers’ and officers’ narratives tend toward the 
hopeless and grim, chaplains’ recollections generally end with reports of spiritual renewal and 
restored, even strengthened, faith. Chaplains, against the traditional narrative of Vietnam, chose 
to interpret the Vietnam War in specifically religious ways that altered the end to the narrative. 
Even if the Vietnam War itself was not positive, God could redeem even the horror and trauma 
of war. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES AND REORGANIZAITON AFTER VIETNAM 
 
 Institutionally, the chaplaincy faced serious questions about its utility, organization, and 
mission after the Vietnam War. Liberal and mainline religious groups felt betrayed by what they 
viewed as chaplains’ prophetic failure and openly criticized and questioned the chaplain corps’ 
effectiveness. Some went so far as to accuse them of complicity in the tragedy of Vietnam. 
Conservative groups continued to promote an evangelical mission to the military. Secular 
observers launched a civil court case that sought to declare the military chaplaincy 
unconstitutional on the basis of the First Amendment. Conservative and evangelical Christians 
gained traction in political circles and in the military. The chaplaincy continued to face shortages 
of Catholic, Jewish, and liturgical Protestant chaplains, admitted women to the chaplain corps 
for the first time in history in the 1970s, and worked to reconfigure the way chaplains were 
assigned to units—all partly in response to the Vietnam experience.  
 The theological interpretations, conflict resolution, and identity formations that began in 
Vietnam continued when chaplains returned home, and the chaplain corps, deeply affected by 
the experience of Vietnam, similarly underwent a process of reflection and reorganization. This 
chapter examines three trends or episodes that illustrate the ways in which the chaplaincy 
responded to post-Vietnam concerns. First, in the 1970s, the military chaplaincy had to respond 
to continuing attacks from liberal and mainline religious groups and from secular critics about 
the constitutionality and moral advisability of maintaining a military chaplaincy, and the chaplain 
corps’ response, along with the changing demographic of the chaplain corps, demonstrated the 
degree to which the military chaplaincy had become divorced from its mainline roots. Second, 
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the chaplaincy undertook a major ecumenical project to produce an armed services worship 
book, and its inclusion of the song “It Was on a Friday Morning”—an ironic and meditative 
song about Jesus Christ’s crucifixion—created an uproar among conservative Christian groups 
and secular politicians who deemed the song blasphemous. This challenge exemplified the 
chaplaincy’s attempts to retain independence and its historical commitment to ecumenicalism as 
well as the religious right’s increasing political power. Finally, these cultural crosscurrents—
declining liberal support for the chaplaincy and rising conservative power—affected the 
organizational culture of the chaplaincy, shifting it toward the political and religious right. 
 Major changes were afoot between the 1970s and 2000s, and this chapter deals with the 
ways in which the Vietnam experience informed and influenced these discussions. This process 
of reflection, resolution, and reorganization, both individually and institutionally, left important 
legacies for the expression of religious practice within the American military and for the role of 
chaplains. Vietnam, a war which called into question basic moral and political tenants of the 
American people, revealed the importance of the chaplain’s liminal position vis-à-vis his role as a 
military officer and clergyman, but post-war changes eventually endangered that very 
positionality as changing demographics, doctrines, and interpretations threatened to undermine 
the chaplaincy’s historical emphasis on ecumenism and pluralism.  
 
Mainline and Liberal Critique 
 As the Vietnam War wound down and opposition to the war reached a fever pitch, 
liberal and mainline religious groups continued to call for the civilianization of the military 
chaplaincy. Furthermore, several books appeared in the late 1960s that set the tone for the 
debate. John O’Connor’s book, A Chaplain Looks at Vietnam argued for the inherent morality of 
the United States project in Vietnam and to support the military efforts there. He used his 
 255 
 
 
position as a military chaplain to establish both military and religious authority for his 
conclusions. Harvey Cox, on the other hand, a Harvard scholar of religion in the United States, 
served as the editor for a collection of essays, titled Military Chaplains: From a Religious Military to a 
Military Religion, intent on repudiating the Vietnam-era chaplaincy system. Gordon Zhan, author 
of a critical examination of the Royal Air Force Chaplaincy during the First World War, also 
contributed to Cox’s collection. Zhan’s essay, “Sociological Impressions of the Chaplaincy” 
examined the potential for role and identity conflict, particularly in combat, but did so from 
intellectual and philosophical grounds rather than experiential ones. A third book, published by 
the General Commission on Churches and the Chaplaincy, Church, State, and Chaplaincy:  Essays 
and Statements on the American Chaplaincy System, presented a more balanced view of the military 
chaplaincy, but still raised some fundamental doubts about the chaplain’s ability to act as a moral 
compass during war.1 
 Within the chaplaincy, this concentrated attention was not welcome. When someone 
recommended that the Army Chief of Chaplains buy a copy of Cox’s book, the Chief replied, 
“Forget it! We’ve had experts try to sabotage us! It’s an effort to salve their own conscience for 
their own inadequate effectiveness in their ministry and divert attention from the utter 
bankruptcy of their philosophy.”2 The gulf between civilian critics and chaplains seemed to grow 
ever wider. A 1970 Chaplain School document stated it quite plainly: “Due to the broad chasm 
between the chaplain and his civilian counterpart, there exist numerous misconceptions of the 
chaplain’s mission and role. This large gap is due not only to the Vietnam War and anti-
                                                 
1 John O’Connor, A Chaplain Looks at Vietnam (Cleveland, OH: The World Publishing Company, 1968); 
Harvey Cox Jr., ed., Military Chaplains:  From a Religious Military to a Military Religion (New York:  American Report 
Press,1971); Gordon Zahn, The Military Chaplaincy:  A Study of Role Tension in the Royal Air Force, (Toronto:  University 
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militarism, but also to a lack of knowledge on the part of the civilian clergy as to the true role 
and mission of the military chaplain in uniform: ministering to the soldier in the environment in 
which he lives.”3 Chaplains and civilian clergy were speaking different languages when it came to 
the chaplain’s proper role within the military establishment. 
 Later, two studies were published to refute Cox’s collection of essays. Clarence 
Abercrombie’s The Military Chaplain, a social science study of Vietnam chaplains, focused on 
identifying and quantifying the existence of role or identity conflict. Based on survey responses 
from civilian clergy, chaplains, and military commanders, Abercrombie’s study concluded that 
the traditional version of role conflict, whereby chaplains forsook their religious identities and 
roles in favor of their military ones, was not generally evident in his quantitative analysis. 
Chaplains, he determined, fell squarely in the middle of civilian clergy and military commanders 
on theological, moral, and pastoral issues and did not display levels of militarism suggested by 
chaplain critics. His book was based on quantitative survey data, rather than a qualitative study 
of chaplain behaviors and experiences.4 A second book, Richard Hutcheson’s The Churches and the 
Chaplaincy, offered a direct critique of Cox’s collection. Hutcheson had served as a chaplain and 
his book unabashedly supported the military chaplaincy system in the United States.5 
 Far more than a simple historiographical blip, this quick profusion of books and studies 
about military chaplains after the Vietnam War highlighted the extent to which that war had 
called into question very basic assumptions about the military chaplaincy and the rightful place 
of religion in relation to the military and American foreign policy. The critique hailed from 
secular circles as well: In 1962 and 1973, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) challenged 
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the constitutionality of the military chaplaincy, and in 1979, two Harvard law students filed a 
civil suit requesting “declaratory and injunctive relief” from their tax burden to pay for the 
United States “Army’s religious support program.”6 Ultimately, the First Amendment provided 
fertile ground for critics. At issue was the delicate, and incredibly murky, line between the 
“establishment clause” of the First Amendment, which prohibited the government from 
establishing a national religion, and the “free exercise clause,” which guaranteed Americans the 
right to free religious practice. 
 The ACLU had long been critical of many of the military chaplaincy’s policies and 
programs. In 1962, Lawrence Speiser, director of the Washington Office, protested to Secretary 
of the Army Cyrus Vance that the Character Guidance program amounted to “religious 
indoctrination.” Vance referred the matter to the Army Chief of Chaplains, who defended the 
program’s religious orientation by insisting that while it was “theistically oriented” and used 
traditional American spiritual and moral principles, the program did not support any specific 
religious doctrine or institution.7 Following the incident, the Army chaplaincy revised the 
curriculum even further to prevent future complaints. It prohibited chaplains from using the 
Character Guidance classes “to deliver a sermon, to announce religious services, to upbraid 
troops for nonparticipation in chapel programs, to show religious films, or to expound on their 
own theological views.”8 Later, they removed “One Nation Under God” as a topic to be 
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discussed in basic training.9 Despite these changes, in 1968 the ACLU revived its protest of the 
Character Guidance program, arguing again that it violated the First Amendment. 
 The ACLU’s 1973 complaint was broader. The board of directors declared that 
“abolition of the present program [the chaplaincy] is required by the principle of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.” It allowed that individual’s possessed the “right 
to access to a minister of his denomination, and the ministry’s right, derived therefrom, to be 
present in the military environment,” and thus declared “it would continue to be incumbent on 
the military to provide those minimum support services necessary to insure that the right of 
mutual access is effectively implemented.”10 Randolph Jonakit, at the time of the report a 
graduate research fellow at New York University, narrowed the scope of his report to the 
“abuses” of the United States Army chaplaincy, which he defined as any structural or practical 
measures that did not further the chaplaincy’s constitutionally-allowable goal of furthering 
religious freedom (free exercise) for members of the United States military. Jonakit concluded 
that abuses existed “in every major aspect of the chaplaincy’s structure.”11 Jonakit’s critique was 
wide-ranging; he reported abuses within the chaplaincy system from the selection and 
endorsement of chaplains, to chaplains’ non-religious functions, to the chaplaincy’s commitment 
to ecumenicalism, to the inclusion of chaplains in the military officers’ personnel system of 
promotion and evaluation. 
 More worrisome to the Army chaplaincy was the 1979 lawsuit brought by Joel Katcoff 
and Allen Weider, two third-year Harvard Law students. Whereas the ACLU report necessitated 
a thorough response from the Army, the lawsuit demanded thousands of hours to fulfill 
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discovery requests and to craft solid legal arguments.12 Whereas Jonakit’s report claimed abuse of 
the free exercise clause, Katcoff and Weider’s suit alleged that the chaplaincy violated the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment. The final complaint included 123 interrogatories 
and “requests for production of documents,” and following liberal discovery procedures of 
federal courts, the plaintiffs requested information about the Army chaplaincy for a six year 
period starting in January 1974. The requests included information about the “organization, 
personnel, duties, policies, and funding of the Army chaplaincy and of all employees, military 
and civilian, who were involved in any way with its religious program” as well as information on 
“rank, promotions, performance evaluations, discharges, entrance educational requirements, 
denominational goals, chapel and other facilities, sacred items and religious literature paid for by 
the Army, missions, retreats and religious-emphasis weeks, religious education, the unified 
curriculum, devotional programs, fund-raising, religious libraries, and chaplain career-oriented 
professional education and training.”13 The plaintiffs claimed that in its current manifestation, 
the military chaplaincy (specifically in the Army) violated the “three-pronged test” set down in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) to determine violations of the establishment clause.14 
 The Army and the chaplaincy responded by assembling a three-tiered defense team, 
composed of personnel from the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, the Department of Justice, 
                                                 
12 In 1979, Katcoff filed nine Freedom of Information requests with the Offices of the Chiefs of Chaplains 
of both the Army and Navy. The Navy requested advance payment of $192.50 for processing the request and 
supplying answers to the inquiries. Katcoff and Weider declined to pursue the matter further, and instead focused 
their efforts on the Army which complied with the FIOA requests at no charge. See Drazin and Currey, For God and 
Country, 46-47. While helpful for understanding the legal maneuvering (of both sides) involved in the case, Drazin 
and Currey’s book often acts as an apologia for the military chaplaincy. Drazin was one of the primary chaplains 
involved in the legal defense of the chaplaincy, and the book lacks the critical analysis that a more detached scholar 
might bring to a study.  
13 Drazin and Currey, For God and Country, 47. Katcoff and Weider’s suit was the first to actually reach the 
courts; five others had been dismissed or decided on their merits. Ibid. 48. 
14 The Supreme Court, between 1963 and 1971, determined that the establishment clause was violated 
when the government makes a law (1) whose purpose is to advance religion, or (2) whose primary effect is to 
advance religion, or (3) when there is excessive entanglement between government and religion. Collectively, this 
three-pronged test became known as the Lemon test. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 89, 310 F.Supp. (1971). 
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and the Army’s Judge Advocate General. The government’s first official move was to reply to 
the complaint with three technical arguments that were “unrelated to the substance of the 
chaplaincy program.” First, the chaplaincy’s attorneys argued that the “plaintiffs lacked standing 
and the issues constituted political questions,” second, they argued that the “complaint failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted” and third, that “the claims were barred for 
want of sovereign immunity.” They hoped the courts would resolve the case without having to 
wrangle over substantive issues regarding the structure and practice of the chaplaincy. Following 
the technical arguments, the government moved for a Judgment on the Pleadings or a Dismissal. 
The government attorneys argued that the Lemon test was particularly ill-suited to determine 
First Amendment violations in this case because military life differed fundamentally from civilian 
society.15 
 The battle lines seemed clear: Katcoff and Weider relied on modern tests of church-state 
entanglement and the clear fact that the government (and therefore taxpayers) were supporting 
religious programs within the military, and the chaplaincy and its lawyers defended the military 
chaplaincy based on historical precedent and military necessity.  
 Judge Jacob Mishler heard arguments in the case in March 1980, and in August denied 
the Army’s motion for dismissal. He ruled that the plaintiffs did have standing as federal 
taxpayers, that the court had the authority to review the claim and that “a ruling on the 
constitutionality of the Army chaplaincy program could not be handed down without a full 
factual record describing the chaplaincy and its programs.”16 Thus, both sides were sent back to 
formulate substantive arguments to make their cases. Because they felt it would open all 
chaplaincy programs up to continuing court inspection and regulation, the Army, over the 
                                                 
15 Drazin and Currey, God and Country, 53-54, 56. 
16 Ibid., 65. 
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objection of the Department of Justice, sought to appeal Mishler’s decision on the technical 
merits of the case. Eventually, however, Army lawyers were dissuaded from this position and 
decided not to file the appeal.17 Mishler was also not inclined to decide the case through a 
motion for summary judgment because he felt the case merited testimony on chaplains’ activities 
and policies.18 Then, unexpectedly, the chief judge of the eastern district of New York removed 
Mishler from the case in November 1981, replacing him with Joseph M. McLaughlin. 
McLaughlin, anxious to expedite the suit, set a March 1982 date for a hearing. 
 During the course of discovery, chaplains and lawyers involved in the case uncovered 
several instances of the misuse of appropriated (i.e. government) funds by chaplains; some had 
used such money to purchase library materials and sacred items (such as candlesticks and 
Bibles). Israel Drazin, a chaplain and lawyer on the case, concluded that the “misuse resulted 
from lack of sensitivity to the problems, ignorance of the law, overzealousness for religion, and 
the generally misguided and improvident view that whatever a chaplain considered to be good 
and righteous and needed must be an acceptable item of purchase.” These problems threatened 
to undermine the Army’s argument about the chaplaincy and bolster the plaintiff’s claims of 
“excessive entanglement” between the government and religion. Around the same time, Army 
Times reported that the Air Force had issued a directive prohibiting its chaplains from 
performing religious services, including baptisms and weddings, for military retirees. The story 
cited constitutional concerns that prohibited “a state-sponsored religious activity.” This action, 
albeit by another branch of the armed services, threatened to undermine the Army’s stance on 
the constitutionality of the chaplaincy as they had laid out in response to Katcoff and Weider. In 
reality, the Army Times story was misleading; the directive was a long-standing one that 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 68-73. 
18 Ibid., 126. 
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concerned dependents of military personnel, but the potential for damage to the Katcoff suit was 
clear.19 
 Legal wrangling, both over technical matters and substantive ones continued for nearly 
three years. US Attorneys working on the case preferred to argue technical matters of standing, 
while the chaplains wished to make substantive arguments about the unique nature of the 
military chaplaincy as compared both to other clergy and to other government employees. 
Eventually, both types of arguments were included in the government’s motions.20 McLaughlin 
heard oral arguments in October 1982 and rendered his decision in February 1984. The judge 
considered the government’s standing arguments, and concluded the plaintiffs did have standing 
before the court.21 He was generally not persuaded by the government’s reliance on historical 
precedent for justifying the chaplaincy. In the end, however, McLaughlin concluded that 
Congress had undertaken to legislate and regulate the chaplaincy and that congressional 
decisions about the chaplaincy should be given great deference by the court. He wrote, “the 
balance struck by Congress cannot be rejected by this Court in favor of the untested possibility 
that a civilian chaplaincy might also meet the religious needs of the military community,” and 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ “remedy, if there be any, lies with Congress.”22 
 Katcoff and Weider filed an appeal on 11 June 1984, reiterating their arguments that the 
Army chaplaincy violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment and claiming that 
McLaughlin’s dismissal of the three-pronged Lemon test to judge the chaplaincy was incorrect.23 
After another round of written arguments, the Second Circuit Court handed down its decision 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 134-135. 
20 Ibid., 146-147. 
21 Ibid., 176-177. 
22 Decision Text, Katcoff v. Marsh, quoted in Ibid., 180. 
23 Drazin and Currey, For God and Country, 184. 
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on 22 January 1985. The judges determined the chaplaincy was constitutional, but remanded the 
case to the district court in order to determine whether certain chaplaincy programs exceeded 
“permissible constitutional limits.”24 The government decided to seek summary judgment on the 
issues left undecided by the Circuit Court. Then, in 1986, Katcoff and Weider contacted the 
United States Attorney’s office and offered to drop the case in return for not having to pay the 
government’s expenses for the appeal.25 The U.S. Attorneys and Army lawyers were inclined to 
agree to the settlement, while the chaplains were less sure; they felt that dropping the case at this 
stage left important questions unresolved and left them open to future litigation. Eventually, the 
arguments for dismissal won out; there were few benefits to be gained by further litigation, and 
the chaplaincy had much to lose.26 
 The Katcoff litigation prompted the chaplaincy to reconsider many of its programs, 
policies, and goals. Though the legal issues were only marginally settled, the chaplaincy did 
appear to be on firm constitutional footing. Many viewed its mission, however, as substantially 
limited by the court case. The chaplaincy existed, in a legal sense, only to allow military 
personnel their rights to the free exercise of religion. The chaplaincy was not intended to, and 
should not be used to, promote religion, morality, or morale.  
 The years following Vietnam constituted critical ones for the chaplaincy as it responded 
to a host of critics from mainline and liberal religious and secular groups as well as civilian 
litigation on the issue of constitutionality. These challenges prompted chaplains to take a 
defensive stand against their critics rather than encouraging open dialogue about the chaplaincy’s 
role and challenges within the modern military. 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 197. 
25 They did, however, request that the case be “dismissed without prejudice,” which would retain their 
right to refile the suit in the future.  
26 Drazin and Currey, For God and Country, 203. 
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Conservatives Gain Influence 
 The rise of the “Religious Right” in the United States has been well-documented and 
analyzed by scholars.27 As the number of Conservative and evangelical Christians in the United 
States rose, so too did their attachment to conservative political groups in the United States. One 
salient feature of the movement was its insistence that liberalism within the United States 
threatened the Christian foundations of the United States and that Christianity, or at least their 
brand of it, was under attack by the prophets of religious “Pluralism” and “Tolerance.”28 
Certainly the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a profusion of new religious movements, splinter 
groups, and non-Christian religious influences. Within the chaplaincy alone, the number of 
officially recognized religious endorsing agencies had grown from just ten in World War II to 
well over 200 by 2000. 
 Parachurch organizations, such as the Full Gospel Men’s Business Fellowship 
International, Campus Crusade for Christ, the Navigators, and Fellowship of Christian Athletes, 
intensified their efforts to minister to military personnel. These groups, clearly evangelical in 
their outlook and mission, met varying levels of resistance and support from chaplains. Some 
“theologically liberal” chaplains felt threatened by such organizations for fear that “too much 
                                                 
27 A large literature has addressed the issue of conservative Christians’ participation in politics and public 
issues. The best are William Martin, With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America (New York: 
Broadway Books, 1996); Loveland, American Evangelicals; Christian Smith, American Evangelicalism: Embattled and 
Thriving (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Martin E. Marty, ed., Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism: Modern 
American Protestantism and Its World (Munich, Germany: K.G. Saur, 1993); Richard Jensen, “The Culture Wars, 1965-
1995: A Historian’s Map,” Journal of Social History 29 (1995): 17-37; Randall Collins, “Liberals and Conservatives, 
Religious and Political: A Conjuncture of Modern History,” Sociology of Religion 54, no. 2 (1993): 127-146. 
28 This was not a new characteristic of late twentieth century Evangelicals. Christian Smith, argued that at 
least since the last third of the nineteenth century, one can “readily detect in its elite discourse a sense of crisis, 
conflict, or threat.” Smith points to Josiah Strong’s 1885 book Our Country: Its Possible Future and Present Crisis, Walter 
Clarke’s New Era magazine article, “Christians, Save the Christian Sabbath,” Harold Ockenga’s 1942 address to the 
National Conference for United Action Among Evangelicals,” and Carl Henry’s 1986 book Christian Countermoves in 
a Decadent Culture as evidence of this phenomenon. Smith, American Evangelicalism, 121-123. 
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evangelistic activity and involvement by outsiders may raise church-state questions.”29 At the 
Marine base in Camp Pendelton, California, senior chaplains even banned such parachurch 
organizations altogether.30 But for the most part, chaplains seemed to accept these 
organizations—their money, resources, and people—as mutually reinforcing aspects of ministry 
to military personnel, and chaplain leadership frequently encouraged cooperation with several of 
these groups.31 
 In 1974, the Army, Navy, and Air Force undertook to compile a new worship book for 
use in the Armed services. The new hymnal represented years of work on behalf of the chaplain 
corps from all three military services as well as the input from civilian leaders. The book 
eliminated denominational and faith-group distinctions for the hymns, and included music from 
a variety of religious traditions and musical styles.32 The song “It Was on a Friday Morning,” was 
included as one of several folk songs in the new volume. Sydney Carter, the British composer of 
songs such as “Lord of the Dance,” wrote the song as an ironic meditation on the crucifixion of 
Christ. The song’s inclusion created a near-immediate uproar from conservative Christians and 
secular politicians who relied on their support. The publication of the Book of Worship and the 
subsequent furor over the song illuminated quite clearly two competing and very divergent 
pressures on the post-Vietnam chaplaincy. On one hand, the book represented a deepening 
commitment to ecumenism, pluralism, and tolerance for religious and cultural diversity. On the 
                                                 
29 Edward E. Plowman, “Bibles in the Barracks: God and the Military,” Christianity Today (March 31, 1972), 
32, quoted in Loveland, American Evangelicals, 174. 
30 Loveland, American Evangelicals, 174. 
31 Richard Hutcheson, Churches and the Chaplaincy, 94; Loveland, American Evangelicals, 175. 
32 John E. Groh, Air Force Chaplains, 1971-1980, Vol. V, Air Force Chaplains, Office of the Chief of Air 
Force Chaplains, (Washington, D.C., 1986), 443-446; For discussion of the hymnal’s development and analysis of 
the Protestant selections see Gary W. Carr, “The Development of the Book of Worship for United States Forces,” 
(MDiv thesis, Duke University Divinity School, 1996). 
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other hand, such significant protest over the simple inclusion of a song in a hymnal highlighted 
the extent of conservative religious and political reach.  
 These competing values came to a head over the inclusion of Carter’s song. Carter 
himself insisted the song was not a “hymn” in the traditional sense and that context mattered a 
great deal with such a text—it could be pious or blasphemous depending on the context of its 
use and the attitude of those singing it.33 Carter’s song was narrated by the thief crucified next to 
Jesus Christ, according to Christian scriptures. The thief narrated his experience and asks Jesus a 
series of questions, intent on discovering why God would allow an innocent man to die and 
ultimately blaming God for the sins of the world. The thief offered a litany of people and spirits 
one might blame for the crucifixion of the “carpenter, a-hanging on the tree” and for the 
depravity of humanity: Pilate, the Jews, the Devil, Adam, Eve, the crowd that freed Barabas—
none of them would have existed in the absence of God’s plan and creation. The thief blamed 
the carpenter’s God “up in Heaven” who “doesn’t do a thing” to stop the execution. The most 
damning lines appeared at the end of the song when the thief exclaims:  
To hell with Jehovah 
To the carpenter I said 
I wish that a carpenter had made the world instead 
Goodbye and good luck to you 
Our ways will soon divide 
Remember me tomorrow 
The man you hung beside 
It’s God they ought to crucify instead of you and me 
I said to the carpenter, a-hanging on the tree. 
 
 Furor erupted, probably in no small part due to national elections, over the “blasphemy” 
of the song. Many conservative Christians expressed outrage at the song, which declared “To 
hell with Jehovah” and suggested that God should be crucified for the sins of the fallen world. 
In 1975, South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, a retired Major General in the Army 
                                                 
33 Sydney Carter, “Context,” Modern Liturgy 7 (March/April 1980): 8-9. 
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Reserves, complained to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. In 1976, nearly fifty Members 
of Congress corresponded with the Department of Defense and/or one of the chaplain services 
on the issue. Almost universally, they called for the song to be removed from the hymnal, by 
razor blade if necessary.34  
 In the face of the controversy, chaplains insisted that any order for removal or 
replacement come from the “theological” or “church” side of the chaplaincy, rather than from 
the “military” or “governmental” side. For most of them, at issue was a fundamentally 
theological question, which made it an inappropriate decision for the Department of Defense or 
other official branch of the United States military to make. According to the chaplain services, 
critics could cite not a single instance of a church organization requesting or demanding the 
song’s removal. Furthermore, they argued, removing “hymns from the manuscript because they 
are objectionable to one or another of the involved religious denominations” would leave the 
military with a “thin hymnal indeed!”35 One chaplain made the argument even more explicit: “If 
we started objecting to a hymn because we don’t like the theological content, then some of the 
more conservative Protestants could go after the ones about the “bleeding heart” and “the 
Mother of God,” and the Jews can certainly take off on the Trinitarian ones, and then many can 
take off on the Mormon hymns and the Christian Science hymns and where do you stop?”36 
Chaplains tended to approach the inclusion of the song pragmatically and based on the 
chaplaincy’s long-standing commitment to ecumenical cooperation. 
 Chaplains did not shy away from the controversy. When the hymnal was released, the 
Air Force Chaplain Board issued an introductory pamphlet, Hello, Hymnal, with commentary by 
                                                 
34 Groh, Air Force Chaplains, 448. 
35 Hymnal Task Force, quoted in Ibid., 447. 
36 Groome quoted in Ibid., 450. 
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Chaplain James Chapman about the inclusion of Carter’s song. He wrote, “Some have said that 
it is not even a hymn. Other critics have denounced it as blasphemous.” Then Chapman offered 
three justifications for the song’s inclusion. First, he appealed to the chaplain’s duty to minister 
to all people and claimed that “the questions asked by the thief are the ones many of our people 
still ask when confronted with the Crucifixion,” and argued that the song gave chaplains “a 
vehicle to deal with these mysteries.” A second justification offered a theological interpretation 
of the song in which “the thief . . . provides the answer, inadvertently,” when he states “‘It’s 
God they ought to crucify instead of you and me,’ and he stumbles on to the glorious solution. 
God is being crucified instead of you and me! That is the Gospel!” Finally, Chapman argued 
from a devotional basis, “This hymn can not be simply sung and dropped,” he wrote, “you’ve got 
to deal with it. We recommend you use it as a basis for a Good Friday meditation. You’ll be 
forever grateful to Sydney Carter.”37 
 Even when chaplains admitted they should have foreseen the consequences of the song’s 
inclusion, they defended the integrity of the process and of the final product. Air Force Chief of 
Chaplains Henry J. Meade said, “It was probably poor judgment that inserted that hymn, but it 
would be bad judgment to excise it.”38 Eventually, with prompting from Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and the eventual concurrence of the Chiefs of Chaplains, it was decided to 
eliminate the song from future printings of the Book of Worship.39 Conservative Christians, calling 
upon what historian Anne Loveland termed the “Sectarian Ideal,” gathered political and public 
support to demand changing an official, but internal, publication of the United States military. 
Conservative influence in the military continued to grow throughout the 1970s and 1980s and 
                                                 
37 James W. Chapman, Hello, Hymnal, USAF Chaplain Board, quoted in Ibid., 451. 
38 Meade quoted in Ibid., 451. 
39 Groh, Air Force Chaplains, 449-450. 
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well into the 2000s, even as the institutional chaplaincy continued to insist on ecumenical 
cooperation and expanding pluralism in the same period.    
 
Organizational Restructuring and Changing the Chaplaincy’s Mission 
 Even before the war in Vietnam ended, the U.S. Army Chaplain School held a workshop 
in anticipation of its eventual end, focusing on re-visioning what the Army chaplaincy might face 
in 1975 and after. The workshop, titled “Army ’75: The Chaplain and the Soldier in the Army of 
1975,” was to “establish conclusions and guidelines for the chaplain in planning and executing a 
local post religious program for 1975 period and beyond.” The concerns and conclusions in the 
workshop materials demonstrated the mindset of the chaplain corps in the waning years of the 
Vietnam War: Their discussions assumed a garrison model, rather than a combat model, focused 
as much on ministry to military families as anything else. Chaplains also recognized that their 
authority as religious leaders might decline as fewer Americans turned to organized religious 
practice to fulfill spiritual needs and provide moral guidance. The program handouts asserted 
that “through 1975 we will see a continuing loss of moral authority by the churches as 
institutions because of the lack of credibility and apparent hypocrisy.”40 Thus, Chaplain School 
instructors suggested that chaplains “of the future will be more active in the community life of 
the military post. He will be less of a religious expert and more the participator in aspects of 
community life which offer meaning and service. His authority will depend on his own 
demonstrated value in the interpretive role, not on his ordained authority.”41 
 However, many of the changes that would confront the US military and the chaplaincy 
after Vietnam were unexpected, and sometimes even contrary to the conclusions set forth by the 
                                                 
40 Army ’75 Workshop, 34. 
41 Appendix D, “Conclusions: The Chaplain, The Career Soldier, and His Family,” in Army ’75 Workshop, 
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chaplains. Among other things, the workshop materials assumed that “the Army of 1975 will not 
be an all-volunteer army but will be organized and structured very much as it is today,” and 
concluded that “No drastic changes will take place in the organization and structure of the US 
Army.” Furthermore, “there is no foreseen change in the mission of the chaplain. But changes 
will occur in the perspectives and ways and means to make the ministry more relevant.” Another 
section concluded: “The US Army will continue at a level of between 850,000-1,000,000 men in 
the 70’s. To maintain this force level a mixed volunteer/draft system will continue to 
function.”42  
 Even though the demographic assumptions proved untenable, the chaplain participants 
recognized changed imperatives for spiritual guidance and worship styles. Thus, it established 
some guidelines for ministry, including the “Need for new forms of worship: Modern language 
liturgies, simpler liturgical forms, folk and modern music, etc.” These sentiments echoed the 
process of liturgical creativity that chaplains and military personnel engaged in during the 
Vietnam war. They also recognized the need for more “dialogue in spiritual matters between the 
chaplain and the people he serves,” and increased skills for chaplains in the area of pastoral 
counseling, especially in the wake of the ongoing trauma of the Vietnam War. They predicted 
that the legacy of Vietnam would mean that “concepts surrounding drugs and sex will be matters 
of commonplace concern,” which reflected a societal tendency to take a “free and frank 
attitude” towards them, prompting “old taboos” to be “shunted aside in an attempt to ‘tell it like 
it is.’”43 
 Perhaps most importantly, the conference participants—career Army chaplains who 
would continue to shape post-Vietnam chaplain ministry—concluded that “the chaplain will 
                                                 
42 Army ’75 Workshop, 11. 
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often have to serve as mediator between the military establishment and the young soldier. The 
chaplain will have to become more alert to the sociological and political trends of the times.” 
Chaplains would be challenged to assert their significance due to “smaller military budgets” and 
ever more “severe questioning by the young soldier of the role of religion, clergy (chaplain) and 
church (chapel) in society.” The chaplain would be increasingly involved in “domestic Peace 
Corps type projects” and “play an increasingly important role in community relations and 
liaison.”44 And while some of the chaplains’ conclusions and predictions clearly did not come to 
pass, many chaplains demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the chaplaincy’s changing 
role within the US military, the changing religious atmosphere within the United States, and the 
legacy of the Vietnam War.  
 One chaplain attending the advanced course at the Air Force Chaplain School in 1976 
wrote that the “single most important development in the Air Force chaplaincy from 1970-
1975” was the “withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam and the fall of South Vietnam.” 
He reasoned that “foreign policy from 1965-1975 was strong on survival of democracy in South 
Vietnam,” but “great amounts of U.S. resources (men, money and materiel) were expended in 
South Vietnam and brought back a ‘zero’ return.” He continued by arguing that “national 
involvement in South Vietnam divided our country (war protest, Kent State, refusal to pay taxes) 
and the problem of amnesty still faces us and divides us,” which made the nation “doubt and 
question our institutions (governmental and military) and leadership.” In his estimation, all of 
these factors led the United States “to a limited position of ‘isolation’ in foreign policy.”45 All in 
all, chaplains recognized what they believed to be a damaged and weakened civic faith, which 
                                                 
44 Army ’75 Workshop, 13. 
45 Anonymous Air Force Chaplain, quoted in Groh, Air Force Chaplains, 25. 
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had been exacerbated by the declining membership within American mainline and liberal faith 
communities.  
 As chaplains returned to the United States, the legacies of Vietnam for stateside ministry 
were apparent. Air Force chaplain historian John Groh wrote that American involvement in 
Southeast Asia deeply affected American military chapel installations due to continued 
involvement with “Prisoner of War (POW) and personnel Missing in Action (MIA); Operation 
Homecoming and the ‘other’ homecoming; operations Babylift and Newlife; [and] . . . the 
resettlement of Indochinese refugees.”46 In addition to direct legacies of Vietnam, the military 
chaplaincy also dealt with the move to an all-volunteer force, in contrast to earlier Army plans 
for a continued draft, which meant an older soldiery with more dependents. This demographic 
change moved the chaplaincy to emphasize “family life” at the same time that they dealt with 
ongoing problems of alcohol and drug use and contentious race relations. In response to high 
PTSD rates and injury, more chaplains completed Clinical Pastoral Education training, which 
prepared them to work in hospital settings with trauma victims and their families. Additionally, 
chaplains continued to play an important, though changing role in Character Guidance training, 
which underwent a substantive revision and was renamed Human Self Development.47 
 In the immediate post-Vietnam years, these sorts of changes, based primarily in pastoral 
care, counseling, and ministry areas, dominated chaplains’ thinking. Army Director of Combat 
Developments Gordon Schweitzer reiterated the extent to which chaplains reconceptualized 
their role after Vietnam, most strikingly by moving away from the focus on combat and front-
line chaplaincy that dominated the war years. “Chaplains were pastors, counselors, and 
preachers. Clinical pastoral education and the emphasis on parish development contributed to 
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47 Brinsfield, Encouraging Faith, 159. 
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the organization and delivery of religious support for the soldier and family members on 
installations.” Chaplain Activity Specialists (Chaplain Assistants before 1977), were trained 
primarily in building maintenance and office administration, and by 1983, fewer than 50% of 
Active Duty chaplains had combat experience.48  
 As the chaplaincy redefined its role, it also underwent organizational and doctrinal 
changes that affected how it carried out its mission.49 The post-Vietnam drop in manpower 
resulted in a significantly older chaplain corps than had served in Vietnam. In the Air Force, 
nearly 50% of all chaplains were over forty-six years old, compared to just over 34% in 1971. 
Across the board, the numbers of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish chaplains decreased, and only 
the number of Eastern Orthodox chaplains rose. 50 At the same time, the chaplain corps 
dropped its system of denomination-based quotas for filling chaplain slots. The reasons for this 
change were numerous: the number of waivers and exception allowed during the Vietnam War 
had already weakened the quota system; some denominations were consistently providing more 
qualified chaplains while others rarely met their goal; and the number of denominations 
contributing to the chaplaincy proliferated at a rapid rate.  
 In responding to this shortage, to changes in force structure, and to developments within 
American religious communities, the Armed Services also explored commissioning women as 
chaplains within the integrated All Volunteer Force (AVF) structure. Several national 
denominational churches had ordained women into full-time ministry and wished to endorse 
them as chaplains, and the military restructured itself to integrate WAC, WAF, and WAVE units 
into previously all-male units. Shortages within the chaplain corps led to aggressive recruiting 
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drives in seminaries, and some of these advertisements—like others of the early AVF era—
appealed to women. Bonnie Koppell, a Jewish Army chaplain, saw such a poster in 1976, when 
she was a student at Reconstructionist Rabbinical College in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. When 
the Orthodox contingent of the Jewish Welfare Board did not veto her application, Koppell 
received endorsement in 1977. She attended Chaplain School at Fort Hamilton in 1979, where 
she was one of three women in a class of 108; Koppell was the first Jewish woman to attend the 
Army Chaplain School.51 
The issue of accepting women as chaplains was not new, however. During the Civil War, 
Ella Gibson Hobart was elected chaplain by the First Wisconsin Regiment of Heavy Artillery, 
but her official appointment was denied by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton.52 Then, with the 
creation of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (later, Women’s Army Corps) in 1942, some 
female ministers challenged the all-male limits on chaplains. However, few women service 
members objected to male chaplains—nationally, clergy were almost all men—so the request 
was dropped. Women continued to serve alongside chaplains as Directors of Religious 
Education, a post which was accessible to female civilian leaders.53 
 In the late 1960s and 1970s, women had gained prominence as ordained ministers in 
several national denominations. Women gained access to ordination in 1956 in the Methodist 
Church of America and in the Presbyterian Church (PCUSA). By the 1970s, women in the 
Episcopal Church, the Lutheran Church of America, Reform Jewish congregations, and a 
number of other smaller denominations were being ordained. According to the 1970 census, 
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three percent of all American clergy were women.54 As might be expected, women faced 
challenges in this new environment. Carolyn Wiggins, a Navy Chaplain, wrote in the Navy 
Chaplains’ professional journal in 1987—fully thirteen years after the first women were 
commissioned chaplains—“We [female chaplains] leave an accepting seminary to enter a hostile 
chaplaincy working with male chaplains who have often never worked with clergywomen and 
have difficulty accepting us as professional colleagues. They often show disdain for our presence 
in the Navy Chaplain Corps.”55 Female navy chaplains identified significant cultural barriers that 
challenged their work, including reticence of commanders accepting female chaplains; difficulty 
socializing in a male-dominated chaplain system; difficulty in obtaining desirable assignments, 
such as aboard s aircraft carriers, which would facilitate promotion and professional 
advancement; and trouble finding role models and mentors among women who had deployed 
with the Navy. 
 Chaplain leaders also examined their organizational structure for clues as to the causes of 
problems in Vietnam. The concept of area coverage meant that brigades were the lowest level of 
assignments for chaplains—a brigade chaplain and three or four assistants had full responsibility 
to provide religious support for all units assigned and attached in addition to any other units that 
might be in the brigade’s Area of Operations. In theory, this provided for coverage at the 
battalion and company level, but in practice, it meant that chaplains could rarely form close 
connections with the units they served. It also strained the chaplain’s relationship to 
commanders. Area coverage later came under serious scrutiny by chaplains at the Army War 
College who wrote that “this doctrinal and manning concept presented difficulties for 
                                                 
54 Mark Chaves, “The Symbolic Significance of Women’s Ordination,” The Journal of Religion 77 (January 
1997): 87. See also Mark Chaves, “Ordaining Women: The Diffusion of an Organizational Innovation,” The 
American Journal of Sociology 101 (January 1996): 840-873. 
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commanders and chaplains” because “the chaplain did not work directly for the battalion 
commander, was not part of the unit, and only showed up in the unit area to conduct services, 
perform counseling or conduct classes.”56 On duty rosters, only the brigade chaplain was listed 
as “staff chaplain,” so few chaplains had direct access to commanders within the parameters of 
the chain of command and the guidelines set out in the chaplain’s field manual about the 
chaplain’s staff responsibilities.57 
 In 1978, in order to clarify command-chaplain relationships and to insert chaplains more 
directly into the life and workings of battalion-sized units, the Army Chaplain Corps instituted 
the “Forward Thrust” doctrine, based on the new Army operations manual FM 100-5 and the 
emerging AirLand Battle Doctrine. Army Chief of Chaplains Orris Kelly, who had served in 
Vietnam, and Donn Starry, the Commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 
responsible for recruiting, training, and educating the Army’s soldiers, worked to assign 
chaplains as far forward as possible in order to provide coverage to company-sized units.58 In 
1984, the Army took the concept even further by instituting Unit Ministry Teams (UMT) as the 
primary source of religious support for Army units. The UMT consisted of a single chaplain and 
a chaplain assistant, who would be assigned to a single battalion or similarly-sized outfit. They 
would provide “direct religious support” to their units of assignment and “general religious 
support” to attached units during peacetime, field training, and in wartime operations. Rather 
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than chaplains being assigned to deployed units as the need arose, chaplains would remain with 
specific units in both stateside and overseas posts whenever possible.59 
 The Navy also restructured its chaplain corps in the 1970s in response to post-Vietnam 
staffing and organizational concerns. Reflecting on the period, one Navy chaplain wrote in 2005 
that immediately after Vietnam “force shaping, or downsizing became a reality of life for all 
branches of the service. Throughout the 70s the naval services cut back on billets and ships, and 
the Chaplain Corps . . . explored new ministry delivery models.”60 The Chief of Naval 
Operations authorized the establishment of “Fleet Religious Support Activities” (FRSA), which 
“was created to meet the emergent needs” of the Navy. For the first time, modern chaplains 
would be “assigned to an administrative command position” and “ordered into an FRSA UIC 
and were concurrently assigned to operational platforms when ordered to do so by their FRSA 
chaplain-commander.”61 The FRSA emphasized a team approach to ministry, the flexible 
assignment of chaplains, coordination between ship-based and shore-based ministries, and the 
development of a new lay-leader program. The FRSA program was discontinued in the late 
1970s and replaced with a new “alternative ministry delivery platform,” the Dependents 
Assistance Board (DAB). The DAB focused on providing a central location for chaplain support 
of deployed commanders and their families.62  
 These structural changes reflected the chaplaincy’s concern with ministry to military 
families and to adjusting to new strategic and tactical military paradigms. Additionally, the 
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chaplaincy became more dedicated to “institutional ministry” in the years following Vietnam.63 
Chaplains were involved in redesigning character education programs and in increasing 
commanders’ and chaplains’ knowledge about minority religious groups. In the 1980s, Chaplain 
Matthew Zimmerman was tasked to create “a handbook for commanders on less familiar 
religions, FM-16-1,” which he deemed a “very interesting project.” He recalled that “back in 
those days we had a lot of new sects, cults, etcetera that were coming into existence every day 
and they were making themselves felt on installations. Commanders didn’t know what to do. 
Somebody would show up and ask for permission to wear a simulation of a sword, and the 
commander wouldn’t know if it was a legitimate request or a con job. It just went on and on.” In 
response, the chaplain corps set out to address the issue by attempting to authenticate such 
requests with the headquarters or leaders of such denominations. Then, the chaplain and 
commander could know what the “parameters were for any particular sect, cult, or any 
denomination that came up.”64 The creation of the new handbook exemplified chaplains’ 
institutional responsibilities and justified, at least in part, the military’s insistence that chaplains 
have broad religious and theological training in order to provide support to personnel of any 
faith.  
The chaplaincy’s focus on institutional ministry and response to increasing calls for 
pluralism and secularism were also evident in the evolution of the Navy Chaplain Corps official 
seal between 1962 and 2001. In 1962, the Naval Chaplain Corps seal included the words 
“Chaplain Corps” (at the top) and “U.S. Navy” at the bottom. The emblem itself was a compass 
rose with an anchor in the middle, with a cross on the viewer’s left and the Tablets of Moses, 
surmounted by the Star of David, on the right. The seal thus reflected the martial and religious 
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traditions of naval chaplain service. In 1981, Hebrew numerals replaced Roman numerals on the 
tablets—a sign of increasing cultural sensitivity to minority religious groups. And in 1996, the 
seal gained a Muslim Crescent, for the first time expanding religious imagery to include a non 
Judeo-Christian faith group. By 2001, however, all religious imagery had been removed from the 
chaplain corps’ seal: Instead “Vocati ad Servitium” (Called to Serve) appeared on a scroll. An eagle, 
holding an anchor and the compass, was “stationed as sentinel to guard the free exercise of 
religion for Sea Services personnel. The open book . . . suggests the doctrines, scriptures and 
guiding principles of religious tradition and wisdom.”65 The evolution of the Navy Chaplain 
Corps seal suggested an institutional move toward pluralism and ecumenicalism. 
The official move toward more pluralistic guidelines and official positions was 
prompted, at least in part, by the growing diversity of military personnel. Yet the chaplain corps 
grew ever more theologically and politically conservative in the post-Vietnam years. A segment 
on National Public Radio’s All Things Considered, aired on 27 July 2005, examined growing 
tensions within the military chaplain corps. Correspondent Jeff Brady reported that nearly 60% 
of the military’s chaplains were “evangelical” (though he did not attempt to define the term 
more precisely), even though only 40% of military personnel identified as “evangelical.”66 Other 
sources also cited the twin trends of growing religious diversity among military personnel and 
ever-more-evangelical chaplain corps. A New York Times story cited Air Force statistics that 
showed there were about “3,500 [enlisted personnel] who say they are either Hindus, Buddhists, 
Muslims, pagans, druids or shamans. There are 1,600 who say they are atheists and about 50,000 
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who say they have no religious preference, out of a total of 280,000.”67 The number of 
evangelical chaplains in the military and their positions therein did not always conform the image 
of the military discriminating against evangelical chaplains. Brady surmised that in the current 
religious climate, Catholic, Presbyterian, or other chaplains were simply “hard to find,” and Air 
Force Chief of Chaplains, Charles Baldwin—himself a Baptist—concurred. He said, “In the Air 
Force, we’re not saying let’s go hire evangelicals today. We’re looking at those who have 
presented their credentials and who want to serve the men and women in the Air Force.” Those 
in Brady’s report concluded that many of these difficulties in recruitment and retention stemmed 
from mainline and liberal opposition to the Vietnam War, which had long-lingering effects on 
those denominations’ willingness to send new chaplains to the military.68 Futhermore, clergy 
who were sympathetic to mainline and liberal religious groups’ anti-war tendencies were unlikely 
to volunteer for chaplain service. 
As the chaplain services made more and more concerted efforts to ensure pluralism and 
ecumenical cooperation, chaplains, especially conservative Christian ones, pushed back, bringing 
several lawsuits against the military services and the Department of Defense and by gaining 
support from prominent conservative Christian groups. Though the controversies emerged over 
a variety of issues, they all reflected the growing vocal conservatism of many chaplains within the 
military and highlighted the extent to which chaplains came into conflict with long-standing 
historical traditions of ecumenicalism and cooperation that had marked the American chaplaincy 
since its inception. Chaplains became champions for sectarian and denominational causes and 
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individual free exercise rights as opposed to furthering their roles as cultural mediators between 
diverse groups of people. At the same time, Congress emphasized the free-exercise rights of 
non-Christian military personnel with a 1987 amendment to the military’s uniform regulations, 
indicating a broader cultural shift.69 To be sure, not all of the lawsuits and controversies 
stemmed, even indirectly, from chaplains’ experiences in Vietnam, but the changed demography 
of the chaplain corps, coupled with a changing American religious landscape, thrust the debates 
into the public eye. 
In 1996, the Department of Defense faced a lawsuit in response to Air Force, Army, and 
Navy directives that barred chaplains from participating in the Catholic Church’s “Project Life 
Postcard Campaign,” which asked religious adherents to send postcards to members of 
Congress encouraging them to override President William Clinton’s veto of a partial-birth 
abortion ban.70 The lawsuit alleged that the directive unfairly infringed on chaplains’ right to the 
free exercise of religion and the right to political participation. The military chaplaincies sought 
to reinforce the wall of separation between church and state by ensuring its chaplains could not 
be construed as speaking on behalf of the military, which would violate anti-lobbying laws that 
prohibited active-duty personnel from attempting to influence political policies or elections. The 
military branches reasoned that chaplains could contact members of Congress but could not 
participate in an organized campaign. Chaplain Vincent Rigdon, who was named in the suit, 
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however, said the directive created a “conflict between two chains of command I am under . . . 
There is the military structure and then there’s my calling in the church and what that requires.”71  
The Washington D.C. Circuit Court ruled that the directive violated the chaplains’ rights 
to free exercise of religion. Judge Stanley Sporkin opined that “What we have here is the 
government's attempt to override the Constitution and the laws of the land by a directive that 
clearly interferes with military chaplains' free exercise and free speech rights, as well as those of 
their congregants. On its face, this is a drastic act and can be sanctioned only by compelling 
circumstances . . . The ‘speech’ that the plaintiffs intend to employ to inform their congregants 
of their religious obligations has nothing to do with their role in the military.” He concluded that 
“the chaplains in this case seek to preach only what they would tell their non-military 
congregants. There is no need for heavy-handed censorship, and any attempt to impinge on the 
plaintiffs' constitutional and legal rights is not acceptable.”72 The Rigdon decision, which the 
government declined to appeal, set a clear precedent for the retention of free exercise rights of 
military chaplains. 
 In 2000, another suit, this time against the Navy, addressed the issue of denominational 
preferences and discrimination when considering chaplains for appointment, assignment, 
retention, and promotion.73 Even though denominational quotas had been abandoned for over 
twenty years, the plaintiff alleged that the Navy favored Roman Catholics and liturgical 
Protestants (to include Methodists, Episcopalians, Lutherans, and Presbyterians) at the expense 
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of non-liturgical Protestants (to include Baptists, Charismatics, and Pentecostals among others). 
They argued that this constituted the Establishment of religion, in violation of the First 
Amendment. As of early 2008, the case had not been decided. 
Also in the early 2000s, the Air Force Academy came under fire from religious and 
secular critics who complained that cadets were being vigorously and unconstitutionally 
proselytized by Air Force Academy faculty (including chaplains) and other cadets. An 
investigation concluded: “Senior faculty and staff members, in efforts that may have been well 
intentioned, have made public expressions of faith that some faculty, staff and cadets believed to 
be inappropriately influential or coercive.  As a result of this, some military and civilian faculty 
expressed concern about the impact of religious affiliation on their personal career 
advancement.”74 Lutheran chaplain Melinda Morton had been instrumental in bringing these 
accusations to light, an action that provoked conservative Christian outrage directed both at 
Morton and the U.S. Air Force chaplain corps.75 Morton was removed from her post as 
Executive Officer of the chaplains’ squadron, though the Air Force claimed it was for reasons of 
continuity rather than as reprisal for her outspokenness.76 Morton eventually resigned her 
commission.77 Morton’s name and accusations appeared on several conservative news websites 
and blogs, which reported that Morton, a “chaplain,”—the quotation marks were used 
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mockingly in the comment—wanted “Christ out of the Air Force Academy.” One blog post, at 
FreeRepublic.com, prompted nearly 400 comments, mostly derisive of Morton’s position. Many 
questioned women’s fitness and ability as ministers; others suggested potential assignments for 
Morton—Greenland and Antarctica being popular destinations—and still others derided the 
Academy for cowing to liberal demands and training cadets on religious sensitivity.78 
Partially in response to these claims and the investigative report, the Air Force issued a 
new directive to its chaplains, clarifying its position on proselyzation and public sectarian prayer. 
The interim guidelines, published in 2005, set out eight guiding principles for balancing concerns 
over establishment and free exercise throughout the Air Force. The first recalled that all 
members of the Air Force were sworn to uphold and protect the Constitution of the United 
States. The second stated that the Air Force would accommodate the free exercise of religion 
except as “limited by military necessity,” but that it would not endorse programs or actions that 
privileged one religion over another or the idea of religion over irreligion. The third principle 
affirmed that “service before self demands respect for the Constitution, our Air Force and each 
other, and an understanding that in the military our service begins with a commitment to our 
responsibilities, not only our rights.” The fourth reiterated that chaplain programs, in service of 
religious support for military personnel, fell under the purview and responsibility of 
commanders. The fifth reminded commanders, supervisors, and superiors that their position 
required special attention and care when dealing with religious issues because of the potential for 
confusion regarding an official endorsement of religious belief. A sixth principle declared 
discrimination or mistreatment of fellow Air Force personnel to be unacceptable. The seventh 
concluded that the Air Force would build a successful team “by stressing our common Air Force 
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Heritage” and by recognizing and valuing “the many heritages, cultures, and beliefs represented 
among us.” The final principle entreated Air Force chaplains to remember that in a “time when 
many nations are torn apart by religious strife . . . our ability to stand together as Americans and 
as airmen” representing many religions and no religions standing “shoulder-to-shoulder” 
constituted “part of our heritage and our strength.”79 
The actual guidelines included policies regarding “Religious Accommodation; Public 
Prayer Outside of Voluntary Worship Settings; Individual Sharing of Religious Faith in the 
Military Context; The Chaplain Service; Email and Other Communications; and, Good Order 
and Discipline.” The directive stated that “public prayer” was generally inappropriate in official 
settings such as “staff meetings, office meetings, classes, or officially sanctioned activities such as 
sports events or practice sessions,” though it did allow for brief, non-sectarian public prayer in 
“non-routine military ceremonies or events of special importance, such as a change-of-
command, promotion ceremonies or significant celebrations” provided that the “purpose of the 
prayer is to add a heightened sense of seriousness or solemnity, not to advance specific religious 
beliefs.”80 These guidelines did not apply to chaplains’ general or denominational worship 
services. The Navy also issued strict guidelines that would regulate public prayer in official 
settings. 
Responding to significant pressure from conservative religious groups and members of 
Congress, the Air Force issued revised guidelines in 2006. Most significantly, it added a provision 
that stated, that the Air Force “will respect the rights of chaplains to adhere to the tenets of their 
religious faiths and they will not be required to participate in religious activities, including public 
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prayer, inconsistent with their faith.” Additionally, it softened the language on prayer in public or 
official settings. The revised guidelines read, “Public prayer should not imply government 
endorsement of religion and should not usually be a part of routine official business . . . Futher, 
non-denominational, inclusive prayer or a moment of silence may be appropriate for military 
ceremonies or events of special importance when its primary purpose is not the advancement of 
religious beliefs.”81   
The revised guidelines sparked immediate discussion from supporters and critics. The 
Associated Press issued a release which summarized the changes: “The Air Force released new 
guidelines for religious expression, dropping a requirement for chaplains to respect others’ rights 
to their own beliefs and no longer cautioning top officers about promoting their personal 
religious views.” The release continued to report on reactions to the guidelines. The AP reported 
that “the revisions were welcomed by conservative Christians. But critics called the revisions a 
step backward and said they did nothing to protect the rights of most airmen.”82 A Stars and 
Stripes article reported that Representative Walter Jones (R-NC) and Billy Baugham, executive 
director of the International Conference of Evangelical Chaplain Endorsers, stated that the 
revised guidelines did not “go far enough” in protecting chaplains’ rights to “pray in Jesus’ 
name.” Baugham was quoted as saying that “The Air Force has a mind-set that because my 
chaplains pray in the name of Christ that it constitutes recruiting. But that’s nonsense. That is 
how we believe we must pray.”83 
Congress soon involved itself in the controversy. A provision in the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2007 would have legislated chaplains’ rights to pray sectarian prayers in 
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public (official) settings.84 Three conservative Republican Representatives, Randy Forbes (R-
VA), Todd Aiken (R-MO), and Walter Jones (R-NC), threatened to block passage of the entire 
bill unless the provision was included. The provision would “add language to each of the service 
sections (including the Academies) stating that chaplains ‘shall have the prerogative to pray 
according to the dictates of the Chaplain’s conscience, except as must be limited by military 
necessity, with any such limitation being imposed in the least restrictive manner feasible.”85 The 
Senate did not include a similar provision. The Conference Report, however, directed the 
Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy to rescind their most recent policies and guidelines on 
religious exercise within the services and to reinstate earlier policies (from 1999 and 2000), which 
did not include strict guidelines about sectarian prayer in official settings.86 The Congressional 
order marked a major victory for evangelical military chaplains, who held that their First 
Amendment right to free exercise guaranteed them the right to pray “in Jesus’ Name” at any and 
all military functions or worship services.  
 
The post-Vietnam chaplain corps emerged as another battleground in the “culture wars.” 
Eric Mazur, writing about competing visions of “pluralism” and “Protestantism” as the 
dominant religious ideology in the United States, attributed much of the controversy to 
conservative Christians feeling “increasingly alienated” and “seemingly nostalgic for what it now 
considers its lost control over the culture.” They began to combat “what they believe[d] to be 
the increasingly immoral nature of contemporary American society because of secularization and 
an abandonment of Christian morality” and “worked to reclaim the American constitutional 
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order and ‘restore’ the proper role of religion—predominantly Christianity—in American 
society.”87 
 The war in Vietnam precipitated a significant number of organizational and cultural 
changes within the military chaplaincy. The immediate post-Vietnam years marked critical ones 
for the chaplaincy as it faced intense scrutiny and critique from mainline and liberal sources and 
confronted growing conservative Christian power within military and political circles. The 
combination led the chaplaincy to defend its mission and ministry in terms of protecting the 
religious free exercise rights of military personnel, even as it moved culturally to the right. At the 
same time, official chaplain channels faced a changing military organization and mission and 
responded to increasing religious diversity within the military by reemphasizing the chaplaincy’s 
historically ecumenical character and its commitment to military families. The values of 
conservative Christianity and religious pluralism collided in the 1990s and 2000s with a series of 
court cases and Congressional actions that privileged chaplains’ individual free-exercise rights 
over chaplains’ roles as cultural mediators and providers of broad-based religious support.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In 2003, former chaplain and Vietnam War Medal of Honor recipient Charles Liteky, 
formerly known as Angelo, again found himself opposed to an American war. He addressed an 
open letter to American soldiers in Iraq on May 7 of that year. His letter proclaimed that he had 
renounced his Medal of Honor because “what the U.S. was supporting in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, namely the savagery and domination of the poor, reminded me of what I was a part 
of in Vietnam 15 years earlier.” He declared the war against Iraq unjust and unlawful, yet he 
conceded “I’m sure you believe that what you are a part of is right and just. I once believed the 
same of my participation in the Vietnam War.”1 Liteky’s post-Vietnam statements revealed deep 
regret over his own complicity in the Vietnam War, anger and disgust for American foreign 
policies in the Vietnam and post-Vietnam eras, and a yet-unfinished process of reconciliation 
and recovery from the war. Following one protest at the School of the Americas, Major General 
John LeMoyne, the post commander at Fort Benning, called Liteky and invited him to 
participate in a symposium on human rights. When asked if he thought the Medal of Honor had 
anything to do with the call, Liteky responded “yes, I guess I did use the medal consciously. I 
didn’t for a long time, but I see now that it provides me with a certain respectability even though 
I've renounced it.”2 The significance of Liteky’s public activism and actions, such as renouncing 
the Medal of Honor, relied heavily on his status as a Vietnam Veteran, chaplain, and Medal of 
Honor recipient. 
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 James Johnson, on the other hand, experienced a more typical post-Vietnam journey. 
After his service in Vietnam, Johnson stayed in the Army as a chaplain, then after retiring from 
the Army and earning a doctoral degree in counseling, returned to civilian pastoral counseling. 
He thinks his experiences in Vietnam helped him in counseling others who experienced severe 
trauma, including psychological, physical, and sexual abuse and estranged familial relationships. 
Johnson’s book, Combat Chaplain: A Thirty Year Vietnam Battle, helped him to come to terms with 
some of his Vietnam experiences, and it provided him opportunities to speak with current 
military chaplains who are or have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. He retired in 2005 
after being declared permanently disabled from the effects of PTSD and renal cancer, which he 
suspects was caused by Agent Orange. In 2008, forty years after his tour of duty in Vietnam, 
Johnson maintained close contact with several Vietnam veterans through online e-mail lists and 
Internet sites.3 For Johnson, “Vietnam” echoed constantly through his daily routines and 
activities; he could not leave it behind, and it would not leave him. 
 Jackson Day entered the military chaplaincy because he believed it was the only logical 
solution to his vocational calling to ministry and his renunciation of conscientious objection as a 
personal philosophy. “I never made a decision to be a chaplain,” said Day. “I made a decision to 
. . . serve in the Army, and I made a decision to be a minister. Put those things together, and I’m 
a chaplain.” The Vietnam War, however, brought about other personal and political crises for 
Day, as he experienced firsthand the death and destruction wrought by war and the breakup of 
his first marriage. When he returned from Vietnam, he became active with Vietnam Veterans 
Against the War and resigned his military commission. For several decades, Day left the ministry 
altogether, earning a Masters in Public Health from the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill and working in the public health sector. Slowly, Day became reacquainted with his own 
                                                 
3  James Johnson, interview by author. 
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Vietnam story and began building a website to document it. The website put Day in contact with 
others who served in Vietnam and their family members. He became involved with the group 
“Vietnam Veteran Ministers,” and eventually decided to reestablish himself as a congregational 
pastor in Maryland.4 
 For Liteky, Johnson, and Day—and nearly 3,000 other chaplains—Vietnam carried an 
individual burden of experience and memory. Their official positions, unofficial duties, and 
personal conflict-solving mechanisms placed them firmly in the middle of converging and 
colliding worlds. They lived and worked at the intersection between religion and war, between 
church and state, between denominational and faith group communities, between Americans 
and Vietnamese, and between civilian and secular worlds. Chaplains relied on their theological 
and military training as well as personal moral codes and understanding of their roles to carry out 
their work in Vietnam.  
 Their liminal positions compelled many chaplains to act as cultural mediators between 
groups with diverse interests and values, but their individual experiences and post-war paths 
were not uniform. Some chaplains acted heroically and others cowardly; some supported the 
war, and others protested it; most remained in ministry, but others left it altogether. The variety 
of wartime and post-war experiences reveals diversity within the chaplain corps. Chaplains, no 
more than other groups of veterans, did not experience, understand, or remember Vietnam 
monolithically. The popular stereotypes of chaplains—the battlefield hero, the militant 
legitimizer of war, and the bumbling incompetent—simply do not stand up under scrutiny.  
 Certain patterns, however, do emerge. First, on the whole, chaplains were unlikely to 
forsake their religious beliefs in favor of military values. Rather, they worked out ways to bring 
the two cultures together. Sometimes, elements of both worlds appeared to take on the language 
                                                 
4 Jackson Day, interview by author. 
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of civil religion, which intertwined religious and martial themes. At other times, chaplains 
interpreted wartime experiences through a religious lens, by, for example, concluding that God’s 
power was still evident in the destruction of war. Yet in other places, chaplains took civilian 
religious practices and reconstituted them to suit a wartime atmosphere, for instance by altering 
lyrics to hymns or offering communion to soldiers of all faiths. Second, chaplains broadly 
understood their primary role in Vietnam to be pastoral rather than prophetic. Most believed 
that their personal convictions about the morality of war in general or the Vietnam War in 
particular were irrelevant to their ability to minister to military personnel serving there. For the 
most part, they did not find inherent contradictions between being faithful and serving in the 
military. Third, many chaplains, like other Vietnam veterans, experienced a sense of alienation 
from civilian communities—both religious and secular—as a result of their service in Vietnam. 
Many were angered by media portrayals of Vietnam soldiers and veterans, while others were 
dismayed by what they viewed as a shortage of institutional denominational support. 
 Chaplains’ individual experiences and reflections about the Vietnam War are also 
significant because they speak to broader unresolved debates within Vietnam War scholarship. 
First, chaplain accounts provide a more complex picture of religious responses to the Vietnam 
War, countering a dominant narrative of religious dissent and protest about the war. Chaplains’ 
responses ranged widely, and discounting their religious language about the war as the product 
of co-option by the military is misleading. Second, chaplains’ post-war reflections, namely 
memoirs and other first-person accounts, offer insights into non-combatant, non-minority men’s 
experiences of war. In Vietnam in particular, where so few personnel were involved in direct 
combat, uncovering non-combatant voices helps to produce a fuller understanding of the war 
effort and its long-lasting psychological and cultural effects. Chaplains’ recollections may also be 
useful for considering other dual-profession military officers such as doctors and lawyers. People 
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in these professions who serve in the military have to deal with two sets of professional norms 
and values, which may not always be compatible. 
 Yet, it is important to remember that individual chaplains’ stories are also part of larger 
institutional and cultural experiences. The military chaplaincy—as an institution, as a 
bureaucracy, and as a group of people—also underwent significant changes in the wake of 
Vietnam. Demographically, the chaplaincy became more conservative and more evangelical after 
the Vietnam War. As more conservative Christians entered the chaplaincy, judicial challenges 
and the cultural prominence of conservative religious and political beliefs increased the sectarian 
nature of the chaplaincy. Some chaplains asserted their free-exercise rights to the detriment of 
the chaplaincy’s historically ecumenical focus. At the same time, the military’s religious diversity 
increased, as did the number of religious groups that supplied military chaplains. In the early 
1970s, the chaplain corps commissioned female chaplains for the first time, indicating a more 
progressive stance on the issue of ordaining women than many of the chaplaincy’s conservative 
supporters would like. The chaplain corps received strident criticism for its ineffectiveness in 
reporting and preventing war crimes and atrocities in Vietnam. Partly in response to that issue, 
the chaplaincy reorganized itself to be more responsive to small forward operating units. 
Chaplains who attended the Army War College determined that “Vietnam” represented a wide-
scale failure for the chaplaincy, even if individual chaplains did succeed in ministry. As for 
individual chaplains, the specter of Vietnam haunted the military chaplaincy for the next several 
decades, especially as the United States found itself in another unpopular war against insurgent 
forces in Iraq. 
 Chaplains’ experiences and public debate about chaplains’ proper role within the military 
also revealed broader cultural uncertainty about America’s religious and civic faiths and foreign 
policy. At the beginning of the Cold War, many Americans coalesced around the language of 
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civil religion and anticommunism. Civil religious language relied on shared cultural assumptions 
about the Judeo-Christian foundations of the United States, the value of free exercise of religion 
(within certain culturally-defined boundaries), and the belief that the United States occupied a 
particular place in God’s plan. Faced with an imposing Soviet threat and the specter of 
Communist revolutions worldwide, Americans—even many without a personal religious 
system—used the language of civil religion to define the foundations of the anticommunist 
struggle. While there were significant variations in the ways religious groups thought the United 
States should confront a communist enemy, the language of civil religion provided common 
tropes and images that papered over some of these differences. 
 Then, as American involvement in Vietnam expanded and as protest at home escalated, 
civil religious language was insufficient to unite Americans around a common cause, and deep 
disagreements about faith and war came to the forefront. Chaplains, especially those from 
mainline and liberal denominations, experienced significant alienation from their denominational 
communities, which claimed that chaplains should act as prophetic voices within (and against) 
the military. Chaplains, former chaplains, and civilians engaged in debates about civilianizing the 
chaplaincy or at least drastically reducing the chaplain’s military trappings of rank and uniform. 
Those who were opposed to the Vietnam War generally advocated a revamped and civilianized 
chaplaincy system, while those who supported its cause thought the established system produced 
the most beneficial outcomes. The debate over the Vietnam War and over the chaplaincy 
marked a significant point in the growing divide between liberals and conservatives in the United 
States. Liberal disillusionment with chaplains, coupled with the military’s new personnel policies, 
resulted in a sharp increase in the number of conservative and evangelical chaplains. Litigation 
that challenged the chaplaincy left it with a more limited mandate—to secure the right to free 
exercise of religion for all military personnel. And chaplains sought, and in many cases, won, 
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such free-exercise rights for themselves as well. This move toward conservatism and 
individualism in many cases collapsed or damaged the chaplain’s position as a cultural mediator. 
 After Vietnam, the institutional chaplaincy set out to correct its mistakes and to 
accommodate a diversifying military and a homogenizing chaplain corps. Due to a constant 
shortage of Catholic, Jewish, and liturgical Protestant chaplains, the chaplain corps abandoned 
the quota system that had been the basis of chaplain appointments for decades, opting instead to 
accept the best-qualified chaplains for available slots. They also altered the way chaplains were 
assigned to units, emphasizing long-term connections with smaller units rather than assigning 
chaplains for deployment overseas more randomly. The chaplaincy revamped its involvement 
with military Character Education programs, reducing the curriculum’s religious content and 
undertones. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the chaplaincy shifted emphasis away from combat 
operations and toward garrison ministry, especially to military families. By the 1990s, the 
chaplain corps placed a new emphasis on chaplains’ roles in peacekeeping and nation-building 
operations. Chaplains’ education, inter-cultural training, and clerical authority could be an asset 
to the military in hostile areas. 
 Considered broadly, the chaplaincy offers a site for scholars to study civil-military 
relations and the church-state relationship in the United States. First, Vietnam-era trends in 
American religion, specifically in American Christianity, namely the move away from 
denominational alignment and toward alignment along political lines, deeply affected the 
chaplain corps’ mission and individual chaplains’ experiences.5 The military relied on (and 
continues to rely on) civilian religious institutions to supply chaplain ministers to the military, 
and this relationship deserves more consideration. Understanding chaplains’ experiences also 
                                                 
5 Robert Wuthnow identified this realignment as the defining feature of American Christianity in the 
second half of the twentieth century. See Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith since WWII 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
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indicates some ways in which civilian religious culture and military culture enter into dialogue 
with one another—each provided language and images useful to the other. Second, the 
chaplaincy’s shifting organizational culture and mission may be indicative of changes within the 
church-state relationship, in which religion and politics are inexorably intertwined with one 
another. By regulating the chaplaincy, the military—and therefore the federal government—is 
frequently in the position of commenting on or even regulating religious practice for its 
members. The military provides an especially good site for testing the limits of the free exercise 
of religion. 
 Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, and the subsequent military 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the relationship between religion and warfare has again 
come to the forefront of public discussion. Americans learned about jihad—at least 
superficially—and many painted the fight against terrorism in apocalyptic and cosmic terms.6 As 
in Vietnam, chaplains became embroiled in these questions as they ministered to military 
personnel in the field and became symbols for religious faith and practice in a time of war. In 
February 2003, the United States Army charged Muslim chaplain James Yee, a West Point 
graduate, with sedition, aiding the enemy, spying, espionage, and failure to obey a general order, 
after he was suspected of leaking classified information to the enemy, having been tasked with 
providing spiritual care for detainees at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As a 
chaplain, Yee had almost constant, private access to detainees and was protected by pastoral 
                                                 
6 See David Domke, God Willing: Political Fundamentalism in the White House, the ‘War on Terror,’ and the Echoing 
Press (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Jasmin Zine, “Between Orientalism and Fundamentalism: 
Muslim Women and Feminist Engagement,” in (En)Gendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflaged Politics, 
eds. Krista Hunt and Kim Rygiel (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 29; Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the 
Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Anonymous 
(Michael Scheur), Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (n.p.: Brassey’s, 2004); Jean Bethke Elshtain, 
Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World (New York: Basic Books, 2003). 
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privilege. The charges against Yee were dropped in 2004; Chaplain Yee resigned and was granted 
an Honorable Discharge later that year.7 
 As the American war in Iraq entered its sixth year, religion retained an important place in 
public debate. Several chaplains who have served in Iraq have published memoirs or collections 
of spiritual meditations.8 Numerous other chaplains have been interviewed by the mainstream 
media, and the religious press.9 The digital age and easy publishing access via the Internet only 
served to increase the amount of information available about the military chaplaincy and the Iraq 
war. In 2008, a simple search for “Iraq” and “chaplain” on Google, a popular search engine, 
yielded over 1,300,000 results. The rapidity and democracy with which information and opinion 
can be produced, disseminated, and evaluated marked a significant change between the Vietnam 
War and the Iraq War, but the sides of the debate were largely the same, with one important 
exception. Liberal and mainline churches critical of the war were largely silent on the issue of 
chaplains being complicit in the immorality of war, reflecting the broad trend toward expressing 
“support” for American troops even if one criticized the war. One of the only major criticisms 
of chaplains came from the organization Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 
which claimed that a Southern Baptist chaplain in Iraq was proselytizing and overstepping 
boundaries by offering soldiers food and fresh water in return for listening to a sermon and 
being baptized. Yet the AUSCS stopped well short of suggesting that federally-funded chaplains 
                                                 
7 See James Yee with Aimee Molloy, For God and Country: Faith and Patriotism Under Fire (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2005); James Yee’s official website, http://www.justiceforyee.com, accessed 3 March 2008; Tim Golden, 
“Loyalties and Suspicions: The Muslim Servicemen; How Dubious Evidence Spurred Relentless Guantanamo Spy 
Hunt,” New York Times, 19 December 2004; Eric Lichtblau, “Army Cleric Who Worked with Detainees Is 
Arrested,” New York Times, 21 September 2003. 
8 See, for example, Kittleson, Meditations from Iraq; William McCoy, Under Orders: A Spiritual Handbook for 
Military Personnel (Ozark, AL: ACW Press, 2005); and Cash, A Table in the Presence. 
9 See, for example, “God & War: How Chaplains and Soldiers Keep the Faith Under Fire,” Newsweek, 7 
May 2007; Andrea Stone, “Military Copes with Shortage of Chaplains,” USA Today, 5 February 2008; Deann Alford, 
“Faith, Fear, War, Peace: Snapshots of the Grim and ‘Happy’ Ministry of Today’s Military Chaplains,” Christianity 
Today, 1 December 2004,; Kristin Henderson, “In the Hands of God,” Washington Post Magazine, 30 April 2006. 
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had no place at all in war, instead emphasizing the chaplains’ historical ecumenical 
responsibilities.10 Even the Christian Century, which opposed the invasion of Iraq from the 
beginning and had a long anti-war tradition, carried advertisements for military chaplain 
volunteers.11 The chaplains’ assertion of their pastoral role within the military had taken hold, 
even among vocal opponents of the war. The debate over chaplains in the Iraq War would be 
over chaplains’ methods and limits rather than over their fundamental purpose.  
 In Vietnam, concern over the chaplaincy and chaplains’ experiences reflected and even 
foreshadowed the national crisis over the Vietnam War and its memory. Religious Americans 
struggled over the proper role for military chaplains, and chaplains, both during and after the 
war, wrestled with their involvement in Vietnam. As chaplains reconciled their participation in 
war with their faith, the American public has done the same. Chaplains, especially in their first-
person accounts, demonstrated various ways to reconcile faith and war by challenging the notion 
that the two were somehow mutually exclusive. Their actions in and responses to war highlight 
the diversity of religious responses to war, and American chaplains—both now and in the 
future—would do well to follow their examples of cultural mediation, ecumenical cooperation, 
and personal struggle to reconcile the horror of war with the assurance of faith.
                                                 
10 Americans United for Separation of Church and State, “Military Should Rein In Baptizing Chaplain In 
Iraq, Americans United Urges,” Americans United Press Release, May 2003, http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr= 
cs_&page=NewsArticle&id=5371&security=1001&news_iv_ctrl=1086#2, accessed 3 March 2008. 
11 “Saluting Chaplains, Reader Letters” Christian Century, 26 July 2003, 43-33; Glenn Palmer, letter to the 
editor, Christian Century, 14 November 2006, 53. 
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